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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the Welfare Party elite's conceptualisation of modernity 
during the party's last 4-5 years before its closure in 1998. Since the party was the most 
important Islamist organisation in Turkey. it was at an important point of interaction 
between Islamism and modernity. The study tries to determine the significance of the WP 
discourse on key modernisation issues by answering such questions as how the WP elite 
conceptualised modernity; how this conceptualisation was formulated, constructed and 
what was modernity's relationship with the West in their view. It argues that, the WP elite 
had a distinct (Islamist) understanding of modernity which, despite its differences in its 
approach to some basic issues (e. g. secularism) overall remained within modernity by 
sharing most of its major characteristics. The WP elite, similar to many other Islamist 
movements, advocated a more Islamic (less secular and less Westernising) route to 
modernity; and they could not be considered as anti-modernists. 
The study contributes towards a better understanding of the critical role that a 
version of Islamism plays in Turkey's politics and process of modernisation and provides 
insights about the impact of Western modernity on the sizeable Islamist section. The study 
employs important concepts such as secularisation, nationalism, the modern state, 
economic development (science, technology, industrialisation), capitalism and democracy 
as important components of modernity. (It also provides a general analysis of Islamism in 
the Middle East vis-ä-vis modernity through these concepts). An analysis of the views of 
the WP elite with regard to these concepts and processes serves to better understanding the 
Islamist stance towards the particular path of modernisation in Turkey, modernity in 
general, and also the West. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Similar to many other Muslim countries, in Turkey too, Islamism emerged as a 
powerful ideological force in the last several decades. It has challenged the main 
characteristics of the current secular system and its secular. nationalist ideology of 
modernisation. The Welfare Party (WP) 1 managed to become the biggest and most 
influential Islamist political party in Turkey in the mid-1990s. The thesis focuses on the 
WW'elfare Party elite's conceptualisation of modernity during this period. Since the 
Welfare Party could be characterised as the most important Islamist organisation whose 
sizeable core members acted often like an Islamist group while trying to promote the 
party in society; the WP constituted an important point of interaction between Islamism 
and modernity in Turkey. My main research concern is how the elite of the Wi'P 
conceptualised modernity; how this conceptual isation was formulated, constructed and 
what was its relationship with the West in their view. It will be argued that, they had a 
distinct Islamist understanding of modernity and could not just be labelled and 
dismissed as anti-modernists. 
Turkey is one of the most important Muslim countries with its roughly 70 
million citizens and its strategic location. In 1995 parliamentary elections, the \VP 
gained 21.4 % of the votes which, according to some surveys included around half of 
those voters who said that they favoured a shariah based state in Turkey, who overall 
constituted around one fifth of the population. Studying the WP presented an important 
opportunity toward better understanding the critical role that Islam plays in Turkey's 
politics and process of modernisation. An analysis of the views of the party elite also 
1 As Fleper (1997) points out, the party's name Refah brings prosperity to mind but Welfare came to be 
used dominantly in the works written in English, therefore the party Hill be referred as the Welfare Party. 
I 
provides insights about the impact of Western modernity on the sizeable Islamist section 
and the future path of modernity in this pivotal Muslim country-. 
I will employ important concepts such as secularisation. nationalism, the modern 
state. economic development (science. technology. and industrialisation), capitalism and 
democracy; all of which are frequently considered in the literature as important 
components of modernity. An analysis of the views of the \VP elite with regard to these 
concepts and processes serve to explore their stance towards modernity. Such an 
approach is necessary because modernity was not directly discussed much by the \VP 
elite (let alone by ordinary supporters of the party). 
It is a much lamented feature of social sciences that terms and concepts are used 
in different contexts with different meanings. Likewise, almost all key concepts 
discussed in this thesis do not connote same meanings for all: this is natural, as people 
have different ideological convictions, social and individual experiences and hence. 
hidden or explicit agendas. It is therefore more important to understand how Islamists, 
who came to constitute one of the most important ideological groups in the world, 
understand modernity and how they see the West and place it in their conceptualisation 
of modernity. The case of the WP presented an important opportunity to understand 
how a most influential Islamist organisation constructed a discourse3 about Islam and 
modernity. Although, as it will be seen in discussion of various topics, there is a vast 
literature on the various aspects of interaction between Islam and secular system in 
Turkey (Toprak 1981; cakir 1994; Göle 1991,1997; Yavuz 1997,2000; Ayata 1996; 
Bora 1998), there has not been any comprehensive evaluation of the WP vis-ä-vis 
2 Ernest Gcllner, observes that Turkey has a special claim on the attention of anyone concerned with the 
future of liberal societies, with Islam, with the relationship berceen the West and the Muslim world 
(1994a: 81) 
31 take the discourse simply as a coherent set of ideas and views. 
3 
niodeniity4. Discussions remained partial and often journalistic. This study aims to 
contribute to this little researched area. 
MODERNITY 
As will be seen in Chapter 1 in detail, modernity was initially a West European 
experience. It makes sense of and facilitates a clearer understanding if one looks at this 
experience without losing the historical perspective. One of the results of a complex and 
lone history of modernity is that there has been no agreement on its definition. One can 
liken it to the story of the elephant and the blind men (Cahoone 1996: 12), because it 
seems that for different disciplines different aspects of modernity seem more important 
(Friedman 2001: 500). Thus, a person's definition of modernity, at a given time, is 
almost always connected to his, her ideological position and his/her perception of the 
social change in societies, which he/she perceives as most advanced' in the world. In 
fact, it is almost impossible to escape from ethnocentric conceptualisations of modernity 
as one is often encouraged to see modernity in that way. It can be argued that this was 
the case for all great observers of modernity and this trend continues to be dominant. It 
has been almost always the case that modernity is associated or reduced to one or a few 
of the most important core processes seen as the factors making a society modern. For 
Marx, modernity was associated primarily with capitalism, for Durkhcim with 
increasing division of labour; while Veber highlighted the importance of culture 
(Protestant Ethic) and the increasing importance of bureaucracy. 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of modernity, Eurocentric 
or West-centric understandings of modernity have been dominant in the literature, while 
As a sign of this neglect, as of summer 2002 when I last checked, the records of the YOK (Council of 
higher Education ) shoes that there has been only one PhD thesis directly related to the WP, which was 
completed in 1999. The study is about political Islam and analyses the WP in the last third of the study as 
a party engaging in political Islam (see, its published form, Akdogan 2000). 
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non-Western understandings of modernity constitute some resistance to this. The «'P 
experience included an example of an ethno-centric (Islamic-Turkic, Islamist) way of 
conceptualising modernity. 
Modernity may not be monolithic but it is possible to talk about a `if'estern 
mtodernit} ; which many observers do in practice when they discuss modernity. For 
example, after giving a somewhat tautological, but useful, definition as, "`Modernity' is 
that distinct and unique form of social life which characterises modern societies" (my 
emphasis, Hall et at. 1992: 2), Hall et al. continue to treat modernity as highly unified 
and equal to «'estern modernity: "The idea of "the modern' was given a decisive 
formulation in the discourses of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. In the 
nineteenth century, modernity became identified with industrialism and the sweeping 
social, economic and cultural changes associated with it". Modernity was constituted by 
the articulation of a number of different historical processes. "Modernity is the sum of 
these different forces and processes" (Hall et al. 1992: 2). Modernity can be associated 
with a number of institutions like the nation-state, and an international system of states; 
an "expansionist capitalist economic order based on private property; industrialism"; 
growth of bureaucracy, "the dominance of secular, materialist, rationalist and 
individualist cultural values", separation of the private from the public sphere (1-fall et al 
1992: 3). Thus f fall et al. gave their answer to the question voiced by \'Vittrock "which 
institutions and practices are the defining ones when we use the term modern [?... ] we 
have to have an idea which institutions and habits are modern and which are not. A 
society is modern if some key defining institutions and types of behaviour can be said to 
be modern" (2000: 32). Thus, certain aspects of the distant or recent history of the 
modernisation processes of societies, which are now considered modern, are highlighted 
by observers as important aspects of modernity in the literature. Therefore, as will be 
seen in the first chapter, there may be a list of important factors that make a society or 
i 
individual modern: 
" increasing use of inanimate sources of energy 
" increasing share of industrial and service sector in the national economy 
as opposed to agriculture 
" social mobility. urbanisation 
" emancipation from the tradition, secularisation 
" increasing scientific knowledge, application of this knowledge in the 
form of technology which brings mastery over the nature (including over other human 
beings as parts of that nature). meeting human needs more effectively by using this 
technology 
" effective socio-economic organisation; (e. g. an effective state: tax 
collection, defence industry: health system); a strong economy 
" Democracy, realised by emancipated, communicative individuals, who 
realised impersonal application of the rules, decreasing importance of ascriptive 
statuses. 
Naturally, not all agree that these are undisputed characteristics of modernity; 
but one frequently encounters explicit or implicit association of modernity with these 
phenomena. It is often the case that modernity is understood by associating it with 
different important processes that have either occurred in the West or are happening in 
`modern', advanced industrialised societies (see, for example Hall 1992a: 6; also 
Giddens 1990). These can be described in the following main, connected, categories: 
Economic growth: Modernisation cannot be conceptualised without a kind of 
economic growth defined in terms of increasing production per capita. As will be seen 
in the first chapter in detail, analyses of the emergence and advent of modernity need to 
6 
mention the escape from `the agrarian trap' to an industrialised economy. Thanks to the 
piecemeal technical developments, Nest European societies were able to make a break 
from being pre-dominantly agrarian. Agricultural output increased, different 
technologies were developed, increasing the power of the Western societies vis-ä-vis 
others. Being technologically and industrially advanced has been a strong component in 
definitions of modernity. A historical analysis shows that those who were considered 
modern have always been technologically superior and industrially more developed 
(large scale, efficient production and consumption). A strong industrial base not only 
ensured the production of daily-consumed products but also of military superiority in 
most cases. 
Secularisation: As will be seen, the decline of the social skmnificance of the 
traditional religions has been an unmistakable and very important part of the 
modernisation process. The emergence of secular modern ideologies owes much to the 
general modernisation/ secularisation trend. Thus, for example, there emerged new 
ways and criteria to define the political and economic groups (e. g. the nation). Secular 
nationalism certainly has been challenging religions in most countries. Secularisation is 
strongly connected to the decline of the community in the modem societies, which 
meant the decline of the communitarian spirit, rise of materialist, individualist culture, 
promotion of the individual vis-ä-vis the social group. 
Centralisation of Politics: Emergence of the modern state, "which is large, 
interventionist, administratively bureaucratic and which intervenes to organise large 
areas of social life" (Hall et al 1992: 3), has been one of the most important modern 
developments (Carnoy 1984; Held 1989). It will be argued that the secular states in the 
Muslim world are perceived to be acting against Islamist definitions of Islam and this 
encourage Islamists to activities aimed at gaining the control of the state mechanism. 
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Today, widespread association of modernity with capitalism and democracy 
owes much to frequently equating modernity with, what may be called, Western 
modernity. From a historical perspective it must be admitted that there have been non- 
capitalist and non-democratic routes too (e. g. socialist, fascist) to modernity (Moore 
1973 [1966]). Thus, it is possible to argue that over all, some aspects of modernity, like 
economic growth (industrialisation), secularisation, growth of state/ bureaucratic 
structures and processes that are associated with these, seem more core-like components 
of it, as they are much more often included in conceptualisations of modernity in the 
world. 
It should also be noted that, in daily life, modernity of a country is often 
associated with being advanced and understood by comparisons with others in terms of 
such indicators as education facilities, health standards (number of doctors, hospital 
beds, infant mortality), housing, wages, democracy, industrialisation, technology (high 
value-addition to the products, military technology), bureaucratic efficiency, impersonal 
application of and obeying to rules (e. g. traffic rules). Since, the West is seen and 
presents itself as having these qualities, the importance of the West in a definition of 
modernity cannot be overemphasised. 
MODERNITY AND THE WEST 
As it will be seen in Chapter 1 in detail, modernity has a complex relationship 
with the West. Modernity started as a Western project/ experience (Giddens 1990). 
Thus, in the formation process of the identity of the West, the modernisation process 
occupied a central place. Therefore, modernisation of the West and the rest of the world 
differ qualitatively: 
C . 
The West forged its identity and interests in relation to endogenous developments in 
Europe and America, and through relations of unequal exchange (material and 
cultural) with 'the Rest- the frequently excluded, conquered, colonised and exploited 
'other' (Hall et al 1992: 2 ). 
It is important to note that since modernity emerged in Europe and continued to 
develop in the \Vest, causes of transition from the pre-modem to modem have been 
being searched for by many observers within the history of the \Vest. Could the greatest 
factor effecting the transition be considered as a form of Christianity (Protestantism), or 
development of a rational, scientific outlook, or was it emergence of capitalism and 
internal economic development or just plunder of other continents? The issue at stake 
here is none other than the identity of modernity. It is important for those who are 
critical of the Nest but in favour of modernisation (e. g. many Islamists) that modernity 
can be conceptualised as separable from the Western experience. 
The European (later the Western) pattern, developed and spread throughout the 
world by Western economic, technological and military expansion into different Asian 
societies, to the Middle Eastern countries and to Africa. This expansion of Western 
modernity undermined the cultural premises and institutional cores of other societies. 
Elites and intellectuals have been either adopting Western modernity or opposing a non- 
selective appropriation in the name of native values and interests (see, for example, 
Eisenstadt 2000). 
Obviously, `the West' is not monolithic and as a concept it means different 
things to different people. It is more of a constructed concept than a natural entity. The 
West represents a certain type of society and level of development; thus no longer 
confined to Europe and not all European countries are in `the West' (see, Hall 1992b). 
Nevertheless, it can be seen that, quite often, `the West' is used to mean West European 
and North American countries who have certain common qualities like being 
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economically developed or having liberal democracies (see, Cahoone 1996: 11). Thus, 
especially from a distance `Western modernity' and the West may seem more unified 
than it may seem from within itself. Thus, it is possible to talk about the Nest'. (Hall 
1992b; Ozean 2002: 117; Beige 2002: 43). 
It will be seen in Chapter 1 that the West as a concept carries out different 
functions depending on the context. It allows one to characterise or classify societies, 
conveys images, and provides standards for comparison. It provides criteria of 
evaluation against which other societies are ranked, "it functions" like an "ideology" 
(Hall 1992b: 277). 
When modernity is understood in terms of what existed or exists in the Nest or 
in other countries which are considered modern, one can even `gauge' the degree of 
modernisation of developing countries by using these perceived standards. For example, 
it is possible to argue that, in many Muslim countries, the state has been modernised but 
the extent of this modernisation seems limited as it stopped short of full control by the 
elected representatives of the people. In other words, it did not become as democratic as 
in modern countries. 
Obviously, especially in the modernising countries major sections of the elite do 
not see modernity just in terms of material progress; for them, secularisation of people's 
worldviews is a goal in itself, and is considered as a major force that has contributed 
strongly to the creation of the modern world with all its technological and industrial 
successes. Nevertheless, other elites and sections of modernising societies, who refused 
to conceptualise and accept modernity as an indivisible whole as represented by the 
West, responded and respond to modernity in a selective way by trying to strike a 
'happy balance' between their native culture and material progress (Eisenstadt 1992). 
10 
Such a selective approach to modernity is unmistakable in most Islamist movements. 
ISLAMISM AND MODERNITY 
As will be seen in Chapter 2 in detail, the advent of modernity can be 
conceptualised as starting with the rise of Europe and later the West. Thus, the 
relationship between Islam and the Nest (i. e. between Muslims and the inhabitants of 
what is known now as the West) first witnessed the meteoric rise of Islam against 
Christianity and a period of clear superiority and then at least equality until the Ottoman 
Empire started to decline (17`h, 18`h centuries), and then witnessed the rise of the 
Western powers. Thus, the Muslim world has become open to various influences of the 
West; Islamism emerged in this context. In other words Islamists have been acting 
under the influences of Islam (i. e. their interpretation of it) and modernity (in most cases 
as represented by the West); they have been trying to promote the influence of Islam in 
Muslim countries at the expense of Western influences. 
Modernisation is usually used as a shorthand to depict a series of social changes 
which are hoped to bring development, that is to say progress towards a valued state. In 
defining this valued state, one's ideology, religion, culture5 and civilisation are 
determining factors. 6 Since there is no universal ideology, religion. culture or 
civilisation, conceptualisations of modernity are bound to differ greatly and quite often 
conflict with each other. In the case of Islam for example, secular nationalisms in 
various Middle Eastern Muslim countries functioned as a rival against the religion by 
defining the political community in secular terms. 
S Geerts offers a useful definition of culture as "historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward, life" (1973: 89). 
" Obviously these terms have overlapping aspects. 
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As will be seen in Chapter 2. despite the differences between different Islamist 
groups in the world, it is possible to argue that a broad body of Islamist political thought 
exists. In fact, a number of generalisations can be made about Islamist movements and 
groups (see, for example Sayyid 1997). ' First of all, almost all emerged in the context of 
modernisation, most of them, under secularising, nationalist regimes. They are all, by 
definition, against secularisation and secular nationalism. It is difficult to make a 
sweeping argument that Islamists movements have been against modernity. In fact, they 
all make sense in a modernising context and have been employing different fruits of 
modernity, not just technological products but more importantly modem forms of social 
activism and organisations. Islamism involves a radical critique of the policies pursued 
by secular governments for causing national failures in various fields of life. These 
secular elite have been pursuing un-Islamic policies according to Islamists who think 
that there are certain core Islamic principles which cannot be re-interpreted according to 
wishes of the secular-minded or according to modem ideas. Thus, all acts, small or big, 
have a religious significance and can be classified as Islamic or un-Islamic. These views 
lead to a struggle between subscribers of Islamic and `non-Islamic' lifestyles. 
Islamists have ambitious aims. According to a leading Turkish expert, Islamism 
aims at "making Islam, once again, dominant in life in its entirety [... ] save the Islamic 
world from exploitation of the West, tyrannical and oppressing administrators, 
enslavement, imitation, superstition [... ] make it civilised, united, developed" (Kara 
1986: XV)8. In other words, Islamists demand a greater say in politics, major issues, 
form and substance of modernisation policies9. These demands are reflected in the 
' In fact, as it will be seen, even about Islam as a much larger concept than lslantisvn generalisations are 
being made. 
Unless otherwise stated, I have done all the translations from Turkish. 
Islamism can be seen in one sense one form of the religiously motivated attempts in the world to reach a 
'harmonious' state in the relation between tradition and modernisation. They are yet to disprove I3ellah 
(1983) who argues "a right relation between tradition and modemisation is difficult to attain, precarious 
when attained, and in today's world is largely a hope rather than a reality". 
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groxving place of Islamic symbols and 
ideals in the government progranis (Voll 1994: 
337). 
Islamists operate mainly in modernising Muslim countries and they interact with 
modernity. In fact, the rise of Islamism owes much to the limited `successes' of 
modernising drives in Muslim countries. "The actors of Islamism acquired professional 
profiles, increased their diversity and their public visibility. This was true not only of 
the militants and politicians, but also of engineers, lawyers, intellectuals, novelists, and 
journalists; all contributed to the production, transmission and dissemination of Islamic 
values and discourse" (Göle 2000: 93)). Without fruits of modernisation such as 
universities, publication facilities or increasing mobilisation, Islamists could not acquire 
intellectual and economic power that increased their self-confidence vis-a-vis 
westernised'modemised elite and other sections of society. 
Since almost all Islamists want modernisation of their societies along Islamic 
lines and see the West as having many un-Islamic features, Islamism contains a strong 
challenge to the equation of modernity with the West, a reflection on modernity from its 
edge, from peripheral areas, and a contribution to the decentralising of the West in the 
world in ever evolving conceptualisations of modernity (cf. Göle 2000: 9l). Seeing 
Islamists as anti-modern prevents fully understanding of their stance vis-A-vis 
modernity, especially western modernity and the West. 
Islamism should be seen basically as a discourse or rather there are various 
versions of Islamist discourses in many Muslim countries. These discourses are usually 
permeated with a heavy use of religious symbols making use of historical and religious 
knowledge interpreted from a certain angle and well known among the traditional and 
Islamically minded sections of Muslim societies. Judging by numbers of people 
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subscribing, to them, Islamist discourses are powerful and usually second in importance 
to the currently dominant, often much more secular and less coherent, discourses in 
these countries. Islamism is ultimately based on the premise of existence of Allah who 
demands obedience to his commands which are to be applied fully and must constitute 
the basics of the social and private sphere. Thus, Islamism presupposes a Muslim [i. e. 
Islamist] identity1° which is not only in tension with Western modernity but also with 
secular systems in Muslim countries. This contributes to the fact Göle points out, 
"tensions between identity and modernity are more salient and dramatic in the non- 
Western contexts of modernity" (cf. Gö1e 2000: 92). 
One could see that even leading academics quite often cannot help themselves 
and seem to suggest that modernity or Islamism are clearly definable. For example, 
according to Göle who is a pioneering Turkish academician on the subject, "Islamism 
rests on civilisational antagonism and rejects dominant features of modernity [... ] and 
monocivilisational imposition of Western modernity" (2000: 93, my emphasis). Here, it 
is important to note that when Göle conceptualise modernity, she prioritises secular, 
democratic characteristics of modernity in the West today, and its cultural reflections 
rather than, let us say, economic growth which has been and is one of the defining 
features of modernity; Islamists are clearly not against economic growth. 
It will be seen in detail that Islamism also presupposes a pure Islam, knowable 
despite the historical corruptions, deviations by small or large Muslim groups from the 
norm. The coherence of Islamism as an ideology often increases for a given region and 
given sect of Islam. For example, it could be seen that different Islamist movements in 
the Greater Middle East, from Morocco to Pakistan, as well as Islamists in India share 
"' A simple definition of identity offered by Schwcdlcr as "how individuals and groups define themselves 
and their relations to others" (2001: 2) 
1ý ' 
very similar ideas and Islam connotes many similar things for them: this coherence ma'- 
be higher within two main (the Sunni and Shiite) branches of Islam. 
Islamism is strongly related to what Islam stands for Muslims. This question has 
many complex and conflicting answers. Many Muslims may slavishly follow their 
ancestors, others may be using Islam to further or protect their interests: still others may 
simply believe in it and take comfort from its mega-narrative which meaningfully 
`explains' life. Likewise, Islamists can be seen as turning Islam into an ideology to 
mask their real motives or they may simply want to `save' their fellow Muslims in the 
best way they know how. In other words, their material and spiritual demands may be 
so deeply entwined that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. to separate them. 
In Chapter 2, the broad Islamist response to important modern concepts and 
processes and the West is analysed; this also prepares the background to the more 
specific response of the WP in Turkey. Thus, the similarities and differences between 
Islamism of the WP and wider Islamism in the Middle East will be seen. 
One of the issues in Chapter 2 is the Islamist aspiration to state power. 
According, to Islamists, Islarnisation of state power is seen as a collective duty as its 
power is abused by the secular sections against Islamists and their interpretation of 
Islam (Ayubi 1991). In other words, Islamisation of the state structure seems to most 
Islamists a logical part of wider Islamisation of society. Extremist Islamist groups who 
advocate armed struggle with the state are excluded from this study. The Islamist stance 
vis-ä-vis nationalism as a modem ideology is analysed. Islamists sec that nationalism 
goes against the religious theory and the idea of ummah and thus divide the Muslims 
into nation-states when they need unity most against foreign power blocs (e. g. the West) 
to defend their rights. 
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It will be seen that there have been mixed approaches toward democracy among 
Islamists. While many prominent Islamist thinkers held that democracy is incompatible 
with Islam and Islam in fact provides nzort' and rL'al freedom than democracy. there are 
also some Islamic thinkers who argue that Islam allows a democratic political system. 
The place of women according to Islamists will also be discussed to point out that 
Islamists would like women to participate in economic and social life in an Islamic way, 
which, from a Western point of view, seems still not to be granting equal rights as with 
Western women. As to the non-Muslim minorities. it will be areued that Islamic 
political theory does not see non-Muslinms as equal partners within the Muslim 
community (unimah) and accordingly their rights are not granted fully. Today most 
Islamists have a negative view of non-Muslim minorities. often due to suspicions about 
their loyalty to that particular Muslim state. 
Another important topic for Chapter 2 will be Islamist views on scientific 
knowledge, technology and industrialisation: because, one of the central feature of 
modernity has been increasing scientific knowledge and the idea that `truth' can be 
reached only via scientific research (not through revelation). It will be seen that 
contemporary Islamists maintain an Islamist line by arguing that Islamic knowledge 
does not conflict with scientific knowledge. They see scientific activity as an important 
prerequisite of technological progress which is in turn strongly related to industrial 
development. Islamists advocate rapid economic growth via technological progress and 
industrialisation and do not object to that the stimulus for these `material aspects of life' 
may come from the West. 
Capitalism is seen as a central component of Western modernity; it will be seen 
in Chapter 2 that, while Islamists claim that Islamic way of managing the economy is 
superior to both capitalism and socialism, quite often they are closer to basically a 
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capitalist understanding of economy. This may be because according to most Islamist 
interpretations. Islam safeguards private property, inheritance, justifies profit made in 
the market. and accepts market conditions (e. g. bargaining between employer and the 
employee to determine the wage). 
In Chapter 2, it will be seen that Islamists have a certain, negative 
conceptualisation of the West. Especially in the Middle East, western, particularly 
American policies (e. g. supporting Israel, always trying to have an absolute control over 
the oil supplies) are not welcome. Overall, the West seems materialist, selfish and ready 
to abuse its power. Western societies are condemned by Islamists for things such as 
having low ethical standards (understood for example in terms of sexual 
permissiveness; amoral individualism), decline of the communitarian spirit and the 
family. 
It is possible to see that some important processes associated with modernity 
have been detrimental to a traditionally understood Islam. This is what Islamists do; 
they approach modernity selectively and point out that some processes of modernity 
(e. g. secularisation) are incompatible with Islam. For example, a secular nationalism is 
against the conception of ummah. As will be seen in detail, broadly speaking, this has 
been the case in Turkey too. 
THE CASE OF THE WELFARE PARTY IN TURKEY 
As Huntington (I 993a) argues in his famous article, there are "torn countries" in 
the world. In these countries, some sections try to redefine the idcntity of their countries 
but significant elements in the society resist to this redefinition. Turkish Islamists and 
the WP can be conceptualised in this perspective, as resisting the proposed route to 
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modernity by a secular Turkish elite (e. g. through \vestcrnisation, secularisation and 
secular Turkish nationalism). 
For about 150 years, first during the Ottoman times and later in the republican 
era, the ruling elite have been trying to modernise Turkish society via westernisation. 
For the modernising Ottoman elite the European experience was the model of 
modernisation. As Lewis points out, Atattirk was an heir to the nationalist, positivist and 
westernising wing of the Young Turks and for him civilisation meant the modern 
civilisation of the West (1968: 292; Mardin 1981: 217; Karal 1981) and the aim was to 
reach the level of most advanced civilisations ("muasn" medenil"etler') (see, Kazancigil 
1981)» 
It can be seen that from the outset, there has been an Islamist opposition and 
criticism of these modernisation attempts which predominantly followed the European 
(later Western) model and this Islamist objection has been one of the most important 
features of Turkish socio-economic and political life. 
After Mustafa Kemal and his leading cadre led the War of Independence and 
"saved" Anatolia, the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, it quickly became clear in the 
early 1920s that Turkish modernisation adventure was to continue along a nationalist- 
secularist line under the guidance of the Kemalists. For example, the Turks would be the 
dominant nation in the new republic. Like any other political system, the newly 
emerging regime in Turkey had a certain, partial and selective interpretation of history 
(Kilicbay 1998) and the glorious past. Turkish history was to be re-written, but research 
in the history of the Ottomans who were heavily influenced by Islam and who brought 
11 The word khtu. wr is active participle of the Arabic root 'usr' which means 'the age'. So utuustr can be 
understood as modern or contemporary, but when Atatürk used the term he clearly meant the most 
advanced (European) nations of his time. 
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the nation to the brink of extinction (: \tatürk 1929: pas i! N) was not encouraged; instead 
greater emphasis was placed on the Golden A; ge of the Turks that meant pre-Islamic 
times. The Turks did not need Islam to be a great nation: they already had their own 
distinctive civilisation. Islam after all was a reflection of a certain moment in history; ' 
for the nationalist Kemalists Islam was "religion of Arabs. Arab nationalism, and a 
servant of Arab imperialism" (Bora 1996: 20). The Ottoman Sunni interpretation of 
Islam seemed an obstacle, in many respects. in front of the changes deemed necessary 
by the Kenialist cadres toward a civilised. contemporary (modern) and strong Turkey 
which, with the help of science and hard work, would never be at the mercy of powerful 
countries again. Therefore, the secular nationalism which emerged during the last 
decades of the Ottoman Empire, especially among the military bureaucracy, became the 
official ideology. Nevertheless, since the state dominance was never complete and it did 
not have enough intellectual and material resources to promote modern Western, 
secular, values as much as wished by the secular elite, the penetration of the Turkish 
modernisation project was uneven and restricted primarily to big cities and towns in the 
first decades of the republic and secularism only gradually became a dominant force. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the 'P's discourse, as voiced by its elite, in order to 
find the answers to the research concerns stated above. The WP elite voiced their 
discourse and it was reported by the media, which included newspapers (e. g. the Mliii 
Gazete) and TV channels close to the party. By the WP elite, I mean those who run the 
party, took important decisions, published newspapers, books, and expressed their views 
as representatives of the party in the media. As it will be seen, the WP elite had a 
coherent enough view of modernity, the West and Turkish modernisation, enabling an 
analysis of their views (discourse) to be made. In order to be able to join the party elite, 
12 Fora criticism of this view from perspective of an Islamist intellectual see 1. Özel (1995: 24). 
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usually, hard-work along party lines for considerably long periods was required, thus all 
party elite were tried and tested as far as their loyalty to party ideology was concerned; 
Islamic knowledge and visible observance of Islamic rules like regular praying or wife 
or daughters wearing Islamic headscarf served as unwritten rules. The WP elite emerged 
as spokespersons and interpreters for the party supporters who. were `informed' about 
and reacted to political developments through these elite. 
Although one should not be as certain as Laciner, a socialist intellectual, who 
argues that "there is no doubt that all those who administer the WP think in the same 
way" (1996: 12), there was a high level of coherence among the WP elite as far as 
political, social, economic views were concerned. The party discourse, as expressed by 
its elite, touched upon economic growth (technology, industrialisation), science, 
capitalism. secularisation, secular nationalism, [modern] state, democracy, which are 
important parts of modernity. The analysis of the party discourse, therefore, can be very 
comprehensive as far as number of topics influencing party members' conceptualisation 
of modernity, and its relationship with the \Vest is concerned. For the sake of this 
comprehensiveness, the thesis will focus on only the last 4-5 years of the party before its 
ban by the constitutional court in February 1998. As it will be seen, such a time span is 
enough to capture a meaningful analysis of their understanding of modernity in that 
period. During these years, there were official publications of the party, the articles of 
the NIPS of the party and press coverage of their day to day views on secularity (laicite), 
Turkish nationalism, Turkish economic order, democracy and the need for scientific and 
technological progress for industrialisation etc. to modernise Turkey. All these kind of 
sources were used in this thesis to make a qualitative analysis. 
In Chapter 3, it will be seen that according to the WP elite, Turkish 
modernisation project has been a secularising, de-Islamising one. Modernisation of the 
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Turkish state meant that secular elite had a powerful tool at their hands to implement 
their modemising policies. The WP members shared the general Islamist view that the 
Kemalist revolution and its continuation by the secular elite have been unnecessarily 
radical toward Islam. The predominantly secular system in Turkey meant that influence 
of Islam in Turkish social life declined. 
The \VP was clearly an Islamist party trying to work according to words of the 
strictly secular laws. As a party it greatly benefited from the general rise of Islamist 
power in Turkey; its members were very active in Islamisation efforts. Islamists 
published many newspapers, owned many radio and TV stations. formed thousands of 
associations, ran hundreds of foundations, schools and courses and owned an important 
share of business life. The WP succeeded to establish itself as the biggest party of the 
Islamist section in Turkey. The WP circles often used a radical language to criticise the 
secular elite and their policies. The WP elite argued that a wholesale adaptation of the 
West as the model for modernisation and undermining Islamic culture has been harmful 
to society in Turkey. They made it clear that Islamisation was the solution to the socio- 
economic problems in Turkey and the WP elite clearly based their legitimacy in the 
eyes of Islamically-minded on being active participants in the struggle for the soul of 
Turkey, as well as, being legal politicians, on promising more secular goals (e. g. 
economic development) to the wider public. 
According to the WP elite, the Turkish modernisation project has failed the 
people and such a failure was natural as westernised-secularised elite have made de- 
Islamisation (understood in the WP discourse as secularisation of the political system 
and causing the decline of the social significance of Islam) part of this project. Thus, the 
secular elite (e. g. politicians, higher civilian-military bureaucracy) distanced themselves 
from Islam and hence from the people. The solution proposed by the WP elite could be 
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described as more. not less. modernisation but on an Islamic path. 
Chapter 3 starts with a look at the nlodemisation (centralisation and 
secularisation) of the state in Turkey especially under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatiirk and his close circle. Thus in the first decades of the republic, under the 
domination of a secular elite, one of the most important part of the modernisation drive 
which took the form of westernisation, was secularisation. Secularisation which meant 
decline of the influence of the religion (Islam) in public sphere and in majority of 
private lives included most importantly Europeanisation of the law and emergence of a 
new secular elite. who increasingly followed a westernised life style, especially in big 
cities. Thus, the new generations of the secular elite who continued to dominate 
important state institutions (the Presidency, the Parliament, the government, the Turkish 
Armed Forces, universities, the judiciary and other civil bureaucracy) inherited the duty 
of modernising Turkey from the first generation of the republic. It will be seen that, 
although there has always been an Islamist reaction to the secular republican ideology 
right from the start, this has been easily suppressed. The first openly Islamist party 
could only be seen in 1970, the National Order Party was the first party of `the National 
Outlook', the name of the political movement and ideology which was developed under 
Erbakan's leadership. After the 1971 coup, the National Outlook movement formed the 
National Salvation Party which was banned after the 1980 coup. The Welfare Party was 
formed in 1983 as the third party of the movement and enjoyed some 10% of the 
electoral support until the mid-1990s when the party made a peak in terms of political 
support by gaining important mayorships and becoming the biggest party in the 
parliament. 
The roots of rising Islamism in Turkey will be touched upon and the role of the 
WP as the most important Islamist group in the country in shaping of'Turkish Islamism 
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will be analysed. It will be seen that an important part of Turkish society saw Islam as a 
solution to their problems. thus the \VP could attract support of a dedicated grass roots, 
articulated a discourse critical of the Turkish niodernisation route. 
It will be seen in detail in Chapter 3 that, the \VP elite had a distinctly different 
understanding of the content of modern concepts brought about by the Turkish 
modernisation project. Most importantly, it can be seen that, for the WP elite, 
secularisation did not have to be a part of modernity. The major Kemalist principle of 
secularism (laicite) was being applied wrongfully and was used by the state to control 
Islam; this meant that various religious foredooms were being undermined. 
As will be seen, the WP elite argued that the 'militant' application of the 
principle of laicite, the attitude of the secular media, the place of the TAF (Turkish 
Armed Forces) were all responsible for inadequate democracy in Turkey. For the WP 
democracy was part of being modern but they understood democracy primarily as the 
vile of the majority and in terms of religious freedoms. 
As for the women, it could be seen that the \VP circles encouraged them to be 
active in political and social life but by using familiar Islamist rationales they argued 
that their activities had to be subject to Islamic precepts. They emphasised the 
importance of being a mother and housewife. Islamists women were expected to join 
into the economic life without compromising the integrity of Islamic rules. 
As an indicator of their inadequate understanding of democracy and their 
religious nationalism it will be seen that the WP elite approached the minorities, 
especially the Jewish and the Greek, with suspicion. Quite often, WP's anti-Israeli 
discourse mixed with anti-Semitism. 
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In Chapter 4, analyses of the views of the MVP elite, vis-ä-vis important aspects 
of modernity and of Turkish modernisation will continue in addition to Chapter 3, with 
a different set of concepts, in order to have a more comprehensive evaluation of their 
understanding of modernity. It will seen that the WP elite had actually its own brand of 
religious nationalism and they criticised the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey 
which, in their view, was undermining the social unity by denying cultural and political 
rights to non-Turk Muslims (e. g. the Kurds). `The nation' was predominantly defined in 
the Welfarist discourse as the Muslim community (the ummah), with frequent 
references to the special importance of the Turkish Muslims in it. The Welfarist 
discourse was in agreement with the general Islamist discourse that current world order 
had to change because it has been working to the detriment of the Islamic world; the 
former glorious position of Muslims could be re-realised by increasing the intra-ummah 
cooperation. The WP argued that the most suitable candidate to lead other Muslim 
countries toward a just world was Turkey. 
It will be seen that the WP elite thought that lack of satisfactory economic 
growth was an important component of `the failed modernisation' in Turkey. The 
`miserable' economic position and the poor performance of Turkey were attributed to 
mismanagement by the secular elite and de-Islamisation. The WP championed the rights 
of the lower income groups and promised to correct income disparities. It will be argued 
that, in line with the wishes of the rising Islamist economic elite in Turkey, the WP's 
economic views had become closer to basically a capitalist understanding of the 
economy as in Western countries, despite to their rhetoric against. The WP also 
demanded equal treatment of the rising Islamist business circles ("green capital") by the 
state institutions. 
In the case of the WP elite, an example of an Islamist stance and its evolution 
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vis-ä-Vis modern science could be seen. They shared the Islamist belief that, contrary to 
the views of many of the secular-minded, Islam does not conflict with the science but 
encourages scientific activity. Nevertheless, they argued that unlike Islam, science 
couldn't be a guide for the life and some of what is considered as scientific fact (e. g. 
Theory of Evolution) was not the truth and should not be used against Islam. 
It will be seen that technological progress and industrialisation occupied a 
central place in the Welfarist conceptualisation of modernity. Acquiring the latest 
scientific and technological knowledge was seen as a must by the WP elite for the rapid 
industrialisation, and economic growth of Turkey. The WP elite saw that lack of 
adequate technology and industrial base made Turkey economically weak and 
dependent on foreign, mainly western, countries. 
It will be seen in Chapter 4 that, the WP elite, like many other Islamists in the 
world, had generally a negative view of the West. The West was suffering from a 
general moral decay, increasing amoral individualism, hedonism, consumerism, 
disrespect and sexual permissiveness; and westernisation in Turkey meant a similar 
erosion which had to be stopped. Islamists argued that the Western manipulation and 
exploitation of the world could also be seen in Turkey. Thus, according to the WP elite, 
it was necessary to separate modernity from the West, this could be done easily in their 
view; a non-Western route of modernisation was possible. This possibility stemmed 
from their larger, if implicit, claim that modernity itself was divisible. What really 
required adapting in the name of modernity from abroad (e. g. the West) was mainly 
understood in terms of technology and industry. As far as cultural matters were 
concerned, it was strongly argued in the Welfarist discourse that, the native Islamic 
culture was more than enough provided that its values re-invigorated properly. In other 
words, the WP elite shared a widespread Islamist belief that an Islamic way to 
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modernity was possible and preferable to westernisation. 
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
I tried to base my analysis of the WP elite's related views directly on what they 
were saying/ writing predominantly in the period under analysis (1994-early 1998, 
which represent the WP's height of power and its banning process starting in May 1997) 
which was published daily particularly by the Islamist media (e. g. Milli Gazete which 
has been publication organ of the National Outlook Movement and Yeni $afak), by the 
Welfare Party and in the books and articles written by them about the issues that are 
chosen in this study as most important areas worth exploring to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the WP vis-ä-vis modernity. It will be seen that, despite my efforts to 
organise them, often, the WP elite apparently jumped from one topic to another in their 
speeches and writings. This was so, because, most of the issues were strongly related to 
one another according to the WP elite and more importantly they trusted that most of 
their audience were well acquainted enough with the main themes of the Welfarist and 
Islamist discourse in general. 
It should be pointed out that an analysis of the WP's discourse shows that like its 
target audience the discourse was complex and multidimensional. The party discourse, 
as analysed in this study, was constructed with the contribution of a diverse elite with 
greater input of the core (gekirdek) group of Erbakan and his very close circle. The WP 
elite made use of popular, religious and cultural vocabulary that the target audience was 
very familiar with. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the party elite and the 
supporters were connected to the party discourse with different degrees of commitment 
and awareness. It cannot be assumed that all the elite shared and contributed equally to 
the body of the party's discourse as put to the public. 
26 
It should be accepted that the thesis Would have benefited very much from a 
number of interviews with the party elite. Unfortunately. as my two visits to Ankara in 
the autumn of 1997 made it very clear to me, those who occupied the top positions of 
the party (e. g. Erbakan and Gil) very extremely busy and had no time for a young 
researcher. Given the number of areas to be covered, interviews would last several 
hours to do justice to the topic. Instead, their published views were consulted. This 
method is also partly justified in my view because there was a lively debate going on in 
Turkey about different aspects of modernity which was rich enough but not evaluated 
and analysed in a comprehensive manner as attempted in this study. 
The decision to focus only on the last 4-5 years of the party, which is by no 
means a very short term in Turkish political life, was taken to provide an in depth 
analysis of the WP's stance vis-ä-vis an important and quite extensive set of aspects of 
modernity and its relationship with the West in a given period. It was not possible to 
make an in depth analysis of the previous or the later period because of time and space 
limitations and point out the evolution or changes in the WP's stance since 1983 (or 
indeed the National Outlook's since 1970) with regard to important areas (e. g. 
secularism, industrialisation and capitalism). Similarly, only a very brief evaluation of 
the JDP vis-ä-vis issues covered will be provided at the end of the thesis. These are 
important areas for further research which would complement our understanding with 
regard to this particular stance vis-a-vis modernity. 
It will be seen that the WP elite had a distinct (Islamist) understanding of 
modernity which, despite its differences (e. g. in its approach to secularism), overall 
remained within modernity by sharing most of its major characteristics. The WP elite, 
similar to many other Islamist movements, advocated a more Islamic (less secular and 
Westernising) route to modernity; and they could not be considered as anti-modernists. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MODERNITY AND ITS CONTENT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter, I will try to locate modernity in time and space, analyse 
historical evolutions of some of its most important processes and concepts set out in the 
introduction. Modernity's relationship with the West Nvill also be analysed to set the 
background for analyses of Islamist and the Welfarist views on aspects of modernity 
and the West. Thus, theoretical spaces will be opened up for the discussion of issues, 
concepts and processes that are chosen to be explored in order to make a comprehensive 
analysis of the stance of the WP elite vis-ä-vis modernity and the West. 
1.2 BEGINNING OF MODERNITY WITH THE RISE OF EUROPE 
It make sense of to look at the initial development of modernity as a historical 
phenomenon that was strongly associated with the rapid rise of Europe vis-ä-vis other 
parts of the world. Indeed, the momentous economic, social and political developments 
that occurred in Western Europe over the last several centuries are often described as 
extraordinary. There is even talk of `A European Miracle' (Jones 1987). Moreover, like 
every extraordinary phenomenon, the European miracle does call for an explanation and 
analysis. Of course, this miracle, which meant, inter alia, the rise of Europe vis-a-vis 
other continents, was a result of a chain of fundamental changes. As a result, the West 
European experience manifested itself mainly as a successful economic development 
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closely interrelated to social and political developments. This experience diffused to 
other parts of Europe and the rest of the world, albeit unevenly. This spread of the 
European experience and the impact of the progress of West European peoples brought 
about the unprecedented increase of international or intersocietal contacts through 
which, in Marx's words: "The country that is more developed industrially only" 
showed, "to the less developed, the image of its own future" (1954: 19). 
The contacts between the more developed countries of Western Europe and the 
less developed countries took an unfortunate form in which the dominant and powerful 
countries, depending on the conditions, exercised different levels of control over the 
dominated (So 1990). Peoples of the so-called backward countries were bombarded 
with `images' and `pictures' of their future by their self-styled masters. Accordingly. 
during the colonial and economic imperialistic era, there was the talk of India as 
Anglicised or Indochina as Gallicised. However, long periods of colonisation showed 
important similarities among the imperialist regimes and these parochial terms were 
abandoned; and the term Europeanisation was employed. World War II marked the 
decline of the European empires and rise of the American presence and influence in 
many places including Europe; and thus one spoke of the Americanisation of Europe 
but for much of the rest of the world, the term was `Westernisation'. However. even this 
larger term seemed inadequate to explain swift and enormous social change in many 
underdeveloped and developed countries that gained momentum especially after the 
war. 
In response to this, a new term, `modernisation' evolved. It enabled scholars to 
speak of similarities of achievements observed in all `modernised' societies - Western 
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or non-Western (such as the Soviet Union or Japan)'. The terns also referred to 
similarities of aspirations of all `modernising' societies regardless of their locations and 
traditions (Lerner 1968: 386-7). Modernisation and aspirations to modernity are among 
the most overwhelming features of the last two centuries. Modernisation is a historical 
process and it is not uncommon to find it defined as a form of social, economical and 
political change that took place in Western Europe (e. g. Eisenstadt 1966: 1; cf. Giddens 
1990), which later spread to North America and other European countries. In other 
words, modernity emerged as a European success and other societies had attained the 
`necessary' sophistication as the pupils of West Europeans. 
In this sense, Europeanisation was equal to modernisation for a certain period 
and for a given society. The terms `Europeanisation', `Americanisation' or 
`Westernisation' were and are employed to describe the influence of the more advanced 
countries on the less advanced. However, although they might be accurate in describing 
the modernisation processes in many places for certain historical periods, they fail to 
take into account both the original transformation within West European countries and 
1 For example, a school of thought known as `Modernisation theory' was developed and popularised in 
1950s and 1960s by a number of scholars (e. g. W. Rostov, S. Smelser, D. McClelland and A. Inkeles) in 
a response to the particular historical conditions. For the lack of space. I had to discard a separate section 
explaining the theory and its defects as pointed out by its ideological rivals (e. g. Dependency theory) and 
by more neutral later generation of experts. Briefly put, the theory argued that Western countries are the 
most developed, and the rest of the world will eventually reach the same level provided that they pass 
through the necessary stages by taking the former as the model. In other words. the West has a positive 
effect in modernisation of the rest (strongly disputed by the Dependency theory) and development stages 
are unilinear. The theory has been very much discredited because of its pro-1': estern bias and some of its 
basic assumptions that went contrary to the facts as indicated by experts critical of this school and 
perception that it was designed as a program explicitly directed to the non-Western world and devoted to 
the promotion of Western institutions and values there. However, based on an extensive reading of the 
recent literature on modernity, which try to be much more neutral, I would argue that many processes 
(e. g. industrialisation, secularisation, urbanisation and democratisation) that were also emphasised upon 
by the 'Modernization Theory' are been seen by many experts, social groups and elites too as important 
components of modernity. Therefore, in this study explanation of modernity by some of the themes and 
concepts that were also employed by the Modcrnisation theory should only be understood as an indicator 
that the theory had also highlighted sonic of the important (and arguably obvious) processes as parts of 
modernisation as also widely accepted today. It will also be seen that with its quite distinct 
understanding of modernity, Islamism has a selective view with regard to which processes should really be part and parcel of future path of Muslim societies to modernity. For more on Modernisation theory and its ideological rivals, sec for example, (So 1990). 
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the impact of the less advanced countries on the still less advanced. Thus, one cannot 
talk about the 'Westernisation* of England and France, or `Europeanisation' of 
Manchuria by Japan. Given these considerations, especially after World War II, 
`modernity' became widely used to refer to the characteristics common to countries that 
are seen as the most advanced in technological, political, economic and social terms; 
and thus. 'modernisation' refers to the process by which these characteristics were and 
are acquired. Therefore, in this thesis, the word inodcrnisation is used to cover a vast 
array from original developments in Western Europe to present modernising policies 
pursued by all societies who wish to be more modern. Although, generally speaking, the 
modernisation process is much more easily observed in developing countries where it 
seems to have a faster pace. 
Since, the original, epoch-making social changes occurred in Western Europe 
and then in time became globalised in their repercussions, it is fundamentally important 
to analyse underlying factors of these changes and the characteristics that Western 
societies have acquired through them. There are basically two ways of looking into the 
rise of Europe: the historical and the comparative. A historical explanation of the rise of 
Europe, however brief, must underwrite environmental factors, history of scientific and 
technical change, the stimulus of the discoveries, colonialism, the formation of markets 
and the implications of the constantly changing European state-system. 
According to one view, the economic success of Europe compared to Asia owes 
much to the ecological contrasts of the continent which forced Europeans to trade goods 
such as grains, meat, fruit,. vine, olives, salt, metal, wood, animal skins and furs -which 
were produced in different places of Europe- right across the continent. Transport costs 
were low due to high proportion of coastlines and navigable rivers. States had no 
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interest in plundering these commodities but only in taxing them in return of providing 
basic social order (Jones 1987: 90-91). 
There were other gifts of geography. One was the fact that Europe and 
especially Western Europe was a long journey from Central Asia, home of invaders 
who captured some other parts of the Eurasian periphery, importantly India and China. 
This distance and a forested landscape, unsuited to cavalry, provided some protection. 
Another locational advantage was, once suitable sailing ships were built (Jones 1987: 
59), the West European coasts were conveniently opposite to some of the richest seas 
and most exploitable but least defended lands in the world. Having a developed 
shipping technology makes the geography seem not so important a factor, but the layout 
of the world does affect the relative costs of economic activity involving transportation. 
What is more in this context was the fact that if Europe were to expand, ecology and 
climate ensured that it would not be towards the north or south. And during the period 
West Europeans had developed sailing capabilities adequate to cross the oceans, their 
expansion would not be eastwards either, because Europe never remotely threatened to 
defeat its eastern neighbours which were the Huns, Mongols or Tartars in the steppes or 
the Ottomans who penetrated deep into South-Eastern Europe (Mann 1988: 17; Jones 
1987). 
Needless to say, the unprecedented European superiority, starting from 18`x' 
century onwards, was mainly result of the Industrial Revolution, which is taken either 
as what really mattered in economic history, or as a very convenient starting point or a 
negative development. The Industrial Revolution had provided Europeans not only with 
all sorts of peaceful consumables but also with deadly weapons assuring invincible 
military might. Europeans enjoyed a sustained agricultural growth and then an 
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`agricultural revolution' before Industrial Revolution that roughly took place in the 
second half the 18`1' century (for major technological inventions in agriculture, see, 
Cipolla 1976: 159-60). The effect was by far the most productive system of agriculture 
the world has ever seen. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that a number of scholars 
have all argued that economic revival in Europe occurred well before 1000 AD (see, 
Duby 1974, Postan 1975 and Mann 1988). However, many popular explanations begin 
much later- with developments of the towns in the twelfth, the struggles in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries between peasants and lords. fourteenth century capitalist 
accounting methods, the Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the 
fifteenth century-navigational- revolution, the scientific revolutions between 1400 and 
1600, sixteenth-century Protestantism, seventeenth-century Puritanism, English 
capitalist agriculture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries... (Mann 1988: 9) 
One thing must be clear - medieval Europe was already very dynamic. In fact, 
historians frequently use the term restless to describe the medieval culture. For 
example, McNeill writes, "it is not any particular set of institutions, ideas or 
technologies that mark out the West but its inability to come to a rest". No other 
civilised society has approached to such restlessness from which true uniqueness of 
Western civilisation stems (1963: 539). However, such restlessness did not need to 
produce socio-economic development. A Hobbessian war of all against all or similar 
types of aimless vicious struggles among the people were also likely, if there were no 
social control or a sense of `direction'. 
Weber and Durkheim, two classical sociologists, tried to explain why not 
anarchy or anomie but social development took place by emphasising cultural factors. 
For Weber, the restlessness of Europe was always integrated to another peculiarity: the 
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rationality. Rational restlessness was the psychological make up of Europe. Weber 
found rational restlessness especially in Puritanism. This rational restlessness was put in 
the service of social improvement by a mechanism identified by Durkheim. Not anarchy 
or anomie but normative regulation was due firstly and primarily to Christianity (Mann 
19SS: 12-3). In fact, although most of the people had more than one identity, the most 
powerful and extensive source of social identity was Christianity; and various churches 
that were preaching consideration, decency and charity to all Christians provided a 
normative pacification substituting costly coercive pacification (Werner 1988: 172-3). 
From a materialist perspective, the ecumene was both infrastructure and 
superstructure. Until the thirteenth century it monopolised education and written 
communication. The church also provided the lingua franca: Latin. The state 
bureaucracies and trading associations and manorial estates all had access to useful 
knowledge through church infrastructures. In short, the common culture of medieval 
Europe was Christianity. In addition, it was an achievement of Christianity to create, 
however minimal, a normative society across state, ethnic, class and gender boundaries. 
Its other achievement was integrating two major parts of Europe, the Mediterranean 
lands with their cultural heritage, their historic and predominantly extensive power 
techniques (literacy, coinage, agricultural estates and trading networks) and north- 
western Europe with its relatively intensive power techniques (deep ploughing, village 
and kin solidarities and locally organised warfare). The European development owes 
much to their creative interchange. The fact that medieval Europeans were primarily 
concerned with exploiting their locality intensively and a certain level of social norms 
provided a favourable environment to natural sciences, penetrating beneath the 
appearance and finding physical, chemical and biological `explanations'. In a sense, 
medieval Europeans surpassed other civilisations in production of knowledge about 
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agricultural and scientific matters (Mann 1988: 14-15). 
One source of European development was its almost uninterrupted production of 
unprecedented amount of knowledge. And if we define technology as the application of 
knowledge about nature, to create tools, machines, new ways of production, to train 
people in new techniques, in short, to increase mastery over the natural world, it was 
only a matter of time for Europeans to start their unprecedented technological progress. 
As with the agricultural technological developments, sometimes there was need for 
great time spans, and the effect might be regionalised but unlike Asia, Europe was one 
technological community where change in one cell tended to diffuse to the others. 
Cultural homogeneity and competitive state-systems forced continuous borrowing, 
which meant that if a problem were solved in one country, soon the same would be true 
for others (Jones 1987: 45; Goldstone 2002). 
1.3 MODERNITY AS A CONCEPT IN HISTORY 
Clearly, modernity has a very long and complex history and therefore to place 
the birth of modernity and its spread geographically in a historical setting is crucial to 
explore its relationship with some very important historical developments and concepts 
like the Enlightenment, capitalism, nationalism and industrialisation that also initially 
occurred in Europe and spread to other parts of the world. 
The Enlightenment can be described as the interconnected philosophical, 
scientific and social beliefs that developed in Western Europe in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. This was a broad European intellectual movement that constituted 
the origins of many modern worldviews of today. The dominant Enlightenment 
thinking, in contrast to the previous generations, rejected superstition and belief in the 
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supernatural as ways of living. For most Enlightenment thinkers the natural world was 
to be understood through objective, detached and unemotional science; reason and 
rationality were the sole source of knowledge. Moreover. the knowledge generated by 
many individuals working freely was to be used for the human emancipation and to 
make the daily life easier. Among the nineteenth century sociologists, Auguste Comte, 
in particular. had much faith in this freely produced scientific knowledge. For him, the 
`modern' society would be dominated by science; a positivist science would replace the 
influence of religion, superstition and philosophy2 (see, for example, Hamilton 1992). 
Another very important factor in differentiating Western Europe from the rest of 
the world was industrialisation. Nineteenth-century classical sociologists, such as 
Comte, Durkheim, Marx and Weber all interested in the social change accompanying 
this industrialisation that had reshaped the world. Marx and Durkheim, unlike Comte, 
placed less emphasis on scientific and rational thinking but they both strongly believed 
that society was developing progressively; for Marx, towards a communist utopia, free 
from the exploitation -characteristic of a capitalist society-, and for Durkheim, towards 
a complex society based on organic solidarity. According to Weber, rationalisation and 
bureaucracy would increasingly be more important in the modern states. All of these 
sociologists believed they could tell the future direction of social change because they 
thought they had used scientific analysis. Such was the importance of the 'scientific' 
way of thinking and science. Science promised domination over nature and hence 
freedom from scarcity and calamity. Enlightenment thinking may be seen as the 
foundation of modernity and its belief in progress and faith in science have been the 
2 Euben's observation, "The opposition of science to religion - like the correlative binaries of reason and 
revelation, rationality and irrationality - is central to the way in which the West has organised its 
intellectual history" (2003: 50), represents a dominant view in social sciences. 
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characteristic of'niodem thinking. ' 
The origins of modern scientific knowledge may be traced to the important new 
scientific endeavour and technological innovation in the Middle Ages, what is referred 
to by historians as the renaissance of the twelfth century. Although, in the fifteenth 
century, modern ideas and techniques emerged decisively, it is appropriate to say a full- 
fledged scientific revolution was in progress in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
The enormous time span from the 12th to the 18th century had enabled the westernmost 
societies of Europe to digest the new knowledge and technology and absorb their social 
impacts gradually (in contrast to the late modernising societies of the twentieth 
century). However, this does not mean that the growth of knowledge and the related 
technology, after a warm welcome as a useful and acceptable development, had not had 
to face some fierce opposition, especially from the church. The trial of Galileo by the 
Inquisition in 1632 because of his `heretical' view that the sun did not rotate around the 
earth, is an example (Black 1966: 69-70). 
Another relevant point about the origins of modern knowledge in the Western 
Europe of the twelfth century is the fact that, at that time, the writings of Greek and 
Arab scholars became available. The basis of this twelfth century renaissance was the 
recognition of the possibility of seeking a rational explanation of physical and natural 
phenomena. By the sixteenth century the growth in scientific knowledge and its 
application in the form of technology brought to West Europeans a great power and a 
previously unseen control over the nature. The scientific revolution generally led to a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of traditional ways of doing things. Almost all of 
humanity's conceptions became subject to scrutiny and all forms of intellectual activity 
went through a rapid transformation. In a way, each generation's idols were toppled 
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down by the next one. Change was considered the normal state of all knowledge. The 
classical periodisation by Europe's historians of the evolution of human understandins, 
as a Renaissance, a Refonnation and Counter Reformation. an A, e of Enli`lltennlent 
and an Age of Materialism remains useful. What is important here is to note that this 
process, which lasted from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, "was almost 
exclusively the product of Europe" (Black 1966: 9-11). In other words, modernity 
emerged as a European success and other societies had to attain the `necessary' 
sophistication as the pupils of West Europeans. In this sense, as stated above, one spoke 
of modernisation as `Europeanisation'. However this evolution of the terms describing 
social change, from Anglicisation or Gallicisation to firstly Europeanisation, and then 
with the emergence of Americanisation to Westernisation and finally to modernisation, 
is not free from its critics. For example Wallerstein points out that to follow this line of 
evolution, without questioning, is tantamount to equate Westernisation with 
modernisation. In other words if there is a contradiction between modernisation and 
Westernisation this was `solved' by asserting that they are identical. If Asia or Africa 
`Westernises', it `modernises'. This, according to Wallerstein, means arguing that 
Western culture is indeed universal. It also means a sophisticated form of arguing that 
only the Western civilisations among all other world civilisations was capable of 
transforming itself to modernity. Wallerstein disapproves this line of arguing and 
writes that some versions of anthropological theory. more specifically some versions of 
modernisation theory, reached the conclusion, "the Nest had emerged into modernity; 
the others had not". And what follows inevitably is to accept that in order to be modem 
one has to be somehow culturally `Western', by adopting Western religions, Western 
languages or at least Western technology which is "said to be based on the universal 
principles of science" (Wallerstein 1990: 45). Turkish intellectual, Cemil Meru also 
attacks the emergence of the term modernisation, presented as a larger and more 
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appropriate term than the terms of Europeanisation, Americanisation and 
Westernisation, as a form of covering blatant imperialism. The real matter, according to 
i\ leric, for the economically more developed world, was to exploit and `domesticate' the 
less developed parts. So "the imperialist" chose to use more polished and colourless 
words not to irritate the exploited people (1983: 234). 
Social change is an age-old process that takes place in all societies. However, 
what is unique about the modernisation of the Western Europe is not only the enormous 
accumulation of knowledge never seen before but also its worldwide impact. In this 
context one definition of modernisation as the process by which historically evolved 
institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented 
increase in man's knowledge , permitting control over 
his environment, that 
accompanied the scientific revolution" (Black 1966: 7) does reflect the classical 
understanding of modernisation which is still shared by many. 
1.4 A SELECTIVE CONTENT OF MODERNITY 
Naturally, no exhaustive analysis of modernity and its relation to the West is 
attempted in this thesis. Instead, a selective approach to `the content' of modernity is 
taken and its relation to the West is analysed according to this selection. In doing so, my 
main criteria will be the relative importance of the analysed vis-ä-vis the Islamist views 
in general and the views of the Welfare Party elite on modernity and the West in 
particular. I will concentrate on capitalism, industrialisation, nationalism and the 
modem state and international state system, globalisation, secularisation and democracy 
as important aspects of modernity. 
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1.4.1 CAPITALISM AND MODERNITY 
One of the globalising forces that accompanied modernity has been capitalism. 
Capitalism, in Max Weber's words, is "the most fateful force in modem life" (1930: 
17). As a socio-economic system, it has been a central, if not the central, preoccupation 
of social theory since the nineteenth century. Capitalism, being the economic order of 
Western Europe in the modern era is indispensable to any analysis of `modernity' and 
`modernisation'. For both Marx and Weber, as for many others, capitalism as a peculiar 
social formation was born in Western Europe, specifically in England (Marx 1973: 277; 
Weber 1992: 251). According to Marx, the emergence of the town as a separate entity 
from the countryside is important in the development of capitalism. The existence of the 
town brought the necessity of administration, police, taxes, etc., in other words politics 
and bureaucracy. In short, the separation of town and country brought a political sphere, 
a division of labour and the constitution of economic sphere and, an industrial and 
commercial capital. Trade was subject to restriction of competition through protective 
tariffs, prohibitions and special treaties. "In the last resort, competition was carried on 
and decided by wars (especially naval wars)" (Marx 1938: 54) out of which England 
emerged victorious and found itself at the centre of the world commerce. The 
commercial superiority of England led to a massive demand for its products. From 
England, the industrial revolution moved on to other countries: "Competition soon 
compelled every country that wished to retain its historical role to protect its 
manufacturers by renewed customs regulations (the old duties were no longer any good 
against big foreign industry), and soon afterwards to introduce big industry under 
protective duties" (Marx 1938: 56). From this time on the modern industrial system was 
in firm position and its main characteristics were: 
a) the creation of a world market that governs nations and individuals, 
b) the resolution of "all natural relationships into money relationships"; 
40 
c) large industrial cities, "the victory of the commercial town over the countryside"; 
d) the appearance for the first time of a class that was international by nature (Marx 
1938: 57). According to Marx, there was something special within feudalism, a hidden 
spirit which led to capitalism. "The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown 
out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the 
elements of the former" (Marx 1954: 66S). Capitalism, according to Marx, "put an end 
to all feudal, patriarchal ties that bound man to his natural superiors... created enormous 
cities and rescued enormous part of the population from the idiocy of viral life". It has 
engendered the modern state "one nation with one government, one code of laws, one 
national-class interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff' and "given a cosmopolitan 
character to production and consumption in every country" it "draws all, even the most 
barbarian nations into civilisation... in one word, it creates a world after its own image" 
(Marx 1975: 486-9). 
Weber's explanation of the emergence of capitalism starts with his rejection of 
the crudely technological and materialistic factors, namely the colonial trade, population 
growth, or the inflow of precious metals. Then, he isolates some necessary but not 
sufficient external conditions: The particular geography of Europe with its cheap 
transportation by water, the favourable military requirements of the small states, and the 
large demand for luxury from an unusually prosperous population. Finally, Weber 
concludes his search with a most important factor: The ethic, justification of the pursuit 
of profit; "the germs of modem capitalism must be found in a region where officially a 
theory was dominant which was distinct from that of the east and of classical antiquity 
and in principle strongly hostile to capitalism" (Weber 1930: 162). This region was 
medieval Christendom. What was most important in this region was the presence of 
Protestantism. Protestantism was not the cause of capitalism but it was the enabling 
force. By providing protection to older and deeper tendencies, Protestantism was like a 
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"wind-break" which allowed the "young plant" to -, ro\\- (Mactärlane 1988: 187). What 
is important in Weber's account of the emergence of capitalism is the fact that, this 
"most fateful force" owes too much to the Protestant ethic. something that was found 
only in Western Europe. This sense of a `unique Western civilisation' in Weber's works 
has a special importance since it affected many theorists of modernisation who also 
think that the West succeeded in building a unique civilisation. This success owes much 
to some certain factors that are found in the West and if repeated would lead 
modernisation of the other parts of the world. According to Weber: 
A product of modern European civilisation, studying any problem of universal 
history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact 
should be attributed that in Western civilisation, and in Western civilisation only, 
cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of 
development having universal significance and value (Weber 1930: 13). 
Therefore, in Weber's view, there was an array of cultural phenomena 
distinctive to `Western civilisation' and they reached their zenith only in modern times. 
The thread linking them was the idea of rationalisation. "Only in the West does science 
exist at a stage of development which we recognise to-day as valid. " Other forms of 
knowledge like Babylonian, Indian or Chinese might be highly developed but were 
merely empirical, not rational. On the institutions, Chinese and Islamic academies were 
"superficially similar to our universities" but "a rational, systematic and specialised 
pursuit of science with trained and specialised personnel, has only existed in the West in 
a sense at all approaching its present dominant place in our culture" (Weber 1930: 15- 
6). 
Marx and Weber approached capitalism in different ways and reached different 
conclusions: For Marx, it occupied a central place in his analysis of social change of his 
time, and capitalism meant, above all, exploitation. For Weber capitalism was "identical 
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with the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit. by means of continuous, rational. 
capitalistic enterprise" (Weber 1930: 17). However. there are common points in their 
observations: Capitalism is "the most fateful force" (Weber) shaping the modern world 
and the "general light" (Marx) in which it is bathed. Moreover, for them, it is not the 
economic aspect of capitalism that causes modernity to be as it is, though for both, 
capitalism's colonisation of global economic life is a crucial agency of modernisation; 
rather, each comprehends capitalism as, in Marx's words, a "mode of life" (Sayer 1991: 
1-2). 
The relationship of capitalism with economic and political modernisation is very 
complex. However, it can be argued that, history `showed' that capitalist mode of 
industrialisation has been more successful - in terms of amount of per capita 
production- than state-planned alternatives (fascist or socialist) routes, perhaps due to 
for example, as in the case of socialism, extreme difficulty of organising a society that 
produces for use rather than for profit (So 1990: 186). Historical experience also shows 
that capitalist societies have been much more successful to become democracies, 
although it is difficult to show that capitalism is the cause of democratisation. 
As far as Marxist analyses are concerned, capitalism showed that it is far more 
flexible than these analyses predicted. Emergence of the welfare state was an important 
example. However-arguably with the implicit consent of the society due to force of 
economic globalisation- the new mode of capitalism is causing the decline of the 
welfare state in the West. 
As for the issue of ethnocentric explanation of causes of capitalism firstly raised 
by Weber, it can be argued that capitalism had existed in pre-modern times at least in an 
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embryonic form. With modernity, capitalism `emerged' in the sense that it become 
much more extensive and intensive in the society. It is not too convincing to argue that 
capitalism could only emerge in a Protestant society because, for example, Islam too 
could be an enabling culture with its safeguard on private property, justification of 
`profit' or bargaining between employer and the employee to arrange the wage. 
Although it should be expected from Islam, like any other great faith, to teach 
compassion for the fellow human being and thus, delegitimise some excesses seen in a 
modern capitalist economic system. 
The capitalist node of economic activity has been resisted far less by the rest of 
the . orld compared to some other 
Western institutions or practices like liberal 
democracy. Many not fully democratic states from different cultures, like Malaysia, 
Singapore had no qualms with most of the basics of capitalist economy. China too is 
speeding up its transition to capitalism without relaxing much the authoritarian 
administration. Perhaps, in recognition of the historical failures of socialist or fascist 
attempts at organising a sustainable economy, capitalism is currently being accepted as 
superior. I will argue in Chapter 4 that the WP circles too did not object to a basically 
capitalist mode of economy and they were at pains to reconcile Islamic precepts and the 
demands of capitalism. 
1.4.2 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIALISATION AND 
MODERNITY 
As stated before, modernity has a complex relationship with a diverse set of 
phenomenon. Developments in the science, technological progress and related 
expansion in industrial fields have been very important in ever evolving definition of 
modernity. These developments have also been very important in Islamist 
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understanding of modernity at least since the beginning of the second half of the 19'x' 
century. 
Rapidly accumulated knowledge on the nature had been an unmistakable feature 
of the history of modernity. If we understand the science simply as systematic 
knowledge about the nature, it is obvious that modernisation involved a massive 
increase in scientific knowledge including medical, metallurgic, mechanical and 
electrical sciences. 
European industrialisation (itself mainly a product of growing knowledge3 of 
Europeans) empowered the `white imperialism' with the latest gadgets of the European 
technology and growing disparity in technologies between those of the leading 
European nations and those of the rest of the world made the Western expansionism 
irresistible. The most important aspect of this disparity was the technical superiority of 
Western armaments. This superiority enabled to Western powers to impose their will on 
the much larger colonial populations (Magdoff 1978: 20). "Around 1890 a little over 
6000 British officials governed almost 300 million Indians with the help of a little over 
70,000 European soldiers [... ] Could there be a more extraordinary proof of absolute 
superiority? " (Hobsbawm 1987: 81). 
Even when there was no enemy to fight against, the industrial technology 
transformed the scale of imperial exploitation. 4 While old empires, the British, French 
and especially the Dutch and Portuguese were rejuvenated by modem technology, new 
European powers, which were created in the last quarter of the century, struggled for 
This also includes practical, technical knowledge that was much more important than advances in pure 
science in early industrialisation. 
4 For example, only after the Trans-Siberian railway construction started in 1891,800,000 subjects of 
the Russian Empire were brought to Siberia within the decade. 
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Africa and what had remained in South-East Asia and Pacific. Germany, Italy and 
Belgium, who had no extra-European possessions before. acquired then almost on the 
map in collusion with other imperial powers and without any reference to the 
inhabitants of the areas concerned. Even other European states which continued to have 
no territories beyond Europe, actively participated in imperialism by supplying 
manpower to the colonies of other states. The South-East Europeans, on the other hand, 
had their own victories against the Ottoman Empire that was dominated by Muslim 
Turks. 5 
All European peoples could share in the collective feeling of superiority over the 
rest of the world conferred by the unstoppable imperialism of the great powers. For not 
only did the imperial experience give Europe a new place in the world, it also gave 
Europeans, in their own minds, a privileged rank in the order of humankind. This 
thought took the form of naked racism and allegedly disinterested science contributed to 
this attitude. For example, Darwin's theory of evolution may be seen as typical of its 
time. Like many other scientific theory, it was product of its circumstances and served 
to interests of a particular race and class. What is more, there was no clear line between 
`scientific' and. `social' Darwinism. Darwin himself amazingly wrote: "When two races 
of men meet, they act precisely like two species of animals. They fight, eat each other... 
But then comes the more deadly struggle, namely which have the best fitted 
organisation or instincts (i. e. intellect in man) to gain the day". For him, blacks would 
have evolved into a distinct species if imperialism had not stopped this process by 
ending their isolation; otherwise, they were doomed to extinction (cited by Fernandez- 
Armesto 1995: 152). 
s The decline of the Ottomans will be analysed later. 
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Comte de Gobineau, who was a contemporary of Darwin, relying on a newly 
emerging 'science', anthropology, had prepared a ranking of human races in which 
Aryans were at the top and Blacks at the bottom. Shortly after, Mendel laid the 
foundations of the science of genetics. Genetics `provided' an explanation of inferiority 
of a man to another just by the virtue of race. All these provided a justification for the 
'better adapted' races of Europe to control the `naturally inferior' (Fernandez-Armesto 
1995: 152). 
Even before Darwin's work on biological evolution, the notion of social 
evolution was well known in Western Europe. Indeed, if not the ordinary people, many 
sociologists were aware that they were witnessing massive social changes radically 
reshaping the structure of society. The nineteenth century theories of social evolution 
pointed out the naturality and inevitability of such changes and, where the change 
occurred, it was to follow same pattern. Thus, for the classical sociologists of the time 
such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim, societies were distinguished from one another 
according to their place on the evolutionary scale. The higher they moved up the closer 
they became to Western industrial societies that were regarded by these sociologists as 
the highest form of civilisation (Harrison 1988: 2). 
Industrialisation is still a central concept of modernisation attempts in 
developing countries. In fact, some equate it with modernisation: "If you want to 
modernise you must industrialise" (Kumar 1988: 3). There are some core aspects of 
industrialised economies: One of these is use of high levels of inanimate sources of 
energy. This was pointed out by the modernisation school (Levy 1966: 11). However, 
correlation between amount of energy used and level of modernisation is not always 
direct. For example, in 1995, in the USA commercial energy use, in Kg. of oil 
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equivalent per capita was 7.905; in the UK, it was less than half of that: 3,786. 
Obviously, a US citizen is not twice as rich or as modern as a UK citizen, which opens 
the issue of the wasteful use of the natural resources. In that year, a USA citizen used 
almost S times more commercial energy than a Turk and 11 times more than a Chinese. 
In fact, a comparison between industrialised USA and industrialising China is a telling 
one. If China continues to develop five "pillar" industries, namely, automobile, 
telecommunications, petrochemicals, machinery manufacture and construction, 
patterned after western economies and Japan, the world would simply run out of 
resources. For example, if car ownership and oil use per person there reach the US 
levels, China "would need 80 million barrels of oil per day. In 1996, the world produced 
64 million barrels per day" (Brown L. R. 1998: 13). This shows that the industrialisation 
model of the Vest is no longer a repeatable option for the whole world. 
Environmentalists who insist that the application of science and technology (and the 
industrial societies based on it), has reached its ecological limits may be right (Brown 
R. H. 1998: 531). 
Another important characteristic of industrialised economies is the extremely 
low proportions of employment in agricultural sector. With the industrialisation of the 
agriculture, we see that, in industrialised countries (e. g. USA, France, UK), only around 
2 to 10% of the population are employed in agricultural sector and that only 2 or 3% of 
the gross domestic product is agricultural (see, World Bank 1999). Therefore, economic 
modernisation is like a `war' against peasantry, in the sense that it reduces their 
proportion in the society (Harrison 1988: 50-52). Economic modernisation involves the 
process of increasing the economic capacity to meet non-agricultural human wants. In 
other words, an important part of economic modernisation is economic differentiation. 
This differentiation is required mainly due to some characteristics of agricultural 
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products. Most importantly, human demand for agricultural products (e. g. food) is 
inelastic beyond a certain point. Therefore, there seems to be an inherent limit in 
agricultural growth. Another important point is the inability of the agricultural products 
to meet some important human wants, for example mobility or telecommunication. 
It should be noted that, although economic modernisation started with an escape 
from "the agrarian trap" by employing relatively simple technology in industrial 
production in small factories, cotton mills etc. the notion of economic modernisation 
has been evolving. Today a `modern economy' entails, utter alia, a high level of 
technology, a strong service sector (e. g. banking, tourism, education). In fact, the share 
of service sector in the western economies is around 70% (see, World Bank 1999: 212). 
This shows that the importance of non-material `goods' in developed economies. 
However, it should not be forgotten that western economies and Japan are still strong 
producers of material products. 
It is assumed in this thesis that, all societies want to increase their real income. It 
should be noted that, the fact that agricultural products has little value compared to 
industrial products or compared to services is also a function of world political 
economy. However defined, `unequal exchange' is also a similar function. The fact that 
the world economy is biased against developing, agricultural economics is not simply 
due to inherent qualities of agricultural or low technology products these countries 
produce, but also, for example, as noted earlier, due to restricted mobility of global 
labour. Another important factor is world demographic structure. In other words, to give 
a simple example, the value of two tonnes of wheat from a developing country may be 
equal to that of a personal computer from an advanced economy, not primarily because 
of the different levels of labour productivity, or because of inherent qualities of 
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agricultural products. Rather it is because in today's world with these levels of 
agricultural production and world population, these are the current prices securing the 
sale. Therefore, a high level of technology is sought after by societies to produce 
advanced products and to provide better services. However, production of high 
technology is very expensive and its transfer to developing countries is limited due to 
lack of financial power of the recipient and the strategic planning on the part of the 
advanced countries, which do not want to transfer their latest technology to other 
countries. 
As we will see, like many other social groups in non-western societies, Islamists 
too are preoccupied with interpretation of modern science and the place of technology 
and industrialisation in their conceptualisation of modernity. 
1.4.3 NATIO\'ALISIN'I AND MODERNITY 
Nationalism as a modern ideology has been an important component of 
modernity. Although there are no adequate and agreed definitions of nation and 
nationalism, according to Hutchinson and Smith, many historians agree that as an 
ideology and discourse, nationalism became prevalent in the North America and 
Western Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century (1994: 4-5). Even Anthon 
Smith who argues that `ethnic consciousness' existed in earlier times concludes that 
"nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon" (196: 
76-79). Gellner summarises the position of the `modernist' theorists of nationalism who 
consider nationalism as inherently modem: culture and power are perennial but they are 
related to each other in a new way in modem age (Gellner 1997: 93). 
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For other views that refute the modernity of nationalism, sec (Smith 1995) and (Gellner 1997). 
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Perhaps most direct theory of the relation between modernity and nationalism 
belongs to Ernest Gellner: "industrialisation and modernisation notoriously proceed in 
an uneven manner... [and]... nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so much with 
industrialisation or modernisation as such, but its uneven diffusion" (1964: 158-169). 
According to Gellner, nations are not "natural, God-given way of classifying men" but 
rather, even it seems as a paradox, they can be defined only in terms of "the age of 
nationalism. " Because, nationalism "engenders nations, and not the other way around. " 
Although it uses pre-existing "cultural wealth" in a selective way (1983: 55-62). 
However, Gellner's thesis is not accepted by Michael Mann who writes, 
"industrialisation was not the principal cause" of nationalism; because "it arrived too 
late. " He adds that two principal causes were the commercial capitalism with its 
universal social classes and the modern state with its professional armed forces and 
administrators (Mann 1992: 162). Giddens, who also regards nationalism as a basically 
modern phenomenon that emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution, defines it 
as "the existence of symbols and beliefs which are either propagated by elite groups, or 
held by many of the members of regional, ethnic, or linguistic categories of a population 
and which imply a community between them" (1981: 190-191). Giddens also says that 
although nationalism associated in time with the rise of capitalism and the nation-state, 
this is not sufficient to assume that it is an excrescence of the nation-state or a sub- 
product of capitalism (1981: 191). 
According to Anthony Smith nationalism can be defined as "an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a human 
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential `nation"' 
(1996: 578). Gellner similarly defines nationalism as "a political principle which holds 
that the political and national unit should be congruent" (1983: 1). Smith points out that 
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nationalism has been with us for t wwo centuries and in that period has spread from 
\Vestern Europe and the Americas to other continents (1996: 57S). 
Smith defines a nation as "a named human population with shared myths and 
memories occupying an historic territory or homeland, and possessing a common public 
culture, a single unified economy and common legal rights and duties" (1996: 58 1, cf. 
Smith 1995: 56-57). As Smith points out, modem nations are `mass nations', i. e. they 
aim to elevate the `people' into the nation and theoretically include all strata of the 
designated population in the sovereign nation. Secondly, "modem nation is a 'leeal- 
political' community, as well as a historical culture-community. " Thirdly, "modern 
nations are legitimated through a universally applicable ideology, nationalism. " 
According to Smith: 
nationalism holds that the world is divided into nations, each of which has its own 
character and destiny; that an individual's first loyalty is to his or her nation; that the 
nation is the source of all political power; that to be free and fulfilled, the individual 
must belong to a nation... and that a world of peace and justice can only be built on 
autonomous nations (Smith 1995: 54-5). 
This `core doctrine' of nationalism emerged only in the 18`h century, first in Europe and 
then elsewhere (Smith 1995: 55; Kedourie 1966: 9). Modern nations implicitly 
subscribe to this nationalist ideology, in a world divided into separate national states. 
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"This system [of nation-states] came into being in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648 and became the dominant pattern in Europe, North America and Latin America 
after 1815. It was then carried by colonialism and post-colonial state-nations to other 
parts of the world -to the Middle East, Asia and Africa" (Smith 1995: 56). 
Nationalism can be an elaborated ideology shared by many people right across a 
' Therefore, another characteristic of the modern nation state is its territoriality. 
territory. Although, as Smith and Gellner among others. point out, nationalism demands 
a degree of commonality among the citizens, there are many culturally and ethnically 
plural states which possess dominant and minority nations. Indeed, Connor regrets that 
the term nation-state has come to be applied to all states. Whereas, he argues, it should 
be used to describe a territorial-political unit if its borders coincide with the territorial 
distribution of a national group. He adds that in 1971 only 12 states (9.1%) of 132 could 
be justifiably be described as nation-states, but in 39 (29.5%) states, the largest nation 
accounts for less than half of the population (1978: 39). 
In the mid-1990s, there were important ethnic minorities in many states with 
nationalist aspirations many of which continue today. This means that although 
nationalism has been a quite successful ideology in delivering `nation-states' to many 
nations, it has, at the same time, failed to do so for some other nations so far. However, 
as Anthony Smith points out, with the end of the Cold War, in one of the many 
resurgences since the French Revolution, some twenty new states have been created on 
the ruins of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. There are still 
a number of potential separatisms such as those of Quebecians, Kurds and Tamils. 
These facts, according to Smith, proved liberals and socialists, who are "committed to 
the view that humanity progresses in stages to greater units of inclusiveness and higher 
values, [and that] the nation and nationalism can only represent a halfway house to the 
goal of a cosmopolitan culture and a global polity, " wrong. "[F]ar from withering away 
with the advance of modernity and mass communications, ethnic and national conflicts 
have been exacerbated [... ] a progressive modernity and its all works have actually 
increased ethnic conflict and nationalism; and as modernisation bites deeper, we can 
only expect an intensification of such conflicts" (Smith 1996: 576). 
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There are different theories of explaining the power and variety of nationalism. 
One, as mentioned briefly above, regards nationalism as a response to industrialisation 
and the nation as a functional element of industrial modernity. Some try to derive the 
nation and nationalism from the modem (rational) state or from the interests of sub- 
elites who uses nationalism in struggle for the control of the state (see, for example, 
Breuilly 1982). Still others regard nationalism, and nations, as ideological constructs of 
intellectuals seeking to undermine anciens regimes and establish modem states and 
societies committed to progress, or to control mass mobilisation of a democratic era, or 
to gain prominent places in the coming society (Kedourie 1966; Hobsbawm 1990). 
Undoubtedly, the processes of modernisation create the conditions for the formation of 
nation-states and the spread of nationalism. Thus, modernisation perspectives are able 
to capture important aspects of nations and nationalism. However, they cannot explain 
the paradox of variety and persistence in nationalism. This is because, according to 
Smith, "they fail to take seriously three sets of components, or resources, that underlie 
all nationalisms: The uneven distribution of ethno-history, the varying impact of 
religious ideals, and the differential nature and location of the `homeland' or ancestral 
territory" (1996: 583). 
Smith points out that "collective cultural identities are based on the shared 
memories of experiences and activities of successive generations of a group 
distinguished by one or more shared cultural elements. " Ethnic identity in turn may be 
seen as the product of these collective experiences and activities of successive 
generations of a group claiming a common origin and ancestry. Therefore, ethnicity 
may be defined as "the sense of collective belonging to a named community of common 
myths of origin and shared memories, associated with an historic homeland" (Smith 
1996: 583, italics deleted. ) 
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Ernest Renan long ago recognised the significance of the past: "To have 
common ; glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great 
things together. to wish to do so again. That is the essential condition for being a 
nation" ([Renan 1882], see, Hutchinson and Smith (eds. ) 1994: 17). Collective 
memories vary. They include recollections of wars and their heroes, religious 
movements and their leaders, foundations of states and cities, dynasties and their kings, 
migrations, discoveries and colonisations, law codes and their legislators, great 
buildings and their architects, painters, sculptors, poets, musicians (Smith 1996: 583). 
Of course, it is extremely difficult to distinguish the genuinely shared memory 
from exaggeration, fabrication, idealisation or heroisation associated with myth and 
legend. However, one could agree with Smith that the more faithfully recorded, 
documented and more comprehensive a golden age, the more impact it can exert over 
the later generations of that community. Successive generations of the community may 
differ on selection of an epoch to be regarded as a golden age depending on the criteria 
of the time, perhaps largely determined by the political elite and milieu. For some it will 
be a golden age because of its religious glory with its great leaders, and saints, for 
others because the art and philosophy flourished, for still others because the community 
enjoyed its greatest territorial expansion and military power, or pioneered great moral 
and legal codes and institutions. Therefore, the ethno-history of a community may offer 
more than one golden age and different sections of the succeeding community may look 
back to quite different golden ages (Smith 1996: 584), perhaps generating or at least 
deepening already existing conflicts within that community, or between that community 
and other communities who were victimised during a particular `golden age'. 
A particular golden age, or ages, may end up just as a form of escapism or 
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consolation for present decline. But, generally, later generations or at least some 
sections of them extract certain characteristics of the nation to be emulated by the 
present community. Golden ages, again for those who look tip to these times, define 
what is and is not to be admired and emulated, what is, and is not, distinctive about that 
community. They present an ideal to be recreated in modem terms. Thus, a golden age 
stimulates a sense of regeneration. The nationalist discourse goes more or like this: 
"Like `our ancestors' `we' too can create a great culture or civilisation provided that 
`we' acquire their characteristics and follow their principles". Most nationalisms which 
start out from a sense of decline, promise restoration to a former glorious state. The 
interpreters of the golden age point out the inherent capacity of grandsons and 
granddaughters to recreate a civilisation, a culture and a strong country worthy of the 
golden age. They reveal to the community its `authentic' (usually pre-industrial) self 
and the community is encouraged to reappropriate and realise that self. Different groups 
in a society may disagree on the characteristics of a particular golden age, or, if that 
community's past boasts more than one golden ages, may choose different golden ages; 
or one certain choice or interpretation can become dominant in that society (Smith 
1996: 584-5). 
The second major set of `deep resources, ' on which different nationalisms can 
draw, relates to religious beliefs which can be used when mobilisation of large numbers 
is required and when leaders and movements need to define the community in terms of 
their shared faith. As a part of the religious beliefs, the myth of ethnic election singles 
out the community as a `chosen people' with a sacred mission. A stronger form of 
election myth is the idea of `the covenant', the immutable contract between the 
community and its god, which requires certain obligations (Smith 1996: 586-8). 
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The third set of `deep resources' relates to historic territories and more 
particularly to an `ancestral homeland'. Generally, a specific area becomes associated 
with a particular community, in the eyes of its members. This relationship between the 
people and the land is the product over the longue duree of continual myth-making. The 
land becomes a historic homeland, a sacred territory. 
Anthony Smith argues that the sheer diversity and variety of different 
nationalisms are to be explained partly by the difference between these three set of 
`deep resources' each nationalism draws on and by the many permutations of myths, 
symbols, memories and values in these ethno-symbolic resources, as well as by any 
special geopolitical, ecological, economical, ethnical and religious features of a given 
community (Smith 1996: 591). 
Nationalism is inextricably linked to modernity because it is a unique creation of 
the modern era. Modernisation and nation-building are inseparable. Kohn describes 
nationalism as a response to the political, social, and cultural problems of integration 
and legitimacy of the transition to modernity (Kohn 1944: 237). Anderson draws 
attention to developments of some products of modernity such as newspapers, books 
(narrating stories of their nations and for example read by pupils in schools), and 
administrative bureaucracies that made it possible for millions of people to identify with 
certain `imagined communities' (Anderson 1991). 8 
Whether nationalism is explained as linked to industrialisation and capitalism 
(Gellner 1983: 27-49; Hobsbawm 1990: 28-41) or in terms of intellectual history (Kohn 
"According to Anderson, nation is an imagined political community as both "inherently limited and 
sovereign" The term 'imagined' is used to express the link among the members of the nation, who may 
not know each other, through a shared culture, history and common sovereignty. 
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1944; Kedourie 1966) one particular aspect of nationalism, important for this study, is 
the fact that nationalism can be seen functioning as a modem religion (Llobera 1994: 
143). It is still the case in many countries that "[n]ationalism is sentimental, emotional, 
and inspirational" (Hayes 1926: 106). The most powerful expression of this new 
religion appeared in the millions of people who died for their nations during the times of 
warfare, especially in the First and the Second World \Var, while fighting against 
soldiers, often, from same religion or class. Normal affirmations of nationalist faith can 
be seen in peace times. Nationalisms seem to have appropriated religious traditions by 
developing sacred symbols (flags), sacred texts (constitutions, declarations of 
independence), sacred figures (founding fathers, heroes, martyrs), evil figures (traitors, 
enemies), sacred places (homeland, places of national battles, cemeteries), public rituals 
(national holidays, commemoration days, parades), sense of mission (promoting 
national ideas, recreating the golden age), sense of sacrifice for national interests, even 
mobilising crusades against those who oppose the nation's interest. Like traditional 
religions, nationalism gives meaning to death by offering similar higher reality to die for 
(see, Kramer 1997: 532-4). As Hayes acknowledged nationalism does not have to 
replace religion, in fact, it can gain even greater appeal when it is fused with traditional 
religious beliefs (1926: 119-123). However, a secular nationalism is indeed one of the 
greatest enemies of religion and one of the greatest secularising forces. 
While some nationalisms can be more political and willing to grant some 
individual rights on the basis of residency or birth within the territory of a given nation 
state, still without being able to eliminate some discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
origin or culture, other nationalisms can be cultural, perhaps stressing on the blood and 
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resistant to grant citizenship to people from other cultures. `' Gellner has a plausible 
explanation for this situation. To be a full member of a modern society, one must 
acquire High (literate, education-transmitted) Culture. Unfortunately, the High Culture 
which, for the first time in history, able to pervade entire societies, is not simply made 
up of formal skills but was to be articulated in certain languages like Russian, English 
or Arabic, in other words. it must contain a `culture'. People do not merely industrialise, 
but they industrialise as a German or Japanese. The result is that modern industrial High 
Culture has an `ethnic' colouring. Therefore, an Englishman is expected not only to 
speak English but also to be white. "Poles or Croats are meant to be Catholic, Persians 
are meant to be Shi'ite, Frenchmen are meant to be, not Catholic perhaps, but at any 
rate not Muslim" (Gellner 1994a: 42-3). 
One important aspect of nationalism is its complex relationship with democracy. 
The fact that democracy has always found its home in particular communities that have 
been constructed by nationalism rejects the simplistic view that it is an enemy of 
democracy (Diamond and Plattner 1994: x-xi; Nodia 1994: 7). One scholar argues that 
"the idea of nationalism is impossible-indeed unthinkable- without the idea of 
democracy and democracy never exists without nationalism, " albeit in constant tension 
with it (Nodia 1994: 4). However, "failure to tame the ethnic flesh of nationalism can 
lead to chauvinism, racism or even fascism" (Nodia 1994: 15). The notorious role 
played by extreme nationalism in two horrific world wars is a painful reminder of this. 
Nationalism may be necessary for the creation of political units where democracy can 
flourish, but an intolerant nationalism, by definition is anathema to democracy. 
" English and American nationalism can serve as examples of political nationalism and German 
nationalism of cultural nationalism. This distinction is also referred as 'good' Western and 'bad' Eastern 
nationalism and the latter is accused of celebrating the culture, race and irrationalism (see, for example, 
Kramer 1997: 541-2). 
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1.4.4 SECULARISATION AND MODERNITY 
Secularisation is also one of the most important core processes of modernity. 
The significance of religion as a fundamental component of any national culture is 
beyond any doubt and as cultural factors, religions greatly shape responses of 
individuals and societies to the advent of modernity. It has been a major thesis in social 
sciences that in modernisation process the social significance of religion declines. This 
is the secularisation thesis. There are some, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties in 
measuring secularisation. First of all, defining religion as a too general concept is not an 
easy task, although a distinction can be made between functional and substantive 
definitions (Dobbelaere 1981: 36). 
Functional definitions identify religion in terms of what it does. For instance, 
religion may provide solutions to ultimate problems or answers fundamental questions 
about the meaning of life. Functional definitions are inclusive, thus communism, 
nationalism (Yinger 1970: 11-12), or evolutionism, Marxism and scientism can be 
considered as new religions emerged in modernity (see, Dobbelaere 1981: 36). 
Acceptance of functional definitions of religion poses a problem for analysis of 
secularisation by making human beings, by definition, religious. Therefore one may 
need to turn to a substantive and exclusive definition of religion in order to understand 
secularisation without however, forgetting that various `-isms' such as Communism, 
nationalism, Fascism, Humanism or any set of ideas can function like a religion in 
various contexts. 
Substantive definitions identify religion as what it is. Wallis and Bruce give a 
substantive definition of religion that allows an analysis of secularisation: "Actions, 
beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the existence of either 
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supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal powers or processes 
possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to set the condition of, or to 
intervene in, human affairs. " (1992: 10-11, Cf. Dobbelaere 1981: 38). With 
secularisation, religion found itself increasingly competing with some other `man-made' 
set of beliefs for the hearts and minds of the people. 
According to John E. Smith some of the factors in the secularisation of modern 
life and rise of ideological rivals of religion are: 
The growth of modem technological society and mass production, the rise of power 
politics and national ideologies, the creation of multinational corporations and 
international trade, the struggles between nations for power and prestige and within 
nations for justice and civil rights, plus many other features of contemporary 
society, have conspired to create a powerful and largely secular society in which the 
concerns of traditional religion have been submerged, and, in many cases, actively 
opposed as outmoded relics of the past (1994: 8). 
Thus secularisation is an important factor in the rise of `quasi-religions'. "Even 
the mutual relations of the religions proper are decisively influenced by the encounter of 
each of them with secularism, and one or more of the quasi-religions which are based 
on secularism" (Smith 1994.10). 
The secularisation thesis asserts that modernisation, particularly three features of 
it. social differentiation, societalisation and rationalisation, brings the decline of the 
social significance of religion. 
Social differentiation means that specialised roles and institutions are developed 
to handle specific functions previously carried out by one role or institution. For 
example, specialist institutions provide education, health care, welfare and social 
control, all once in the domain of religious institutions. In short, social differentiation 
lessens the importance of religion by decreasing the importance of religious institutions 
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and norms for life. 
Societalisation is the process by which "life is increasingly enmeshed and 
organised, not locally but societally (that society being most evidently, but not uniquely, 
the nation state)" (Wilson 1982: 154). Religion according to Wilson, has its source in, 
and draws strength from, the community. As societalisation process has been making 
the society rather than the community the locus of individual's life, religion has been 
shorn of its functions (Wilson 1982: 159). 
The processes of differentiation and societalisation break the plausibility of any 
single overarching moral and religious system. Religion, increasingly, have less 
connection to most roles, defined in secular terms and is performed in an anonymous 
and impersonal public domain, and withdrawn more to privatised, individual domain 
where its existence can continue. Therefore, religion becomes privatised and is pushed 
to margins of the social order. It ceases to be a matter of necessity but a matter of 
preference, a leisure activity (Wallis and Bruce 1992: 13). 
Rationalisation largely involves changes in the way people think and 
consequentially in the way they act. According to Weber the Judeo-Christian tradition 
was peculiarly susceptible to secularisation and Judeo-Christianity had prepared the 
milieu for secularisation "by freeing the way for empirical enquiry, pragmatic and 
instrumental treatment of this world, and by encouraging rationalisation of theology 
(and after theology, of economics, politics and public life generally)" (Wallis and Bruce 
1992: 14). 
As a multidimensional concept, secularisation can be used to mean different 
things: It may mean decline of religion, perhaps measured in terms of individual 
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attendance to church, mosque. or other fon is of temples. It may mean religious change 
as a form of social change not necessarily implying the decline of the social significance 
of the religion. These kinds of usages may be misleading in the former case, and 
causing difficulty to understand secularisation thesis in the latter. 
Religion quite often is an all-embracing worldview. Therefore, secularisation - 
decline of the social significance of religion- must mean that certain processes in the 
modernisation process increasingly disengage modern individuals from social forms of 
religion. Some of these processes can be identified as differentiation, societalisation, 
rationalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, and increasing 
mobility. Secularisation is, therefore, predominantly a latent process, an inherent part of 
modernity. However, it is sometimes a deliberate policy. For example, this was the case 
in laicisation of the French education system (under the influence of intellectuals such 
as Durkheim10) with an aggressive secularism, and with a desire to establish and 
inculcate a doctrine that would replace the religion". Marx, Lenin and the Marxist 
parties were also in favour of a deliberate policy of laicisation. Marx upheld the 
autonomy of politics and this position was later affirmed by Lenin and implemented in 
the USSR. Indeed, the deliberate policy of laicisation that was mainly responsible in 
secularising the `Eastern Bloc' was based on the Marxist thought. As "the opium of the 
people", religion was considered as serving, to the oppression of the masses. For Marx, 
religion was the form of alienation par excellence. For Marxism, the future was to be 
classless, nationless and religionless (Gellner 1994a: 5). Rather than, in accordance 
with the Marxist theory, waiting for the natural withering away of the religion as the 
abolition of economic exploitation is realised (because religion would linger), the 
' See, for example, http: //www. reist. uiuc. edu/durkheim/Biography. htmi (last visited February 2005). 
The influence of the French example in Turkish education reforms has been unmistakable. 
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socialist states tried to hasten the dying out of the religion through dissemination of 
scientific-educational anti-religious propaganda and through socialist education in the 
schools (Dobbelaere 1981: 28). 
Historical notes on secularisation are helpful to understand this critical concept 
and process of modernity. Secularisation, as a process with a long history, has retained 
its ambiguous and controversial meaning. It was linked to the ideas of the 
Enlightenment. However, it is safe to say that `secular' is used in opposition to `sacred' 
and secularisation means a cultural `emancipation' from religion and church. 
Secularisation refers to the differentiation process in which structurally different 
institutions are developed to perform different functions. Religion becomes one 
institution alongside others and in turn loses its overarching claim. Thus, the 
disengagement of society from religion occurs (Dobbelaere 1981). This view, which 
goes back to Durkheim, is also related to Weber's analysis of the social change in the 
Western society. Durkheim's concept of differentiation implies that society gradually 
takes over all the secular functions previously performed by religion. This 
transformation of the sacred domain into secular institutions means desacralisation of 
the world that Weber described as the process of disenchantment. The source of 
mastering the world shifted from magic to the technology and calculation, which 
implies a rationalisation process. 
Secularisation is a process in which proper religions are pushed to the periphery 
of modem industrial societies. It is a process by which "sectors of society and culture 
are removed form the domination of religious institutions and symbols"... [its result is] 
the decline of religious content in the arts, in philosophy, in literature and, most 
important of all... the rise of science as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective 
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on the world" (Berger 1967: 107). Thus, in a world that becomes increasingly crowded 
with institutionally specialised, rational, and secular modern ideologies, religion loses 
its primary social function of societal legitimation. The `Church' loses its control over 
social institutions. As Durkheirn pointed out "religion tends to embrace a smaller and 
smaller portion of social life", whereas, "originally it pervades everything; everything 
social is religious", however. gradually, "political, economic, scientific functions free 
themselves from the religious function", God progressively withdraws himself from the 
world and "leaves more place to the free play of human forces" (Durkheim 1964: 169- 
170). 
According to Berger. the roots of laicisation are in the rationalisation of 
economic area, which "is the prerequisite for any industrial society of modern type" 
(1967: 128). A modern society requires large cadres of scientific and technological 
personnel with high degree of rationalisation both on the level of organisation and 
consciousness; the modern state becomes increasingly occupied with the political and 
legal requirements of the economy resulting in establishment of highly rational 
bureaucracies with adequate ideological legitimation. Thus, an affinity develops 
between economic and political spheres. "Secularisation then passes from the economic 
to the political sphere in a near-inexorable process of `diffusion"' (Berger 1967: 131). 
Secularisation process is not limited to the economic and political spheres; knowledge 
also becomes increasingly secular, leading to secular schools of thoughts. Secularised 
science increasingly diminishes the impact of theological outlook on the world. 
In modernisation process, rational institutional spheres develop at the expense of 
the community. Individuals are required to assume and perform roles in rational 
organisations. As the success of these rational organisations are measured by their 
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efficiency. unrelated to an over-arching meaning system. each person is required to 
perform his or her anonymous specialist function. The new rational empirical 
orientation to the world means that the individual becomes `replaceable' in these 
rational institutions. The result is that relationships in modern societies become more 
and more secondary or gesellschaftist. They become impersonal, positional, 
contractual. formal. utilitarian, confined to segments of the person and transferable. The 
individual ceases to be an end in himself/ herself as in the Gemeinschaft, where the 
relationships were primary. affective, total. regulated by habits. "A community really 
involves face-to-face relationships of known persons... Society, in contrast, involves the 
interaction of role-performances of unknown role-players" (Berger 1967: 264). As the 
community (Gemeinschaft) ceases to be the basis of social organisation, religion as the 
constitutive element of community loses its social significance. Therefore, 
secularisation can be seen as decline of the community or communitarian spirit. 
The individual is segmented in the modem society as the public and private 
sphere are segregated. Religion is left to private sphere and the private sphere becomes 
consumer oriented. One expert argues that the individual in constructing his identity 
becomes free to choose his religiosity in the same way he chooses friends, a marriage 
partner, goods and services. As a private matter, religion could no longer be imposed on 
him, but it has to be marketed. It has to compete with other leisure activities 
(Dobbelaere 1981: 19-22). 
Secularisation indicates a process of laicisation. On the societal level, 
institutions such as politics and education are withdrawn from the religious sphere; the 
`sacred' canopy is more and more restricted. On the individual level, people are said to 
be secularised when their involvement in the churches declines or when important 
66 
occasions in life (e. g. birth, marriage, burial) are not sacralised. Secularisation is a 
sensitising concept, giving the user a general sense of guidance, a general direction in 
approaching to empirical cases. Therefore, some apparent contradictions between the 
European and the American cases do not mean that they are not but two variations on 
the same theme of secularisation. ''- 
The secularisation thesis is not free from criticism, for example Brown, 
mentioning counter evidence, expresses doubts by asking "why should religion be 
stronger in a community than in a society? " and points out that "religion is not a human 
failing that was born in ignorance and that is dying in knowledge. " He also states that 
religion adapts to different social and economic contexts and it is not static but 
changing; and changes that churches undergo, do not mean secularisation (Brown 1992: 
39). Therefore, to give an example, according to Brown, the social significance of 
religion can rise and fall in any social and economic context, pre-industrial, industrial, 
post-industrial; does not decay automatically or irreversibly with the growth of human 
knowledge, rationality or technology, or with urbanisation and industrialisation; can 
suffer short to medium-term decay, but adapts to new contexts (Brown 1992: 55-6). 
There are naturally conflicting views on the result of modernisation as the cause 
of the rapid social change including secularisation. Johan Galtung provides a 
pessimistic picture of the social costs of modernisation. He observes that many societies 
are in a state of advanced social disintegration, they are caught up in a process of 
destructuration and deculturation, heading for structurelessness and culturelessness, 13 
and at this stage in human history, we need to question whether there is any normative 
culture at all. Galtung warns that "we may be on the way" towards a society consists of 
12 For a comparison between secularisation processes in Europe and the USA, and an explanation high 
church going in secular USA, see (Dobbeleare 1981). 
13 For the elaboration on the terms see (Galtung 1996: 382), he refers to culturelessncss as 'anomie' and 
to structurelessness as 'atomic'. 
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isolated social atoms (1996: 379-384). In his analysis of wide-ranging developments 
Gattung observes that the secularism as a project of the West undermined transcendent 
religion and secularism in the form of humanistic ethics has not been capable of 
producing binding norms for human behaviour: 
Why shall you not kill, steal and lie when other humans are mere objects and there is 
no accountability to higher forces as there is no transcendent God anyhow? (Galtung 
1996: 397). 
He also observes that all over the world, people are in shock after reading, listening to 
or viewing the media. The world seems in turmoil. each nation wants its state and he 
adds: 
big blocs are taking shape at the world level, rich countries are set against 
poor... there are new military alliances; culture, and particularly religion, come up 
against secularised elites capable only of uttering the standard curse: 
`fundamentalism'. Homo homini lupus, bellum omnium contra omnes; everybody 
for himself; apparently out of control, unrestrained; disintegration (Galtung 1996: 
400) 
Secularisation is a complex and ideologically weighted concept that is 
multidimensional, nonlinear, and sometimes reversible. In fact, for example, Kepel 
argues that starting from the mid-1970s the secularisation trend in the world went into 
reverse. A new religious approach emerged "aimed no longer at adapting secular values 
but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organisation of society- by changing 
society if necessary" and moving away from modernism that had failed due to 
"separation from God" (Kepel 1994: 2; see also Eisenstadt 2000). 
Secularisation as a trend and secularism as a political principle came under 
strong criticism from rising religious movements in the last several decades. Emergence 
of these movements and their agenda challenge almost every basic assumption of 
secularisation theory and secularism as a political ideology (see, Jakobsen and 
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Pellegrini 2000, McClay 2001, Baird 2000). Islamism should be considered within this 
global phenomenon. It is too early, nonetheless, to argue that the general trend of 
secularisation in the world, in the West or in the Middle East has ended and that a 
reverse trend has started. 
1.4.5 THE 1IODERNISATION OF THE STATE 
The advent of the modern state, which has come to dominate our lives, has been 
also an important part of the development of modernity. Once again, developments in 
Europe, the cradle of modernity, have been extremely important in shaping the nature of 
the modern state and modern international state system. The feudal political system 
with its overlapping and divided authority/loyalty (Poggi 1978: 27) left its place in 
Europe to `absolutist' (France, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Sweden and Russia) or 
`constitutional' (England, Holland) monarchies, with more apparent differences than 
real ones (Mann 1986: 476). Absolutism as the predecessor of the modern state 
signalled the emergence of larger and stronger states by annexing smaller-weaker 
political units. In the creation of these larger absolutist states, the impact of the 
European modernisation process, especially increasing technological mastery over the 
nature and other human beings who lacked that technology, was decisively important. 
The most important feature of the European absolutist state, which was passed to 
the modern state, was its success in centralisation. The centralisation meant that 
political and economic decisions radiate from a centre towards the periphery. The 
state's administrative power had been increased by introduction of a permanent, expert 
bureaucracy and with the introduction of a standing army; the centralisation of means of 
violence was nearly complete (Anderson 1974; Giddens 1981). There was also 
centralisation of fiscal management with increasing (compared to feudal system) 
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efficiency to collect the taxes. 
As far as the society of the European states is concerned, the Westphalian model 
of 1648 was a milestone in international relations. According to the model 
" the world consists of sovereign states with no superior authority which means that; 
" all states are equal before the international law, disregarding asymmetries of power. 
But no higher authority means; 
0 differences among the states can and will be settled ultimately by force (Held 
1992a: 86). 
The importance of the absolutist state and the Westphalian model of society of states lie 
in the fact that they had been the proximate sources of the modern state and modern 
international state system. 
Although, the transition from the absolutist to the modern state is very complex, 
it should be noted here that the modern state, for better or worse, is very different from 
the absolutist state in many fundamental aspects of life. In the modernisation process, 
ever-increasing centralisation of the state institutions, led to an enormous ability of the 
state to influence/shape the lives of individuals or social groups (e. g. religious groups) 
within its territory. 
Before, analysing how the states influence our lives, the difficulty of 
generalising about the state must be recognised. However, Mann's definition of the 
state, which he says much influenced by Weber, provides a minimalist but very good 
starting point of analysis: 
1. the state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel; 
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2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a 
centre, to cover a; 
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises; 
4. some degree of authoritative, binding nilemaking, backed up by some organised 
physical force. (Mann 1993: 55). 
. 
Today, almost all states are nation-states and almost all of them posses the above 
qualities with varying degrees. The importance of how the state acts is obvious from 
the Mann's definition. First, the state extracts a certain income among other resources 
(e. g. manpower as conscripts in many countries) from the society. For example, it is not 
unusual in the West for state budgets to be around 40% of the national income. 
Naturally, the way the state spends these enormous amounts is fundamentally important 
for the whole population. For example the quality of education at all levels, health care, 
crime rate, quality of public/ private transport or even one's employment are directly or 
indirectly related to state's preferences in its redistributive spending. 
Another important point in Mann's definition that the state makes rules 
governing crucial aspects of one's life and enforce them if necessary, through police 
force, judiciary 14, or even through military. Non-observance is punished, even by death 
in many countries15. The State's monopoly on the `legitimate' use of violence within its 
territory is emphasised by Weber who writes: "force is a means specific to the 
state... state is a relation of men dominating men... a relation supported by means of 
legitimate16 (i. e. considered to be legitimate) violence" (cited by Gerth and Mills (eds. ) 
1967: 78). 
1' Although the place of judiciary is not straightforward as an institution within the state, as it has certain 
levels of autonomy from the executive varying from country to country. 
15 It is interesting to note that, among the 41 members of the Conference of Europe, only Turkey retained 
the death penalty in its laws until 2003. In other words, the death penalty is banished from `modern body 
of law' in Europe, whereas it remains in the most powerful and modern USA. 
16 1 will return to the question of legitimacy. Suffice it to say that not all states can have a claim to 
legitimacy and hence legitimate use of violence domestically. 
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In short: 
the state has grown increasingly important in every society, from advanced 
industrial to Third World primary-good exporters. and in every aspect of society, not 
just politics, but in economics (production, finance. distribution) in ideology 
(schooling, the media), and in law enforcement (police, military). (Camoy 1984: 3; 
some punctuation marks deleted). 
Thus, modern state is politicising by definition because its policies are so 
important for our lives, it is more so in many Muslim countries because it is often seen, 
for example, by Islamists, simply as a tool of a particular group (e. g. secular, 
Nvesternised or nationalist elite). 
1.4.6 MODERN INTERNATIONAL STATE SYSTEM 
A comparative look a the international state system makes one realise that there 
are vast differences among nation-states due to they are being at different levels of 
(economic, social and political) modernisation and also due to historical developments 
or even by luck (e. g. having large oil reserves or other natural resources). 
The World Development Report (WDR) of 1998/99 (World Bank 1999) 
presents its statistical tables of countries, under the titles of "Size of the economy; 
Quality of life; Population and labour force; Distribution of income or consumption; 
Education; Health; Energy use and emissions; Growth of the economy; Structure of the 
output; Power and transportation; Communications, information, and science and 
technology. " In the Table 1, "Classification of economics by income and region 1998, " 
countries are classified according to income as, low, middle (lower or upper) or high- 
income countries. 
The WDR is a contribution to the worldwide international `culture' of 
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comparison. It is an affirmation that the nation-states or their members can be 
compared, for example, on the bases of population, land area, gross national product - 
absolute and according to purchasing power -, life expectancy, child malnutrition, adult 
illiteracy, level of urbanisation, income distribution, public spending on education, level 
of schooling, health expenditure, infant mortality, amount of energy use per capita, 
growth rate of their economies, structure of output; number of daily newspapers, TVs, 
land and mobile phones, personal computers used by per 1000 people; internet usage, 
proportion of scientists and engineers in population. number of patent applications. 
The WDR (World Bank 1999: 190) shows that in 1997 the GNP of the USA was 
USS 7,690 billions (with per capita income (pci) of S 28,740), Japan's was 2,951 (pci: 
23,400); Germany's was 1,748 (pci: 21,300); Turkey's was 410 (pci: 6,430). Ethiopia 
with a population of 60 millions had a GNP of 31 billions and a per capita income of S 
510, equivalent of 1.4 dollar per day. A USA citizen had 4.5 times more income than a 
Turk and 56 times more than an Ethiopian. In 1997,2,048 millions of world population 
who had low income had an average per capita income of S 1,400; 2,855 millions who 
had middle income had an average of S 4,550 and 926 millions (equivalent of one sixth 
of world population) had a high income of S 22,770 per capita. The figures in the 
WDR reminds that there are very rich (developed, industrialised) and very poor 
(underdeveloped/developing, agricultural) countries in the world as well as countries 
which are somewhere between these two ends of the scale. 
The WDR (World Bank 1999: 190) figures also remind that there are very big - 
in terms of population and land area- and very small and in between nation-states in the 
world. For example, population of China, in 1997, was 1,227 millions, United States' 
population was 268 millions, Germany's was 82 millions, UK and France had 59 
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millions each, Turkey's population was 04 millions. Hobsbawm observes that in 
around 200 states in the world, about 25 has populations of over 50 million each; this 
makes up to three quarters of the global population. "At the other extreme, 71 of the 
political units treated as `economies' by the World Bank in 1992 contained less than 2.5 
million; 18 of these contained populations of less than 100,000. " (1996: 271). 
It would be useful to add the category of democracy when comparing countries 
as an important index of (political) modernisation. "Modernity shifted the political 
power from kings to people" (Mann 1993: 46), and the fact that today there are both 
liberal democracies and non-democracies in the world provides another factor in 
`measuring' modernisation. One of the most important differences between democratic 
and non-democratic countries is the mechanism of ensuring the obedience of the 
population to the state rules (laws). Failure of the state in this task has grave 
consequences, like long civil wars, low intensity wars within a region of the state or 
even death of that state. 
Obedience may be due to many factors. Held (1989) distinguishes seven 
reasons: "We may obey or comply because: 
I There is no choice in the matter (following orders, or coercion) 
2 No thought has ever been given to it and we do it as it has always been done 
(tradition). 
3 We cannot be bothered one way or another (apathy). 
4 Although we do not like the situation.. . [we] accept what seems 
like fate 
(pragºnatic acquiescence) 
5 We are dissatisfied with things as they are but... [we accept them] because it is in 
the long run to our advantage (instrumental acceptance or conditional 
agreement/consent). 
6 In the circumstances before us, and with the information available to us at the 
moment, we conclude it is `right', `correct', `proper' for us as an individual or 
member of a collectivity: it is what we genuinely should or ought to do 
(normative agreement). 
7 It is what in ideal circumstances -with, for instance, all the knowledge would like, 
all the opportunity to discover the circumstances and requirements of others- we 
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would have agreed to do (ideal normative agrc'c! ndut). " (p. 101) 
Held thinks that only types 6 and 7 deserves the term legitimacy -an important concept 
for democracy- with category 5 being ambiguous, which could "imply a weak form of 
legitimacy", but since it is "instrumental or conditional" it does not deserve the terns 
legitimacy (p. 102). Therefore, legitimacy is something that the state has to won (Held 
1992a: 88) and if the power belongs to the rulers, legitimacy rests with the general 
population. It seems that, a legitimate state can only exist in a liberal democracy where 
the individuals are free and empowered and have access to necessary information as 
qualified by Held in category 7 above. Theoretically, one possible alternative of a non- 
democratic but legitimate state would be a state of an extremely homogenised - 
especially in terms of ideology- population who's popular will manifests itself in a non- 
democratic way, but this kind of society is highly unlikely. 
Legitimacy is an important part of democracy; but democracy is a broader term. 
One of the most important terms in discussion of democracy has been Dahl's concept of 
`polyarchy. ' Polyarchy requires not only extensive political competition and 
participation but also high levels of freedom of expression and pluralism (1971: 3). 
According to Diamond a liberal democracy has following features: 
1) Real power lies-in fact as well as in constitutional theory-with elected officials 
and their appointees, rather than with unaccountable internal actors (e. g. the 
military) or foreign powers. 
2) Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other 
government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, 
ombudsman... ) 
3) ... electoral outcomes 
[are] uncertain... no groups that adheres to constitutional 
principles is denied to form a party and contest elections... 
4) Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups ... unempowered majorities, 
are not prohibited... from expressing their interests in the political process, and from 
using their language and culture. 
Additionally, citizens have alternative sources of information, associational freedom, 
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substantial freedom of belief. opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly. 
demonstration and petition; they are equal under the law and are protected from 
"unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture and undue interference in their personal 
lives"(Diamond 1996: 23-4). 
It will be seen in detail that many themes similar to mentioned above emerged in 
Islamist criticism of legitimacy of regimes and lack of democracy in the Middle East in 
general and in Turkey in particular. 
1.4.7 GLOBALISATION AND MODERNITY 
I have analysed some important aspects of modernisation, namely, capitalism, 
secularisation, nationalism, modem state and state system, and 
industrialisation/economic change. Globalisation can be considered a closely linked 
process to modernisation that binds these aspects in a world scale. Globalisation is 
defined by Harvey as "time and space compression" (1990: 240). By using this term, 
Harvey highlights the feeling that (largely due to technological progress) the spatial and 
time related features of the world is exceedingly compressing to the point of collapse. 
A more precise definition of globalisation is offered by Held et al: 
a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organisation of social relations and transactions-assessed in terms of their extensity, 
intensity, velocity and impact- generating transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power (1999: 16). 
We are living in a globalising world where secular, anti-secular, industrialised (rich), 
underdeveloped, militarily powerful, weak societies (or groups, individuals) in the 
nation-states interact much more intensely compared to previous generations. Thus, 
globalisation becomes a central concept in analysing the evolution of modernity. 
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Rosenau gives primacy to technology in explaining globalisation: 
It is technology... that has so greatly diminished geographic and social distances 
through the jet-powered airliner, the computer, the orbiting satellite, and many other 
innovations that now move people, ideas and goods more rapidly and surely across 
space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered the 
scale on which human affairs take place (1990: 17). 
Giving primacy to technology can be justified if we define it broadly as the things and 
brays used to increase human masten" over nature. 
As Waters points out, globalisation is a key development in `three arenas' of 
life: 1. The economy. Production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and 
services are increasingly being globalised. 2. The polity. The states' capacity of 
coercion, military power, surveillance is globalising. 3. Culture. Cultural products, 
values, symbols are produced, diffused or consumed increasingly globally (1995: 7-8). 
Evidence for economic globalisation is obvious, as international trade has 
reached to unprecedented level of around 20 per cent of world output (Held et al. 1999: 
149). Economic globalisation involves, inter alia: 
1. Emergence of world markets for traded goods and services, which means emergence 
of transnational corporations (TNCs) in production of these goods and services. 
2. World scale competition in production and sale of many services and products. In 
this competition, it can be said that Wallerstein's characterisation is still valid. The core 
(developed) countries are successful in keeping ahead of the periphery 
(underdeveloped) countries. And there is limited, but psychologically extremely 
important, success of some semi-periphery states (e. g. Asian Tigers). The success of 
newly industrialising states is providing both a hope/example of promoting one's 
relatively underdeveloped economy in the world and an excuse for the developed 
countries in abstaining from providing economically important help to the 
underdeveloped (see, for example, Bauman 1998: 73). Among the many reasons of 
economic success or failure in an increasingly globalised world economy, the level of 
technological development occupies a special place. A higher level of technology 
ensures that a society may produce high value added (core-like in Wallerstein's terms) 
industrial products and services (satellites, computer hardware or software, medical 
equipment, cars etc) and hence highly paid jobs as opposed to low value added (e. g. 
agricultural) products or services. 
The impact of economic globalisation is by no means even all over the world. 
This is mainly because of the relative immobility of the labour as opposed to almost full 
mobility of the capital. In other words, "people who invest" are no longer space-tied in 
their decisions but employees are, and cannot easily follow the company once it moves 
elsewhere (Bauman 1998: 8). Thus, globalisation can strike in the heartlands of the 
economically most developed countries in terms of unemployment, de-industrialisation, 
de-skilling or even decline of the welfare state. 
If we turn to globalisation of the polity, we see that as far as the form of the state 
is concerned, the world is fully globalised, as the world is divided among the nation- 
states. However, there are vast differences among them in terms of political power 
defined in terms of means of violence and capacity of surveillance. Therefore, the 
globalisation of politics means that, increasingly, political decisions and actions in one 
part of the world can rapidly have worldwide ramifications. Political globalisation 
means that the more powerful states (e. g. the USA) have now larger capacity to project 
their power in a global scale. Their use of this capacity, for example in the Gulf War is 
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rapid, large scale and easily observable, even in the living room of our houses thanks to 
24 hours news channels, like 17 , broadcasting globally. 
Their political decision not 
to use their power (e. g. in Bosnia, during first few years) also has worldwide 
ramifications with much more criticism in the Muslim world. Political decisions taken 
by powerful states can have dramatic effects on the small states but again the effects of 
globalisation are not linear or easily predictable and the dependence of the powerful 
states on the weak states can also increase. Today, political practices and political 
values of the modem (largely `Nestern) states, which can be put under the umbrella of 
liberal democracy, have an enormous importance in world politics. Although the 
triumphalism of some (e. g. Fukuyama 1989) is premature, liberal democratic countries 
often, but selectively, use their political principles as yardsticks in their relations with 
other countries. Lastly, it should be noted that economic power is extremely fungible 
(i. e. transferable). An economically powerful state can have or increase political power 
very quickly. 
Cultural globalisation involves, inter alia, diffusion of religions, secular 
ideologies, ideas, `high' or `low' cultural values, practices or products between 
societies. Therefore, the spread of world's most populous religions like Christianity, 
Islam or Hinduism; the spread of secular ideologies like nationalism, socialism are great 
examples of (limited) cultural globalisation. If we focus on today, we see that, once 
again, largely due to technological progress, there is an increasing movement of 
different cultural values, practices and products as well as people (who carry their 
culture with them) across the globe. We see globalisation of (Western? ) scientific view 
among the world scientists. We see globalisation of football as a world sport with same 
17 The emergence of Al- Jazecra in early 2000s providing an alternative perspective, for the Middle 
Easterners in particular should be noted. 
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rules applying in Japan or Turkey. We see globalisation of liberal democratic values as 
more and more countries are moving towards becoming democracies. We also see that 
as opposed to limited cultural influence of `the rest of the world', there is an increasing 
cultural influence of the West on the rest of the world (Holton 1998: 163). 
There are many factors contributing the globalisation of Western cultural 
influences. For example, historical developments of colonialism and imperialism, and 
technological-economical superiority of the West are important factors in making large 
sections of the world population speakers (as a second or foreign language) of the 
languages of the Western powers. The place of English is especially important. 
Language is perhaps the most important milieu of culture. The politico-economic power 
of the West and Japan means that they have a large capacity to project, carry/sell their 
cultural values, products. For example, affluent, large enough US market means large 
budgets (high-tech, more time, more people working) in production of cinema films, TV 
programs or music albums which are sold through well-organised (often backed by the 
states) international distribution networks. As much as 30-70% of TV shows watched 
in many developing countries may be Western in origin (Bin Sayeed 1995: 147). It 
should be noted that cinema films, TV programs and music albums are not devoid of 
substance as mere entertainment products. Their contents have explicit or hidden 
messages sometimes unintentionally put across. Therefore, there are important cultural 
consequences of watching Western films, TV programs or listening to musical products 
in the recipient countries. 
Increasingly, transnational developments are linked with local and sub-national 
is For example, when an MP in Turkey proposed a law to force cinema halls to allocate at least 25% their 
time to show Turkish films, according to 1 k, President Bush, to safeguard the interests of Hollywood, 
intervened and the law dropped from the political agenda (Iýik 1990: 90). 
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identities and cultural processes, thus forcing, for example, Islamic groups to articulate 
discourses and strategies against, for example, Western cultural, economic and political 
dominance. 19 
1.4.8 MODERNISATION. FOR DEVELOPMENT 
With regard to the question of "modernisation for what", most of the people 
would give an answer that "modernisation is desired for economic, social and political 
development". Clearly, there is no agreed definition of development; it is a normative 
term. However, it can be said that development is the change towards a valued state. 
Moreover, by definition, disagreements about the nature of development among 
individuals and societies are nothing less than reflections of their broader ideological 
and cultural commitments. For example, in his seminal paper Dudley Seers argued that 
development involved "the realisation of the potential of human personality" and 
suggested that this was best achieved through reduction of poverty, unemployment and 
inequality. "If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse-it would 
be strange to call the result development, even if per capita income doubled" (1969: 2- 
3). When asked to revisit his meaning of development this time he included self- 
reliance and increased cultural independence: 
Development now implies, inter alia, reducing cultural dependence on one or more 
of the great powers -i. e. increasing the use of national language in schools, allotting 
more television time to programmes produced locally... raising the proportion of 
higher degrees obtained at home, etc (1977: 5). 
As we will see, most Islamists share such an understanding of modernisation. 
'" It should be kept in mind that, as Holton reminds us, despite the Western dominance there is not a 
single dominant centre in the global field. For many locations some other force than Westernisation or 
Americanisation may seem threatening (1998: 169-170). 
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1.5 MODERNITY AND 1'HE NEST 
Clearly, modernity started as a European project. Until the US became a major 
actor in the world, modernity was in the monopoly of Western and central Europe. Then 
modernity had become a western project. Is it still so? Today, the relative weight of the 
West in conceptualisation of the modernity is extremely important. It should be clear 
from the previous analysis in this chapter that `the West' is a historical rather than 
geographical construct. By 'itwestern ' one means the type of society seen in the West, 
politically and economically developed, capitalist, urbanised in short modern. 
'Modernisation of these societies started in Europe after feudalism, so, modernity as a 
concept had been associated with a luggage of period and geography. It could be argued 
that it is still possible to associate modernity with a period that is now and, to some 
extent, with a place that is still predominantly the [Vest. What is exactly at stake here is 
this extent. Level of debt in the definition of modernity to the West is extremely crucial. 
If it is too high then it means that the modern and the West can be identified. 
As flail points out, `the West' as a term can function on different levels: 
First, it allows us to characterise and classify societies in to different categories... 
Secondly, it is an image, or set of images. It condenses a number of different 
characteristics into one picture... for example, `western' = urban = developed; or 
'non-western' = non-industrial = rural = agricultural = under-developed. ) 
Thirdly, it provides a standard or model of comparison. It allows us to compare to 
what extent different societies resemble, or differ from, one another. Non-western 
societies can accordingly be said to be `close to' or `far away from' or `catching up 
with' the West. It helps to explain difference. 
Fourthly, it provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked 
and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster. (For example, 
the West' = developed = good = desirable; or the `non-West' = under-developed = 
bad = undesirable. ) It produces a certain kind of knowledge about a subject and 
certain attitudes towards it. In short, it functions as an ideology. (Hall 1992b: 277). 
Development of the West as a concept, which is closely related to development 
and definition of modernity as a concept, is related to growing inadequacy of the term 
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Europe for the same task. According to one interpretation, modernity was all about the 
rise of Europe. 'Tile European Miracle', the idea of the miraculous nature of the 
European experience, and later the Western experience, cannot be disputed. How did 
Europeans manage to escape from `the agrarian trap', from the dreadful regiment of 
kings and priests? One answer is, because, they were `better' than those who failed. 
Indeed, they were better in certain aspects; for example, in constructing an economic 
system conducive to development (Marx), or in finding more rational religious 
interpretation of the world (Weber). This was the belief in superiority of the `Western 
civilisation' and continued to influence most of the social scientists in the West, 
including theorists of modernisation school. They, like evolutionary theorists of the 
nineteenth century, also `found' many, basically ethnocentric, explanations of the fact 
that why modernisation firstly took place in Europe. However, it is possible see the rise 
of Europe as a gigantic series of coincidences. Many factors, some old, long term, 
others recent, emanating from the European, Near Eastern and even Central Asian 
civilisational areas came together in a particular time and place to create something 
unusual (Gellner 1988; Mann1988). 
It is also possible to see the rise of Europe and the West as a historical phase 
like rise and fall of many other civilisations in history. The point at which Europe 
`overtook' Asia must have been around 1450 writes Mann (1988: 7). Prior to that 
Europe was inferior not superior to Asia in many aspects. Most innovations proved to 
have great positive implications in European development came from the East including 
gunpowder; the mariner's compass and printing. Naturally, one may think that the 
Western civilisation owes great deal to Eastern civilisations and religions including 
Islamic civilisation, which were once superior to it. Therefore, many non-Westerners, 
including many Islamists, like to think that it is possible for others to regain the lead 
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from the West. 
Modernity can be seen as a historical phase and to attribute modernity to some 
ethnocentric factors that emerged in the West, - like individualism, Protestant ethic, or 
capitalism- is to state that modernity is inherently western or `western modernity' is 
universal, and there is no way of escaping from it. Perhaps this attribution occurs 
because, "Modernity, the creation of Europe, itself created Europe" (Heller and Feher 
1991: 146) (and the Europeans created the USA, Australia, New Zealand etc. ). 
Therefore, discourse on modernity in the West is West-centric, because the term 
modern like the term western can function at different levels and one of them was being 
like an ideology in the formation of Europe and `the West'. 
But, if one chooses a reductionist conceptualisation of modernity like Lyotard, 
for whom modernity was characterised by "a desire to systemise and capture the world, 
to free human beings by using calculative thought to master and manipulate the 
conditions of life" (cited by Sayyid 1997: 106), then it is possible to disengage 
modernity from its socio-political connotations to a considerable extent. The importance 
of such disengagement is obvious. First, it provides a `breathing space' for an anti- 
western but pro-modern ideological stance that, for example, held by many Islamists. 
However, even a conceptualisation of modernity, like Lyotard's, which effectively 
reduces modernity to the progressive mastery over the nature, is not free from problems. 
Because the change in economic activity to improve human mastery over the nature and 
hence to improve `conditions of life' necessarily involves processes previously 
analysed; namely, societisation of the community, differentiation of the society, or 
rationalisation of human actions. It is safe to assume that these processes starting in 
economy would have social and political consequences like secularisation that have 
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wide range of effects on social and political life. There is extreme difficulty, not to say 
impossibility, to separate the modernity from the West as far as crucial modernising 
processes concerned. Secularisation as one of the most important process to be 
associated with modernity is also a fundamental aspect of the West. Therefore, it can be 
said that if a society is modernising, it is secularising; not only that it is also 
westernising in the sense that its socio-political system is, at least in part, resembling to 
that of the secular West. 
It should be stressed that, apart from its secularising influences, economic 
modernisation understood in terms of using developing technology to improve the 
material conditions of life, is sought after by most societies if not all. Clearly, many 
secularising influences of economic change (be it industrialisation, economic 
differentiation which includes supply of religiously forbidden goods or services) are not 
welcome by religious individuals or societies and they think that these influences must 
be stopped or at least slowed down. However, even for the anti-secularist groups, it 
seems that majority of the economic modernisation is predominantly value-neutral and 
it does not present a problem, even if it means becoming closer to the western economic 
model. In other words, in anti-western countries it would not bother the regime or the 
people to produce cars or computers like in `the West'. This might be so because of 
same biological or environmental limits of the human beings all over the world. For 
example, extreme exceptions aside, it can be assumed that all human beings want a 
shelter/house against the elements, adequate food, access to medical care (hospitals), 
mobility (car, planes), good education for the society (schools, teachers), 
communication (telephones etc), safety (adequate police force and adequate military), 
time (time saving machines like tractors, computers) and means of entertainment (e. g. 
music players, TVs, etc. ). Economic modernisation (and globalisation) is exactly about 
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production of these or similar products or services to meet very similar human needs or 
wants. Although the global economic activity is very complex, it can be argued that as 
long as the West continues to be economically advanced, its importance in defining 
economic aspect of modernity will continue. 
As Huntington points out, the Nest has been dominating and using the 
international economic and political structures to enhance its own position and interests. 
The West dominates international political and security institutions itself and economic 
institutions with the help of Japan. Decisions of the U. N. Security Council or the 
International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the \Vest are presented to the 
world as the desires of the world community (and the phrase `world community' has 
become a euphemistic collective noun like `the Free World'). The West promotes its 
economic interests through international economic institutions. The West also promotes 
its values, often presenting them as universal values (Huntington 1993a: 39-41). 
Huntington points out that, non-western states have three alternatives to follow 
as their responses to the western power and values. The first is complete isolation, like 
Burma or North Korea, to insulate their societies against `corruption' by the West. The 
second way, the equivalent of `bandwagoning' in international relations theory, is to 
join the West by accepting its values and institutions as Turkey has been trying to do. 
The third alternative 'is to try to balance the West by creating economic and military 
power and cooperating with other non-Western powers against the 'Vest, as most 
Islamist movements want. In other words, modernising while preserving indigenous 
values and institutions and thus not westernising (Huntington 1993a: 41). Huntington 
touches an important point. If the non-western societies are going to be more and more 
important in defining modernity they will have to be more and more important in 
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economic and political terms. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that it is possible to see some processes as 
core processes of modernity. It could be argued that economic modernisation started 
with agricultural revolution and then industrialisation and now with growing importance 
of service sector in a globalising world economy has been central to modernity. In other 
words, it is not possible to imagine a modem society without a successful economy. As 
for the capitalism; although all collapsed at the end, Soviet Union and other socialist 
states had showed for a long time that a non-capitalist (socialist, planned) route to 
modern society is possible. However. today, capitalism remains to be the dominant 
economic system of modem societies. What is more, the capitalist model of economic 
modernisation is being followed by countries, such as Turkey, which has been under the 
influence of the West. This makes capitalism a central concept in the dominant or 
alternative visions of modernity in these countries. 
Nationalism has been another very important component of modernity. Today, 
the world is a world of nation-states. In most of the nation-states, it is possible to see 
dominance of a particular nation, the French in France, the English in the UK, the 
Germans in Germany, the Chinese in China and the English-speaking white American 
in the USA. This is not to say that all these societies are fanatically nationalist; they are 
not. The point is the importance of the act of defining the nation as the subjects of 
nation-states. In this sense, the nation-states are being re-defined according to 
nationalist principles. Their societies are `communities' created according to mainly a 
secular definition of the nation in each nation-state. A secular understanding of the 
nation is a great force against religions like Christianity or Islam. 
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The modernisation of the state and the international state system is also central 
to comprehend modernity as aglobal concept. The centralisation of the state with its 
oppressive machinery has been crucial in shaping modernity. However, it is a fact that, 
although in democratic (mainly Western) societies the power of the state has come 
under popular control, in many other, including Muslim, countries, as if in an `arrested 
mode' the powerful-centralised state is still run by unaccountable rulers. Therefore, in 
these authoritarian countries, the political modernisation is behind the `schedule' and 
this fact is often partly justified by referring the powerful Islamist currents that are 
perceived as more anti-democratic than existing regimes. Whether this is so will be one 
of the issues discussed in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 starts with an analysis of the relationship between Islam and the West; 
Islam and the important concepts and processes brought about by modernity. After an 
analysis of the rise of Islamism, the views of Islamist groups in the Middle East on 
important aspects of modernity and the West will be analysed. It will be seen that while 
Islamists advocate economically and politically strong Muslim countries, they want to 
disengage some politico-ideological connotations of modernity from economic 
modernisation. 
One of the sources of Islamist criticism or resistance against modernity is the 
criticism of the West as the embodiment of modernity. In other words, when the West is 
seen as a more or less unified (civilisational) entity that is thought to represent the 
modernity as the most modem part of the world, the criticism of the West also contains 
a criticism of the Western path to modernity. Islamist conceptualisation of an Islamic 
civilisation also includes a criticism of the West as a civilisation. 
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In Chapter 2,1 will analyse the Islamist response to modernity and the West 
along the lines discussed in this chapter. The Islamist responses to modernity and the 
West are shaped by certain reinterpretations of historical sources of Islam and recent 
modernisation processes of Muslim countries usually under secular, nationalist elite. 
C9 
CHAPTER 2 
ISLAMISTS, MODERNITY AND THE NEST 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, in an historical and selective approach. I have tried to put 
modernity in a context, recognisable by experts and Islamists alike. It is also important 
to put Islamist responses to modernity and the West in a context according to themes 
touched upon so far, to better understand the Welfare Party's stance in Turkey and this 
is what I aim for in this chapter with a special focus on the Greater Middle East. 
2.2 ISLAM AND THE WEST, THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that one important aspect of `modernity' 
is that it is strongly associated with and can be seen, as the rise of Europe, vis-ä-vis 
other continents. It is necessary to analyse the relationship between Islam and Europe to 
understand attitudes of Islamists towards modernity and the Nest. Although there seems 
an asymmetry between two terms, as one being a religion and the other is a 
geographical expression, the name of a continent, this asymmetry is more apparent than 
real. Europe is a European notion, it was conceived by Europeans and Europe 
discovered, named and made America. Also "Europe had invented both Asia and 
Africa. " The notion of Europe as a cultural and political entity was relatively modern; it 
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was "a postmedieval secularised restatement of what had previously been known as 
Christendom" (Lewis 1993: vii). The civilisation formerly designated by the term 
Christendom has undergone a process of reform and secularisation and has come to be 
known, in various contexts, as Europe. Islam is not a place; it is a religion, but for 
Islamists Islam is not a religion in a narrow sense which has become the case in the 
West as a result of a long historical experience; it is not merely a system of belief and 
worship or an isolated compartment of life distinct from other compartments, left to 
non-religious authorities. "It is rather the whole of life. and its rules include civil, 
criminal, and even what we would call constitutional law" (Lewis 1993: 4). Therefore, 
Islam has been the counterpart not only of Christianity but was also of Christendom. It 
is also the name of a whole civilisation which flourished under the aegis of that religion. 
Additionally, it has become fashionable since the end of the Cold War to speculate that 
with the `collapse' of communism, Islamism will be the next `-ism' that will challenge 
Western societies (see, Esposito 1995). This assumption is more or less based on the 
`incompatible' qualities of Islam with the Western liberal values (Mernissi 1996: 251). 
It is a common view among Muslims, not just among Islamists. that Islam 
survived to remain much closer to its original divine spirit whereas Christianity, like 
Judaism, had been falsified or corrupted by its followers. Christian doctrines of the 
Trinity, the son-ship and divinity of Christ were blasphemous and are explicitly rejected 
by the Qur'an (5: 75,78 and 112: 1-4; see Lewis 1993: 5-6) The prophetic mission of 
Muhammad (23 years) was to restore true monotheism which had been taught by earlier 
prophets (including Adam, Abraham, Noah, Moses, Jesus) but had been abandoned or 
distorted, to abolish idolatry and to bring God's final revelation. 
After death of the Prophet Muhammad, the first phase of caliphatic periods 
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(632- 661) began. This period of first four caliphs', in addition to the time of the 
Prophet itself, constituted what most, if not all, Muslims perceive, as the Golden Age of 
Islam, witnessing the spread of Islam in a breathtaking speed and scale, idealised as 
untarnished by any worldly desires on the part of the rulers. This period was the locus 
for the formation and development of Islamic ideology without a prophet. It is a 
reference point for Muslim self-understanding. It is a time to which "both conservative 
and modernist Islamic activists return for guidance in their attempt to delineate the 
Islamic character of modem states. " (Esposito 1991: 7). 
For Muslims the age of Muhammad and the first four caliphs is the normative, 
exemplary period of Islam. It was the time when God sent His final and complete 
revelation for humankind and His last prophet, Muhammad. The Islamic 
community/state was created, bonded by a shared religious identity and purpose. The 
Qur'an and other sources of Islamic life and law, inspiring leadership of Muhammad 
originated at this time. Muhammad's exemplary behaviour (Sunna) and his traditions 
and sayings (hadith) and the early practice of the community of the companions of the 
Prophet set a model for Muslim life. Therefore, this period (or rather its particular 
understandings), is used as the reference point for all Islamic revival and renewal 
whether traditionalist or modernist. 
At the Prophet's death (AD 632) Islam was still confined to parts of the Arabian 
Peninsula. However, within about a century, the geography of, Islam had been 
transformed, in what was one of the most swift and most dramatic changes in human 
history. Under the caliphs, "Muslims progressed from victory to victory, from triumph 
to triumph", conquering a vast realm extending from the borders of India and China to 
The first four caliphs were Abu Bakr (632-34), Umar (634-44), Uthman (644-56) and Ali (656-661). 
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the Pyrenees and the Atlantic -greater than Roman Empire at its zenith- and ruling 
millions. of new subjects large numbers of whom converted to the new faith (Lewis 
1995: 54; Lewis 1993: 4). Later, a new Islamic power, the Turks emerged who 
conquered parts of Anatolia from the Byzantines and in 1453 added Constantinople 
(Istanbul), as copestone, to their new imperial structure in Europe and Asia. The 
Ottoman sultans launched new series of further expeditions which took them to the 
plains of Hungary and twice in 1529 and in 1683 to the walls of Vienna. For a century 
and a half, the Turkish armies operating form their bases in Buda and Belgrade posed a 
greater threat to the heart of Christian Europe than had ever come from the Arabs in 
Spain (Lewis 1993: 11). 
Military response of the Christendom to Islamic threat included the Crusades. It 
is interesting that for many of today's Muslims the Crusades symbolise the earliest and 
the clearest example of mindless militant Christianity, earlier manifestation of 
aggression and imperialism of the Christian West, a reminder of Christianity's hostility 
toward Islam. 
The eleventh century marked a turning point in the relationship of the 
Christendom with the Islamic world. 
Up till 1000 the West was poor, backward and illiterate region, precariously 
defending itself against the assaults of barbarous nations by land and sea... All 
this while... Islam... was able to build up a brilliant and impressive urban 
culture. Now the situation was dramatically transformed... Trade and commerce 
revived, towns and markets sprang up; the population increased... the arts and 
sciences were cultivated on a scale unknown since the days of the Roman 
Empire. (Esposito 1995: 40, citing Saunders 1965: 154). 
The Crusades and the offensive of the Arabs and the Turks toward 
Christendom/Europe were very important historical developments which are referred to 
by those Muslims and Christians who see `the other' as militant, somewhat barbaric and 
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fanatical in its religious zeal, determined to conquer. convert, or eradicate the other; and 
thus an obstacle and threat to the realisation of world peace. 
With the modernisation of Europe the tide of Islam embodied in the Ottoman 
Empire was decisively broken and the European superiority had begun to be felt by the 
Muslims firstly in wars; but sooner it was seen that the Europeans were `superior' in 
their general social organisation and their success in wars was a result of their progress 
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rather than a cause. The European success in economy, technology and war was the 
major external factor forcing the Muslims, first, to look at critically and then try to 
appropriate European modernity. Especially after the ascendancy of the U. S. A. in the 
world, modernity has come to be embodied by the West, particularly for the Muslim 
world. 
2.2.1 Islam and Social Change: The Need for New Religious Interpretation 
It can be seen that the original sources of Islam -the Qur'an and the Sunna- 
provide limited legal texts in various fields of life (for example with regard to the nature 
of state and government). When it is needed, new laws can be made through Ijtihad -the 
process which develops new laws by employing juridical reasoning under the lights of 
the original texts and previous cases. Fiqh, that enormous corpus of laws, is the product 
of this intellectual process. Ijtihad is an unending process as the new situations of the 
Muslims demand new laws loyal to the spirit of Islam. Ijtihad can be done by a 
Mtjtehid. 
Unfortunately, by the ninth century "it came to be held by the great majority of 
ulema that the exercise of ijtihad was no longer permissible" (Watt 1988: 106). 
According to many non-Muslim or Muslim experts the end result was a stagnation of 
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thought in the Muslim world for centuries. It is important to note that, it was largely the 
European impact in IS"' and 19`x' centuries that caused the Islamic reformers to speak 
about the need to reopen the gate of iitihad (Cf. Tibi 1990: 41). 
The issue of ijtihad2 has a central place in religious history and political theory 
in Islam. A more precise definition of ijtihad is provided by Fazlur Rahman: 
the effort to understand the meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, 
containing a rule, and to alter that rule by extending or restricting or otherwise 
modifying it in such a manner that a new situation can be subsumed under it by a 
new solution (1982: 8). 
Ijtihad was understood in early Islam to be interpretation loyal to true sources 
namely the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. In other words the `Interpreters' were 
restricted in their judgements. Today. for Islamists the Islamic credentials of a Mc jtehid 
are important and for example the views of scholar who are close to secular regimes are 
subject to their scrutiny and often dismissed as it is the case for example in Egypt 
(Fuller and Lesser 1995: 39). 
In the context of rapid modernisation, a broad current of Islamism emerged and 
has come to be one of the most important forces in many Muslim societies in the last 
few decades. After an analysis of Islamism and causes of its rise, I will analyse Islamist 
views vis-ä-vis modernity and the relationship between modernity and the West. I will 
focus on their views on secularisation, democracy, state, nationalism and the nation- 
state, science technology and industrialisation, capitalism, and the West and its 
relationship with modernity. 
2The term ljtihad is mostly used to refer to the need for fresh interpretation of Islamic principles in 
accordance with the social, economic, political developments in the world. 
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2.3 ISLAMISM 
`Muslims' includes all who believe in and practice Islam, or who consider 
themselves to be Muslim in a cultural sense, part of a Muslim society whether 
practicing or not. 3 The term Islamic can be used for things related to Islam, thus Islamic 
countries means states that posses a Muslim majority. Islamic `fundamentalism' as a 
much talked about term may be misleading, particularly because it is borrowed from a 
Protestant Christian experience and does not exist per se in the languages of the Islamic 
world (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 6). Although the term Islamic `fundamentalism' is used 
as a convenient catch-all term in reference to particular Western concerns; there are 
more appropriate terms such as `Islamism' and `Islamists' which do exist in various 
languages of the Muslim world and are widely used in the literature. Islamism, as will 
be seen, is a larger term than `political Islam, ' because, Islamists are not just after the 
political power exercised according to their interpretation of Islam. 
Roy rather narrowly defines Islamism as "the contemporary movement that 
conceives of Islam as a political ideology" (1994: ix). It is a form of protest produced 
by modernity (1994: 1). Islamism holds that Islam as a comprehensive way of life 
possesses certain laws and that society (as well as private lives of Muslims) must be 
organised according to these laws (Cf. Ruedy 1994: XV). It is always implied by 
Islamists that they have access to the correct understanding of Islam (Orthodoxy) and 
correct form of practice (Orthopraxy) and what they believe in and practice is the Islam 
of the Golden Age. This Islam is complete, timeless and universal. It is perfect because 
it is from Allah who not only knows the human beings but also the future. Since it is 
3 Thus, very similar to Christianity, it is often justifiably argued that the terms Islam and Muslim have 
come to possessing very little analytical value in social sciences. On the one extreme there are Bosnian 
BDMs (Beer Drinking Muslims) and on the other extreme, there are cases of strict Taliban and Saudi 
understanding of Islam. 
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perfect, Islam does not need to change (modernise or reform) and adapt in its 
fundamentals4. It has answers to all new situations and it is the task of Muslims to 
interpret Islam while remaining loyal to its original spirit (Cf. Roy 1994: 37). To be able 
to re-shape society according to Islam, Islamists feel themselves obliged to engage in 
political activity which cannot be considered too dirty a business for the Muslims 5 
Prayers and piety is not enough. If Islam is to be lived as God intended the political 
power must be within Islamist hands6. 
Historically, emergence of Islamism is directly related to the impact of Europe 
and associated secularisation that took place in the Muslim lands. The first proto-types 
of Islamism and Islamic reformists in the Muslim states which were most exposed to 
European influences (e. g. Namik Kemal in the Ottoman Empire or Muhammad Abduh 
in Egypt) actively sought political answers within the Islamic heritage to newly 
emerging Muslim plight vis-ä-vis the militarily and economically dominating Europe'. 
In fact, the impact of European and later Western dominance has been very deep. The 
West ended, in around 90% percent of the Muslim lands, the effective self rule of the 
Muslims from the very early period of Islam. The Western impact still continues in 
Muslim countries in political, economic and cultural terms. 
However, European and later Western dominance was only one of the factors in 
emergence of Islamism. It should be noted that in Islamic tradition there has been 
One Pakistani writer who received a Western education puts it like this: "Those who think of reforming 
or modernising Islam are misguided, and their efforts are bound to fail [... ] Why should it be modernised, 
when it is already perfect and pure, universal, and for all time? " (see, Tibi 1990: 73). 
S See, for example the introduction by Khurram Murad in Mawdudi (1991: 23). 
6 The necessity of political activism was stressed by influential Islamist leaders such as Mawdudi, Qutb 
and Khomeini, and by Turkish Islamists alike; for example $evki Yilmaz, a Welfare Party , MP, in his 
much publicised speech in a Pilgrimage (for which he was convicted) was saying that for years the 
devout Muslims have been kept away from political activity by arguing that it is a 'dirty business. ' 
7 Obviously, there are other types of Muslim reaction to ascendancy of Europe, including blaming Islam 
for the backwardness and advocating a near-total rejection of Islam (see, for example, Ocak 1996). 
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movements of renewals (tajdid) by renewers (nn jeddid) (Nasr 1996: 56; see also Algar 
2001). For example, Imam Gazali is popularly known as a great mujeddid and there 
have been lesser mujeddids. The important point, of course. is the belief that Muslims 
had become lax in following Islam and with the guidance and hard work of the great, 
charismatic men of religion they could be more Islamic by a return to the `correct' Islam 
and orthopraxy. In fact, the feeling that "something went awry" for and within the 
Muslim unimah has been with Muslims since almost immediately after the Prophet. But, 
this feeling has been much deeper in the last 2-3 centuries. And today it is hard to 
reconcile Islamic doctrine that the Muslims are the best ummah (community) with the 
reality that the members of this ummah rank among the underdogs in the world (Tibi 
1990: 33). The cause of this decline of the Muslims vis-ä-vis non-Muslims (e. g. 
Western societies), according to Islamists, is de-Islamisation of Muslim societies (to 
which the negative impact of the West contributed to)8 and the cure is re-Islamisation. 
In other words, answers to the problems posed by the modern age are to be found in 
Islam. 
In the second and third quarter of the 20`h century, there emerged important 
Islamist scholars and leaders in Egypt, Turkey and British India. Turkey just became a 
republic (1923) under Mustafa Kemal who was determined to make his country a 
secular nation-state. He ended the caliphate in 1924 seated in Istanbul since 15 17. 
Hasan al-Banna in Egypt and Mawdudi in India were living in very turbulent times 
under British rule. Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Their main aim 
was to establish an `Islamic order' which included an Islamic state which was to come 
almost naturally in due process of reforming society by reforming the individuals. The 
B Sec Piscatori (1986: 22-24) for the three schools on the causes of the decline of the Muslims. One of 
which argues that the reasons are to be found in Islam itself. 
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Brothers' slogan has been "God is our objective; the Qur'an is our constitution; the 
Prophet is our leader; Struggle is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest 
of our aspirations" (Ayubi 1991: 132). Mawdudi was also an important Islamist thinker 
and some of his views will be analysed later. 
2.3.1 Causes of Islamism 
There are certain themes deployed by different experts to explain the rise of 
Islamism9. It was pointed out that the nationalist-secularist elites in Muslim countries 
failed to meet the demands of the masses. In other words. Islamism owes much to failed 
modernisation attempts by the secular elite. 10 A direct result of inadequate 
modernisation has been economic hardship among the Muslims which encourages 
radical opposition to the existing regimes. An important proportion of this discontent 
has been articulated in an Islamist language. 
Another important factor has been that almost all Islamist movements saw and 
see the rapid social change under secular-nationalist elites as erosion of the Islamic 
culture. Islamism has been containing a strong reaction to the secularisation- 
westernisation of the national cultures. The Islamist elite have been challenging the 
secular elite who are accused of being alienated from the native-Islamic heritage and of 
leading/ forcing the masses along the same path (see, for example, Arjomand 2002). 
Islamism often contains a direct attempt, through democratic or un-democratic 
ways (e. g. popular revolution), to capture the state authority. In other words, Islamist 
9 For a critical analysis of these themes see, for example, (Sayyid 1997: 18-26 and Tugal 2002). 
"' This includes failure in modernisation of the armed forces as well, especially in terms of training. The 
1967 defeat is much quoted as land-marking event in rise of the Islamism (See, for example, Piscatori 
1986: 26-27). It showed the complete failure of nationalist-secularist formula in Muslim countries against 
a 'religious' one: Israel (Ayubi 1991: 59, also Esposito 1995: 13-15). 
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movements often constitute the opposition in many Muslim countries (Fuller 2003). 
Generally speaking, Islamists emerge among those who have not been benefited from 
limited modernisation processes in their respective countries. 
Perhaps the most convincing argument in explaining why Islamism as opposed 
to other ideologies (e. g. Socialism or Liberalism) has benefited from the failure of the 
nationalist-secularist modernising regimes is the `availability' thesis. " According to 
this thesis the fact that Islam has been available as an alternative to the existing regimes 
unlike the other ideologies can account for much'. Simply put, since the nationalist- 
secularists failed, the communists were in prison, the only remaining alternative was 
Islamists. Obviously the reality is more complex than this but certain core developments 
can be identified in the emergence of Islamism as an ideology and movement: 
1. The modernising drive under the nationalist-secularist elite has been a 
qualified failure. It is not a coincidence that many strong Islamist movements have 
emerged in those Muslim countries where socio-economic hardships have been very 
severe. Perhaps the most important example is Egypt where high population growth 
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accompanied by restricted industrial development14 makes the country look like being 
in a permanent socio-economic crisis. Generally, in many other Muslim states, Islamists 
propagate to the masses the importance of (Islamic) virtues in the current socio- 
economic difficulties while blaming the un-Islamic elite for failing the population in 
general. 
11 For a discussion of the availability thesis of Laclau, see, (Sayyid 1997: 73-83). 
12 Although as Sayyid points out, mere existence of Islam cannot account fully for Islamism (1997: 74- 
76). 
13 The high population growth among the Muslims has been a major factor of unemployment. Obviously, 
an effective population planning requires an effective birth control which in turn requires an adequate 
health administration on the part of the state and use of these methods by the population. 
14 Radical Islamists have attempted to devastate the tourism industry in Egypt by terrorist acts perhaps to 
facilitate the collapse of the regime which, presumably would give birth to a new Islamic order. 
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2. The ideological hegemony of nationalist/secularist ideology has never been 
complete in Muslim countries where it was pursued by the military or monarchic elite. 
Of course, the preservation of Islam in some form is a prerequisite for emergence of 
Islamism in Muslim countries. 
3. Islamists have been successful in extracting an ideology (or ideologies with 
some common features) from Islam which in turn did not lose its ability of being a 
"master signifier" according to them''. Islamist currents emerged in many Muslim 
countries often influencing each other (Roy 1994; Ayubi 1991). There are `deep 
sources' in Islam which lend themselves to Islamists to formulate political agendas 
which differ in many details but never loses their significant relationships with Islam. 
4. Islamists had been helped by the nationalist governments in their effort to 
cultivate the `cultural and symbolic capital' of Islam (see Ayubi 1991: 61). This 
argument is much favoured by leftists. There is no doubt that it happened for example in 
Egypt, Jordan and Turkey (where Islamists were `used' mainly against the left); but 
soon they were out of government control (see, for example, Abdalla 1993). 
It is important to note that, Islamists do not put their interpretation of Islam 
across as a possible interpretation among many, but as an authentic, valid, true 
understanding of Islam based on sound Islamic knowledge. They trust their own 
religious scholars who provide a different interpretation of Islam than that of the 
scholars on the pay-roll of the state and part of the establishment. Islamism as an 
is "The master signifier is a signifier to which other signifiers refer, and are unified by - and it fixes their 
identity" (Sayyid 1997: 45). For a discussion of the term 'master signifier' and the Islamist attempt to 
make Islam is the master signifier in Muslim societies providing a nodal point and defining the nature and 
limits of the community see (Sayyid 1997: 45-49). 
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ideology and movement has been successful in promoting its own elite 
16, 
some of these 
are men of religion but there are also an important section of intellectuals who provide a 
critical view of the West. 
According to Islamists, the current Muslim societies and the world in general are 
not ordered according to Islam. In other words, the existing socio-political reality does 
not fit into an Islamist vision and Islamists struggle to change it (Tibi 1990: 13). The 
idea that "life should or can be ordered according to a system, even an ideal one, and 
that is the business of Islam to provide such a system seems to be a modem idea" 
(Smith 1978: 117). 
'Islamism' is a modern term to denote a modern phenomenon. Islamist political 
movements are usually not led by religious scholars, and they are interested in modern 
mechanisms of publicity and mobilisation of the masses. Islamists espouse political, 
economic and social change in line with their understanding of Islam, usually in the 
interest of the lower and lower middle classes of society (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 6). 
2.3.2 Islamisation and Its means 
It can be argued that the main aim of Islamist groups is to re-Islamise '7 their 
societies which they consider to have become largely comprised of nominal Muslims. 
This perceived de-Islamisation of Muslim societies owes much in Islamist accounts to 
the impact of the West in the 19`h and 201h centuries. Especially the secularised/ 
westernised elite who followed a secularising policy in most Muslim countries are 
1' As Islamist movements gain importance, Islamist elite represent the views of Islamists and their views 
are scrutinised by non-Islamists to understand Islamists in general. 
17 It is assumed by Islamists and reflected in their choice of words that their societies were once 
thoroughly Islamic which is disputed by many secular writers. 
102 
blamed. The possibility of de-Islamisation has always been warned against and in fact 
expected in Islam which has generally a pessimist view of the religious steadfastness of 
human bein2s'S. 
Perception by some sections of society of the need for re-Islamisation of the 
whole society is an age-old phenomenon. Re-Islamisation means to raise Islamic 
consciousness of the Muslims who are seen at best, as passive adherents of Islamic 
creed, or at worst, active opponents of re-Islamisation. Hence, perhaps the mostly used 
idiom, `wake up', implies that there is almost no Islamic `consciousness' in the most of 
society which makes the work of Islamists extremely hard. Naturally, to economise the 
limited resources, target groups of re-Islamisation (usually receptive lower classes) are 
carefully selected. There are certain means employed in the re-Islamisation of society. 
Perhaps, the most important means of re-Islamisation are the Islamist groups 
founded by Islamist leaders. Generally an Islamist group considers itself as the model 
for the rest of society; the individual Muslim completes his/her transformation in the 
group. The group works within society to recruit new members but it also functions to 
carefully separate the members from the rest of society which is not Islamic enough yet. 
The group is run by the core members around the leader with the effort of full members, 
but often there are sympathisers of the group whose popular religiosity is used to collect 
different kinds of support (e. g. donations). Total Islamisation of the whole society is the 
ultimate aim (Cf. Roy 1994: 68-70). 
Other means of Islamisation, usually utilised by Islamist groups, include, inter 
alia: 
" According to a much circulated hadith in Turkey, the Prophet himself predicted that with each 
generation the Muslims would be less and less observant with some exceptional circumstances. 
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" Books written in support of the Book (Qur'an). Magna opera of 
the revered Islamist ideologues like Qutb or Mawdudi; classic books of 
Islamic teachings like `reliable' hadith books; books by founders or current 
leaders of Islamist groups; novels; books on scientific issues, either drawing 
attention to God's miraculous works or criticising or refuting some theories 
(e. g. theory of evolution) which are considered contradictory to the Islamic 
teaching. 
" Television, audio or video cassettes, newspapers and periodicals 
to propagate their views (Esposito 1995: 10). 
" Schools, child-care centres, youth camps. In these institutions, the 
modem scientific knowledge is transmitted in an Islamic milieu, 
characterised by segregation of sexes and the laws of the modem science are 
presented as the laws put by Allah. Students in state schools and at 
universities are also recruited in activities at spare times or by providing 
housing or financial help. 
" Mosques, private mosques or houses, as in line with the Sunna, 
are to be used for Islamisation. If necessary, for example, if there is a strong 
state control of the mosques (as in Turkey), Islamists find other places, for 
gatherings and dissemination of the Islamist message. 
" Professional associations like those of lawyers, engineers or 
doctors are also targets of Islamists to be controlled and used, firstly as 
power houses and then also part of the civil society as a force against the 
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secular state. The general rule for an Islamist. in line with the Sunna, is to 
start Islamisation from inner circles e. g. family. friends and the 
neighbourhood. Especially an Islamic education of the children is important. 
2.4 ISLAMISTS, SECULARISATION AND THE POLITICS 
Islamists claim that Islam rejects secularity. Secularisation as discussed in the 
previous chapter is defined as the decline of the social significance of religion. Ernest 
Gellner encapsulates the secularisation thesis similarly: "in industrial and industrialising 
societies, the influence of religion diminishes" and he adds that there are a number of 
versions of this theory which attribute it to the scientific basis of new technology which 
undermines faith, or to the erosion of social units which deprives religion of its 
organisational base, or to centralised, unitarian, rationalised religion which "cuts its 
own throat. " However, Gellner voice a view, shared by many in the West, that "the 
secularisation thesis does not apply to Islam" and in "the last one hundred years, the 
hold of Islam over the minds and hearts of believers has not diminished and, by same 
criteria, has probably increased. " (Gellner 1994b: xi). He observes that this hold is not 
restricted to some parts of society; it is not "backward" or socially underprivileged or 
rustics, or women or those linked to traditional regimes which are prone to preservation 
of faith; retention of religiosity marks both socially radical and traditionalist countries. 
Gellner attributes this development to the old internal division of Islam into a `High' 
and `Low' variants and the way this old tension between them played itself out under 
conditions of modernisation. In the past, there had been the unitarian, scripturalist, 
puritanical, rule-oriented, sober, literalist and anti-esoteric religious style of the urban 
scholars and their bourgeois clientele as opposed to the ritualistic, ecstatic, meditation- 
prone, esoteric path of the rural population and the lower strata of the towns which 
were committed to saint cults and organisations known as orders and brotherhoods. At 
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most times they had remained interpenetrated and they tolerated each other in peaceful 
detente. The `High' form remained normative, recognised as true, even if not 
implemented due to resistance of the popular `Low' form. The central power simply did 
not have necessary skills and resources to impose the individualist `High' Islam which 
dispenses with mediation and presupposes literacy. However, "under the impact of 
industrial modernity" in most places, the colonial and post-colonial state was strong 
enough to destroy those rural self-help associations and eliminate the social need for the 
services of saints who mediate between groups. In cities and towns in particular "people 
turned to fundamentalist rather than saint-sectarian forms of religion. " (Gellner 1994b: 
xii ). Or more accurately, significant portions of Muslim societies gradually started to 
follow `High' version of Islam. 
To be able to understand the sources of Islamists' relationship with secularity, a 
brief look at the some related aspects of Islamic history is necessary. Because, for 
example, the Islamic Golden Age as an ideal is frequently referred both by Islamists to 
show the authenticity of their views and by the modernist Muslims to support their 
views on the compatibility of secularism and Islam. Although, perhaps the majority of 
those who favour a western style modernisation of the Muslim societies the real 
relevance of the Islamic history or even of Islam to the task of modernisation is 
minimal. 
It could be argued that because of the doctrine of the oneness (tuwheed) in Islam 
(see, for example, Cornell 1994) and the conduct of the Prophet as the only interpreter 
of Islam and his being the political leader of the whole of ummah (Muslim community), 
the chief justice and even the commander in wars, it is easy to see the `monist' structure 
of Islam. There are too many examples of the Prophet's unchallenged authority in 
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various positions to refer to. In contrast. the examples of those who claim that Islam 
recognised secularity are so few. An oft-quoted one is the saying, of the Prophet "You 
know your worldly things" after an agricultural advice of his to some date-tree farmers 
had failed (see, for example, Donohue and Esposito (eds. ) 19S2). 
Since the conduct of the Prophet was perceived to be depending on the divine 
guidance, it is understandable that there is not much evidence of secular applications in 
his time due to logic that his conduct had religious significance by definition. There are 
other examples, during the Rightly Guided Caliphs, referred to as supporting an 
understanding of Islam compatible with secularity. One of them is the refusal of Uniar 
to give the share of the zakat (tax) to a certain group of non-Muslims (in order to "warm 
their hearts" towards Islam) on the grounds that the Muslims had become too strong to 
need this kind of support. The second example is also his refusal to give the huge lands 
conquered during the wars in his time to the mujahedeen (warriors) who participated to 
these wars, as previously done by the Prophet on the grounds that the situation is 
different now as whole countries are conquered very quickly; probably fearing the 
effects of creating an extremely wealthy landed class overnight and thinking that it is 
contrary to egalitarian spirit of Islam (see, Donohue and Esposito (eds. ) 1982: 156). 
It is not convincing to argue that Umar or any other Rightly Guided Caliph acted 
as secular rulers and disregarded the Islamic doctrines by citing a few such examples. 
The overwhelming evidence shows that they were striving to be loyal to the Islamic 
teaching and even on the very small issues they refer to the Sunna of the Prophet when 
there is no clear Qur'anic mandate. 
After the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the practice of rulers was often at odds with 
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the Islamic ideal. The Muslim masses were by and large passive. Many if not most of 
the ulema provided religious doctrines and justification for the conduct of the rulers. 
However, there were many personally pious Muslim rulers who tried to be as close to 
the Islamic ideal as possible. What is more, even though there had been un-Islamic 
conducts among the Muslim rulers after Ali, it is not easy to classify their acts as 
secular. Because predominantly, either out of conviction or for the purpose of ensuring 
legitimacy these were careful to be seen as loyal to Islam and if necessary, justificatory 
religious doctrines or fatlras (opinions) with regard to their actions were obtained from 
the ulema by coercion or financial reward. At times, they may have acted arbitrarily or 
independently of Islamic rules but they never challenged or abrogated the shariah (Khan 
1992: 102). Therefore, theirs were not deliberate secularising policies, which has been 
the case in 19`h and 2 0'h centuries. 
It is easy to understand the Islamist stance vis-ä-vis secularisation. Since in their 
view, Islam asserts its centrality in both social and private sphere, it has been of 
paramount importance for Islamists to reverse the secularisation trend in the Muslim 
countries, which shapes not only the public sphere through the influence of the 
secularised state but also the private sphere. Secularism is rejected as an alien and 
unnecessary concept. If the secularism is too entrenched in state and society, as in 
Turkey, Islamists often propose a re-definition of secularism aiming to provide a 
breathing space for them, mainly by lessening the state control over Islam. 
Secularism has been one of the most troubling western ideas for Islamists. It is 
important to note that beginning of secularisation in the Muslim world in the European 
sense, took place in countries which were most exposed to European domination. Two 
most important examples were the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. The European military 
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and economic superiority rang the alarm bells and even caused Muslim self-doubt in 
terms of religious beliefs. The elite, who felt the shock of modernity much more than 
the general population, suffered more from this religious self-doubt which showed itself 
mainly in discussion of whether Islam (or certain elements in it) was inimical to 
progress in the European sense. This development was neatly summarised and criticised 
by an early Islamist Ottoman poet, Ziya Pasha (d. 1870): 
Islam, they say, is a stumbling-block to the progress of the state 
This story was not known before, and now it is the fashion 
Forgetting our religious loyalty in all our affairs 
Following Frankish ideas is now the fashion (in Lewis 1968: 139). 
It can be said that Islamist views on the political issues revolved around 
rejection of secularity. Islamists hold that a political reading of Islam (that is the Islam 
of the Golden Age) is necessary. For Islamists, Islam is Din (religion), Dunya (world, 
i. e. a way of life) and Dau, la (state). This holistic understanding of Islam can best to be 
realised by a collective action (Ayubi 1991: 68). 
The main source of Islamist refusal of secularity is their belief that Allah asserts 
his authority in the Qur'an and Sunna. In other words, the metaphysical deity must hold 
the authority. Whereas secular politics means that human beings must have the ultimate 
say. There had been important socio-political, 
'9 scientific and philosophical20 reasons in 
l' The dominance and negative effect of the Church on the medieval European society is a frequently 
referred one. Islamists argue that that negative effect was due to existence of a clerical class in 
Christianity which does not exist in Islam. Therefore, laicism (understood as separation of the church 
from the state power) was both necessary and beneficial to Europe but is not necessary in Islam. 
However, the doctrinal non-existence of clergy does not mean that there has been a functional equivalent 
in Islam, classified as Ulema (plural ofAlim which is active participle of llm: science). For example, Iran 
is now effectively ruled by Faqihs (scholars of jurisprudence). 
20 For example `the question of evil' has been a troubling one among the Christians and Jews (especially 
after the Holocaust). How God can permit to such evil acts? B. Russell concluded that such a God must 
be at least partially evil (see, Janabi 1990: 131). In the Islamic world, arguably the doctrine of 
predestination had been dominant which, suited some rulers to justify their seemingly un-Islamic acts. But 
Islamists argue, in line with another tradition of Islamic philosophy, that since God is the 'owner' of 
everything and gave to human beings 'free will', occurrence of evil does not make him evil. In fact, 
human beings will be accountable for evil acts and perhaps more importantly, 'seemingly evil events' are 
part of the 'religious test' of human beings in this, after all, temporary world. (Similar explanations can 
be found in a Christian worldview see, for example, McClelland 1996: 304-309). 
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the secularisation of Europe. In Muslim countries, however, it is argued, it started with 
the emulation of Europe under European pressure. 
Islamists argue that secularisation causes social decline in secularising countries 
be it Muslim or Western. Obviously the concept of social decline cannot be measured 
objectively and strongly related to one's worldview. However, certain themes emerge in 
Islamist views. For example, according to Islamists, associated with the secularisation 
process there has been a laxity in following the Islamic dress code in Muslim countries 
taking its cue from the West where people, the women in particular are perceived to be 
slavishly following the fashion gurus. This trend is part of a general moral decay, 
particularly in sexual mores. Islamists want especially the Muslim women to dress 
Islamically. 21 Thus, the headscarf (covering the hair and the neck) had become an issue 
in some Muslim 22 countries. For example, in Iran the state make it compulsory even in 
the street 23. In Turkey it is forbidden at universities. Islamists in Turkey supported by 
liberals argued that there is no difference between Turkey and Iran, both uses state 
power to dictate a certain dress code. 
Islamists argue that due to the secularising effects of the modernising drive, in 
Muslim countries, the communitarian spirit has declined. This shows itself for example 
in `get-rich-quick' attitude of business circles and ruling institutions, usually through 
corruption, which contributes to the disappointment and alienation from the system. The 
affluent sections of societies in Muslim countries seems most Westernised and most 
Z1 According to predominantly accepted view in Islam a Muslim women should cover her body (except 
the face, hands and the foot) in a way concealing her figure, where as the man must cover only the parts 
between his belly and the knee cap. 
22 It has also become an issue in France where the education system has been 'militantly secular. ' 
23 Therefore, it can be concluded that for majority of Islamists the dress of the individual is part of the 
public realm and subject to state coercion when necessary. In the Ottoman Empire, the non-Muslims were 
commanded to wear cloths that distinguished them from Muslims. 
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alienated from the population, insensitive to the socio-economic plight of the bulk of 
society. Many Muslims see that the young are becoming more and more disrespectful to 
the elderly. Society is becoming atomised as individuals are trying to `save' only 
themselves. There is a deep nostalgia for the good old days and the model community 
which is believed to have existed in the early Golden Ages. Islamic commands of good 
neighbourly relations 24 and the care for the extended family members and the needy in 
the community25 are not observed. For Islamists, it is because Muslims are not Muslin, 
enough anymore. In Turkey, the much referred example of the decline of the 
community by Islamists and many seculars is the fact that many people who live in 
apartments do not know and talk to other people in the same building. 
Islamists envisages a Muslim ummah which might be large but characterised by 
community-type (Gemeinschaftist) relations. According to Islamists, in this ideally 
Muslim society, the believers would have more empathy and sympathy towards the 
fellow believers and the rulers for the ruled. Contrary to a popular understanding of 
Marx, for Islamists, Islam is not the "opium of the masses" to be used to justify or mask 
the exploitation in society. In fact, currently Islamists use Islam mostly as an ideology 
of opposition to the existing socio-economic political systems that are, among other 
things, exploitative and characterised by a sense of alienation between the ruling circles 
and the ruled. However, Islam as a religion of competing strands is capable of being 
used in legitimisation of `injustices' in society, but this does not mean that it can easily 
be a legitimisation in toto, as long as there are those who are subject to injustices in 
society who would have a different interpretation of Islam from any dominant version 
and would use it to air their discontent. 
24 For example there is a much quoted hadith: "Fie who sleeps full when his neighbour goes hungry is not 
one of us. " 
25 See, for example, the Qur'an: surah 107. 
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Another. presumably the most important form of alienation, according to 
Islamists, is the alienation of the human being from God which should be understood as 
the source of other forms of alienation. A Muslim must keep his/ her ties with Allah 
strong. Muttagi (God-fearing and respecting) Muslims are an Islamist aim. A society 
consist of niuttagi Muslims will be free from all social ills. 
Secularisation for Islamists is primarily a form of de-Islamisation. De- 
secularisation must be in the form of re-Islamisation. Re-Islamisation of the individual 
Muslims and society in general, is considered by Islamists as the answer to ill-effects of 
modernisation process largely attributed to secularisation. The circular logic dictates 
that Islamisation will surely produce the perfect believers. How can there be any social 
problem in a society of perfect believers? Deductively, if there are problems in Muslim 
societies it is because of de-Islamisation. And one can only ask to Islam to provide 
solutions or theoretical answers to problems in an Islamic society. In other words, the 
ills of capitalist or socialist applications in Muslim societies are not really Islamically 
relevant26. These societies must be re-Islamised first. 
One would concede that the utopia of a society of `angel-like' believers has a 
strong appeal in many Muslim countries where the corruption is rampant and seen as a 
main contributor to the economic hardships. Many Muslim countries like Pakistan, 
Turkey are high on the corruption lists routinely published by some international NGOs. 
Islamists generally argue that there has been a moral decay in Muslim lands and corrupt 
politicians and bureaucrats are among the results. 
Desire for social change towards an Islamic society is common to all Islamists. 
26 Although this does not stop many Islamists to argue that 'Islam is the solution' to the present problems 
of Muslim societies. 
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All Islamists are historicist in the Popperian sense (see. Popper 1961) as they all refer to 
the history to find both motivations and a map to change society. Widely shared belief 
in the Muslim world that the Golden Age of Islam is 'well documented' is a bonus for 
them. They are also `essentialist' in two senses. Firstly, there is an explicit belief in the 
essentiality of the possibility of changing society by dedicated human agents, as done 
by the Prophet and the early Muslims. Secondly, according to Islamists all human 
beings are essentially the same; they have certain inherent qualities. Islam is universal 
and eternal because it addresses to these essential qualities in human beings (see, Qutb 
1993 [1964]). It tries to bring the good out of a Muslims towards the fellow Muslims. 
Therefore, Islamist discourses do not accept the argument that human beings and 
societies are changing and Islam is no longer adequate as a system for modern 
societies, Muslim or otherwise. It is the only valid divine message, universal and 
eternal. 
2.5 ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 
One of the most frequent criticisms levelled at Islam is its alleged 
incompatibility with democracy, and thus its being an obstacle to political 
modernisation in Muslim countries. This criticism is hard to substantiate at this level of 
generality simply because there is no monolithic understanding and application of 
Islam; the same is true for democracy as well. Conceptual confusion over democracy is 
so serious that Collier and Levitsky have identified 550 subtypes of democracy (cited 
by Diamond 1996: 21). However according to Diamond, liberal democracy has the 
following features: Real power lies -in fact as well as in constitutional theory- with 
elected officials. Executive power is constitutionally constrained; there are fair 
elections; freedom of association, protection of cultural, ethnic, religious, and other 
minority groups; alternative sources of information; substantial freedom of belief, 
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opinion, discussion. speech. publication, assembly. demonstration and petition 
(Diamond 1996: 23-24). Needless to say, such an understanding of democracy is 
strongly related to the Western experience. 
When liberal democracy is taken as the touchstone for democracy the historical 
record of Muslims is not encouraging at all. Lewis observes in 1996 that, of the 53 
member states of Organisation of Islamic Conference, only Turkey (which is "in many 
ways a troubled democracy-) can pass Huntington's test of democracy, a test which 
reveals existence of a very basic democracy if a country has made two consecutive 
peaceful changes of government via free elections (Lewis 1996: 53-54). Lewis attempts 
at making a rough classification of regimes in Muslim societies, seeing Turkey as "the 
great exception": Traditional autocracies like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf sheikdoms; 
Modernising autocracies, like Jordan, Egypt and Morocco that have their roots in 
traditional autocracy but are taking significant steps toward modernisation and 
democratisation; Fascist-style dictatorships, like Asad's [and now his son's] Syria and 
Saddam's Iraq (at that time); Radical Islamic regimes like Iran and Sudan and finally 
the Central Asian republics, classified by history and geography rather than by regime 
type and which are struggling to disentangle themselves from their former imperial 
master, Moscow (Lewis 1996: 58-60). 
Analyses of the views of some prominent Islamists reveal some core Islamist 
ideas with regard to democracy. These ideas have been influential among the Islamists 
in the Greater Middle East which is the home of the heartlands of Islam. For example, 
Mawdudi has been a significant figure; he lived in India and after the partition, in 
Pakistan. He argued that "Islam [... ] is the very antithesis of secular Western 
democracy" and it repudiates the principle of popular sovereignty. Islamic politics is 
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founded on the sovereignty of God and vice regency of human beings on earth. 
A more apt name for the Islamic polity would be the `kingdom of God' which is 
described in English as a "theocracy. " But Islamic theocracy is something 
altogether different from the theocracy of which Europe has had bitter experience 
[.... ] the theocracy built tip by Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class 
but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file. The entire 
Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the 
practice of His Prophet. If I were permitted to coin a new term, I would describe 
this system of government as "theo-democracy" that is to say a divine democratic 
government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular 
sovereignty tinder the suzerainty of God. The executive under this system of 
government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who have also the 
right to depose it. (Mawdudi 1976: 24-25). 
Thus 'Islamic democracy' is limited because not even the whole Muslim 
community has the right to change an explicit command of Allah in a secular manner 
(Cf. Osman 1986: 79). Rules governing the ummah are to be divinely sanctioned and in 
the lack of further revelation'-?, interpretations of the experts of Islamic law become 
important. The experts would guide the Muslims by making sure that their conduct is 
Islamic. Khomeini drew this line of argument to it logical extreme by his principle of 
the 'Guardianship of the Jurist (Velayet-i Faqih), where the religious experts hold the 
real political power as well28. The political power is subject to certain interpretation of 
religious knowledge, and, does not flow from the popular will (Cf. Roy 1994: 44). 
Because the masses are ignorant of religious doctrine and they might be misguided. 
One frequent theme among Islamists is that Islam in fact provides more freedom 
than democracy in which freedom is imaginary. For example Sayyid Qutb, whose views 
are influential among Islamists, puts it as follows: 
This din [Islam] is a universal declaration of freedom of man from slavery [... ] Any 
systems in which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the 
source of all authority are men, deifies human beings by designating others than 
27 The end of revelation means that there could not be no new prophets and only the original Muslim 
community of the Prophet and first four caliphs are the valid references (See Tibi 1990: 39). 
28 On the principle of Velayct-i Faqih, see Piscatori (1986: 125) and Sayyid (1997). 
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Allah as lords over nun (199i [1964]: 47). 
Qutb uses a familiar wont for the Muslims to attack the modern (or modernising 
Muslim) societies: Jahili}}-ah (Ignorance) denotes the pre-Islamic society which did not 
have the Islamic knowledge. 
The jahili [ignorant] society is any society other than the Islamic society [... ] any 
society is a jahili society if it does not dedicate itself to submission to Allah alone in 
its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal norms [.. ] all the 
societies existing in the world today are jahili (1993 [1964]: 66). 
It should be noted however that despite this kind of ideological intellectual 
opposition to democracy, where possible most Islamist groups do contest in national 
and local elections, for example in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine (and once 
in Algeria) where they often have good results which shows that Islamists are not 
marginal but either constitute, or at least gather the political support of important parts 
of their societies. However, given the widespread strong negative Islamist views on 
democracy it should not be surprising that there has been a deep suspicion among the 
secular rulers and pro-secular parts of Muslim societies with regard to Islamist `use' of 
democratic means. There are important questions: Is it `One man, one vote, one time'? 
Are they sincere in advocating democracy as a permanent way of politics or once in 
power would they turn to authoritarian methods and never again allow free elections? 
Generally. the secular elite, whose belief in democracy is quite often minimal or non- 
existent, do not want to take any risk by allowing Islamists to share the power. Hence, 
their risk-free politics in practice means continuation of repressive regimes. This is 
another important factor; Islamists, however large their numbers be, are generally 
among the oppressed themselves, and do not live in democratic cultures (Mayer 1999: 
189). 
It is clear that the God-centric political understanding of the most Islamists is 
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not compatible with modern politics. Because a core characteristic of modernity is 
secularity, which means, i, l1w alia, that the politics is a human prerogative. Therefore, 
advocacy to 'unchanging' rules like that of Islamists is anathema to a modern 
understanding of politics. 
However, this is not to say that there are no Islamists who hold that democracy 
and Islam are compatible. In fact, as Robin Wright observes that there is a growing 
number of Islamist reformers to whom she gives two examples: Abdul Karim Soroush 
and Rachid al-Ghannouchi. According to Wright, for the reformers the question is "how 
to modernise and democratise political and economic systems in an Islamic context. " 
These reformers contend that Islam is flexible, and its principles can be interpreted to 
accommodate and even encourage pluralism. They challenge the notion that Islam has a 
single, definitive essence that denies change regardless of time, space and experience; 
and therefore. for example democracy is incompatible with or alien to Islam (Wright 
1996: 66-67, quotation from p. 66). It seems that the central drama of a possible Islamic 
reform is the difficulty to reconcile Islam and modernity by creating a worldview that is 
compatible with both and that is acceptable to majority of Muslims. 
For Soroush, a Shi'ite from Iran, there is no contradiction between Islam and the 
freedoms inherent in democracy. Islam and democracy is not only compatible but their 
association is inevitable. Islam can grow. It should not be used as a modern ideology, 
because it is likely to become totalitarian. Secularism is not an enemy or rival of 
religion but its complement. "It means to look at things scientifically and behave 
scientifically-which has nothing to do with hostility to religion. Secularism is nothing 
more than that" (Wright 1996: 70; on Soroush, see also Arjomand 2002). 
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Ghannouchi, a Sunni from Tunisia. says that "Once the Islamists are given a 
chance to comprehend the values of Western modernity, such as democracy and human 
rights, they will search within Islam a place... [tor]... them. " Islam brought only general 
principles and "It is our duty to formulate this program through interaction between 
Islamic principles and modernity. " For him, like Soroush, Islam and democracy are an 
inevitable mix (Wright 1996: 73-74, quotations from p. 73 and 74). 
However this line of thought and its highlight by westerners are not free from 
critics. M. E. Hamdi, for example, accuses Ghannouchi of confirming the supremacy of 
\Vestern values and playing the "democracy card" to attract support from Western 
circles. And that is why he is one of the favourite Islamists of Western scholars like 
Wright, Esposito and Burgat. Hamdi also observes that "Westerners have not exactly 
been keen to engage in direct dialogue with the most prominent representatives of 
"Islamic fundamentalism" from Iran, Egypt or Sudan" (Hamdi 1996: 83; Cf. Piscatori 
1986: 20). 
2.5.1 Women According to Islamists 
The place and rights of women in Muslim societies are hotly debated and they 
go beyond the issue of democracy (Ahmed 1992; Hassan 1994; Badawi 1993; Baykan 
1990). It is a common view that the place of women is much further behind in Muslim 
countries than in modern (mainly Western) countries. The general view is that, 
especially in the West, the modernisation process in the economic social and political 
sphere also involved relative emancipation of the women. In the West the woman has 
become an individual and is on a par with the man, if not always in practice, at least 
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according to the laws''. 
It is a fact that the Qur'an addresses both the male and female Muslims in many 
verses, implying that they are equal Muslims (Esposito 1995: 30). However, it is also a 
fact that, according to most Islamist interpretations, polygyny is allowed up to four 
wives30, whereas, polyandry is cate`_orically forbidden. 31 It is also generally accepted 
that the Muslin women are required to dress `modestly' and leave only their faces, 
hands uncovered. Islamic teaching emphasises the importance of the family and the role 
of the woman as mother and wife while making the husband responsible to provide for 
the household. 
During the medieval period, like in many other non-Muslim societies, the 
Muslim women were treated as little more than creatures for men's pleasure and 
reproduction. Islam had an important but ultimately limited effect in lessening the 
suffering of the women in conservative Muslim milieu with a dominantly patriarchal 
social system predating Islam. So much so that, although explicitly un-Islamic, the level 
of domestic violence towards the wife and female children was (and is) very high. 
As far as the contemporary Islamists are concerned it can be seen that their 
views break up with the medieval tradition and they advocate greater involvement of 
Islamist women in social and economic life, albeit in an Islamic way. According to 
Islamists, women should work -quite often in `feminine' professions as teachers in 
primary schools, nurses or doctors serving to the female patients- without 
compromising Islamic dress or other Islamic conditions (Göle 1991). There are certain 
2" Although, Islamists repeatedly argue that Islam gives a higher place to the women and safeguards their 
rights much better than other systems (see, for example, Al- Lail 1996). 
30 Islamists defend this on various grounds. 
31 For other traditional and recent Islamic views on women see (Mayer 1999: 97-130). 
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factors for the increasing emphasis on the education of the daughters in Islamist circles. 
The predominant one is perhaps, however limited, the success of the modernising state 
in spreading the education and its economic failure in creating a healthy economy with 
well-paid jobs. Therefore, many Islamist families, as in Turkey, see education as 
necessary for their daughters to stand a chance of having a decent job and thus making 
the much needed contribution to the family budget. 
It should be stressed that it is still the case for Islamists to emphasise the 
`feminine' side of the women as mothers and wives in a way detrimental to their full 
participation in economic and political life (. Mayer 1999). There are almost no high 
ranking women in Islamist groups. Biological differences are used to argue that 
physically weak and "emotional" (rather than rational) women are different (rather than 
equal to) from the men (Roy 1994: 59). Hence, it is necessary to protect them from the 
harshness of the street or of political life. 
2.5.2 Islamists and the Minorities 
According to shariah rules, Christians and Jews in the conquered lands were 
allowed to continue in their beliefs provided that the.,. - pay a special poll tax (jiz), u). 
Although in theory, polytheists when conquered had two choices, becoming Muslim or 
death, Muslim toleration also extended in history to the Hindus and other polytheists. It 
is still a matter of pride for Muslims that compared to medieval Christian standards the 
religious minorities were shown far greater tolerance by Muslims (See, Mayer 1999: 
135-6). However, it was as late as 1839 and 1856 and under the European pressure, that 
the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire were granted equal legal status much to the 
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dismay of the : \'1uslims? 
2 
. 
It should be noted that, the Islamist suspicion of the Western policies is extended 
to religious minorities and their relations with the Western powers (including Israel as 
well, in this context). One can see that religious minorities in many Muslim countries 
such as Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan are complaining of human right 
abuses (see for example, Kazemi 1996). It must be stressed that, given the traditional 
Islamic understanding of Islam as a superior religion, Islamists find the modern doctrine 
of equality of all citizens in a country, difficult to accept. Differential treatment of non- 
Muslims is considered as a religious precept. At most, the non-Muslims must be treated 
fairly; they can share economic goods and social benefits but not political power 
(Vatikiotis 1987: 55). They are not ordinarily to be accepted as first class citizens of an 
Islamic state (see i\-layer 1999: 84). 
It may be necessary to touch briefly on some other issues, shaped by certain 
interpretations of Islam and incompatible with the liberal understanding of human 
rights. One of these is the `extreme' punishments prescribed for certain crimes. For 
example amputation of the hand for theft, much caricatured in the Western media33 or 
stoning to death for adultery which is continuation of a Semitic tradition (Deuteronomy 
22: 24) and not prescribed in the Qur'an (Watt 1988: 20). Another one is the death 
penalty for a Muslim who renounces Islam. 34 These forms of punishments may be 
shocking, but faithfully defended by Islamists in general by arguing that they are 
32 It was complained semi-humorously by the Ottoman Muslims that it was no longer permissible to call a 
gavur (infidel) gavur. 
33 For example, despite the fact that the amount of the stolen goods must exceed a certain threshold in 
some Hollywood movies it is shown that the verdict of stealing a bread or apple is amputation. 
34 Although, it is argued by some Islamists that, as long as the 'apostate' does not engage in an active 
opposition to Muslim community (treason) the death penalty is not applicable; it is certain that, generally 
speaking renouncing Islam is not included in Islamist understanding of freedom of belief. 
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applicable only in an entirely Islamic society where there will be no need for theft or no 
temptation to commit adultery. Therefore, given the additional factor of severity of the 
punishments it is argued that these crimes will hardly be committed. So it should not be 
a central issue 3'. 
Fuller argues that the majority of Islamist movements have reached the conclusion 
that democratisation is the best overall vehicle to put their agenda to the public and gain 
political influence, and eventually come to power (2003: 29). Esposito also argues that 
many Muslims came to accept the notion of democracy but differed as to its precise 
meaning. Certain Islamic concepts (like consultation: shura, community consensus: ijnua 
and interpretation: ijtihad) can be reinterpreted to support democratic concepts and 
institutions like the parliament. representative elections. Islamic organisations like the 
Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan, the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan, Kashmir, 
India and Bangladesh, WP in Turkey, FIS in Algeria, ABIM in Malaysia among others 
have advocated the principle of democratic elections and where permitted participated in 
elections (1995: 217). Indeed, it cannot be denied that there are serious soul searching 
going on to find Islamic roots to support some form of democracy (Nasr 1996: 88; 
Esposito and Voll 1996: 28). However, it should be concluded that although Islamist 
understandings of democracy might quite often seem more `democratic' than the actual 
situation in many Muslim countries, their desire to move away from `tyranny' do not 
reach to the logical final destination when judged from the perspective of liberal 
democracy. This is because their conceptualisation of politics rest upon the dictum `rule 
by the Islamic rules' (as interpreted by them) and not `by the people'. Islamists tend to 
present Islamic values as eternal, immutable and final; this is in direct clash with 
35 This is clearly a result of Islamist quest for authenticity. They are afraid of opening the flood gates by 
accepting the reformist views which argue that the important thing should be the punishment not the form 
of the punishment. 
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secularism and liberal democracy, because one essence of secularism and democracy is 
acceptance that there can be no finality of forms or exclusive claim to absolute and 
indivisible tnith (ct'. Vatikiotis 1987: 98). A greater degree of flexibility in interpretations 
is needed if any form of Islamic democracy is to be developed. 
2.6 ISLAMISTS AND THE STATE 
After his forced emigration to Medina in 622, Prophet Muhammad consolidated 
his political power and established a city-state36. He was the political leader as well as 
the religious leader. He had all the state power as head of state, commander of the army 
and the chief judge. His authority and its acceptance by his followers were based on his 
being prophet of God and Qur'anic mandate: "Obey God and the Prophet" (3: 32), 
"Whoever obeys the Prophet, obeys God" (4: 80). Moreover, He was the model which 
Muslims were to follow: "You have a good model in God's Prophet" (33: 21). 
Throughout the years, the Prophet's exemplary character and conduct, his continued 
reception of divine revelations, and his success, reinforced his position of leadership. 
Under Muhammad's guidance, Islam `crystallised' as both a faith and a socio-political 
system albeit with some empty spaces as we will see. 
Although there are no clear-cut definitions of the state and government in Islam, 
this does not mean that there are no general Islamic principles concerning the state. The 
state in Islam can be said to be founded on certain general principles laid down by the 
Qur'an and Sunna. The first and perhaps the most important principle is that all 
authority in the universe lies with Allah who created it. Thus only Allah is to be obeyed 
and man can be obeyed only if Allah commands it. The second principle is that the 
"' The choice of date of Migration (}lijra) as the beginning of Islamic calendar by Caliph Uniar 17 years 
later (Hitti 1970: 116) is indicative that the political independence and freedom from religious oppression 
provided by the establishment of Islamic state in Medina was of paramount importance for the early 
Muslims and of still symbolic value. 
123 
Islamic law has already been legislated in the Qur'an by Allah and ill the Sum1a of the 
prophet, the latter being the authoritative exposition of the Qur'an and which was also 
dependent on revelation (Brown 1996). The Qur'an and the Sunna are enough for the 
guidance of the mankind and Muslims must enforce existing Islamic regulations in all 
spheres of their life, or at most, must produce new interpretations through ijtihad which 
must be in conformity with the more basic Islamic rules (Iqbal 1986: 37: El-Awa 1980: 
74-82). 
According to the verse (3: 59), Muslims are commanded to obey Allah, the 
Prophet and those among them who are in authority. This verse has been traditionally 
interpreted by the Sunni scholars as commanding obedience even to tyrants who might 
be no more than just nominal Muslims for the fear of anarchy that would be caused by a 
rebellion and would result in greater evil (EI-Awa 1980). \'atikiotis argues that since 
the 11th century "the only political theory of Islam has been that of passive obedience to 
any de facto authority, " government by consent was unknown and autocracy has been 
the only experience (1987: 22). In contrast, today, Islamists generally hold that the 
obedience is conditional and it is a religious must only if the rulers themselves are in 
obedience to the commandments of Allah and the Prophet. 
Traditionally, Muslim jurists have emphasised three important features of an 
Islamic state: the Muslim community (ummah), the Islamic law (shariah), and the 
leadership of the Muslim community (caliph, imam or emir). Since the absolute 
authority or ultimate sovereignty belongs to Allah, the Muslim community is to be 
governed according to the shariah37 and the Islamic state must uphold the supremacy of 
shariah. The Islamic state must have an executive with a head of state to implement or 
37 Although, today shariah is generally used to mean the Islamic la". %-; in fact it means in Arabic, among 
other things, "the way to the water"; so shariah in a general sense means whole body of Islamic rules. 
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execute the shariah. Although, the head of state has no inherent power to legislate in 
certain exceptional circumstances he is authorised to alter, or suspend some Islamic 
laws or make subordinate legislation. But to do so, there has to be a body of advisers 
(shura) to consult its members to determine the nature of the subordinate legislation. 
According to a certain school of jurists though, he is not bound by their advice (Iqbal 
1986: 38). 
To use today's terminology. according to Islamic constitution the Islamic state 
has two important organs: the executive and the judiciary; the possible third organ -the 
legislative is constitutionally undefined, rather there is no place for a legislative like the 
ones in the western democracies. Because. it is assumed that all important legislation 
has already been laid down by Allah in the Qur'an and through the means of the 
Prophet whose Sunna was also dependent on revelation according to some views, or at 
least inspired and guided by Allah. Therefore, the government's duty is to implement it, 
not to change it. The need for legislation on issues not specified by shariah, which 
presumably will be subordinate rather than change the basics, can be met with due 
consultation with the shura or by ijtihad of the jurists. There are two verses in the 
Qur'an indicated by experts about consultation (42: 38 and 3: 159). In the first 
consultation is recommended, meaning that it is not obligatory. However the second 
verse, addressed the Prophet, contains instruction that those who have authority should 
consult the community on all matters of importance. 
Islamic political thinking has been concentrated on the headship of the Islamic 
state (the caliphate or the imamate). It is evident that the first four leaders of the Muslim 
community could only be appointed with the consent of the people; women were not 
excluded from this process. It must be clearly pointed out that there was no hereditary 
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succession: one might say that it was specifically excluded. However, it was through 
hereditary successions that the caliphs came into their positions until 1924 when the 
caliphate was abolished in Turkish Republic. 
What is important to note that, although the form of state is not clearly defined 
in Islam and constitutional theory is rather underdeveloped, as pointed out above, the 
general Islamic principles that are binding on Muslims are also to be respected by an 
Islamic state (El-ANNa 1980: 74-82). Thus, in the Muslim world, Islamists and 
conservative Muslims often too easily argue that their governments are un-Islamic or 
not Islamic enough by pointing out their `clear' disregard for these principles. 
Today, the political importance of Islamists largely stems from their aspiration 
to state power. In Iran and Sudan they have succeeded. In Algeria they were stopped by 
a coalition dominated by the army. As discussed in Chapter 1, the modernisation of the 
state caused an unprecedented increase in its importance for society. It was relatively 
easy for the religious or political groups in medieval times to withdraw from centres of 
society as a form of protest or a way of escaping the wrath of the rulers, but escape from 
the modern state is not an option anymore. Its extensive power makes it almost natural 
for the political groups to fix their eyes on the ways of taking state power under their 
control. This is also by and large the case for Islamists. Therefore, it has no impact on 
Islamists to argue, like many of their critics do, that their aspiration to political power is 
indeed a radical break from the Islamic tradition. The cause of Islamist aspiration to 
state power, however, cannot be explained solely by the limited modernisation of the 
state where its new and more efficient apparatuses severely restricts breathing spaces 
for the Islamist groups which are generally in opposition (often the opposition). For 
Islamists the state power is also necessary for an Islamic society. Ayubi, who argues 
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that Islam is not particularly a political religion, accepts that it is not private or 
individualistic either and, Islam "stresses above all the collective enforcement of public 
morals" (1991: 35). Interestingly, he admits that his conclusion that Islam is not 
political depends on "a narrow and possibly artificial, conception of politics" that 
dominates contemporary political science (1991: 239). But, this is exactly the point; 
Islamists who advocate an all-encompassing interpretation of Islam do not accept a 
narrow conception of politics. 
It can be seen that, starting from the second half of the 19°i century, the state 
power has been used in many Muslim countries by secular elite to disestablish 
traditional understanding of Islam and popularise an `official' version of it. Therefore it 
is not surprising to see that many Islamist leaders pointed out the importance of using 
the state power in the service of Islam (i. e. their particular understanding of it). "The 
reforms that Islam wants to bring about cannot be affected by sermons alone. Political 
power is also essential to achieve them" (Ahmed 1980: 5). However, there is no clear 
model of an Islamic state. This situation is defended by Mawdudi: "Islam does not 
prescribe any definite form for the formation of the consultative body or bodies for the 
simple reason that it is a universal religion meant for all times and climes" (1980: 260). 
In a sense, constitutional or institutional formulas do not occupy Islamists too much 
because there is a deep belief that Islam has the answer for all aspects of life. There is 
also a circular logic; the important thing is the quality of Muslim, the believer. If the 
Muslims are as virtuous as Islamists want them, the Muslim society will be problem- 
free, a paradise on earth. Therefore, the important thing is to emphasise Islamic qualities 
of the `core' groups of Islamist groups who actually try to mould society in their own 
image. 
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As far as the Islamist political theory concerned, it can be argued that the main 
emphasis is changeable. Traditionally, it has been the head of the state rather than other 
possible organs like consultative body (shura) or judiciary. The main reason for this 
perhaps is the idealised historical record. The Prophet, the Rightly Guided Caliphs38 and 
pious Umar Bin Abdulaziz are the examples of Islamic leaders. They were pious, wise, 
just. upright. strong in leadership. Today, these qualities are sought by Islamists in a 
leader. In other words the Islamist emphasis is on power rather than democracy; on 
adala (justice)39 rather than freedom, on the group (community) rather than the 
4 individual. 'ý 
However, today is far from the ideal for Islamists who are in opposition and the 
state persecution and abuse of them is the rule rather than exception. Therefore Islamists 
aimed to gain a voice in the exercise of the state power, and worked toward removing 
or changing powerful elements within the state who opposes them (Fuller 2003: 124). It 
seems only natural for them to employ a certain interpretation of Islam in de- 
legitimisation of the present regimes in the eyes of the population. The immediate task 
is often to stop, or at least lessen, the secular state's arbitrary oppression by advocating, 
for example, to rule of law which exists in Islam in their view. It is an often emphasised 
point that Islam commands the rules to be applied fully and indiscriminately among the 
Muslims. 
38 For example, Uniar the second caliph considered the safety of a lamb on the bank of the Euphrates as 
his responsibility (Ayubi 1991: 16). The salary of the first caliph Ebu Bakr was only half a sheep a day. 
}' Justice depends on the wise ruler or judge who applies Islamic rules to each case impersonally but 
according its specificities. 
40 It is important to note that there are some views that since Islam is a `comprehensive way of life' it is 
best suitable for a totalitarian society. One can argue that in Iran after 1979 a totalitarian interpretation of 
Islam was employed in the fervour of the revolution. The active participation ofthe individuals was 
welcome by the regime partly because of the war against the Iraq. However, in the late 1990's the so- 
called hard-liners took an authoritarian stance when the relatively moderate Khatemi who was selected as 
president tried to implement some `liberalising' policies that he promised to the electorate. 
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For some Islamist groups who advocate the `from-the-below', approach the 
capture of the state is not the main aim but it is a fundamental instrument within the 
larger aim of re-Islamising the whole society. After that the state may not be essential. 
For example, Turabi argues that the. Islamic state cannot exist without an Islamic society 
and "Islamic society can exist and has existed without the structures of a state for 
centuries" (see, Esposito (ed) 1983: 241,243). Nevertheless for the majority of 
Islamists it seems that the capture of the state, as their proportion increase in society, is 
a logical and necessary step. The state power must be used in further Islamisation of 
society `frone-the-top'; and to defend Islamist way of life against enemies within and 
non-Muslim foreign powers that might conspire to undermine it. 
There are radical small Islamist groups who advocate an armed struggle against 
the state which are not focused upon in this study. They may be qualified as extremists 
or terrorist. They use terrorism against Western, particularly American targets. They 
seem to have an ambiguous relationship with the larger Islamist groups in general. It 
can be said the attitude of the state is crucial in this respect; when the Islamist groups 
are crushed by the state forces ruthlessly, using arbitrary, mass- imprisonment, torture 
or even extra-legal execution, like happened in Algeria or Egypt, it becomes easier for 
groups condoning terrorism to recruit new members from the larger Islamist population 
who become more radical (see, for example, Toth 2003). 
2.7 ISLAMISTS VIS-A-VIS NATIONALISM AND THE NATION-STATE 
Nationalism as analysed in the previous chapter, as a European creation, has 
been one of the most important forces of modernity. It has been mainly a secularising 
ideology and movement, closely related to the building of nation-states. The nation- 
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state based on a secular politics is the norm in the West. In the rest of the world, one can 
say that the secular nation-state is also dominant 
but there are a few nation-states where 
the religion is decisive in politics (e. g. Iran). It is important that Israel is also seen, 
especially by Islamists, as a state which has been founded and is being faithfully 
defended by the Jews who owes this success to their religious devotion. The lesson to 
be learned, of course, is that a similar attitude by Muslims would produce similar 
successes (Schwedler 2001: 10). 
Nationalism has been a potent force in many Muslim countries too, where it has 
been often the major force in nation-state building. In the Ottoman Empire, under the 
pressure of modernising Western powers and Russia, the idea of Ottomanism and Pan- 
Islamism were used to maintain its multinational structure with no success. Turkish 
nationalism was the last resort, after all the remaining imperial possessions in Europe 
were lost to nationalist movements in the Balkans. The World War I proved that the 
Arabs also wanted independence. With the support of the Western powers (especially 
Britain and France) the Arabs fought against the Ottomans who were fighting the Allies 
as an ally of Germany. Many Turks still see this Arab revolt as a stab in the back. 
Needless to say, contrary to the Western promises, the Arabs had to wait for decades for 
their real political independence. In discussing the Ottomans, Nadwi, a leading Islamist 
who influenced Qutb, laments the loss of their leadership, and their state as the shield of 
Islam against an advancing Europe. Nadwi recalls that the Ottoman state had a huge 
territory where Islam "held sway. " Despite its decline, up until deposition of 
Abdulhamid in 1909, Christian and Jewish conspiracies and attacks against the Muslim 
Holy places (Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem) were halted. But, the Allies succeeded in 
attracting the Arabs to their side, thus separating the Arab provinces from the Ottoman 
Empire, and recast them as nation-states which, even when they attained independence, 
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had no strong hand to protect them. Then, Israel, a creation of 'big European powers. 
was eventually able to dominate these new states and to possess Jerusalem for the firs: 
time in history. "The end of the Ottoman Empire was the greatest victory for crusader 
Europe and world Judaism" (cited by Vatikiotis 1987: 128). In these views the Islamist 
association of decline of Muslims with the loss of earthly power and their selective 
reading of history is clear. 
In Turkey, Iran and most Arab countries such as Egypt. Syria. Iraq, Algeria 
(Saudi Arabia being an exception) political independence came under the leadership of 
secular, nationalist elites. Understandably, intellectuals from religious minorities and 
modernist Muslims actively supported the development of a secular nationalism. For 
example the development of Bat'hism as a form of nationalist Arab 'socialism' which 
has been influential in Syria and Iraq, owed much to Michel Atlaq a Christian from 
Damascus (Hourani 1991 b: 404). Nasser, the charismatic dictator of Egypt, became the 
leader of Arab nationalism. His Egypt, along with Syria and Iraq built close ties with 
the Soviet Union. The ideology in some of these Arab countries was Arab Socialism, 
which was dubbed as "communism plus Allah". It was presented as a third way 
eschewing evils of capitalism (individualism, wealth concentration or consumerism) 
and of Marxist socialism (atheism, class conflict) (Esposito 1995: 73). 
However, it is an important point that starting with Turkey in 1923, Muslims 
have begun to live in nation-states most of which have been based on secular 
nationalism. In the case of Arabs the success of nationalism, as far as building a state 
for the nation is concerned, is ambiguous. There are more than 10 major Arab nation- 
states for more than 250 million Arabs. This means fragmented, or artificially created 
as Islamists and many other secular Arabs would like to put it- Arab states with man;: 
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conflicts among them. This fact in turn makes the Arabs disunited and hence weak in 
the international arena. 
Islamists are generally opposed to nationalism and nation-state as ideas4' for 
both doctrinal and pragmatic reasons. As discussed above. according to Islamists, Islam 
leaves no secular domain in life, let alone a secular space for the state power which is 
the natural result of a secular nationalism. It is often pointed out. in rejection of 
ethnicity based definition of Islam that among the close companions of the Prophet 
there were Blacks or Persians, and that the Prophet said that there was no Arab 
superiority over the non-Arab and vice versa. The Qur'an also declares that the different 
ethnic groups are created so that they may know each other not that they may despise 
each other. Superiority is only shown through religious piety (49: 13). 
Therefore, in line with the Islamic doctrine, Islamists hold that the religious and 
political community (ummah) of Islam must be one. In other words, Muslims are a 
religiopolitical community (Esposito 1995: 30). There is no place for discrimination on 
the basis of race or nationality. The ummah is "We" and the rest is "Them" in the final 
analysis. Since the political community of Muslims is identical to the religious 
community, ideally it is governed by a leader who has both political and religious 
knowledge. All administrative acts are subject to Islamic norms. It is interesting to note 
that the medieval view of some scholars that there may be more than one caliph, 
because of geographical distances among Islamic countries which may prohibit 
effective ruling, cannot be defended today due to advances in the communication 
41 See for example Mawdudi (1986: 37) and Qutb who writes "A Muslim has no country except that part 
of the earth where the Shari'ah of Allah is established [... ] A Muslim has no nationality except his belief 
which makes him a member of the Muslim community in dar-al-Islam" (1993 [19641: 103), these ideas 
are very similar to those voiced by Ottoman Islamists who declared many decades ago that Fatherland 
was where shariah prevails (Lewis 1968: 323). 
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teclulology. 
Pragmatically, since about one fifth of the world population is Muslim, Islamists 
argue that a united front of Muslims would be a great force in world politics and it 
would mean the end of humiliating situation of Muslims. The political and economic 
problems of Muslims would be easier to solve. Jerusalem would be saved. Economic 
backwardness of many Muslim societies would be eradicated by the common use of 
Muslim wealth and energy. For example, the oil revenues would be used for the whole 
of ummah (an idea, naturally much disliked by rich oil states). A successful economic 
cooperation among the Muslims would not only provide much needed steady economic 
growth but also serve to boost the self-confidence in the cultural realm as well, 
especially vis-ä-vis the West. 
It is easy to see that a secular nationalism which denies the centrality of Islam in 
politics is in conflict with the ideal of an Islamic state where the political community is 
defined on the basis of religion. 42 However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, there 
may be nationalisms with religious ingredient. In this sense, it can be said that there are 
no qualms of Islamists in Iran, Turkey, Algeria or Egypt to accept a form of religious 
nationalism which define the nation as the Muslims in that country. }fence, the article 
115 of Iranian constitution stipulates that the president must possess Iranian origin and 
Iranian nationality. 
Many Islamists indicted nationalism for causing division among the Muslims. 
Today, it seems that all Muslim states accept the principles of international politics 
among the nation-states. There are serious conflicts among them43 and almost no 
'Z Which is fully open to converts. See also Vatikiotis 1987, especially pp. 42-44. 
43 Many Muslim countries have better relationships with the Western countries than their Muslim 
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preferential treatment (Piscatori 1956: 1 11). a situation which must be changed 
according to Islamists. 
The institution of the nation-state and the principles of international state system 
are obstacles to an Islamist vision of the world. According to Islamists, Islam as a 
religion and civilisation must be a determining force in shaping the activities of the 
Muslims; however it is the other way around. Islam is subordinate to the nation-state 
structure in Muslim countries. To a considerable extent it is the state which defines and 
shapes the role of Islam in society and in international relations. Islam is just another 
factor, albeit often a very important one, in articulating the national interests. Islamist 
aim is to make it the defining one. Needless to say, a strictly ideologically defined 
foreign policy might be very ambitious to the point of world-domination and often 
makes a nation-state a threat to others. This can be seen in the case of Iran where the 
export of the `Islamic Revolution' has been a state policy (Esposito 1995: 19-22) which 
made Iran a threat to neighbouring Muslim states, like Turkey, oil-rich Gulf states and 
hence to the Western countries (e. g. the U. S. A), because of their high dependency to 
the oil. 
Unification of all Muslim states to constitute a super-state of all Muslim ummah 
is a utopia that is perceived to have existed in Islamic golden ages. Some argue that the 
unified ummah never existed (Tibi 1990: 11). For Islamists, establishment of Islamist 
regimes in some leading Muslim countries, for example in the Middle East which may 
cause great strategic threats to the West, seems an initial step towards final unification. 
Given the negative image of the West among Islamists of the region, it is highly likely 
that such states would take a confrontational stance vis-ä-vis the Western states, but this 
neighbours. 
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is by no means certain. It could be averted by a change in the \Vestern policies and a 
moderation in Islamist views. 
Establishment of an Islamist regime in an influential Sunni Muslim country, for 
example, in Egypt seems a remote possibility, but if it happens this would send great 
shock waves to all other Sunni, and especially Arab countries with a great possibility of 
the establishment of other Islamist regimes there. At the moment the West is perceived 
to be supporting the current secular regimes and betting against a Sunni Islamic 
revolution. It happened in Iran against what turned out to be a Shiite revolution. 
2.8 ISLAMISTS, KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE. TECHNOLOGY AND 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, in the evolution of modernity, crudely put, 
growing amount of knowledge and changing (e. g. secularised) attitudes toward it, its 
development and systematisation as science, its application as technology and overall 
industrialisation of Europe (as a closely related development), do account for much. 
Islamists approaches to these concepts reveal their general stance vis-ä-vis modernity. 
It is a well known suggestion that one of the major reasons for the decline of the 
Muslim world is the Islamic attitude towards knowledge. This seems paradoxical given 
the well known hadith that "Seek the knowledge even from China" (i. e. even at the 
other end of the world). However, it is assumed that given the (alleged) other- 
worldliness of Islam, the knowledge must mean the divine knowledge, what really 
matters for the Muslims. It must be granted that other worldly tendencies in Islam are 
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well known and perhaps majestically manifested in the Suti tradition.; It can be argued 
that the historical evidence is in more support of an Islam which encourages other- 
worldly orientated Muslim. The medieval passivity of Muslims vis-ä-vis the political 
authority and their more recent passivity in responding to the advent of modern 
science45 is largely attributed to their fatalism, a reflection of otherworldliness46. In this 
tradition, for example, many Muslims leave it to Allah to avenge their maltreatment, 
rather than taking action against it (Mernissi 1993: 57). 
However, Weber classified Islam as this-worldly but lacking asceticism, which 
was also necessary in his view, for capitalist development. It would be more correct to 
accept that there are competing strands in Islam and both other and this worldly 
emphasis (Vatikiotis 1987: 32). In fact, the Prophet advised moderation in observing 
worshipping and forbid excessiveness in religion (see, Lemu 1993). Therefore, it would 
be more in line with the spirit of Islam, for a Muslim, to try to strike a balance between 
this world and the hereafter. Obviously this is no easy task due to many differing 
traditions and interpretations. For example for many sufis, this world had no 
significance to the point of nothingness in value, because after all, it is transitory. 
However, Islamists prefer to conclude from the Islamic sources that this world must be 
important and its importance stems from the fact that it is the only instrument to gain 
the pleasure (Rida) of Allah which, by definition, is the ultimate/real aim. Therefore, the 
as For example, it is reported that famous Sufi Ibn Arabi gifted his only house to a beggar who asked 
perhaps "for the sake of Allah", for the lack of anything to give or in the case of a Sufi who only ate 
flavour after coming to conclusion that he loses valuable time for chewing in which he preferred to zikr 
(chanting [attributes of God]) 
as floodbhoy observes that Muslims who lead the world in science between 9'h and 13`' centuries had not 
succeeded creating a scientific revolution and what is worse later they did not take the science and 
technology from Europe where they were developed. There was a larger problem than simple 
disorganisation on the parts of Muslim in importing these on time. Perhaps due to unfavourable 
developments in Islamic philosophy or extreme sense of superiority at that time, Muslims did not show 
enough interest in the scientific and technological development that took place in Europe (see, 
Iloodbhoy 1993). 
°`' Otherworldliness finds encouragement in the Qur'an "What is the life of this world but play and 
amusement" (6: 32). 
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world, including worldly power (political, economical etc. ) must be under Islamist 
control if the `will' of God is to be realised and if Islam to be lived fully. This means in 
practice that Islamist understanding of Islam must be dominant in the Muslim 
community (ummah) and ummah must be free from un-Islamic, including foreign, 
influences. This, at a minimum, requires an adequate scientific, technological and 
industrial base. 
One can often cone across traditional categorisation of knowledge by Muslims 
as divine and non-divine. This seems to have some influence over Islamists who are 
anxious to subordinate interpretations of growing `non-divine' knowledge to a proper 
understanding of divine message. Qutb's, stance is highly indicative of the Islamist 
attitude vis-ä-vis knowledge. What really matters in the end is correct religious 
knowledge to live by47. Interestingly he includes economics in the issues like `matters 
of faith, acts of worship, morals and principles of politics' which are to be learnt from a 
pious Muslim. Whereas "abstract sciences such as chemistry, physics, biology, 
astronomy, medicine, industry, agriculture, administration (limited to its technical 
aspects), technology, military arts, and similar other sciences and arts" can be learnt 
from a non-Muslim if need be. To learn "these essential sciences and arts" to meet the 
needs of the community is "a collective obligation" for the Muslim ummah 
(1993[1964]: 92-93). 
One can see that, self-servingly, the ideologues of Islamist groups tend to belittle 
non-religious sciences. The expertise in these sciences are encouraged but expected to 
serve obediently to the cause of building and maintaining an Islamist society, ruled 
47 Watt argues that there is a difference in Muslim and Western approaches to knowledge. For Muslims 
knowledge is primarily "for living" and for the Westerner it is main]: "for power" (i. e. to dominate the 
nature and other human beings). In the kind of knowledge for living (religious and moral values) Islam 
claims finality and self-sufficiency (1988: 13). 
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ultimately in accordance with Islam as authoritatively interpreted by spiritual leaders 
(e. g. Khomeini, Qutb, Mawdudi) who are well versed in the Qur'anic and Prophetic 
(Sunna) knowledge. 
The most important knowledge in Islam depends on the belief in the authority of 
Allah. Thus, Islam provides the ultimate Truth from Allah through messengership of 
Muhammad. However, since this knowledge is not a scientific knowledge in the 
modern sense, it is open to contestation 4S. Therefore, `the Islamic Truth', like other 
truths, needs backing of the earthly power in practice for its claim to be the Truth49. 
This is because, as often, secular elite and scientists use the scientific knowledge as a 
"veil" in front of a correct understanding of Islam according to many Islamists. The 
limits of human reason and scientific knowledge must be recognised and it should not 
be forgotten that if properly understood natural sciences can only lead to Allah as 
pointed out by Islamist leaders from Said Nursi-0 to Qutb and Khomeini (see, Euben 
2003). 
It should be noted that, the secularised scientific method and conceptualisation 
of what amounts to be science and the methods of its research and transmission to new 
generations (e. g. the university) have all been developed in Europe and by and large 
became dominant in the world. This situation is causing anxiety for Islamists. Some 
Western scientific ideas (e. g. the Theory of Evolution) are perceived to be in conflict 
48 It might be more accurate to call it Islamic wisdom which had been perceived to be in need of 
transmission (nukl) to new generations rather than reason (aql) (Ayubi 1991). However it should not be 
forgotten that, naturally Islam teaches that Islamic truths are the bases of one Muslim's life and there are 
different levels of knowing these religious truths. Thus, scientific knowledge can be taken as a 
preliminary, ultimately not that important stage in discovering higher and much more important truths. 
°'' For the relationship between truth and power see (Foucault 1980). As Foucault argues the truth is not 
external to the power relations. 
5° An important concern for Nursi (d. 1960) the leader of the Nurculuk movement in Turkey, was to show 
that modern sciences coming to Turkey from Europe were actually showing the greatness of God rather 
than being a tool for systematic dc-mystification of Islam, and some atheistic propaganda, at the hands of 
the secularised (sec, Yildirim 1995: 151). 
i; s 
with traditional Islamic beliefs. Many other scientific developments are interpreted in 
such a way to diminish the claim of Islam on certain aspects of life. '' 
It seems possible to make a few generalisations with regard to Islamist attitudes 
vis-ä-vis modem scientific, technical knowledge and technology. These attitudes, as 
suggested above, include downplaying the importance or relevance of these knowledge 
vis-ä-vis most important aims of life (i. e. leading an Islamic life). There seems a 
psychological barrier for Islamists to learn and borrow from the non-Muslims especially 
with regard to interpersonal relations and social organisation. Islamists advocate a 
selective approach toward the scientific knowledge based on the view that modernity is 
divisible. There are good and bad parts and it is possible and desirable to make learning 
and borrowing from non-Muslim (e. g. Western) cultures subject to Islamic scrutiny and 
approval. Technology can be separated from the social (i. e. Western) milieu that 
enables its creation. In other words technology is generally considered value-neutral 
(for example, see Nasr 1996: 52) and, can and should be harnessed for Islamic purposes. 
For example an Egyptian scholar, Yusuf Kardawi, who answers the questions via the 
satellites channels like Al Jazeera, is very much in favour of using the internet to be 
able to convey the Islamic message to the its intended universe. "We must use the 
technique of the age to serve to Islam" (Yens . ýafak 10.5.1997). 
There has been a tension testing the leadership ability of spiritual leaders of the 
Islamist groups. There are vast numbers of technically educated professionals in 
Islamist groups who might advocate a more secular organisation of economy and 
perhaps society. In fact, this occupational differentiation has been a core process of 
51 One example is the occurrence of the rain. Islam teaches that it is, inter alia, a blessing from Allah. 
When some Turkish Muslims make ceremonies of `rain prayers' during drought it is the custom of many 
secular Turks, including some elite, to belittle this as a useless tradition of medieval minds by talking 
about the mechanics of the rain (see, Dursun 1996: 45). 
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secularisation in the Nest. Islamist answer to this, the emphasis on the instrumentality 
of non-religious expertise, has not been fully successful: and it can be seen that, there is 
a certain level of secularisation - e. g. escape from the full control of the spiritual leader 
by the technically educated- in organising activities of Islamist groups observable for 
example in Turkey. 
As far as technology is concerned it is important to note that the `stagnation' of 
Muslims vis-ä-vis the West has been felt due to the advance of the West in science and 
technology. The majority of Muslim countries have been the underdogs militarily, 
politically and economically for now around 200 years. In today's globalising world, 
modern technology imposes itself on everybody; it also willingly or unwillingly 
preoccupies Islamists at different corners of the world. One interesting example might 
be the sophisticated weapon systems (e. g. Stinger or similar missiles) possessed by the 
Taliban (whom might be considered partially Islamists but mainly rural ultra- 
traditionalists) in Afghanistan who on the other hand destroyed video tapes or cameras 
as un-Islamic. 
The importance of technology and an industrialised economy is clearly shown 
by the Nest and some other advanced industrialised countries (e. g. Japan). Therefore, it 
is only natural for Islamists to advocate for a high-technology industrialised state and 
blame their current rulers for failing in this task. Usually cited causes like corruption 
and resulting mismanagement, waste or laziness are said to be against the Islamic 
virtues. Technological products are also of useful in re-Islamisation of society. Tape, 
video cassettes, fax, photocopy machines, the internet were and are very important in 
Islamisation efforts. Television or radio channels, often using satellites, are also used. 
There are large numbers of experts among Islamists who are well-versed in technology. 
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Another important disturbing point for Islamists is the lack of industrial base in 
most Muslin countries. Even rich ones capable of developing their industries generally 
make off-the-shelf purchases from the advanced western states. For example, Saudi 
Arabia spends tens of billions of dollars to buy arms from USA or UK but these 
weapons still failed to save them from humiliatingly requesting, largely American, help 
against the Iraqis during the Gulf War (Mitchell 2002). This kind of spending of petro- 
dollars or their investment in the West is criticised not only by Islamists but by more 
liberal Muslim intellectuals like Mernissi (1996: 257) who points out that these funds 
may be used to provide employment to large number of unemployed young Muslims in 
North Africa and Middle East, who feel totally useless and let down by the current 
s system `'. 
2.9 ISLAMISTS AND CAPITALISM 
Another important concept associated with modernity is capitalism and Islamist 
views with regard to it worth analysing. Since the Islamic world is one of the areas 
where endogenous capitalist development did not occur, it is very easy to argue that the 
reasons for the blockage are to be found in the precepts of Islam and in the historical 
developments (sec, for example, Langman and Morris 2002). However, the conclusions 
of Rodinson (1974) are well known. A pre-capitalist sector existed in the Muslim 
Empire, and Islam did not stand in the way of its development. 
It can be argued that a general evaluation would reveal that Islam is more 
conducive towards a capitalist economy than a command (socialist or fascist) economy. 
According to frequent themes in publications by Islamists, Islam safeguards private 
52 In fairness, it must be pointed out that the Muslim states failed to save Kuwait and they would 
certainly fail to save Saudi Arabia or any other rich oil state in case of an occupation by a neighbouring 
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property and inheritance, justifies profit made in the market and accepts bargaining 
between employer and the employee to determine the wage. It encourages the active use 
of savings (capital? ) by taxing it in the form of zakat (Khan 1995: 33). As far as 
socialism is concerned, it is possible to refer to examples in Islamic history encouraging 
egalitarian use of economic resources'' and one should not forget the strong emphasis 
on the general welfare of the community rather than that of the individual (Vatikiotis 
1987: 32). However, in recent times. perhaps most of Islamists have not been in favour 
of a socialist economic order which. inter alia, seemed to be guilty of associating with 
an `atheist' state, the Soviet Union which pursued an aggressive secularisation policy 
which included de-Islamisation of millions of Muslims lived within its borders, as well 
as de-Christianisation. 
Although, Islamists often propagate that they are in favour of neither capitalism 
nor socialism but a third way superior to both51, so far their economic views have been 
closer to a capitalist understandin255 which seems more in line with Islamist emphasis 
on justice56 rather than on equality. Roy argues that many Islamists emphasise all that is 
compatible with capitalism in Islam (1994: 136). Ray Takeyh also argues that 
"[m]oderate Islamists are likely to be most liberal in the realm of economic policy. The 
failure of command economies in the Middle East and centrality of global markets to 
the region's economic rehabilitation have made minimal government intervention 
Muslim states. The Islamist wishes to create a Muslim UN or an Islamic International Court remain just 
wishes (Gauhar 1978: 309, Piscatori 1986: 101-111). 
53 For example according to a hadith humans have common ownership of three things: grass, water and 
fire. More importantly, a leading companion (Ebu Zer Gifari) was strongly in favour of equal distribution 
of the wealth, this led some to refer to him as the first Muslim 'socialist' (See, Abrahamian (1988) and 
Roy (1994: 135). 
54 For Mawdudi's views to this effect see (Nasr 1996: 103), sec also (Turner 1994: 88). 
55 For example according to Hadar some clerics in Iran were economically liberal, ideologically closer to 
Thatcher and Reagan than pro-American statist rulers elsewhere (1993: 36). 
56 Justice in practice means that the individual are to be rewarded according to his ability. Erbakan once 
said that in justifying his small fortune, if a person does the job of three persons he can earn the weight of 
three persons in gold. 
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appealing to Islamist theoreticians" (see. McDaniel 2003: 31S-319). However, given the 
lack of clear rules in Islam which can be interpreted as favouring a certain mode of 
economy; it should not be surprising to see Islamists in the future re-interpreting Islamic 
doctrines on economy as anti-capitalist if they see it fit. In fact, the existence of higher 
moral objectives in Islamist ideology provides a convenient tool for from arguing, for 
example, against consumerism to justifying economic failure, or belittling importance 
of economic factors in mobilisation of people, as in the case of Iran'. Very importantly, 
unlike in the West, for Islamists the economy cannot have its own fully independent 
logic; it must be subject to higher Islamic principles (McDaniel 2003). Therefore, it can 
be argued that, under normal conditions the capitalist economies with their pursuit of 
profit very little restricted by morality are to be more successful than an Islamically 
organised economy which may have a basically capitalist structure but nevertheless 
have to uphold certain moral principles''. This line of argument is countered by 
Islamists, similar to Marxism, that in fact an ideologically motivated work force and 
consumers in an Islamist society would ensure economic success. 
It can be seen that with the increasing importance of economic activity and its 
gaining complexity, new Islamist interpretations are being put forward. These 
interpretations are often presented as depending on certain ground rules with an 
economic impact in Islam (e. g. zakat, participation in the risk in business and hence ban 
of usury (riba) (the Qur'an 2: 275-80,30: 39)59. Thus Islamists have to systematise and 
5' Khomeini said that the Islamic revolution was not motivated by a desire to make "melons plentiful", to 
argue that there were deeper ideological motives behind it (Bchdad 1994: 81 I). 
5' This is like following an ethical foreign policy which restricts the sale of arms to certain countries at 
the expense of short-term economic loss which means unemployment. 
59 The precise meaning of riba is debated (Watt 1988: 107) and there have been some weakly put 
propositions that a `fair' amount of interest should be accepted in Islam. One can see that, it is often 
argued by non-Islamist Muslim and non-, Muslim experts that the proposed ways by Islamists to avoid 
interest in economic activity are quite often thin disguises that can only serve to guilt reduction (see, for 
example, McDaniel 2003). 
1-1. 
conceptualise a coherent ensemble of basic shariatic prescriptions that would often offer 
a 'middle' `round between two systems of the twentieth century socialism and 
capitalism in various national contexts (cf. Roy 1994: 132-133). The economic activity 
must be exercised within the ethical framework provided by Islam. The political 
authority must ensure the social justice which is of paramount importance according to 
Islamic ideals. In fact, in the name of upholding the interest of the public an Islamic 
government can be said to have an enormous degree of flexibility and array of tools and 
as a result a more egalitarian and redistributive economic theory will remain within 
options of Islamism. 
It can be observed that Islamism tends to function consciously or unconsciously 
as a vehicle for certain class aspirations although Islamists strongly oppose to Marxist 
interpretations of society with its purely material vision of life and its distinctions 
among warring classes, politics of hatred and envy60. Nevertheless, Islamists tend to 
attract social groups or individuals that felt excluded by the statist elite. Islamists have 
typically drawn their largest base of support from the lower-middle class, petty 
bourgeoisie and the urban rather than rural population (Fuller 2003: 34). 
2.10 THE WEST AND MODERNITY ACCORDING TO ISLA. MISTS 
Defining `the West' is hard, not just for Westerners but for Muslims as well. 
Sometimes to Muslims `the West' means the entire industrialised world including 
Japan, in other words those who have dominant influence over the international 
economy, such as the G-7 states. At times, `the West' means former colonial nations -all 
`d1 This Islamist policy is also may he because in the Middle fast "horizontal class divides are far less 
important than vertical cleavages between ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities" (Ifale 1994: 
320). 
144 
European- who conquered and dominated most of the Muslim world at some point in 
history. Sometimes `the West' actually refers to the United States as the leading 
Western power and dominant political, cultural and economic actor in the Muslim 
world. On occasions `the Nest" refers to elements of Western populations who hold 
and express negative impressions of the Muslim world. It can be seen that Islamists use 
the term the Nest' usually to refer to the USA and leading West European countries. 
Although as Lewis observes, "the Muslim world is far from unanimous in its 
rejection of the Nest, nor have the Muslim regions of the Third World been the most 
passionate and the most extreme in their hostility" (1990: 48), it became very common 
to argue, especially after the end of the cold war that Islam might be the next threat to 
replace communism (see, Esposito 1995: 4-5). Overall it can be argued that, perhaps not 
from the great majority of ordinary Muslims but from a sizeable Islamist minority 
within the Muslim world a most important, multidimensional challenge to certain 
Western countries and policies exists. 
For Islamists, there are certain problems posed by the West to the Muslim 
World stemming from abuse of its superior power over the rest of the world, a fact 
which has become much more unmistakable after the collapse of the bipolar world. As 
Bin Sayeed observes, the West does have a hegemony over the Muslim world and more 
visibly so in the Middle East which is the region of many leading Muslim countries. 
Hegemony means, in this context, the dominant role that have been being exercised in 
the region by countries like the United States, Britain, France or other European states, 
either solely or in cooperation with each other. This hegemonic or dominant role is 
exercised by these certain countries because of their ascendant position in the world 
economy and nation-state system and is ultimately backed by their military and 
145 
technological superiority. Another important aspect of this hegemony is the fact that 
Western countries have not only penetrated Muslim countries in the region in economic 
and political terms but also in every significant cultural area. Therefore, the Islamic 
resistance to Western dominance is articulated not only in political and economic terms 
but also in cultural and religious ternis (Bin Sayeed 1995: 5). In fact, Leonard Binder 
argues that. compared to Latin America, which has largely been concerned about 
European and American economic exploitation, the focal point of Middle Eastern 
resistance to Western dominance has been primarily religious and cultural: 
I think it is correct to say that no other cultural region is as deeply anxious about 
the threat of cultural penetration and westernisation. And the central symbol of 
this anxiety is Islam, with which authenticity, identity, dignity, and even manhood 
are associated (Binder 1988: 83, Cf. Tibi 1990: 43). 
In other words in the 20th century, the Western world by its superiority caused a 
political and cultural crisis in many Muslim countries. This superiority also caused and 
causes a spiritual crisis for many Muslims: How Muslims who adheres to Islam. Allah's 
chosen religion, can be inferior to other cultures? (see, Smith 1957: 41). "Failure is 
scandalous. Either God has forgotten men, or men have forgotten God" (Roy 1994: 67). 
Obviously according to Islamists the latter has happened. 
One of the important results of the superior Western economic and technologic 
base is undoubtedly the amount of knowledge produced in the West. This vast amount 
of knowledge also includes Western knowledge about the Muslim world which is far 
superior to the Muslim knowledge about the West". The Western knowledge about the 
Muslim world is coming from an enormous array of sources including the military 
satellites, open and secret espionage and the universities. Clearly, this knowledge can 
61 Of course it can always be argued that both sides do not really know each other. 
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both be used for peaceful goals as well as for more cynical ones. In fact, many Arab and 
Muslim scholars have accused the West of deliberately creating an entire body of 
literature and scholarship to be used against the Muslim world (see, for example Said 
1995). 
Fuller and Lesser argue that "the Islamic world feels itself under siege from the 
West in numerous vital political, military, cultural, social, and economic realms" (1995: 
81). Especially Muslims in the Middle and Near East feel that because of the strategic 
location of the area "they have been under siege for nearly two centuries" by a 
continuous and often overwhelming force (Bin Sayced 1995: 1). In the political arena. 
Muslim states face strong political pressures from the West in many ways. The greatest 
example is that Western states, especially the United States, have put enormous pressure 
upon the Muslim world to accept and deal with Israel. The friendship and support of the 
United States has been given to Middle Eastern states in close accordance with this 
main issue. In the eyes of Muslims, Arab Muslims in particular, Israel has been a most 
important source of humiliation and a defining issue in relationships with the West. 
Muslims see the issues related with Israel as visceral since they are associated with 
Muslim soil and Muslim refugees (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 81-2). 
In military terms the Muslim world has also been a leading arena for Western 
military intervention. There have been continuous Western efforts to maintain a military 
presence in many parts of the Islamic world, a presence welcomed by few populations, 
even if it helped some rulers to strengthen their authority and domestic security. At 
various times, Western bases in Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Bahrain, Turkey and Pakistan have been viewed by regional elite and the masses, as 
opposed to ruling families or regimes, as Western infringement upon their sovereignty 
lý- 
designed to promote Nestern. not their own, strategic goals (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 
S? ). 
In the economic realm, frictions between the Islamic world and the West are 
even more complex and often reflect broader North-South frictions over relations of 
inequality. Although there are enormous differences among the Muslim countries in 
terns of their income level, generally Muslim countries are in the league of poor 
nations. Only those who have oil and other energy sources are rich and perhaps too rich 
for their fellow Muslims. Even this case needs qualification as among the Muslim 
countries which have oil or other energy sources only Saudi Arabia and other small 
countries in the Gulf have populations-which by no means a substantial proportion of 
the Muslim Arabs, let alone of all Muslims- with income comparable to that of the 
developed Western countries. Muslim-oil-states have wrested from the West the right to 
control `officially' their own resources only over the last two decades. The extent of this 
`official' control and its geostrategy is also a very much debated issue in the world and 
especially in the Muslim world. For most of the century, these oil resources were 
viewed so essential to Western economies that Muslim governments had very little say 
over their use. Ownership of oil companies and pricing policies were controlled by the 
Western powers (Esposito 1995: 172); local governments in the Middle East risked 
overthrow if they did not cooperate. Muslims are aware that this relationship has hardly 
been one of equality, mutual respect or even commercial convenience, but in essence a 
`colonial' one. Ironically, possession of a critical and strategic international resource 
has not brought greater national sovereignty or a dominant place in international arena 
but actually diminished sovereignty of its owners (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 82-83). 
Islamists remain convinced that Western, particularly American, policies are 
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dedicated to manipulation of the Middle Eastern politics to gain control of the oil For 
example the argument was being popularly invoked in the 1990s that the United States 
"set up" Saddam Hussein in 1990 by encouraging him to invade Kuwait in order to 
justify a massive U. S. invasion and establishment of a permanent military presence. 
United States interest in Kazakhstan is explained by many Muslims exclusively in terms 
of oil. United States intervention in Somalia was driven by an interest in "Somali oil 
reserves" according to much of the Arab press. There is what might be called a Muslim 
`paranoia' relating to oil, its importance to the West, and its role as a source of 
permanent Western intervention (Fuller and Lesser 1995: 84). 
The economies of the Muslim world are perceived by Islamists as deeply 
connected, in fact dependent, to the West and its powerful institutions. Beyond the 
financial control, most Islamists, see a more fundamental "cultural gap" that leads to 
friction with the West in the economic and social realm. In Islamist perception, the 
dichotomy is between an American vision of society designed to function on the basis 
of efficient capitalist principles and an Islamist predisposition to organise government 
and society to meet certain ethical, social and religious goals, involving interests of all 
social classes. When international financial institutions -dominated by the West- such as 
the IMF impose a narrow economic orthodoxy on the Muslim governments, along with 
many other Third World states, with austerity policies by starting with cuts in subsidies 
to the poor, this threatens the social stability. In many Muslim countries, states that for 
years have been committed to fulfilment of an "unspoken social contract with the 
public-social and economic security in exchange for political passivity-now find it ever 
more difficult to fulfil the economic end of that social bargain. "(Fuller and Lesser 1995: 
62 For the view of Moroccan feminist Mernissi on the relationship between oil and Western support of the 
ultra-traditionalist Saudi regime see (Mernissi 1996). For an interesting argument that conservative 
Islamic movements for example in Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been pivotal in global oil policies and 
helping to functioning of world capitalism see (Mitchell 2002). 
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84; see also Mitchell 2002). These developments help Islamism to grow. 
The West may not be directly at fault for regime failures in many Muslim states. 
Nevertheless, Western policies have contributed a great deal to the existing situation by 
lending explicit or implicit support to authoritarian regimes and by a strong preference 
for stability over change across the Middle East (Hadar 1993: 39). In other words, the 
western support to fi"iendl)" tyrants shows itself in many Muslim countries as 
persecution, repression or even extermination of Islamists. Obviously, this support 
much accounts for the Islamist critique of the West. 
Islamists object not only to the Western political, and economical domination of 
the Middle East, but also to the cultural influence of the West which is perceived to be 
strongly contributing to the erosion of the Islamic character of their societies (Saleme 
1993: 22). This is because they generally give priority to a social vision of society based 
on a "heavily idealised' )63 past. According to Islamists in an ideal society there must be, 
inter ilia: 
" An emphasis on the family and upbringing of children according to 
Islam. The task of women is very important here. 
" Hence, importance of the married life, and disapproval of a sexually 
permissive society. 
" Respect for the parents and the elderly. 
" Protection of the weak (the poor, widows, orphans etc. ) 
According to Islamists, the cause of not following the moral commands of Islam, 
in the list above, is the fact that the Muslims grew weak in religiosity. The cultural 
influences of the West are seen as greatly contributing towards an un-Islamic society. 
63 The term belongs to Saleme (1993: 22) 
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The television is the agent par excellence of the decadent West. The movies and other 
programs bought by secular state or private channels or accessed through satellite 
dishes do portray, often selectively, a Western life style where the spouses have 
affairs";, the children are rebellious or more disturbingly "half-naked" women try to 
entertain the audience. Islamists see these as corrupting images bombarding the very 
fabric of society. 
Generally speaking, Islamists have a selective view of the West65 whose 
realities pale compared to the ideals of Islam 
6G. The Western societies are seen on the 
brink of collapse due to social ills G7. The West is greedy, double-faced 
6S, materialistic, 
individualistic, too competitive, lacks compassion, arrogant, sexually too permissive 
and deviant (e. g. homosexuality), full of alcoholics etc. The social system in the West 
(however defined, capitalist consumerist) has failed westerners because it breeds 
emptiness, dissatisfaction, and despair. Therefore, the imitation69 of the West and its 
cultural effects are to be stopped by Islamisation of the Muslims, who would then 
understand the emptiness or at least `un-Islamicness' of the things offered by the West. 
In other words a central theme in Islamist discourse is that Islam provides a much better 
"'The TV series `Dallas' has been one of the most known examples. 
"5 There are conflicting Islamist views of the West as far as its commitment to Christianity concerned; 
often the West is depicted as an ultimately Christian entity, evident in its perceived incurable, religiously 
motivated hostility toward Islam. Islamist thinkers, who are aware of the degree of secularisation 
in the 
West though, argue that pretension to be emancipated from religion brought new, empty, forms of 
worship like worshipping autograph of a celebrity (Shariati 1987: 65). 
" It is indicative of a self-conscious effort by Islamists to construct a `modern' Islamic worldview 
"better" than offered by modern ideologies that Islamist formulas are favourably compared not with 
Christianity but with various western concepts political and economic forms of organisation (Nasr 1996: 
83). 
Obviously, many non-Muslim non-Westerners also criticise the West in similar lines. 
Western use of double standards showed itself according to Islamists in Bosnia and Kuwait where the 
oil proved to be worthier than Muslim blood. 
'The goodness or badness of imitation (taglid in Arabic and laklit in Turkish) depends on the model. 
While the imitation of the West is condemned by the Islamists, (for example Erbakan referred to other 
parties in Turkey as `imitators of the West', taglid of a most learned religious scholar (e. g. an Ayatollah) 
(who presumably closely follows the Prophetic paradigm) in Iran might be a religious duty. Shariati 
makes an interesting argument that Muslims may imitate Europe (presumably in technical fields and for a 
certain period to acquire material power) in order not to resemble to Europeans (1987: 96). 
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blueprint for life than the western model in general, despite the western pretensions and 
claims of progress and enlightenment. Therefore, no intellectual guidance should be 
sought in the West (Mayer 1999: 186). 
To be able to adapt technical and material advances, especially from the West, 
while resisting to its cultural influences Islamists have to hold that the modernity is 
divisible. By only doing so, it is possible to modernise Muslim societies in a selective 
way by rejecting certain components of modernity which seem tin-Islamic, while 
adopting some. Secularisation and secular nationalism are rejected. Modern science and 
technology are accepted subject to an Islamic interpretation where necessary. Since the 
image of the West is negative among Islamists, it is often assumed and argued in the 
Islamist circles, similar to the arguments that can be heard in many other non-Islamic 
cultures, that the West does not represent true modernity or some aspects of western 
societies cannot be part of modernity or must be rejected even if they are part of 
modernity. This is so, because the ultimate reference is Islam, not modernity. There is 
not much to be learned from modern/ Western societies in terms of human relations. 
Therefore, modernity is reduced, in great extent, to technical ways and products which 
are supposed to be instrumental for the Muslims and ummah in general. Thus, in most 
Islamist discourses the link between modernity and the West is broken. 
Although, one frequently come across with the view that many problems of the 
Muslim world could be attributed to the fact that it did not experience a renaissance, 
reform or enlightenment; Islamists beg to differ and often counter-argue that the 
Westerners will soon realise that they can derive the light they need from Islam. 70 
70 Sec for example Nadwi's speech at http: //www. rauf")6. supanct. com/role. htm, (last visited 1.2.2005). 
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The growing intellectual self-confidence of Islamists vis-ä-vis modern 
concepts throughout the Muslim world is unmistakable. For example Hasan Turabi 
of Sudan strongly argues that Muslims need not be intimidated by the ungodly 
concepts by which modernity is perceived or articulated. Like the Prophet who did 
not hesitate to use the pagan Arabic idioms to preach Islamic monotheism, Muslims 
have the duty to engage in modern concepts to deliver the message (cited by 
Ibrahim 1999). 
2.11 CONCLUSION 
In the complex and long history of modernity, which in its formative phases 
had been almost exclusively shaped by the West, a special chapter must be opened 
for Muslims. In its first century Islam had contacted with Christendom and around 
two centuries ago, Europe decisively gained the upper hand against Muslims. The 
evolution of modernity in Europe (later West) created certain criteria with which 
modernisation of other cultures have been evaluated. For example, an important 
aspect of modernisation of the West has been secularisation. Thus, whether Islam is 
compatible with secularisation is an important question toward understanding 
compatibility of Muslim modernisation with Western conception of modernity. It 
can be seen that, contrary to those who argue that Islam is open for new 
interpretation (ijtihard, a broad school of Islamists, in accordance with their 
interpretation of Islam, argue that Islam is not compatible with secularisation. In 
their view, politics and instruments of politics (e. g. state) have to be conceptualised 
according to Islamic precepts. 
153 
I have tried to show that Islamism as an ideology can be qualified as 
basically modern. It has been shaped within Muslim countries which have been 
experiencing modernisation under strong Western influence. At the same time, this 
period has been one of rapid decline for the Muslim world. Therefore, it is only 
natural that Islamism, like other major ideologies of this period (such as secularism, 
nationalism, socialism) has some general views about these processes. In other 
words, it can be said that modernity imposes certain forms on various versions of 
Islamism. These forms stem from both self-perception of the `moderns' both in the 
West and in the Muslim countries and conceptualisation of modernity on the part of 
Islamists. It is not a clean form obviously due to differences in particular histories 
(e. g. elite's attitude toward Islam), but all Islamists have to react to certain core 
processes of modernity (e. g. secularisation, nationalism). Thus, as we saw, Islamism 
first of all contains a certain interpretation of history and sees the decline of 
Muslims and increasing influence of modernity from this perspective. Islamist 
activism on the other hand contributes to decentralisation of the West in the 
definition of modernity. 
Islam as a religion possesses a vast system of meanings and symbols that 
makes it open for various, even conflicting interpretations. Therefore, Islam can be 
used for different purposes. Islamism employs a selective re-interpretation of Islam 
to affect the social change toward re-Islamisation of society. It can be seen that 
there are some common themes shared more or less by Islamists. These common 
points stem from their general agreement on the perfectness, comprehensiveness 
and self-sufficiency of Islam (hence its superiority to any other political, economic 
or cultural formula). There are no significant secular spheres of life. Politics too, as 
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an important part of life, must be subject to Islamic principles. 
The Islamist rejection and frequent stereotyping of the West, like other 
stereotypes held by non-Muslims, has enormous repercussions, for the world 
politics. The possibility of establishment of Islamist states or states with strong 
Islamist influences at the governmental level, especially in the Middle East is a 
feared one in the West because as things stand, such states would likely be 
important parts of anti-Westernism in the world. 
It is possible to talk about a broad Islamist stance in the world vis-ä-vis 
modernity as associated with the West and modernity as an abstract term reducible 
to its certain core processes. Islamists generally favour modernisation of Muslim 
countries defined as progress in science, technology and industrialisation. They 
oppose secularisation and secular understanding of the nation; democracy is often 
either de-legitimised or re-defined in a way incompatible with certain tenets of 
liberal democracy. 
It can be concluded that not all aspects of modernity as it developed in the 
West causes equally fierce Islamist oppositions. For example, capitalism and 
nationalism and the institution of nation-state are accepted to a great extent either 
with a belief that subject to some corrective Islamic remedies they are in line with 
Islamic basics (e. g. capitalism) or they can take the form of a half-way stage toward 
Islamic universalism (e. g. the nation-state). 
In the next two chapters, the views of the elite of the Welfare Party circles 
will be analysed vis-ä-vis modernity and the West under the lights of the themes 
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touched upon in this chapter and Chapter 1. Especially their views on secularism. 
nationalism, capitalism, democracy and suitability of the West as a modernisation 
model for Turkey will be focused upon. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE WELFARE PARTY AND ISLAMISM, STATE, 
SECULARISATION AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, I discussed, amongst other issues, the relationship of modernity 
with the modernisation of the state, and development of an international state system 
that contains both democratic and un-democratic states. Secularisation was also 
discussed as an important process of modernity. In Chapter 2, the emergence of 
Islamism in the Middle East and Islamist responses in this region to the rise of the 
'modern' state and its use by the secular elite were among the issues. Islamist responses 
to secularisation and democracy were also analysed. These analyses provide the 
background for a focus on the WP vis-A-vis these issues. Although, the similarities and 
differences between Islamism of the WP and wider Islamism in the Middle East will 
often be pointed out in Chapter 3 and 4, rather than trying to make a comparison for 
each and every issue, I will make an overall comparison in the concluding chapter with 
regard to most important issues. 
In this Chapter, the following important issues will be analysed: 
I:, - 
The rise, centralisation and secularisation of the state mechanisms in the 
hands of a secular elite which used the state in the service of 
westernising/secularising Kemalist reforms that primarily aimed for a 
radical break from the Ottoman/Islamic past. 
" Important factors in the rise of Islamism in Turkey and the \VP's place 
and role within it. The WP's attempt to shape Islamism and its relations 
with some other important Islamist groups. The party's Islamic 
discourse, characteristics and activism of its grass roots. 
" The WP elite's views on secularisation in Turkey, on the principle of 
laicite and their struggle to re-negotiate its content to end its "strict" 
application especially in education system. 
" The WP elite's views on democracy in general and on Turkish 
democracy in particular. Their views on the issue of women, media and 
the minorities. 
Further analyses of the WP elite's views on the secular Turkish nationalism, 
science, technology and industrialisation; Turkish economy and capitalism; and the 
relationship between the West and modernity will be conducted in Chapter 4. Thus, a 
more comprehensive understanding of their stance vis-ä-vis Turkish modernisation, 
modernity in general and suitability of the West for Turkey as a modernisation model 
will be reached. 
A leading Turkish expert, close to Islamist circles, makes a very broad and all- 
inclusive definition of Islamism which shows that Turkish Islamists share certain 
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general Islamist views with regard the current state of the Muslim world: 
The movement, consists of predominantly activist, modernist, eclectic political, 
idealistic, intellectual and scientific efforts, quests, suggestions and solutions in the way 
of making Islam, once again, dominant in life in its entirety (beliefs, worship, ethics, 
philosophy, politics, education... ) and with a rational method to save the Islamic world 
from exploitation of the West, tyrannical and oppressive rulers , enslavement, imitation, 
superstition [.. ] make it civilised, united, developed" (my emphasis, Kara 1986: XV). 
Indeed, Islamism as an ideology aims to re-interpret Islamic rules and symbols. 
make them once again valid for all areas of life. However, it might be possible for a 
? 'luslim or Islamic group to advocate a partial Islamisation or be content with partial re- 
Islamisation of the society as it is often the case in Turkey; this should not prevent them 
being called 'Islamists', albeit with careful qualification. 
According to Tftrköne (1991: 32-32) a form of Islamism was originally 
developed in the period 1867-1873 by Ottoman intellectuals (see also, Mardin 1962). 
However, non-Ottoman intellectuals, such as J. Afghani, R. Rida and M. Abduh are 
often shown as pioneers of Islamic reformism (Esposito 1995: 55). It is indicative that 
both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, where Islamist thinkers first began to emerge, 
were the most exposed Muslim countries to the modernising impact of Europe. 
Therefore, an important part of Islamism that emerged and evolved in the Ottoman 
Empire and also later in Turkey has been a reaction and attempt to formulate an 
ideological stance against the penetration of European/Western references, symbols, 
political, social, economic ideas and systems. Obviously, Islamism has been much more 
than just a cultural reaction. 
WP members shared and voiced a view, also widely shared by other Islamists in 
Turkey, that the rise of and most powerful period of the Ottoman Empire were directly 
linked to their Islamic steadfastness. When they remained loyal to Islamic principles 
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they triumphed both in battlefields and in their endeavour to build the `mosr advanced' 
example of Islamic civilisation. The more excessive aspects of the Ottoman 
Westernisation reforms were largely due to the personalities of the reformers who had 
less than the desired level of faith'. During the Ottoman reforms, especially in the 
second half of the 19`h century, there were early Islamists who argued that the 
Westernisation drive should be more in line with Islam (Bora 1998: 80-81; Mardin 
1962)2. 
There has been what can be called `a tradition of Islamist critique of 
Westernisation' in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, since very early time of 
acceleration of Westernisation as the dominant version of modernisation. The argument 
that `a selective' approach has to be taken when borrowing from or imitating Europe 
(later West), has been the dominant one among Islamists (see, Türköne 1994: 62-63). A 
self-conscious continuation of this tradition was obvious in the WP. 
3.2 EMERGENCE AND CENTRALISATION OF `MODERN' STATE IN 
TURKEY 
Modernisation attempts during the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire 
were a direct result of the superiority of Europeans and Russians on the battlefield that 
put the survival of the Empire in doubt. The Ottoman and early Republican reforms 
aimed for centralisation of the state and were inspired by Europe, France in particular. 
The initial predominant aim for these reforms was to increase the power of the state 
machinery, especially the armed forces vis-a-vis the external powers to guarantee its 
survival. Yet these resulted in a strong state mechanism in terms of its capacity of 
1 It has been a frequent theme in Islamist discourses that many Ottoman reformers emerged among those 
individuals who were irreligious unlike their ancestors. 
2 Indeed, a central claim of all those Islamist movements in the world that do not deny the necessity of 
modernisation is that it can be done in an Islamic way. 
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shaping the political system and use of legal force 3. The largely Sunni population 
continued to remain passive vis-ä-vis any exercise of state power. Islamist intellectual 
Ismet Özel explains that, the fact that there has not been a tradition of rebellion on 
Turkish soil and the space given by the ruled to the rulers (not to give rulers any excuse 
to confiscate produce or money held by the general population) caused state power to 
become absolute in the modernisation process after the Tan_inrat4. Yet, the same 
powerful state could not ensure the participation of the population in modernisation 
efforts to reach the targets it set (Milli Gazete, 12.10.1997). 
The reforms, aiming to make the Ottoman Empire powerful enough vis-ä-vis 
foreign countries and a place for all nations of the empire to coexist in peace, were too 
little and too late. As the fervour of nationalism increased among the non-Turkish 
subjects, the Ottoman Empire, weakened by the wars, disintegrated and effectively 
ended in the last months of 1918 with defeat, as an ally of the Germans, in the WWI. 
The dominant Turkish Population of the Empire clung to Anatolia as the last piece of 
land in their possession; but in 1919 Greece occupied Turkish territory from Izmir to as 
close as 30 miles from Ankara. However, the Turkish War of Independence, under the 
leadership of General Mustafa Kemal, 5 ended in 1922 with the defeat of the Greeks. 
During the war, The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was founded on 23 
April 1920, ostensibly as the new centre expressing the national will. 
Mustafa Kemal, who emerged as the new undisputed national leader, ended the 
sultanate (1922) and founded the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923. The main aim 
3 As will be seen, in terms of providing economic benefits to the general population the state remained 
relatively weak. It is useful to make a distinction between the terms `legal force' and `legitimate force'. In 
the case of the former, a substantial amount of society may see state's use of force as illegitimate. 
The Ottoman reform period, 1839-1876. 
5 In 1934, European style surnames were made compulsory, and Mustafa Kemal took the surname of 
Atatürk (Father Turk) (Lewis 1968: 289). 
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for him and the Kenialist cadres (i. e. those who were close to him) was to pull Turkey 
from backwardness to, in his oft-repeated words, "the level of contemporary 
civilisation". In their view, the only viable models in front of Turkey were the Western 
countries (Toprak 1981: 39)6. To westernise was to modernise. The countries that 
served as a model for Turkey were industrialised and advanced in technology. For the 
Kemalists, one of the most important factors in the background of their progress was 
rationalisation of mind that produced scientific knowledge. Turkish modernisers wanted 
to create a new society of model individuals who would base their lives on scientific 
(observable) facts, rather than on `revelation' (Göle 1997, Yavuz 1997, Ayata 1996). 
Certain aspects of Islam, if traditionally understood, clashed directly with the Kemalist 
image of a modern nation-state (Toprak 1981: 39). Under the influence of European 
modernity, and similar to their Ottoman intellectual predecessors, the Kemalists started 
to implement a "new religious policy" (Berkes 1964: 484). They held the view that 
Islam was a rational religion in essence; the only thing needed was to clear it of 
superstitions and to end its exploitation by reactionary men of religion, and 'crooked' 
individuals and groups. In truth, the `new' Islam had to be `rational' and national, i. e. to 
be free, as much as possible, from supra-natural dogmas and of organisations around 
religious leaders, who traditionally interpreted Islam for their followers and often 
claimed to mediate between them and God (Yildirim 1995: 113-152). ' Islam at the same 
time, needed to be `nationalised' i. e. 'Turkicised' and no longer allowed to tic the Turks 
to other Muslims8. This tic, according to many secularised Turks, had brought nothing 
" Ahmad observes that "Kemalists had a linear view of European history, especially French history, from 
which they were convinced Turkey had much to learn" (1993: 78). 
Islamists in Turkey have also been trying to point out and change many folk understandings and 
practices of Islam which seem irrational, especially to more secular minded Turks. One of the most 
significant of these beliefs has been belief in ability of some people, e. g. muskacr. s (who write niuskus; 
religious formulas) or ifil, rilks its (who titter religious formulas, even claim to make hilyil: (magic) to 
change the course of things. This belief has been and is still causing exploitation, in many forms, by most 
of these trusted people, who are considered by many to be no more than charlatans. 
s In fact Other Muslim countries were not in a position to be models, in terms of material progress, for 
Turkey which was still the most advanced Muslim country. 
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but 'Arabisation' and misery to the Turkish nation, which had made too many sacrifices 
in defending the Muslim world (Bora 1996: 2 1). `' 
The Kemalist modernisation drive aimed for a secularising social change but 
met with more of a muted societal inertia than active opposition. The state under the 
guidance of Mustafa Kemal used its power to silence the whatever opposition (whose a 
sizeable proportion almost instinctively clung to Islam) there was, and tried to impose 
its own understanding of modernity on the country with relatively more success in 
urban centres than viral areas. Therefore, in an undemocratic1° atmosphere, the 
modernisation of the state meant centralisation of decision making and increasing of its 
power (largely defined in terms of legal force and control over education) vis-h-vis 
society (see, for example, Ergil 2000: 123; Lewis 1968: 239-293; Zurcher 1994). 
The Kenialist reforms aimed for a radical break from the Ottoman past, which 
was heavily influenced by Islam. " Thus, reforms sought to diminish the role of Islam in 
policies of the state' and even in daily life of the population, where state power could 
penetrate. In this task, according to a veteran Milli Gazete columnist, many scholars of 
Islam and religious leaders betrayed Islam and served "the RPP dictatorship" (Eygi, 
Milli Guzete, 21.8 1997). 13 
The Kenialist reforms and principles have survived and became the features of 
9 l. e. the Middle East inhabited by Arab Muslims was saved by the Turks, from destruction by 
Christendom, but in the end, there was no loyalty from the Arabs who "stabbed" the Ottomans in the back 
during the WWI. 
1" Needless to say, democracy was not widespread in the world at that time. With the emergence of Hitler, 
the term dictator gained a new meaning and the Western media began to approach Mustafa Kemal much 
more favourably (Koloblu 1995: 87-91). 
11 Kemalism provided the proto-type for other secular-nationalist regimes emerging in the Middle East 
which also put emphasis on their pre-Islamic heritage as in Iran, Iraq and Egypt. 
12 Often written with a capital 'S' in official documents to emphasise its importance and its gaining a 
separate identity almost independent from society. 
13 l. e. they contributed to the legitimacy of the regime by active co-operation or simply by remaining 
silent; a "mistake" which must not be repeated. 
163 
the Turkish state, for example by becoming constitutional articles which cannot be 
amended. They have been fiercely defended by most of the secular military-civilian 
bureaucracy's and politicians. The «'P circles shared the general conservative view that 
Kenialist reforms were unnecessarily radical toward Islam. '' This view was one of the 
factors that made the Islamist WP clash with the secular state. 
According to. frequently made criticisms in Turkey, which the WP shared, the 
state in Turkey has been a powerful tool in the hands of Jacobin elite (Alkan 1998: 76). 
Jacobinisni was defined in terms of using the state power to force the masses to change; 
a kind of social engineering by force that went directly against democracy (Göle 1997: 
48). Kemalism only gradually changed society and "had initially transformed only the 
upper layers of society and had left four-fifths of society untouched" (Gellner 1994a: 
87). 
Very similar to Islamist criticisms in the region, the WP circles argued that, 
since the secular military-civilian elite perpetuates by certain mechanisms, '6 the state 
machinery continues to be the tool of a certain laic (secular), nationalist ideology. ' In 
other words, the Turkish State is an ideological state; it promotes a laic, nationalist 
ideology. The advocates of this ideology are rewarded by the state, in terms of 
prestigious positions in military-civilian bureaucracy. including the judiciary, or access 
to state resources (incentives, exemptions etc. ) which could make all the difference in 
economic life. In this sense, the situation in Turkey supports the view that in many 
Middle Eastern countries, in contrast to democratic countries, the state is not neutral 
14 Since the Tanzimut, the state bureaucracy emerged as the principle carrier of modernity (mainly in the 
form of Westernisation) in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. 
15 Vergin (1994) argues that the intellectual source of "intolerant" laicism in Turkey was apart icu I ar 
understanding of French philosophy. 
1`' Such as control of education and recruitment into civil and military state cadres. 
17 The strict Turkish nationalist and secularist nature of the Turkish State is also often highlighted by non- 
Islamist experts as a source of lack of democracy in the country (Ergil 2000; Gandar 1999; Yavuz 2000). 
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toward society at all but is a tool for a certain group (e. g. secular. westernised elite). 
One of the most important Kemalist reform, shaping the secular character of 
Turkey, was the adoption of the `principle of laiklik' (laicite) in state affairs. The 
European model for this reform was France and the French word laic was rendered as 
laik. Laiklik can mean either laicite or laicism in day-to-day usage. 1S It officially became 
a characteristic of the state as late as 1937. However prior to this date it was included in 
the Republican People's Party19 program in 1931. Starting from the mid- 1920s politics 
was laicised and no interference from the religious part of the society was allowed. 
According to Bernard Lewis "Within four years, in a series of swift and sweeping 
changes, Kemal repealed the Holy Law and disestablished Islam" (1968: 404, cf 
Davison 2003, Dursun 1995). From the very early years of the Turkish revolution, the 
state took an active part in the secularisation of Turkish society. In 1928, the article 
designating the official religion of the state as Islam was removed from the constitution. 
There was a tide of Kemalist modernising reforms mainly aimed for 
westernisation/secularisation of society. On 3 March 1924, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA) ended the Caliphate and accepted the law of `the Unification of the 
Education' which meant standardisation and complete secularisation of the education 
system. It also abolished the office of sheyhulislam and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Pious Foundations, in their places two directorates were created (Zurcher 
1994: 195). In September 1925, the religious shrines (tiirbe) and the dervish convents 
(tekke) were closed down; in November, the fez was prohibited and replaced by the 
western-style hat. The tekkes and tiirbes were important components of the daily life of 
18 The Islamists want /aik/ik to mean laicite (a form of governance by separation of state affairs from the 
religion) at its worst. They complain, however, that it often means laicism, an ideological stance against 
Islam adopted by the secular elite. 
1) Effectively the only party in Turkey until 1946, led by Atatürk until his death in 1938 and then by 
Inönü until his defeat by ßülent Eccvit in 1972. 
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Muslims especially in the rural areas and the hat, for the devout, was clearly a symbol of 
Christian Europe. In 1926 the European calendar, the Swiss civil code and the Italian 
penal code were adopted. The penal code prohibited formation of associations on a 
religious basis. The Kemalists maintained this trend with complete secularisation of 
family life through abolition of polygamy and religious ceremony in marriages (Zurcher 
1994: 180-181; Toprak 1981). 
The adoption of the Latin Alphabet in 1928 (its predecessor, a version of 
Arabic/Persian alphabet was not fully phonetical) was another very affective way of 
cutting off Turkish society from its Ottoman and Islamic past and steering Turkey closer 
to the West (Lewis 1968: 279) . 
20 Other reforms such as adoption of the western clock 
and calendar in 1926, western numerals and western measures and weights in 1931, or 
making Sunday the official rest day instead of Friday21 in 1935 were aimed at not only 
giving Turkey a more European image and facilitating communication with Europe but 
also cutting off its links with the Islamic world (Zurcher 1994: 195-197). The new 
regime in Turkey saw westernisation as the only acceptable way of modernisation of 
Turkey, and westernisation mostly meant adopting European ways. For the Kemalists 
the secularisation of the social life, `freeing' it from domination of Islam, had had a 
special place in their reformist thoughts. Atay, who was in Atattirk's close circle, 
defined Kemalism as a "fundamental religious reform" (cited by Karal 1981: 11). 
Mustafa Kemal and his elite cadre as the pioneers of Turkish modernisation set a 
secular tradition. Since that time, the majority of members of the political and civilian- 
military bureaucracy, who can be called modernists, have continued to try to change a 
21 According to a common Islamist criticism, thus, the whole nation was made illiterate overnight. 
21 The Islamists in Turkey would love to see the Friday as the 'day of rest', enabling them to go to the 
Friday prayers more "easily. " 
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traditional country primarily by using the state power and through the force of example 
(GÜle 1997). Prof. Ergil, a secular academic, points out that the modernists in Turkey 
"may present themselves as Kernalists, contemporary, \Vesternists and/or the 
secularists". He argues that "they all concur on statism and the central role of the state 
in running the daily affairs of society" (1997: 21). 
In the 1990s the state was still strong, as is evident in its influence over the 
economy and perhaps more in its capacity to use of force, as embodied in the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF) and the police force. The TAF, in particular, continued to be 
considered as the most powerful institution in the country and the last bastion of the 
regime. Hundreds of thousands of conscripts serving in the military make the TAF 
much closer to the public than a purely professional army would be. The TAF has been 
identified as the most trusted institution in many public opinion polls. It has been 
efficient, hardworking and devoted to ideals of Atatürk especially to secular nationalism 
and laicite. As a number of studies show, the well educated and disciplined officer 
corps have been suspicious of politicians' honesty, devotion to the homeland and basic 
principles of Kemalism. The great majority of army officers continue to hold the view 
that, with the advent of multiparty politics, many populist politicians, especially the 
rightist ones have been giving too many `concessions' to Islamic `reactionaries' 
[Islamists] '22 
in exchange for their political support. In other words, there has been 
tension between the electoral process as an important part of democracy and strict 
application of the principle of laicite. These `concessions' have included, inter alia, 
opening up `too many' Imam-Hatip Lycees (IHLs)23, and allowing the Islamists to seize 
22 Islamic reactionism or ü"tica was (is) a major threat in the eyes of the secular elite but for the Islamist 
leaders like Erbakan or Gillen it was (is) not. So, the term "reactionaries" in the secular discourse mostly 
means Islamists. 
Z} In these schools, pupils received 7 years education after a primary education of 5 years. The pupils 
received religious (Islamic) education in addition to what the other pupils receive in secondary schools 
and 'straight' lycees. 
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some key official positions within the state. etc. Being among the pioneers of Turkish 
modernisation, the officers hold that the state power should be used to modernise the 
masses not for appeasing the religious feelings of fundamentalists who try to bring the 
shariah to Turkey. It is easy for those who exploit religion for political purposes to 
deceive the large sections of society, who are ignorant, but in the long nm, this would 
be an obstacle for the modernisation of Turkey (see, candar 1999; Öztürk 1993; Birand 
1985; Karaosmanoklu 1993; Hale 1994). The \V'P elite criticised this view. For 
example, Abdullah Gül, a \VP vice-chairman, argued that this attitude held by the great 
majority of the Turkish elite was justified by arguing that the masses were not mature 
enough. It was wrong of them to say "we know their interests better than they do" (Milli 
Gaete, 14.9.1997). 
The secularised section of Turkish society was small in the first years of the 
republic, concentrated mainly in the elite, which controlled the state, but gradually large 
numbers of Turks became secularised and the seculars (laics or laikler) became the 
majority in the society. 24 During the political life of the \VP and especially in its last 3-4 
years (1994-1997) this became obvious only when political tension heightened. This 
might be natural in a country where de-politicisation was actively sought by the state 
and big media, after the 1980 coup. The ideological gap between the seculars and the 
traditionally religious, the Islamists and the radical Islamists became wider, seeing each 
other as obstacles to a better Turkey. For the secular elite, the `ignorant' masses have 
been ripe for exploitation by `charlatans' who present themselves as men of God. For 
Islamists, the secular elite, similar to their counterparts in many other Muslim countries, 
have become too alienated from Islam and hence from the ordinary people. 
2' This is in the sense that the majority opposed to any shariah based state and continuously voted for the 
parties that overall remained loyal to the principle of secularism. 
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It was disheartening to see that even reciprocal de-humanisation has been at 
work in Turkey between the secularists and Islamists. '' Some Islamists, taking their cue 
from the Qur'an and Sunnah, likened the secularised elite and masses to the figures of 
the age of ignorance (i. e. pre-Islamic times) or the infidels who strongly opposed to the 
prophet Muhammad. The Qur'an itself calls those who do not follow Islam as worst 
kind of beasts, or lower, implying that unlike animals they have ability to think and yet 
do not heed God's message (7: 179; 8: 22). According to the Chief Prosecutor of the 
time Vural Sava, "political Islamists [which included the \VP members according to 
him]" saw the Kemalists as "modern idolaters" (1997: 75). For the secular elite and 
secularised majority the religious reactionaries (Islanmists26) are like bats that are afraid 
of the light, their heads are full of spider webs (örfimcek kafah) (I$ik 1990: 42). The 
chief prosecutor likened the WP to metastasis. The secular elite feared that Islamic 
reactionism could resurrect anytime if the majority of population failed to be vigilant. '' 
3.3 THE ISLAMIST PARTIES OF THE *\ATIO\AL OUTLOOK' 
It can be seen that Islamists criticised many of the Kemalist reforms from the 
outset. There have been quite a number of important Islamist figures like Said Nursi 
(1876-1960) and Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959) 28 who had shown their 
disapproval of the Kenialist reforms, yet these did not have any real impact on the 
character of the regime. The mono-party period ended in 1950, when the ruling RPP lost 
the elections and peacefully handed the office to the Democrat Party (DP) which made, 
according to Kemalist history-writing, `huge concessions' to `Islamic reactionism' 
25 One of the major reasons of mutual hatred frequently observed between the secularised and Islamist 
sections is undoubtedly mutual ignorance about the lifestyle and thoughts of the opposite `camps'; 
caricaturisation has been the rule rather than exception. 
26 Again, by `reactionaries', they usually mean Islamists. 
27 The similarity to the de-humanisation of the Jews or Gypsies in the Nazi Germany is noticeable. 28 There are still hundreds of thousands of followers of Nursi known as Xurcu. s" and Tunahan known as 
. SÜ/ej'mancis in Turkey; in elections, their leaderships often did not support the WP. 
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(Born 1996: 21). These included making the call to prayers in Arabic again and 
allowing some religious education in schools. 
The DP was not an Islamist party and the first Islamist political party that 
attracted considerable votes was formed under the leadership of Erbakan. On 26 January 
1970 Erbakan and his 17 friends, mainly engineers, lawyers and politicians, formed the 
National Order Party. The party's foundation manifesto declared that: 
Today, the National spirit which extinguished the crusades one thousand years ago, 
passed ships over the land [allegedly, to Golden Horn, during the conquest of 
Istanbul] five hundred years ago [... ]. created the miracles of the War of 
Independence half a century ago, once again risen. After a long period of attempts to 
deviate our Grand nation, which al wwavs progressed on the most noble route of 
humanity by remaining loyal to the Truth and promoting the Truth, and by enjoining 
the good and forbidding the evil, from its path. missiles are fired to put it back to its 
sublime and glorious historical orbit (cakir 1994: 20). 
As Qakir points out this manifesto shows the'Ottomanist', pro- independence, 
Islamist and modernist nature of the party. There is a direct reference to the Qur'anic 
verse (3: 104): "Let there be a group among you, enjoining the good and forbidding the 
evil. " It also shows the fascination of Erbakan, the engineer, by technological 
developments of the time. Erbakan declared that the party's door was open to anybody 
"except the Masons, Communists and Zionists" (Saribay 1985: 99). 
The NOP was the first party of the National Outlook' (NO), the name of the 
political movement that was developed under Erbakan's leadership and its political 
ideology. It can be seen that Erbakan defined 'the nation' with two predominant 
elements: Turkishness and Islam; as since the 1970s Erbakan refers to the noble deeds 
of "our nation for a thousand years" which is the amount of time the Turks had been 
Muslims (see, Saribay 1985: 115). In other words, `the nation' does not include pre- 
Islamic Turks or Muslims only, but the Muslim Turks (Kurds and other Muslims in 
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Turkey were also included in the conception of the nation in the National Outlook 
movement). Therefore, the term The National Outlook' refers to the prescribed 
ideology of the nation. Though it was never made too clear, the National Outlook had a 
predominantly Islamic character. Virtues were defined in terms of Islamic teachings and 
Turkishness was a natural ingredient. 
The foundation of the NOP was encouraged by the Iskender Pasha branch of the 
Nakshibandiyye Order, and some other influential orders and an important part of the 
Nurcus involved in this party. The NOP demanded Islamisation in every sphere of life, 
more religious education in schools, and new laws in accordance with Islam etc. 29 Just 
after the 12 March 1971 coup, the party was banned by the Constitutional Court for its 
anti-laic stance (Duman 1997: 79). In the eyes of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the 
military-civilian bureaucracy and the secular politicians the NOP lacked legitimacy. 
However, the political atmosphere rapidly thawed. In fact, it has been rumoured 
that the TAF encouraged Erbakan to form a new party, primarily to divide the right and 
hence weaken the Justice Party (JP) of Demirel and possibly as an attempt to integrate a 
considerable amount of Islamists into the political system (Duman 1997: 80; call§lar 
1995). Thus, On 11 October 1972, the National Salvation Party (NSP) was formed. 30 
The party's program was almost a copy of that of the NOP. In 1973 elections, the NSP 
gathered 11.8% of the votes and became the third largest party with 48 MPs. Yet, other 
equally strong Sunni3' religious orders and groups continued to support centre-right 
parties. This shows that, not all Islamists saw the party as their own and the centre-right 
2" Thus, this Islamist party as its successors broke the unwritten contract drawn by the secular elite which 
stipulates a degree of freedom to political parties in return ofa commitment to basic principles of 
Kemal ism (Sunar 1996: 144-145). 
30011 the NSP, see, Saribay (1985) and Albayrak (1989). 
31 Alevis (15 to 20% of the population) have been overwhelmingly supporting centre-left secular parties 
(sec, TÜSES 1999). 
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parties, especially the JP continued to provide `enough' to other Islamist groups in 
terms of protecting them from any pressure from the state and providing jobs and other 
benefits by using state resources (see. for example, Kara. leni $a%nk 14.10.1995). 
The 1970s witnessed the radicalisation of Turkish politics. During this period, 
the NSP, like other parties, used very inflammatory language and its cadres openly 
demanded implementation of the shariah in Turkey. Its youth partially participated in 
the struggle against the left, but real terror took place between the revolutionary leftists 
and the nationalists of the National Action Party of Türkeý. By the time the military 
intervened with the coup of 12 September 1980, there had been about 5.000 deaths in a 
decade. All political parties were banned after the coup (Özdemir 1995; Ahmad 1993). 
3.4 THE RISE OF THE WELFARE PARTY 
The Welfare Party, as the third party of `the National Outlook tradition', was 
formed on 19 July 1983 but, due to veto of the ruling Generals, could not participate in 
November 1983 parliamentary elections. On 25 March 1984, the WP gained 4.4% of the 
votes in the municipality elections. This was around only half of the amount of what 
was considered the traditional proportion of the votes gathered by the NSP, the previous 
party of the National Outlook movement. This was largely due to the shift of its 
traditional voters to the Motherland Party (MLP) of Özal32 who was firmly on the right 
and seemed personally religious enough for his voters. Özal's reforms were geared 
toward an economically and politically liberal and socially conservative Turkey 
(Erdogan 2000: 228-236). 
32 In 1983 elections, 45%, of the voters supported the MLP despite the clear support by the I lead of State 
Evrcn (former Chief of Staff and the leader of the 1980 coup) for another centre-right party headed by a 
retired general. 
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In 1987, the ban on former politicians was lifted by a referendum and, Erbakan, 
the undisputed leader of the National Outlook. -' took over the party leadership. When 
the MLP called for early election on 29 November 1987, Erbakan likened the election, 
to the Turkish War of Independence: 
The MLP applied formally to melt Turkey in the pot of European Common Market 
[... ] If the WP will be able to form a strong group in parliament Turkey will be 
saved (Tiirkiye, 12.10.1987). 
However, The WP got only 7.16°/, 0 of the votes, well below the 10 iö, required 
to gain representation in parliament. The first WP success came on 26 March 1989, 
when in municipal elections, 34 it won 2,170.365 votes (9.8%). This was an 
indication that in the next elections the WP could pass the 10% threshold. However, 
this was not certain and the WP leadership did not want to risk their chance for the 
parliamentary elections on 20 October 1991. After long calculations of costs and 
benefits, and hoping for very good results due to an idiosyncratic electoral system 
which strongly favoured most powerful parties, they agreed to form an alliance with 
two nationalist parties, the Nationalist Activity Party (MQP) of Türkeý and the 
Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) of Edibali, the latter had very low support. The 
Nationalist Activity Party was the party of `Grey Wolves' who were considered by 
many as ultra-nationalists and it cost the %VP considerable amounts of Kurdish votes. 
The alliance which won 63 seats rapidly disintegrated. Those who achieved tickets 
on the nationalist quota resigned and the remaining 40 MPs formed the first WP 
group in the parliament (see, for example, (; akir 1994: 27-50). 
The results of the 27 March 1994 municipality elections in which the WP 
33 Erbakan has been portrayed by the'National Outlook' movement as the man who has single-handedly 
developed the movement. 
34 As a sign of democratisation and localisation of Turkish politics after 1980, the local governments 
gained immense importance and Islamists usually successfully contested for local offices. 
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gained 19'/0 of the votes and became the third largest party (behind the TPP and the 
INILP which gained 21% each) showed that the \VP had finally succeeded in 
transforming itself from a small, ideological party to `a mass-party with a strong, 
ideologically motivated core group of supporters. It was a "Welfare Earthquake" 
according to the secular press; Ankara was "lost" to the \VP, as well as Istanbul and 
many other big cities (Akdogan 2000: 233). Later it was seen that the service record 
of the WP mayors was generally good, they worked hard and tried to solve the 
problems of their cities rather than engaging in political bickering (Kazan 2001: 
249-336; Akinci 1999: 78). 
On 24 December 1995, parliamentary elections were held and with the help of 
the successes of its mayors the WP became the biggest party in Turkey with 6 
million votes (21.4%). In the 550-seat parliament the `'VP won 158 seats , the two 
centre-right parties, the Motherland Party won 133 seats (19.7%) and the True Path 
Party won 135 seats (19.2%) . As 
for the two leftist parties, the Democratic Left 
Party won 75 seats (14.6%) and the Republican People's Party won 49 seats 
(Özbudun 1996). 
For the military, other political parties and `big capital', the WP has continued to 
be somewhat suspect as far as its commitment to the current secular political system is 
concerned. 36 Therefore, there was a hesitation on the parts of the two centre-right parties 
the TPP and the MLP about forming a coalition with the WP. According to the TDN 
editor cevik, they had a rather alienating attitude toward the WP and the masses who 
voted for them and treating the WP "like lepers" did not serve to maintain stability in 
35 This showed that as an important part of society in Turkey Islamists interacted with other sections of 
society and they often shared some main views with them, especially with those who were in the centre- 
ri gh t. 
36 There are a few frequently used terms to refer to the secular political system in Turkey like, 'the 
regime', 'the system', 'the order'. 
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Turkey (TDN, 26.12.1995). In the end, the MLP and the TPP formed a minority- 
coalition government but it did not last. In the summer of 1996, the TPP agreed to form 
a coalition with the WP and, after 27 years in politics. Erbakan finally became the PM 
for nearly one year between 28 June 1996 and 17 June 1997. 
3.5 THE WELFARE PARTY AND ISLAMISM 
It can be seen that the WP continued to follow the National Outlook tradition 
with an Islamist political agenda, albeit with important modifications, the result of the 
political experiences over the years. There was a more or less coherent WP discourse. 
Coherence and party discipline seemed a requirement in Turkish politics, especially for 
the WP, under the spotlights of other parties, groups and 'big media' who were ready to 
denigrate any disconcerted voice (a)-kirr ses) as evidence of party disunity. Therefore, 
through an analysis of WP discourse, it is possible to understand the WP's views on 
Turkish modernisation and its elite's conceptualisation of modernity. This is not to say 
that `the public face' of the WP had been very neat and clear or its public discourse had 
been refined or Islamically sophisticated. 37 As will be seen, there were important 
internal and external factors preventing this. For example, the intellectual capacity of 
the party leadership was severely handicapped by the `one man show' of Erbakan who 
might have been a brilliant tactician in politics but was certainly not an Islamist thinker. 
More importantly, the state (represented by attitudes and positions of the secular 
politicians, the officers who controlled the armed forces and other great majority of high 
ranking secular bureaucrats, including the judiciary), and more importantly, the laws of 
the republic did not allow the WP to put its views much more openly and directly to the 
37 One could argue, with the exceptions of the WP and the nationalist NAP, none of the other remaining 
major political parties bothered to put seriously a party programme to the electorate. As if it was enough 
to be against the WP, they just emphasised that, in contrast to the WP, they believed in a secular political 
system. 
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public. The \V'P members needed to be very careful about what they were saying and 
how they were saying it. Often, they were accused oftakire (dissimulation) (see. for 
example TDA' 17.10.1996), i. e. wanting in reality to create a shariah based state while 
giving the impression that they were playing by the rules. 3S 
Another important factor was the low education level of the electorate in 
Turkey. WP voters still had lower than average levels of education and income. This 
`forced' the WP elite and justified in their eyes as with many other parties, to give a 
coarse, unrefined message to the electorate . 
39 The MVP also preferred to address. the 
anger' of the religiously inclined toward the secular state and elite who, according to 
Islamists, had been repressing Islam"') and the religious sections since the foundation of 
the republic. 
An important part of the rise of Islamism in Turkey was emergence of an 
Islamist counter-elite (Gö1e 1997) who have been influenced by Islamist thinkers (e. g. 
Mawdudi, Qutb, Shariati) whose works have been translated to Turkish. Islamist 
sections consciously tried and raised their own elite and hence strongly contributed to 
increasing pluralisation of elite thought in Turkey. 41 The new political and economical 
Islamist elite guided the Islamic masses in their economic and political decisions. 
'h The legal impediments to "talking freely" were raised frequently by Erbakan and other prominent 
members of the party. I lowever, Islamist columnists, such as Ahmet Ta%ctircn, implied that the Islamists 
were "aware" that not every aspect of the Islamist message could be voiced publicly in Turkey (Yeni 
. Safak, 17.5.1997). " The education and political reaction levels of the masses had been perennial topics of criticism by many 
of the leftist, rightist and Islamist elite in Turkey. The usual metaphor, used for the masses which lack 
political reaction and are apathetic to the social political and economical processes that directly influence 
them, has been the `sheep'. One often heard the saying that "As a nation, we are like flock of sheep. " 
Obviously, ideologically motivated political groups, including the Islamists (and the WP) used different 
tactics to get their supporters mobilised. 
°" For the attitude of the leftist intellectuals, as a part of secular elite, vis-ä-vis Islam, see (Subayi 1996). 
'Islamists in Turkey are, in the words of Göle, "writing best-selling books, becoming part of the political 
and cultural elite , winning elections, and establishing private universities 
[... ] carving out new public 
spaces, affirming new public visibilities and inventing new Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities" (2000: 
93-94). 
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Raising "its own politicians" has been a very important part of this process. because it 
has been perceived that politicians on the centre-right, like Demirel, "short-changed the 
religious" (Taýlletiren, Yeti'afak, 26.9.1997). 'Islamist intellectuals 142 increasingly 
had a great impact on society by their books, articles in new Islamist periodicals and 
newspapers, which they used skilfully in creating a vibrant intellectual life among the 
relatively elite section of Islamists. 43 Their relationship with the WP and indeed with 
any other big Islamic groups has been usually torturous. Although, some Islamist 
intellectuals had an impact on the WP, in general, the leading cadres of the party kept 
their distance from these `undisciplined' and 'principled 944 group. Yet, the WP had 
directly benefited from the efforts of Islamist intellectuals who strongly contributed to 
the Islamisation of Nvorldviews of their readers. 
The general trend of the Islamisation of certain sections of society in Turkey 
(which included inter alia, formation of organised large Islamist groups) had many 
reasons. Perhaps the most important factor has been relative democratisation that 
Turkey has been enjoying since the end of the WW II. This enabled various social 
groups to voice their views and attract new followers and forced the centre-right parties 
in particular to compete for the votes of the conservative-religious masses (Rouleau 
1993: 120). In the rise of Islamism, increasing mass-education and modernisation of 
communication technology proved crucial; thus, large sections of society, active high 
school and university students could be reached by charismatic leader cadres of Islamic 
groups, including Erbakan and several other WP members. For example, despite very 
low levels of readership in Turkey45 Islamist periodicals like Sizintt or Islam regularly 
42For example, A. Bulac, I. Özel, A. Dilipak. 
43 For example on the same page of the Islamist daily Yeni . afak edited by Islamist economist Mustafa Ozel, one could read his review of Fukuyama's latest book (on trust), a translation of Robert N. Bellah's 
views about religion and modernisation in Japan, and translation of Wallerstein's views under the title of 
"No I lope from Progress" (2.5.1997). 
44 I. e. not as `pragmatic' as it was felt the politics in Turkey demanded. 
45 According to a survey "68% do not read any books" (Ergil 1997: 13). 
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sold more than 100 thousand copies, very high by Turkish standards. There were 
numerous other periodicals addressed to other groups. The Islamist youth especially 
widely read publications by Islamists, like newspapers, books (on religious knowledge 
or novels46), and periodicals. Although the WP circles talked a great deal about the need 
for a strong media serving to their cause, the daily ARM Gazete, known to be closely 
related to the party, had just around 50 thousand copies47 out of general circulation of 3 
million in Turkey. Roughly one third of this circulation was published at some point by 
Islamist or Islamics groups. 
In fact, the rise of Islamist power disturbed the secular establishment. At the 
briefing the TAF gave for judges and prosecutors, it was told, "the reactionary 
movements are preparing for jihad. They have 19 newspapers, 110 magazines, 51 radio 
and 20 television stations49, some 2,500 associations, 500 foundations and 1,000 
companies as well as 800 schools and courses. " There were some 30 reactionary radical 
organisations. With the WP-TPP coalition, the reactionaries started to form their own 
cadres within the state. Under the name of privatisation, state enterprises were being 
handed out to "fundamentalists" almost "as gifts" (Hii, riyet 11.6.1997). Thus, the TAF 
made it clear that it had to take the initiative since no other state organ showed enough 
sensitivity toward the rise of `fundamentalism'. 
It could be seen that many WP members, like other influential Islamist groups 
worked for the Islamisation of an important section of the youth in Turkey. The youth 
4`' For the major themes in Islamist novels, see cah$kan (1996). 
4' However, it was widely read by those WP supporters who were active and influential at local levels. 
48 Islamic (Island) groups could be defined as those, which have been traditionally religious but not as 
Islamically `radical' as Islamist groups. The daily Tiirkiye which at one point sold hundreds of thousands 
copies, for example, was controlled by an Islamic group and pursued a publication policy of being close 
to any centre-right party, including the WP when they were in government. 
47 One of the television stations close the WP was Kanal 7. Erbakan encouraged Islamist businessmen to 
support this station with their adverts and donations because "it is not possible to wage the jihad without 
television" which can be likened to "air force" or "tank force" [in a war] (TUN, 24.10.1997). 
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organisation of the party was the i\IGV (National Youth Foundation). Similar to other 
Islamist groups, \VP members supported university students and high school students 
for example by providing scholarships and places to stay. 
The argument that in many Muslim countries the relatively secular state elite. 
often inadvertently, supported rise of Islamism by promoting a `moderate' version of 
Islam (eventually getting out of state control), seemed to also be the case in Turkey. The 
Turkish state, especially after the 1980 coup, played its part by providing, (notably 
through the school system and the Directorate of Religious Affairs - DRA), a `moderate 
amount' of Islam50, as a panacea to social ills. However, this often served as a stepping 
stone in the further Islamisation of the youth. Many IHLs were opened especially by 
centre-right parties to cater for the religiously minded in the population. In other state 
schools, a limited amount of courses (entitled `Religious Culture and Knowledge of 
Ethics' and usually given by graduates from the faculties of divinity who were often 
agents par excellence of Islamisation) also provided some vocabulary of Sunni Islam for 
the youth. The books in these courses classified religions as true or false, divine or non- 
divine, thus, not only favouring Islam over `corrupted' Christianity and Judaism but 
also Christianity and Judaism over other religions. Islamists argued that the state's aim 
was to create an officially approved, a "TSE (Turkish Institute of [Commercial] 
Standards) Islam" (Dilipak 1991: 101). Others, leftists in particular, argued that these 
policies in fact contributed to rise of Islamism in Turkey. There have also been illegal 
activities, such as unauthorised Qur'an courses or youth camps, by Islamists to 
'educate 51 the youth. 
S" According to Ismet Özel one of the aims of this `manipulation' of Islam by the state was to keep the 
poor masses religious in order to prevent any social explosions (see, Akdogan 2000: 172). 
51 This `education' could be in various forms: Teblig: delivering the message of Islam, enabling others to 
hear that message; tenvir: to enlighten, terbiye: bringing up, educating according to good [Islamic] 
manners, etc. 
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The \VP elite, like other Islamists, argued that ethics depend on religion. and one 
needs to be religious to behave ethically. To a certain extent, this view seemed to be 
shared by many in Turkey, including top generals of the 1980 coup (Yavvuz 1997). 
According to the WP discourse, parents who sent their children to the IHLs or Qur'an 
courses just wanted their children to have some knowledge of Islam and be respectful to 
them and keep away from social ills such as gambling, alcoholism or drug use. Only 
few of them wanted their children to have religious professions, which paid poorly. 
The Islamisation of certain sections of society in Turkey owed much to the 
activities of Islamists generally using their networks and means similar to other Islamist 
groups in the world as discussed in Chapter 2. Most importantly, Islamist groups used 
their core members to recruit new members and to have large numbers of sympathisers. 
These groups, like other groupings, based on common religious or ethnic background, 
provided a sense of belonging, and emotional and material support for their members 
and sympathisers. The relationship between the leader cadres and the rank and file in 
Islamist groups, including the WP, was a dynamic process oscillating between criticism 
and over-praising. On the one hand, the sense of guilt of the followers was periodically 
touched upon by reminders that compared to the Muslims of the Golden Ages, they 
were not working hard enough to spread the Islamist message. On the other hand, they 
were standard bearers of Islarnisation and the only hope for a more Islamic Turkey. 
Generally speaking for Islamists in Turkey, including many WP members, a selective 
reading of history of Islam defined what periods and what kind of virtues were to be 
emphasised. Asr-i Saadet (the Age of Felicity - the time of the Prophet) the period of 
first four caliphs and the most luminous periods of the Ottomans were the Golden Ages 
according to the WP discourse. 
Islamists use a more or less coherent vocabulary in their relationships with each 
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other. The %VP made the most skilful use of some of `sloganic parts' of this vocabulary 
among the political parties to great effect. ' For example. Erbakan and the \VP officials 
pointed out that jihad is the struggle with one's wealth and life for Islam. and since the 
NVP worked for a more Islamised Turkey, participating in party activities was jihad par 
excellence. Therefore, WP's core supporters worked for the party with a religious zeal: 
they work for spiritual rewards [from God]" (Erbakan 1997: 91). '' 
In fact, although the WP and other important Islamist groups agreed on the need 
to re-Islamise Turkey, their disagreements on the method proved to be unbridgeable. 
Most importantly, the political style of Erbakan did not allow other Islamist groups to 
have a 'say' in the party that was proportionate to their support. For Erbakan and hence 
for the WP, other Islamist groups had to support the party like other ordinary supporters 
and give up their group identities in favour of the party identity. This had to be a crucial 
factor for the leaderships of many Islamic groups who preferred to support other centre- 
right parties. 54 Additionally, the rapid growth of the party and the Welfarist style of 
politics, in the judgement of many Islamist groups, were deemed too risky and likely to 
cause great upheavals, polarisation and even provoke military intervention. Another 
factor was that Erbakan was not really a'saintly' figure for these groups. 55 First of all his 
flamboyant style, constant exaggeration of party targets or party power proved 
embarrassing even for some senior WP members. In short, according to many other 
Islamist groups, the WP was unable to provide the same kind of warm, sincere 
52 Other parties, especially centre-rightist ones that enjoyed support of many conservatives and Islamists, 
also used Islamic symbols. For example tiller, leader of the TPP, frequently appealed to the religious and 
nationalist feelings of the electorate by saying that "This call to prayer will never be stopped, this flag will 
never be lowered. " 
53 For them the WP functioned like an Islamic community. For example, WP supporters in the 
Netherlands bought vehicles for Tuzla municipality run by a mayor from the WP, and these people had no 
connection with Tuzla but wanted the WP mayors to be successful, see, cakir (1994: 185). 53 This did not mean that all the members of these groups also supported the same parties. There is no 
study on this issue. However as some experts predicted, a significant amount of the members of these 
communities probably quietly voted for the WP. 
ss Both F. Gillen and E. Cogan, as leaders of very influential Islamist groups strongly criticised Erbakan, 
see, for example Yalcin (1994: 214-228). 
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atmosphere and sense of identity provided by them! 
In other words, although the \VP occupied a central place within that Islamist 
section in Turkey, many Islamist groups often voiced different demands and pursued 
different tactics from the WP. Interestingly, overall, many of them, saw the WP as an 
obstacle in front of Islamisation of Turkey rather than facilitating it. For them the \VP 
often acted like a bull in a china shop. It provoked some dynamic (zinde) 57 forces which 
once in motion would not just stop after crushing the \VP but march on to also 'deal 
with' other Islamist groups whose institutions (e. g. schools, companies, press organs) 
and members (e. g. cadres in the state bureaucracy) would also suffer greatly (Heger 
1997: 38-9; Lariner 1997: 9). They were proved right in their fears, and what was 
perceived by many as a short-sighted and unnecessary challenge to the state by the WP 
raised the political tension in Turkey around the 28 February 1997 National Security 
Council meeting. Many Islamist groups that did not support the WP and that were busy 
trying to become more powerful (in terms of size, economic and political impact) 
through companies, unions, financial institutions, foundations for the needy (e. g. 
students), also became targets of state policies against the `reactionaries' in "the 28 
February Process", named after that meeting (Bayramoglu 2001). 
Yet it seems ironic that, for the influential secular circles in Turkey, all Islamists 
constituted a united front. This was due to the perception that the ultimate aim for all 
Islamists was a shariah-based state. They were all against laicite and this was their 
primary ideological stance vis-a-vis the Turkish state and society. (Ladner 1996: 8). 
s" What was worse, with its excessive emphasis on political activism, the WP was seen as preventing 
conveyance of a sophisticated and really effective Islamic message to the masses. For discussions with 
regard to differences between the working principles of the party and those of the Islamic communities 
see for example, cakir (1994), Bayramoglu (2001) and Akdogan (2000). 
57 This term usually refers to the TAF. 
Is: 
The general trend of Islamisation amongst a considerable proportion of society 
allowed the \VP to tell society "Vote for the MVP if you are [a true] Muslims! " Other 
parties and secular media had to resort to the argument that the \VP leaders were not 
really good Muslims but hypocrites5S who unashamedly exploit things sacred for 
political purposes. 
The WP used modified versions of its discourse in different parts of Turkey. In 
the South-East where the Kurds are concentrated the emphasis was more on Islamic 
brotherhood. In Central Anatolia it was more (Turkish) nationalist and so on. When the 
press was present, no disturbing things were said against Atatürk or the principles of the 
republic. Whereas in private, at their gatherings, extremely inflammatory language was 
quite often used against the same things. ' Many laws and the power of the state 
prevented a more open and honest expression of the WP discourse in public. 
Nevertheless, the main points of Islamist discourses in general and of the Welfarist 
discourse in particular usually reached their target audience. 
It should be noted however that, the WP had been successful in gaining 
significant numbers of voters through projecting the honesty of its `God-fearing' cadres. 
Indeed, many WP mayors proved much more honest than their secular counterparts who 
seemed immersed in corruption. According to a survey conducted by Piar-Gallup, 
among those who said they had voted for the WP at the last general election, WP 
supporters considered the party as one that would "restore justice, " in Turkey. Poll 
findings indicated that the WP voters regarded the party as a `saviour'. A majority 
ss 'AMünafik' which has strong Islamic connotations. This is very similar to criticisms levelled at Islamists 
in other Muslim countries by seculars or by religious scholars close to the secular regimes. 
S`' This fact became public in video recordings, probably used for intra-party propaganda, but which tivere 
handed to and/or broadcasted by media with very interesting timings. This led Islamists to believe that 
either secular media or some state agencies kept these cassettes for special times in order to secure 
maximum damage against Islamists. 
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(60.6%) of those surveyed expressed support for including Islamic rules in the 
constitution. When asked, 72.5`'o said that they trusted Erbakan, while 66.7% trusted his 
government. The TAF come third with a 65.9%. When asked, whether Hagia Sophia60 
should become a mosque, 63.3° o said "yes", 25.2% said "no '61 (TDN, 17.1.1997). 
It seems that there was a real uneasiness about application of laicite in Turkey 
and this helped the NAWP to attract more votes. For example, 45% of those who were 
surveyed for an academic project in the early 1990s said that they felt state pressure as 
far as laicite was concerned (471%'o did not). 4S% said the state intervenes in religion 
(17% said it does not), and 60°ö said that there were foreign influences in adoption of 
laicism (see, Sezen 1993; cf carkoälu 2004). In fact, some academicians argue that a 
major factor in `politicisation of Islam' in Turkey is the state's refusal to meet even 
simple demands of ordinary Muslims (Türköne 1994: 70; Yavuz 1997) which fuelled 
Islamist desire to gain control of the state. 
Formation and continuous reinterpretation of Islamist identities in Turkey were 
not only related to perceived socio-economic status but also to idealistic conceptions of 
Muslim identity. They were also related to intellectual integrity and self-respect, and 
had very important psychological dimensions and were often subject to emotional 
impulses (e. g. desire to help to Bosnians at that time). The WP had succeeded in 
becoming the most important player in these processes in the mid-1990s. Even by its 
existence as an important political party (which has been considered by many Islamists 
in the world as an un-Islamic form of political activism) (Akdogan 2000: 276), the WP 
w'This landmark was turned into a mosque, as a customary symbolic act, when Istanbul was conquered in 
1453 and turned into a museum in 1935. For a very critical radical-Islamist view of keeping it as a 
museum, see, Akit 20.1.1998 ["Fatih's mosque is a museum"]. 
r'I The results also show that the \VP grass roots had substantial differences with the party leadership 
which wanted the Hagia Sophia to be a mosque again as a symbol, and engaged in sharp exchanges of 
criticism with the military. 
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imposed a certain form on the Islamisation efforts in Turkey and bestowed a certain 
legitimacy, (which was cnicial as it came from Islamists), upon the democratic 
procedures and the existing regime in Turkey. 
3.5.1 Islamisation as a Solution to the Problems of Turkey 
Similar to many other Muslim countries in the Middle East, there had been some 
serious social, political and economic problems in Turkey. These were important factors 
in the population's search for new policies and politicians. The TÜSES foundation 
researches show what the most important problems according to the electorate were, 
during the WP's height of power. 
"What is the most important problem in Turkey? " (TÜSES 1999: 23): 
Table 1: Electoral views with regard to most important problems (percentages). 
1994 1996 1998 
Inflation- Economy 36.9 46.7 46.1 
Terror [the PKK 45.0 16.7 11.9 
Unemployment 10.4 12.0 10.7 
Administration of the country 1.0 4.3 7.2 
Democracy, Human Rights 1.1 2.2 2.3 
It is clear that there was a widespread discontent with what the previous 
governments, or the state in general, had achieved so far. As the PKK terror declined, 
economic hardships continue to preoccupy the people. Therefore, in Turkey, one can 
speak of a long lasting but limited crisis of legitimacy of the regime. However, this is 
not to say that the great majority of the discontented demanded a regime change. Only 
an important part of Islamists and radical left could have been said to be seeking the 
solution in that. 
The National Outlook movement under the leadership of Erbakan had been 
working toward the goal of Islamisation of society in Turkey primarily by the means of 
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a political party since the late 1960s. Therefore. the \\'P had been the party of a tradition 
for 25-30 years ((; akir 1994: passim) that proposed Islamisation as a solution to socio- 
economic problems. During these years. although there have been shifts in party 
policies, it has been possible to identify some core aspects of the discourse and actions 
of the movement at any given period. 
The WP carried the traditional discourse further. Similar to many other 
politically active Islamist groups in the Middle East, it continued to argue, for example, 
that it was necessary for more and more of the religiously inclined to participate in 
politics. This, it was implied, was because Islam wants to organise not only the private 
life but social life as well and, because Islamic political projects and Islamisation could 
only be realised by strong participation and sacrifices by Islamists. It can be seen here 
that, the emphasis placed by the WP, and indeed by other Islamists as well, on the 
difficulty of the task of re-Islamisation of society in Turkey has been a sign of their 
acceptance of the success of the secularisation process until then. At the same time, this 
reveals the 'historicism' of almost all Islamists in Turkey, in the sense that the huge task 
at the hand is likened to the task of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of 
Muslims. History `teaches' Islamists that, since they had achieved their task with great 
sacrifices, today, a very similar task of struggle 'to make the God's word uppermost' 
requires a similar level of sacrifice. Therefore, for Islamists a teleological reading of 
history is necessary. It also allows them to invite the religiously inclined to channel their 
"anger, " G2 and work with them for a more Islamised Turkey. 
Like most members or sympathisers of the Islamist movements, WP members 
`'Z "0 Muslims! Do not lose this hatred inside you, " in the words of WP Kayseri Mayor, Associate 
Professor Karatepe (10 November 1996). For these words he was convicted for inciting hatred and served 
a jail sentence for 10 months. It was also used against the WP in the closure case. 
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were reacting to the socio-political developments under strong influence of their 
emotions. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the analysis of the Islamist 
movements purely based on their rational calculation of 'their interests. ' This is 
because, most Islamists certainly pursue their interests, but also believe in `metaphysical 
realities' taught by Islam and their interests are formulated in a framework heavily 
influenced by their perception of these metaphysical `realities*6`. 
The WP was certainly annoyed by repeated charges of exploiting or trading on 
the religious sentiments of the masses. "Our people are turning towards the party not 
because it exploits religion but because of [our] successful services [in municipalities], 
in fact our people are conscious and they have political maturity" (Welfare Party 1997a: 
98). Yet the WP leaders were acutely aware that influential circles in Turkey considered 
the party an illegitimate exploiter of religion or even an illegal entity. because a large 
section of its members wanted to turn the country into a shariah-based state. The WP 
refused to be associated with political Islam, or the charge of wanting shariah, and said 
in its defence in the closure case that it was a political party not a religious or 
philosophical school (Welfare Party 1997a: 90). 
The WP, like many other Islamist movements in the world and in Turkey, held 
that it was necessary to raise `believer cadres' in state administration. This implies, as 
Islamist intellectual Ismet Özel summarises well, that "the cadres which had been raised 
according to official ideology do not posses the much missed characteristics. " In order 
to rectify the problems in Turkey it is necessary to raise a new administrative elite that 
63 Islam like many other religions teaches that in addition to this world which is visible there is another 
world and another dimension to God's creation, which is normally hidden from human beings but no less 
real. The believers are advised to consider what is best for them in the afterlife even when this means to 
forego certain things in this life. Thus, Islam expects its own version of ideological behaviour from 
Muslims/ Islamists, even if it seems sometimes irrational, fanatical and self-destructive, for a higher, 
mystical good. This fact further complicates the politics by making Islamist behaviour less predictable 
and manageable. 
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share the beliefs of the majority of society. `'; Thus, an important part of the Islamisation 
campaign according to the WP leadership was to appoint as many of its members or 
sympathisers to key bureaucratic positions and provide as many jobs as possible for its 
members and supporters in the state sector. This was especially so in municipalities, 
whilst even discriminating against other Islamist groups that did not support the party. 
In fact, the gradual increase of Islamists in state cadres has been a troubling 
development for the secularised section of society. Given the democratic parameters of 
Turkey, the secular state could not have been uniform in its reaction to this 
development. For example, while the TAF did not allow the graduates of the IHLs to 
join officer corps, G5 the very same students won the right to study in the most 
prestigious university faculties that, for example, traditionally educate the elite 
administrative bureaucracy. 66 The Islamist groups provided facilities that encourage 
their young members and sympathisers to enter university, 67 so that they would become 
valuable state officials in key positions, 68lawtiyers, teachers, engineers, and doctors etc. 
Islamisation of society, according to the WP and almost all the other Islamists groups 
eventually would result in more and more Islamist youth becoming officers and NCOs 
in the army, or police officers. 69 Naturally, this prospect alarmed the secular sections of 
society, especially the TAF. 
`'' This project has failed so far, according to Üzel, because, he argues, the new Islamist cadres also 
integrated themselves into "this corrupt system" (Milli Gazete. 21.8.1997). 
`'SKaratepe, mayor of Kayseri from the WP, observes that since 1950 the [civilian] bureaucracy lost its 
character of being a homogeneous group strongly loyal to mono-party ideology. However, there has not 
been any radical change within the officers' corps that controlled the TAF (for example due to the 
discharge of officers with any connection to disapproved ideological movements). He sees this as an 
obstacle in front of democratisation (1997: 9). 
"" For example, it has been frequently pointed out in the mid-1990s that, as many as 40% of the students 
of the prestigious Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, were graduates from the IHLs. 
67 Since only about 20% of the lycee graduates could win the right for a place in universities after a 3- 
hour multiple choice exam, the preparatory courses for this exam along with the regular schools had 
gained immense importance. Many Islamist groups were quick to open these courses where they were and 
still are able to `Islamise' thousands of students in extra curricular activities each year. 
°" Placing those people in these positions often requires political influence. 
`'" Followers of Fcthullah Gillen, in particular, have been frequently criticised by the secular media for 
trying to infiltrate the army. 
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3.5.2 Grass Roots of the Welfare Party 
The WP had a variety of types of followers operating for different motives, and 
this fact made it possible for many observers to see and prioritise different aspects of the 
WP movement. For example according to a senior, secular observer: 
Millions of people have voted for WP not because they attach too much importance 
to religious issues or they expect the WP to introduce a Shariah regime in Turkey... 
[but] because of the bitterness they feel toward the forces which currently govern the 
Turkish state. Because they resent the fact that the state has created a certain 
mechanism which is bleeding the country dry like a leech. Because they want to 
protest certain fanatical circles who try to impose their own hegemony in the name 
of protecting secularism and other Kemalist principles. And, primarily because, they 
want a fairer share of the cake (Birand, Sabah 5.6.1996 [as translated by the TDJ\', 
6.6.1996] cf. Bulac Yeni Lafak 27.5.1997). 
In other words, the failure of the state, as also seen in many other Muslim 
countries, and the disillusionment with other secular political parties were crucial in the 
success of the WP. However, this is not enough to explain why the voters did not 
choose other parties, (especially the radical leftist ones, which were not guilty of 
associating with previous governments and which were also vehemently criticising the 
current regime), but voted for an Islamist party. The `availability' of a rich vocabulary 
and the warehouse of symbols provided by Islam that is shared by perhaps a majority of 
the population with varying degrees, and skilful use of these symbols by Islamists on a 
massive and organised scale should count as important factors. The repression of the 
radical left by the state in the aftermath of the 1980 coup has been another factor. One 
of the most important factors was the dedicated activism of the core group of party 
members. Their attachment of religious importance to political activity was clear as 
frequently stated by Erbakan, "other parties have members, we have believers" 
(Erbakan 1997: 91). 
The WP continued to advocate the `Just Order' slogan of the National Outlook. 
1S) 
The `Just Order' `project' which is based on important Islamic symbols and rules, can 
be criticised for its theoretical shortcomings. Indeed its unsympathetic. naive language 
disturbed even Islamist experts. 70 Nevertheless, the Just Order still proved to be a 
valuable solid slogan in appealing to the electorate, largely because it meant that the \VT 
wanted to change this "realli, terrible" order for the better. In fact, relative 
radicalisation of the Turkish electorate showed that they had serious misgivings about 
the current social, economic and political situation in Turkey. In 1995, the \VP. the 
`ultra-nationalist' Nationalist Action Party (NAP)71 (which promised to solve the PKK 
terror with a hard-line approach), Islamist-Nationalist GUP, pro-Kurdish HADEP and 
other a few extreme leftist parties had around a total of 40% support of the electorate. 
The centre-left and centre-right blocs on the other hand could only muster around 30". 
each. If one includes the alienated voters of 10-15% - who did not bother to vote despite 
a small potential fine - into the analysis, it became obvious that 'the centre' of the 
political spectrum evaporated. It could be seen that voters in Turkey, in search of a 
radical change of the political and economic system shifted further toward the right. 
Among the electorate, the WP typically attracted votes from the relatively 
religious, 72 Sunni Kurds and Turks in the landlocked areas of Turkey where the people 
have generally a more conservative outlook and relatively recent migrants from these 
areas to big cities (the party received higher than its average votes in many big cities 
like Istanbul and Ankara thanks to this tide of migration); and the relatively poor 
sections and those who received lower than average education. The rural, less 
industrialised South-East, East and East-Black Sea regions of Turkey which had 
"' For example, Islamist economist Mustafa Ozel (1993) criticised the WP for not using sophisticated 
enough language. 
71 The NAP is considered to be more nationalist than other parties, yet it should be noted that even the 
leftist parties have been nationalist in Turkey the DLP of Ecevit adopted the slogan of Nationalist-Left 
emphasising the independence of Turkey mainly against the American and European influences. 
72 Erbakan observed that the traditionally religious sections, which have been "ridiculed" by secular 
circles, found a place within the WP which respected their beliefs and appearance ($en 1995: 123). 
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comparatively more traditional and religious populations gave higher than average 
support to the MVP (see, TÜSES 1999; Fakir 1994; Akdogan 2000). 
Those who voted for ideological reasons (the so-called hard core) among the \'VP 
supporters were often estimated to be between 8-12% of the voters in Turkey (see, for 
example, Kahraman 1995: 30). Among these, there were substantial sections influenced 
by mosque imams and muezzins and other DRA officials and a certain group of teachers 
at the IHLs known as meslekci ' (i. e. teaching basic Islamic sciences). These groups 
almost by definition had an Islamist worldview and were underpaid, and would 
certainly benefit from a more Islamic order, at least in terms of gaining social prestige 
by virtue of their jobs and Islamic knowledge. This was certainly a main issue for the 
secular parties and they accused the WP of using mosques and the IHLs for political 
purposes. 
The activism of Islamist women was very effective in the rise of the WP. In fact, 
no other centre-right political circle was able to develop a women movement 
comparable to that of the WP (Mert 1996: 57). Just before 24 December1995 elections, 
there were 300,000 female members of the party in Istanbul alone, while its nearest rival 
could muster only 15,000. They were organised in every neighbourhood and members' 
names were on a computer database. These active female members of the party were 
visiting almost every house in both urban and rural areas of Turkey, organising 
conferences, attending weddings, funerals, holding tea parties (TDN, 15.12.1995). 
Since a level of support of 8-12% was not enough for the WP to be a partner in 
government, the party was at pains to try to be a mass-party, albeit without losing its 
distinct ideological identity. This left the party open to internal and external criticisms. 
According to a small percentage of more radical Islamists, the party was losing its 
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identity and making concessions to the current political reginme. Many Islamist groups 
and individuals accused the WP elite by claiming that being a NVP voter was more 
important for them than being a good Muslim (see, for example, $en 1995). 
It could be seen that, new societal sections, different from the traditional grass 
roots of the WP, were beginning to emerge and were choosing to support the WP. These 
were new Muslim `capitalists' in rapidly industrialising provincial cities, highly 
educated technical and administrative cadres, a considerable numbers of youth coming 
from laic or even foreign language lycees. There were also a sizeable urban mass of 
women motivated by young women with good education, and a substantial amount of 
workers (Laciner 1996: 9). Most of these new sections had a more assertive Islamic 
identity than that of the traditional party supporters. 
There is a consensus among the observers that the WP superseded other political 
parties in terms of size, efficiency and dedication of its party machinery. A strong core 
group of activists acted very professionally, they were highly motivated, disciplined and 
strongly committed to the cause, defined often as a religious mission (a form of jihad). '3 
They, like the vein in a body, functioned at community level, communicating with every 
voter if possible. Party activities were carefully organised to reach all voters (cakir 
1994: 51-9; Soydan 1994: 41; $en 1995: 88, Yavuz 1997). 
The grass roots organisation of the party carried the party discourse to people. 
The discourse `explained' the causes of problems in Turkey and offered solutions 
couched in an Islamic terminology. The party grass roots also provided material benefits 
such as health care, assistance in finding jobs, food, fuel and other commodities to the 
" In the words of Erbakan "the success of our party registered so far is a product of our cadres who have 
worked with a religious zeal and sincerity by only aiming at the attainment of the consent of Allah" (see, 
Yildiz 2003). 
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poor. Furthermore they offered sympathy and an appreciation of difficulties of everyday 
life. Thus, they created an atmosphere of closeness. affection. congeniality and 
companionship. This combination of ideology, material benefits and personal touch 
worked and returned as votes. Other political parties did not posses or could not 
mobilise a comparable group of hard-core members; they were less convincing and their 
policies were more self-centred and showed little care for problems of "the little people" 
(Ayata 1996: 52). 
3.5.3 A `Nativist' Party 
The WP shared a general characteristic of Islamist movements in the world by 
its emphasis on Islam as the most important local, constitutive cultural element. The WP 
was a professed 'nativist' party. Erbakan frequently addressed the crowds by stating "we 
are just like you, exactly like you. " Presumably, this 'sameness' came from sharing the 
same `authentic' cultural, Islamic values and background. Thus, according to the leaders 
of the WP, the WP was different from other parties, which were responsible for the 
socio-economic failure of Turkey. Asiltürk, a leading MP of the WP, was saying in 
1995 that "the WP is on one side and all the others are on the other side. Other parties 
are merely establishments, consisting of various interest groups that look like a political 
party only in form" (TDN, 17.11.1995). 
For the WP, Islam (as a shared system of symbols and meanings) brought the 
rulers and the ruled closer. Erbakan said that the WP's coming to power meant that "for 
the first time, the people came to power, its beliefs, its history came to power [... ] from 
now on, the state will be at the service of the people, not the people at the service of the 
state" (Milli Gazete, 1.10.1996). The WP held that the gap between the secular elite 
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and the masses in Turkey was mainly result of the 'enemy-like'; approach of the former 
towards Islam: whereas, the masses were traditionally religious according to the \VP. 
More disturbingly for the «'P, a certain section of the secular elite was very active in 
trying to promote a nationalised, 'Protestantised' Islam. For example, they opened a 
debate about performing mama= (prayer) in Turkish as opposed to Arabic, "despite" the 
fact that (as popularly claimed in the Islamist press), "they would not even pray in 
Turkish". This, non-practice of Islam (as a sign of not really sharing) by the secular 
elite, made them non-persuasive in the eyes of the religious Muslims. Nevertheless, 
their desire to `modernise' Islam further in Turkey caused anxiety, because it was feared 
that by using the state power they might be successful in damaging Islam. 
3.5.4 The Welfare Party and the Shaping of Islamism in Turkey 
In various Muslim countries, the general colour of Islamism is naturally strongly 
related to the policies of existing powerful Islamist organisations. Similarly, the WP was 
an important actor in shaping Islamism in Turkey. As Yildirim observes the WP 
behaved like a religious community at public level and as a political party at state level 
(1999b: 129-133), often sacralising its political activity as the most important form of 
serving to Islam (jihad). The WP elite often presented themselves as the only or the 
most important representatives of Islamic demands, spokespersons of the religious 
sections in Turkey, thus they attempted at monopolising leadership of Islamism in the 
country (see, for example, BayramoLlu 2001: 60-61; Akdogan 2000; Yavuz 1997). This 
was clearly a disturbing attitude for other Islamist groups. The WP members, like many 
other Islamist groups, conceived Islam as more than a political ideology; because unlike 
74 See, various issues of Islamist dailies and Subani (1996: 155) for the `Enemy of Islam' image of the 
secular elite in the eyes of the religious. 7' For an interesting complaint by an Islamist intellectual about "Protestantisation" of Islam by "[secular] 
intellectuals" and `Protestantisation' of the Islamists who ceases to be homo Isia, nicus in favour of being 
homo economicus, see (Yildirim 1999b: 92-106). 
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ideologies, the argument went, Islam was not a human invention. Islam, as a 
comprehensive way of life, provided a political blueprint for society. 
The WP shared the predominant Islamist view in Turkey and in the world that 
Islam is timeless and universal, so, does not need to change in essential doctrines. 
Views of influential Islamist intellectual Ali Bulae is typical: Islam is different from 
other religions (e. g. Christianity) because, its essence, basic principles, and "its spirit" 
have been transmitted to the present day authentically, without any corruption, 
intervention or changes (as God promised in the Qur'an) (i. e. its perfect form did not 
change) and this makes any reform attempt absurd. What Muslims need is to change 
their, "decayed, corrupted, eroded" understanding of Islam according to `ideal' Islam 
(1995b: 56-57). WP members also shared another Islamist view in the world: Islam is 
'knowable' in its ideal form (Bucenun 1990: 113-116). 
Islamists in Turkey have been trying to establish a new dominant tradition of 
Islam, especially since the late 1960s. They critically evaluate the Islamic tradition since 
around 662 AD from the perspective of what they assume to be correct knowledge 
about the Golden Age of Islam. Their approach also includes an idealisation of the 
Ottoman history. Thus, they reach an understanding of `ideal Islam'. One Islamist 
argues that this understanding has been very important for Islamists in Turkey in 
rendering unsuccessful the efforts, by the state or foreign powers, to promote a 
modernised, convenient version of Islam, "a quasi-Islam" (Kaplan 1993: 99). 
One can see that the WP circles did not accept a sociological explanation of 
Islam that took its shape by historical experience. For example, in the Milli Gazete, a 
former prime minister of the mono-party period, Günaltay was criticised for stating in 
1949, "we will not follow the Utihads of Imam Malik who made them over a thousand 
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years ago according to conditions of that time and geography in the Arabian deserts, " 
and for his further claim that a considerable amount of verses of the Qur'an were not 
valid any longer (29.9.1997). In contrast, as Islamists, Erbakan and other WP leaders 
held that, `commands' in the Qur'an that organise social and private life are valid 
forever. They clearly shared the general Islamist claim that, a correct socio-political 
World Order (Nizam-z Alem) can and must be realised according to `original' Islam. 
From Said Nursi to Erbakan, almost all Islamist leaders in Turkey advocated a 
somewhat restricted space for ijtihad. Their traditional attitude has been that more and 
more people should follow Islam in detail. This is not to say that, they did not have a 
very critical approach to the Islamic history and especially the `degeneration' of Islam 
in folk practice. Yet, it has been almost unanimously accepted that, there are the Qur'an 
and other trusted written sources that describe the `correct form of Islam. ' Therefore, 
Islamists have argued that much caution is needed about ijtihad; otherwise it could turn 
into the modernisation of Islam, changing it according to fancies of some people (e. g. 
the secular elite), and eventually turning it into another religion. Here, the Islamist 
craving for authenticity and claim to have the original divine wishes, as a blueprint for 
life, have proved to be much more potent forces than their perception of the need to 
change to accommodate `modern' ways into their lives. 76 On the contrary, Islamist 
groups, including the core group of the WP, wanted their new members to follow 
Islamic rules strictly. In fact, being a practising Muslim seemed to be an unwritten rule 
for becoming a high level member of the WP. 
It is possible to see that when Erbakan demanded that the members should not 
76 In fact, it can be argued that many Islamists in Turkey do not want to cut hands off, or marry with 4 
women (sec, Carkoblu 2004). These are not important issues for them at all, but they cannot currently, 
bring themselves to deny that these are part of the Islamic heritage, because it is feared that such a denial 
would open the gates for wishful amendments to Islam. 
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give their =akat (alms) individually but through WP mechanisms, (so that the receivers 
of the charity would feel closer to the WP), he was at the same time making use of a fact 
that many Islamists would know, in the `Golden Age' of Islam, it was state's duty to 
collect and redistribute zakat. Thus, he implied, the WP viewed itself as the natural heir 
to traditional functions of an Islamic state, as these functions were ignored by the 
secular state in Turkey. In fact, similar to many other Islamist movements in the Middle 
East (Kepel 1995; Toth 2003), providing for the needy by organisations formed either 
by the party members or by using the resources of municipalities, has been an important 
WP policy. Talat Halman, a social democrat and a former minister of culture, bitterly 
observed that the WP was the only party, which actually did something for the poor 
masses. It fed them, took care of the grass roots, and gave hope and aspirations about 
possibility of a better life (TDN, 12.3.1996). A New York Times editorial, just after the 
24 December 1995 election, argued that the victory of the WP was linked to a lack of 
social services in big cities and the pressure applied to the Kurdish minority. The NYT 
noted that WP gained votes by providing cheap bread, health clinics and other social 
services desperately needed by the poor, many of whom were recent migrants from the 
countryside (cited by TDN, 29.12.1995). 
The Islamisation of Turkey, according to many Islamists and the WP elite, has 
fundamentally been a problem of `educating' the nominally Muslim masses about 
Islam. 77 So, one of the functions of the core group of the WP supporter was `educating' 
the WP sympathisers and other target groups about the key Islamic concepts and 
political `demands' of Islam from a Muslim. 
" Erbakan and many other WP leaders clearly attributed the low support for the WP in the 1980s to the 
ignorance of the masses about Islam. The party members assumed that the WP was the natural party to 
support for anybody who was Islamically conscious (sec, for example, Ceylan 1996). 
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The \VP leadership also implied that other Islamist groups should join them as 
the biggest Islamist organisation which was most likely to influence the current regime, 
toward more Islamic lines. The party leadership did not give enough respect to identities 
of other Islamic groups whose members often became subject to a'Welfarisation' 
(Refahlrla. nia) process when they came into contact with the party and lost their ties 
with their original groups (cakir 1994: 54-56). 
3.6 THE WELFARE PARTY AND SECULARISATION IN TURKEY 
It is useful to keep in mind that for Islamists in Turkey secularisation means 
decline of the social significance of Islam, in other words secularisation means de- 
Islamisation more than anything else, the opposite of the main Islamist aim. It can be 
seen that the general discourse of the Welfare Party did not recognise secularisation of 
Turkish society as a natural process accompanying the general modernisation trend but 
mainly a reflection of the worldviews of the republican elite. 78 According to the WP, 
since most social groups in Turkey were either religious or at least very respectful of 
Islamic values and natural candidates to be religious again, the secularisation of society 
was not seen as an informed choice of the people but an effect of the laic character of 
the regime. In fact, in the WP discourse, secularisation (understood as decline of 
religion) was portrayed as something that did not need to happen in a modernising 
society. This was because the discourse defined modernisation not in terms of 
secularisation but for example in terms of industrialisation and technological progress. 79 
The WP argued that secularism should be understood as a principle guaranteeing 
78 The relationship between the religiousness of the political leaders and their attitude toward laicite has 
been meaningful. For example, Atatürk (Bulac 1995b: 65) and tnönü were not religious according to 
Islamists, whereas Oral was religious enough for the masses and Erbakan has been very religious since 
his youth. 
The emphasis on industrialisation accompanied and helped by technological progress had been there, 
from the start, in the Milli Göriiy, (National Outlook) as will be seen in Chapter 4. 
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freedom of religion and consciousness. '0 
A common Islamist theme in Turkey has been that secularisation has weakened 
ethics in the country, as it did in the West, because Kemalism in general and the 
principle of laicite in particular have undermined Islamic values that are necessary for a 
healthy society. In other words, in the WP one can see the continuation of a general 
conservative view (which existed since the first decades of the republic), that excessive 
secularism as an ideology undermined family and community ties, and led to moral 
degeneration of youth, the weakening of spiritual values, spread of non- or anti-Islamic 
views (Karpat 1959: 274-78). 
cakir's observation that the WP had some modernising and secularising effect 
on its supporters (1994: 58) captured only the half of the story, because, the party at the 
same time boosted their confidence in opposing basic assumptions and targets of the 
Turkish modernisation project. In their own way, WP members, like other Islamist 
sections of the society, were modernising81 but their modernisation pace and route, were 
slower and significantly different from those of the pro-laicite majority (especially from 
the relatively elite secular sections within this majority). The two different 
understandings of modernity were often perceived to be in conflict with each other in a 
zero-sum game in the country. 
When pressed by the circumstances of the 28 February Process, it became 
clearer that there had been considerable secularisation in Turkey. According to one poll, 
80 These terms appear in the Turkish Constitution and laws in tandem; freedom of din (religion) and 
vicdan (consciousness) which are under state guarantee. 
81 One of the best ways of seeing the 'modernisation' of the great majority of the Islamists in Turkey is 
certainly to look at the internal criticism of this modernisation trend by some more conservative fractions 
among Islamists. As they point out, many Islamists joined in the modernisation process (albeit in their 
own distinct way) and started to do things that would have been considered un-Islamic a few years earlier. 
An example might be the acceptance of adverts that contain women dressed 'un-Islamically' on their 
television channels or on their newspapers, justified on the grounds that these institutions (television 
channels, newspapers) needed these sources of income to survive. 
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the majority of the public (60.5%) saw the anti-secular activities as a greater threat than 
the PKK (TDN, 25.4.1997). However, the real important move against rising Islamism 
(defined as reactionism) and especially against the «'P, came not from the civil groups 
but from the military through the National Security Council. The NSC was constituted 
by the President, the PM, 3 ministers (Defence, Internal and Foreign Affairs) and the 
top five Generals of the TAF. At the insistence of its military wing, the NSC on 28 
February 1997 `recommended' 18 measures to the government, mainly to curb 
`fundamentalism' in Turkey. These included the handing over of the private schools and 
hostels operated by Islamist groups to the Ministry of National Education, a new system 
of 8-year basic education (causing the closure of the junior sections of IHLs) and stricter 
control of the Qur'an courses by the state. The number of IHLs was to be reduced in 
accordance with the need for religious functionaries. Media reports showing the TAF as 
anti-Islamic were to be brought under control. The dress code of the Kemalist 
revolution was to be implemented fully. 82 Activities of the religious extremists that 
would fuel sectarian differences and divide the nation had to be prevented. Arms 
licensing rules had to be stricter. 83 Anti-regime organisations had to be prevented from 
collecting the skins of animals slaughtered during the Feast of Sacrifice [hence 
depriving them of considerable funds84] (TDN, 20.3.1997). The culmination of the 28 
February Process was the ban of the WP by the Constitutional Court in February 1998. 
Turkish secularisation has not been visible only in the emergence of a dominant 
secular elite. WP circles also complained about the increasing negative or indifferent 
attitudes toward Islamic values by a majority of the general population which they 
82 The TAF was disturbed by the increasing visibility of men wearing ciibbe (long jackets) and sartk 
('Islamic' headgear) which were outlawed. Although Atatürk did not stipulate an outfit for the women, he 
was clearly in favour of parting with the headscarf and clearly against car. of (black chador) which 
certainly looks very archaic to the secular minded in Turkey. 
83 The increasing amount of pump-action rifles, licensed for hunting, especially became a concern. 
84 Skins were collected by various, mainly Islamist, groups, including those close to the WP and the PKK. 
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perceived as part of dc-Islamisation. For example, a Milli Ga_etc' columnist Ozean 
wrote "our people, who have been deliberately shaped according to Western culture. 
understand Islam in an extremely corrupted form". According to these "Islam means 
fasting [... ] visiting shrines. giving money to the beggars [... ] following religious duties" 
is enough for being labelled as "an extreme religionist" (5.7.1997). A WP minister, 
celik, charged that some circles were trying to create an "atheist society" in Turkey by 
"abusing Kemalism and laicite" (, Milli Gazete, 4.11.1996). 
The level of secularisation (de-Islamisation) that the society had reached was 
very disturbing for the WP circles. The majority of the masses were no longer paying 
enough attention to Islamic standards. Westernised, secularised upper classes were 
leading largely "a materialist, hedonist, extremely consumerist lifestyle [... ] wasting 
their time in orgies, drinking, gambling". The duty of Islamists was to "work day and 
night" and "raise world class writers, poets, historians, philosophers, artists, architects, 
with high moral values, virtues, wisdom [... and] gain economic power in the country" 
(Eygi, Milli Gazete, 2.7.1997). 
3.6.1 The Welfare Party and the Principle of Laicite in Turkey 
The principle of laicite had been the thorniest of the Kemalist principles for 
Islamists. Mainly because, it has come to be understood as the chief principle giving the 
character of the regime by the state elite, which have been "reluctant to give up its 
tutelage of the masses" in the name of preserving the founding philosophy of the 
republic (Kramer 2000: 1). Laicite has been usually propagated and understood as 
"separation of religious and state affairs". 85 It is attacked as such by Turkish Islamists 
who, like their counterparts in many other Muslim countries, have been arguing that it is 
ös In 1928, during the discussions in TGNA, it was also defined as such (see, Ozek (no date): 40). 
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wrong to keep Islamic niles away from the state affairs. because Islam was sent to be 
applied to all aspects of life. A former Commander of the Navy lamented that since the 
laicite had been taught so simple-mindedly in schools over the years. the young 
generations did not properly understood the good reasons behind the principle. 
However, this was a comment with the benefit of hindsight, after perceiving a failure to 
raise all the youth with a belief in the laicite. 
In fact, the separation of state affairs from the wishes and desires of the 
population has historical roots in Turkey and many saw it as necessary. The politics and 
political offices and death often walked hand in hand, especially in the Ottoman Empire 
and many Grand Viziers and even Sultans were executed. In the Turkish Republic, the 
executions of the PM Menderes and two of his ministers in 1961, after the coup of 1960 
are entrenched in living memory. Therefore, the separation of politics from religion has 
its rationale for the masses at large. Trying to involve Islam in political life has been 
engaging in politics par excellence and has been perceived to be too dangerous. Perhaps 
more importantly, it can be argued that, the same uneducated masses usually saw it 
natural that the running of the state should belong to high office holders, who by virtue 
of their education and knowledge understand what is best for the country. What is more, 
the laicite, understood as legislating and governing the country according to 
contemporary (modem) values and without paying particular attention to Islam or even 
deliberately banning some aspects of it, has been well guarded by the republican elite 
and laws. 
Although, the leading members of the WP made it clear that they believed that 
the state had to be subject to Islamic rules and it should serve Islam as the religion of the 
great majority; these beliefs could not be voiced in public for legal reasons that were 
firmly based on the principle of laicite. Nevertheless, since certain Islamic 
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rules/symbols were (are) discouraged by the state (like the headscarf at universities). the 
\VP members were able to show their stance by various symbolic acts (like joining 
protests to support these female students). 
Although it was strictly against the principle of laicite: a substantial amount of 
Islamists wanted a shariah state in Turkey. The findings of the TÜSESS6 and other 
researchs are interesting. The results of polls conducted face to face as follows: "Do you 
want Turkey to be administered according to shariah? " (TÜSES 1999: 25). 
Table 2: Attitudes toward Shariah (Percentages) 
1995 1996 1998 
Wants shariah 19.9 26.7 19.8 
Does not want shariah 61.8 58.1 59.9 
No idea 18.4 15.2 20.2 
According to these polls, at least 1/5 of the voters in Turkey wanted the shariah as a 
state system. The sudden increase by 6.8% in the one-year after 24 December 1995 
election victory of the WP could be interpreted as a reflection of growing confidence 
among the religious. However, such figures should not be understood as unwavering 
support for a strict application of shariah. 87 
Party sympathisers' 88 attitude toward shariah in 1998 (TÜSES 1999: 92) is also 
illuminating: 
Table 3: Party sympathisers' attitude toward Shariah (percentages). 
Wants Shariah Does not Want No idea or answer 
Motherland Party 15.1 64.9 20.1 
Welfare-Virtue P. 45.8 33.9 20.3 
True Path Party 20.2 55.6 24.2 
Nationalist Action P. 26.5 61.3 12.2 
Democratic Left P. 6.9 80.2 13.0 
Republican Peoples' P. 6.9 84.6 8.5 
84 Social, Economic Political Researches Foundation of Turkey. 
87 As carkoglu (2004) highlights when analysed in detail, support for specific prescriptions of Islamic law 
greatly varies in Turkey, for example, from 10 - 15% (e. g. for polygamy and larger share from the 
inheritance for the male) to 75% (for the headscarf at universities). 
88 Defined as "those who would want to vote for that party under ideal circumstances. " 
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It appears that there were substantial pro-shariah sections among the NAP 
(26.5°0). TPP (20.2%) and MLP (15.1%) sympathisers. These were centre-right or 
nationalist parties. 35% of those who wanted the Islamic law would vote for the WP-VP 
(Virtue Party, the WP's successor), 10.4% for MLP, 10.4% for TPP, 12% for the NAP, 
5% for the DLP, the RPP and pro-Kurdish HADEP and the remaining were undecided 
or would protest the elections. In 1996, according to another TÜSES research, the WP 
would get 52.3% of pro-shariah votes. The WP was the only party whose supporters 
wanting shariah as a state system outnumbered those who did not. This showed both its 
distinctive Islamist character and the fact that not all of its supporters wanted a state 
based on the shariah. In interpreting this data it should not be forgotten that the word 
`shariah' has become much tarnished over the decades in Turkey and strictly speaking, 
any attempt to base the regime on it, even partially, was and is against the law. 89 This 
might cause hesitation or even fear for ordinary citizens to say, "Yes, I want the 
shariah" to an unknown poll conductor. 90 Yet, research results, year on year, have been 
very consistent. At least around 20% of the population in Turkey was pro-shariah and 
60% was against it, the remaining 20% being undecided or declined to answer. 
Therefore, it can be said on the one hand that secularisation has taken firm roots in 
Turkish society and on the other hand, there was a firm base for Islamists to cultivate. 
The Islamist argument, which the WP shared, that the "shariah means Islami91 did not 
seem to reach large sections of the society. The great majority of people considered 
themselves Muslim but opposed a shariah-based regime. On the other hand, the WP had 
a relative success in conveying the message to its grass roots that shariah means Islamic 
"' According to Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution: "No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse 
religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose 
of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, 
and legal order of the state on religious tenets". 
9" Some Islamist publications, for example, the daily Zaman of Fethullah Gillen Group criticised this poll 
at that time, asking whether it was a pretext for gathering information on the religious persons. '' An influential theology Professor H. Karaman was arguing that shariah means Islam and it also means 
a part of Islam; i. e. Islamic rules related to political, economic, social and legal matters (see Yeni $afak 
25.3.1997). 
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ntles and not a word one should be afraid of usinz. 
It could be seen that there were both pragmatic and ideological reasons in 
voters' minds influencing their approach to shariah (TÜSES 1999: 70-71 [1998]): 
Table 4: Reasons influencing electoral attitudes toward shariah. 
Reasons for wanting shariah % % of whole population 
It is the requirement of being a Muslim 47.6 9.4 
It is a socially, economically and politically better system 39.8 7.9 
It will bring morality and honesty 7.3 1.4 
Reasons for not wanting shariah 
It is not a realistic thesis 31.2 18.8 
It is against democracy & Human Rights 29.6 17.8 
It is against contemporary rule of law principles 19.6 11.8 
It is socially and economically a backward system 11.0 6.6 
The WP consolidated its hold over its supporters with the help of heightened 
political tension in Turkey and by ensuring an animated debate over Islam and laicite, 
and constantly giving similar messages. Therefore, it was not surprising to see that 
(although not too different from some other parties), the most rigid voters belonged to 
the WP. Around 30% of whom would not cast their vote for any other party should the 
WP could not take part in elections (see, TÜSES 1999: 120-121). 
The WP leadership shared and strongly argued the view that laicite has been 
wrongly understood and used against Islam in Turkey. For example, S. A. Emre, a 
leading WP member, criticised Bayar, the president of the republic between 1950 and 
1960, who said in 1952 that "laicite is to make society forget religion completely" (cited 
by Dilipak 1991: 150). 
Most WP members would agree with Omer Laciner, a socialist intellectual, who 
argues "in Turkey, laicite means ensuring the dominance and privilege of the `modern' 
way of life over the traditional Islamic way of life by state hands and enforcement" 
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(1996: 10). If laicite meant banishment of Islam from the public sphere (all kinds of 
official places; e. g. universities etc. ) then, the Islamist drive, (in which mamv \VP 
members took part), to open schools, preparation courses for the university entrance 
exam, even universities has also served to create Islamised spaces as a forni of getting 
away from the "militant" laicite (see, Göle 2000). 
It has been frequently argued by WP circles that Western countries are secular 
too, but there, religiously oriented people are much freer to practice their beliefs. They 
frequently compared Turkey with some other countries as far as secularity was 
concerned and thus criticised what was being done in the name of laicite in the country. 
Eygi summarises these views well: 
No, we do not want to turn Turkey into a Sudan or Iran but want to make it a 
democracy like Israel. And yes, it is possible to be a democracy without laicite. For 
example in Britain, there is no laicite where the sovereign is also head of the 
church. 92 If the laicite is the most debated issue in Turkey it is because everybody 
exploits this principle according to their ideologies... If the loyalty of the Jews to 
their religion in Israel cannot be considered reactionist then the desire of Turkish 
Muslims to lead a life in accordance with Qur'an and Sunnah should be considered 
natural (Milli Gazete, 7.7.1997). 
In fact, even according to liberal observers, the Kemalists who thought that they 
were attacking the Islamic reactionaries, at the same time alienated "good, mosque- 
going Muslims" who gradually joined forces with Islamists and gave the \VP a boost "in 
Anatolia" [i. e. in provincial, especially central and eastern parts of Turkey]. "In the end 
the Kemalists made themselves look like atheists and non-believers" ((; evik, TDN, 27. 
2.1996). 
Leading intellectuals in the WP circles, like other Islamists, frequently argued 
that the state was trying to control religion in Turkey. "In our system the state controls 
92 Note the distortion of reality to make a point. Britain, of course, is very much a secularised country. 
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the religion. There is the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA), it has a hundred 
thousand imams, muezzins and muftis who are state officials on state pay roll" (Eygi. 
[Milli Gazete 3.7.1997). A radical Islamist writer, Yaýar Kaplan was voicing a 
widespread Islamist perception that although the regime in Turkey does not in any way 
want to involve Islam into its affairs, it also does not want, and fears to be seen, as 
irreligious (1993: 85). 
The secular elite has been justifying the 'exceptional' application of laicite by 
arguing that Turkey is a special case as far as laicite is concerned, because there has 
been a real threat of a theocratic state being established. The «'P argued that the hard- 
line application of secularism in Turkey could not be justified, because, democracy was 
democracy everywhere and Turkey had to comply with universal standards (see, 
Welfare Party Anayasa Degicikligi Uzla. nia Teklifi: [no date]). 
In fact, the WP circles advanced an argument, which was generally shared by 
Islamists in the region and in Turkey, that laicite was a foreign concept, and that was 
why people did not understand it; it did not match social values and realities in Turkey. 
"Laicite, born raised and developed outside of us. It does not have any parallels with our 
history, beliefs, cultural values [... ] trying to patch laicism into Islamic world is nothing 
but only an attempt at the impossible" (Dilipak 1991: 171). The historical experience 
that gave birth to laicite in Europe did not have a parallel in Islamic history but "our 
ignorant intellectuals talk about dark medieval ages [... ] this nation's medieval ages 
were enlightened. Europe's medieval ages were dark" (Ünaldi, Milli Gazete, 9.10. 
1997). 
The Milli Gazete quite often pointed out that, though politicians and high- 
ranking bureaucrats who were in favour of laicism did not want Islam to influence the 
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system in Turkey, they were using Islam selectively when it suited them. `" For example, 
President Demirel's statement that "the PKK terror is supported by Syria, if they are 
Muslims they should not lend this support" did not seem to sit well with what was 
happening in Turkey "where the WP is being judged because of not closing the IHLs 
and supporting the headscarf wearing students. Besides, in Syria "Muslims [i. e. `good' 
Muslims] do not control the administration. On the contrary, it is being controlled by a 
small, sectarian [i. e. Alawite, a Shiite Sect94] junta which is determined to annihilate 
Islam" (Milli Gazete, editorial, 9.10.1997). 
It can be argued that the prominent members of the \VP tried to re-negotiate the 
content of the principle of laicite because it proved too firmly rooted in Turkish society 
for the WP to challenge it directly. For example at the 1993 WP congress, Erbakan was 
declaring "if laicite means freedom of religion and conscience, freedom to live as one 
believes, prevention of repression because of religious beliefs and state guarantee for 
these issues then the WP sincerely believes in these" (see, Welfare Party 1997a: 235). 
The WP manifesto, for the parliamentary election on 24 December 1995, was arguing 
"in nowhere on the earth, laicite means being an enemy of religion. On the contrary, it 
guarantees the right to believe" (see, Welfare Party 1997a: 235). 
According to Erbakan, laicite should be understood as "acting in the light of 
science and rationality, whereas being reactionary is being dogmatic and ignorant. In 
our country, there are also laic reactionaries. These are fascist laics [... ] Laicite means 
making the laws in the parliament". Erbakan also said that while separatist terrorism and 
reactionary movements must be fought, the affection shown to the Kurdish population 
93 For the use of sonic Islamic discourses and symbols by the state forces when propagating against the 
PKK and strong claims of state forces' support of the WP as an alternative to Kurdish separatism in the 
region, see, (Yalcm 1994: 200-20 1). 
94 Which was strongly disapproved of by mostly Sunni WP supporters. 
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in general should also be extended to the sincere belie%, ers`)' (TD., Y, 12.3.1997). 
Erbakan was claiming he had no problems with the secular system in Turkey, 
but he added that the state was continuing to use the principle of laicite to fuel anti- 
Islamic feelings and this had to stop. He gave the West as an example to correct the 
laicite application in Turkey: "In the West laicite means not to discriminate between 
beliefs and to respect and recognise the religion of the people [... ] We do not want to 
change the secular principles of the state, all we want is that these principles are applied 
properly" (TDN, 9.1.1996). 
3.6.2 Secular Education System and the Welfare Party 
Most Islamists could not agree more with Professor Kongar, an influential 
secular intellectual: 
The education system of the Republic was indeed based on a reaction. The aim was 
to eradicate religious education of the Ottomans and its effects. The founders of the 
republic thought of education as a weapon against Caliphatists and Islamists and 
hence it assumed an ideological nature; this education system, which was open to 
the West, functioned as the carrier of foreign ideologies like nationalism and laicite 
(cited by Iýik 1990: 45). 
Thus, from the start, the education system had an important place in the 
Kemalist revolution, because the population had a very low level of formal education 
and most of the educated minority only had religious education. The education system 
was to be under strict control of Ankara and the new generations were to be given a 
'unified' scientific education as opposed to a religious one. The policy of a unified laic 
education has been a'half-success', mainly, because, the laic (secular) policies could not 
reach all parts of Turkey evenly. The centre's ability to control has been high in urban 
"S As the TAF-led secular sections of the society tried to curb the rise of reactionism (Islamism), it 
became a political necessity to argue that the measures were aimed at 'reactionaries' not the "sincere 
Muslims" in Turkey. 
areas, but some traditional religious education survived in "difficult conditions", 
especially in rural areas. 96 However, as Turkey democratised. the official education 
system started to loose its unity. Even the RPP felt obliged to concede some grounds in 
the late 1940s to the part of the population who wanted some religious education for 
their children in state schools (Bora 1996: 21). 
In the mid-1990s, secular sections of society became increasingly alarmed by the 
systematic Islamist efforts to enhance the `Islamised' space within the education system. 
They were continuing to open their private schools and number of students who came 
under the influence of Islamists in state `controlled' schools (e. g. the IHLs) seemed to 
be rapidly increasing. Indeed, the IHLs had become one of the most sensitive issues 
between Islamists and the secular sections. The number of pupils in IHLs increased ten- 
fold in twenty years from 1975 to 1995 and reached 473,301 (Duman 1997: 179), some 
15% of the total number of students in secondary and high schools. These schools 
seemed and were dubbed as backyard of the WP. Their graduates overwhelmingly 
favoured implementation of shariah in Turkey. There had been more graduates than the 
need for male religious functionaries (and very few women preachers) in state cadres, 
so, many of them entered faculties other than divinity and occupied important positions 
in bureaucracy after graduation. "The laic sections" of society and especially the high- 
ranking officers who spoke in the name of the TAF voiced their concerns and demanded 
a reduction in their numbers. 7 
In the 28 February Process, one of the key demands of military wing of the 
NSC from the government was to increase basic education from 5 to 8 years which 
`96 "Extremely difficult conditions" in which religious education was maintained during the mono-party 
period has been a frequent theme for Islamists and the WP leadership. 
'7 Turkish General Staff "projected" in 1997 that if the trend of religious education continued without any 
intervention from the state, in 2005 a reactionary [Islamist] party could get 67% of the votes and could 
change the constitution. 
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meant, inter alia, the abolition of secondary school parts of the IHLs. "The S year 
primary education" la%\ was enacted on 16 August 1997 by the TGNA (TÜ)kirL'. 17. S. 
1997). The WP circles argued strongly that, in education, advanced countries, like the 
Western countries or Japan (where pupils could choose a certain type of secondary 
school after 4 or 5 years of primary education), were needed to be taken as models not 
some "backward", "undemocratic", "Third World" countries (where there was S or 
more years of continuous education "aimed to indoctrinate the pupils") (Welfare Party 
1997c: 38). 
During the preparation and enactment of the law, the \VP criticised the move 
harshly. According to Erbakan, the existing government was a leftist one and the 
Motherland Party had become just a prop of the left; democracy had been destroyed. He 
accused the government of working "day and night" to close the Qur'an courses, the 
IHLs and the religious foundations. This meant fighting against the people. The 
religious minorities in Turkey were freer than the majority in enjoying their religious 
freedom. The seculars wished to raise a certain type of people. Many \VP members 
signed a petition saying that they did not want to be treated as `slaves'93 in their own 
country nor want to be ruled against their will (my emphasis, TDN 30.7.1997). Later, 
Erbakan commented, "I wish, we can provide 11 years of basic-compulsory education 
for our 70 million people and teach more science, more modern knowledge, but this 
[law] is only to impede the religion of our people contrary to human rights; and to close 
junior parts of the IHLs. Contrary to contemporary trend in the world, some try to take 
Turkey back to the repressive regime of 50 years ago" (Milli Gazete, 29.9.1997). 
`'k The term often used by Islamists is pariah, as in the famous poem by Nationalist-Islamist ideologue N. 
F. Kisakürek (d. 1983) "Oz yurdunda garipsin, bz vatan: nda parya! (You [were made]. a stranger in your 
homeland, in your homeland a pariah! (in Düzdag 1996: 108). 
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The WP circles were also "aware" that although the secular state has been trying 
to utilise the administratively hizhly centralised education system as an important tool 
in its quest of controlling Islam and promoting a certain 'harmless' version of it, its 
attempts have been strongly resisted and quite often derailed by Islamist efforts and 
tactics. An IHL student reflected the Islamist view, which the WP shared, well: "you 
[the secular elite] opened them [the IHLs] to raise imams who would be puppets of the 
regime, but God thwarted this plot and now we are studying la\v, medicine and 
engineering faculties we, the graduates of the IHLs, are coming despite (those tivho call 
themselves) the contemporary, the civilised, the progressives and TÜSIAD members 
(my emphasis; cited by Duman 1997: 172-3 ). 
According to the WP, another wrong application of laicite in the education 
system was the ban on the headscarf worn by female students. The WP repeatedly 
criticised the YÖK (the Council of Higher Education), especially the head of the YÖK 
for this ban and centralised control of higher education. According to an influential WP 
MP, Kapusuz, the YÖK was putting pressure on universities and firing Islamist 
academics (Milli Gazete, 22.9.1997). 
Actually, the Constitutional Court" found the wearing of headscarf in 
universities against the constitutional principle of laicite. However not all universities 
applied the ban strictly. The European Court of Human Rights also found the ban lawful 
on the grounds that by choosing to go to a secular university, students accepted the rules 
of that institution. 100 
Consisting of II judges appointed by the presidents of Turkey. 
"N" Although, as often pointed out by Islamists, all universities were and are subject to secular rules in 
Turkey. It is not allowed to open non-secular schools. 
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Islamists charged that, in the past secularists criticised the religiously oriented 
for not allowing and encouraging their daughters to enter higher education, but now 
they themselves did not allow these girls to be educated as they wished (Bulac 1995b: 
142). The headscarf ban was labelled as a zu1in (wrongdoing), a term with strong 
Islamic connotations. 101 There has been fierce, emotional day-to-day condemning of this 
ban in the Islamist media. For example, a Milli Ga_ete correspondent reported that he 
was told by one member of the High Council of Religious Affairs of the DRA that there 
were non-Muslim foreign powers behind the headscarf ban in Turkey. The same expert 
on Islam further commented that those who ban the headscarf have nothing to do with 
modernity and could not be true Kemalists because Atatürk did not interfere with the 
dress of the women. The head of the council, Öner, told the reporter that it was certain 
that according to Qur'an and hadiths the headscarf was a religious requirement (firrd). 1 °2 
The reporter lastly criticised the DRA because, while expressing its views at press 
conferences on almost every topic, it had not issued any official statement on `the 
headscarf problem' in Turkey for the last four years (23.9.1997). This is to imply that 
these scholars did not join in the Islamist `struggle' as they `should'. 
3.6.3 The Welfare Party and Legal Secularisation 
The WP circles shared the widespread Islamist argument in Turkey that the 
adoption of different bodies of laws from various European countries such as 
Switzerland, Italy, Germany (Gözaydin 2002) had been a mistake, as these laws did not 
conform to the native, Islamic culture. Therefore, the WP elite quite often implied that 
the harmonisation of the laws with Islamic teachings would boost social order. 
01 For an analysis of the term according to the Qur'an see Ulutürk (1990). 
u2 It can be noted that the Islamic style of beard was also banned at universities. While the headscarf is 
considered a religious must by the Islamists, beard is only a Sunnah, so the fact that there was no 
'struggle' for right to have a beard by the Islamist students was indicative of how the Islamists drew the 
distinction between essential and non-essential religious rights. 
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The NVP also adopted a `solution', suggested by Islamist intellectuals, to the 
"problem of oppressive and uniform" application of secular laws to all citizens 
regardless of their wishes. The solution, principally suggested by Ali Bulac and 
supported by some other Islamist writers like Dilipak, had drawn from the Medina 
Document, signed between Muslims around the Prophet and other communities in 
Medina. For Bulac and some other Islamists, it showed that Muslims were and are 
willing to live together with other religious communities provided that every 
community is governed according to its own laws (Bulac 1993a: 11). 103 This view was 
adopted by the WP and was translated as a demand that state intervention in the lives of 
people should be at a minimum and social life could be governed by ensuring the 
freedom of contract among the people. Thus, the religious would be free to reorganise 
their lives among themselves according to their wishes. Obviously, the secular elite 
found this idea of multiple laws as another way of limited introduction of shariah to 
society and an anathema to the whole philosophy of a unitarian laic republic (see, for 
example, Sava 1997). 104 
3.7 THE WELFARE PARTY AND DEMOCRACY 
The WP elite's understanding of democracy was strongly tied to their views 
about the application of laicite. Therefore, the above analyses of their stance vis-ä-vis 
laicite are very much indicative of their stance towards democracy. Some other 
important issues related to their conceptualisation of democracy will be briefly analysed 
below. 
First of all, it is worth keeping in mind that the WP supporters, like most other 
'`'j For the text and an analysis of the document, see EI-Awa (1980: 15-25). 1"For the views of an MP from the WP supporting the system of "Multiple Laws" see (Zengin 1995). 
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Islamists in the world, did not exist in a fully democratic culture. "'' Islamists too shared 
the widespread view that Turkish democracy had mane shortcomings. 10" In 1993, 
Tavyip Erdoan argued that there was a "dictatorial regime" in Turkey. not "real" 
democracy (Gülalp 2002: 94) and according to the `VP circles. the tutelage of the 
TAF" was an obstacle in front of a full democracy'07 (, Milli Ga=ete 15.9.1997). An 
Islamist intellectual, Mehmet Metiner, who worked closely with the WP, argued that his 
two identities, being a Kurd and a Muslim, posed problems according to the Turkish 
state. This was because "the political regime and state in Turkey were not democratic. 
The state was defender of an undemocratic nationalism and a Jacobin secularism". The 
solution was to save the state from being tool of a particular group or ideology (TD, X'. 
28.12.1996). 
According to some WP circles, many in the secular elite did not want a real 
democracy in Turkey, because in that case, they "knew" that Islamists would come to 
power. Instead, they wanted an authoritarian regime like in the 1930s and 1940s when 
there was only one party (see, for example, Eygi, Milli Ga_ete, 3.7.1997). Despite these 
feelings, it is important to note that contrary to widespread Islamist de-legitimisation of 
democracy - as a concept and method - in the previous decades, the WP elite, as a legal 
part of the political system, generally tried to re-negotiate the content of democracy 
rather than de-legitimising it from an Islamic point of view as often done by Islamist 
writers (see, Gülalp 2002: 93-95). This was mainly because, a democratic atmosphere 
ius Although, Turkey has been "decidedly more democratic" than its Muslim neighbours in the region 
(Meyer 1999). 
1w' When looked at from the perspective of liberal democracy as discussed in Chapter 1, some of the 
problems with Turkish democracy at that time (and arguably now), as often pointed out by various 
observes, can be summarised as follows: Not all of the real power lay with elected officials. Other 
`unaccountable' actors (e. g. the TAF, and some other bureaucratic powers) were also influential. Cultural, 
ethnic, religious and other minority groups (e. g. the Kurds and the Alevis), and Islamists had some 
varying degrees of problems with the political regime. 
1" Like other Islamists who wanted more freedom, the WP elite downplayed the fact that Turkey has 
been one of the most democratic Muslim countries in the region. 
215 
promised them a chance to change the political system in Turkey peacefully. \VP circles 
understood democracy in a reductionist way as the rule of the majority in parliament 
more than anything else. A common \VP argument was that there could be no 
incompatibility between Islam and a `true' democracy in Turkey. "Democracy means 
realisation of the people's will and since the Muslims are the majority in our country 
there can be no contradiction between Islam and people's will (Eygi, Milli Gazete 7.7. 
1997). 
The WP leadership did not encourage intra-party democracy (caktr 1994: 52-53) 
and used religious symbols and vocabulary in its attempt to silence criticism from other 
Islamist groups, many of which strongly reacted to this tactic. For example, in 1990, 
Esad Cohan, spiritual leader of the Iskender Pasha community, accused Erbakan of 
claiming to be the Commander of. hhad, which meant wrongly arguing that there was a 
religious war going on in Turkey and he, as the leader of the whole Islamist camp in this 
war, was above the spiritual leaders of other Islamist groups (see, caktr 1990: 54-55). 
These messages, which were coded in an Islamic vocabulary, were reaching out to 
certain sections of the society, such as many students, graduates of the IHLs in 
particular, who were familiar with this vocabulary. However, they were not effective on 
some very important Islamist groups like those who were known as the `SÜleyntancts' 
and the `Fethullahcis' who kept a distance from the WP. 
For the majority of the secular elite the WP's "real" views were obviously 
incompatible with democracy. One important question was would party members resort 
to armed struggle to bring an Islamic order, a complete and strict application of shariah 
rules. For the TAF and important parts of the secular elite, the party had this potential. 
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Some careless remarks of Erbakan and other WP VIPs did not help. los However, the \1'P 
officials frequently stressed that they would play the game (i. e. democracy) by its rules 
and would come to and leave government by way of elections. As many experts 
observed, the WP was against the use of violence to gain the political power in 
Turkey109 (Soydan 1994: 122; $en 1995, Akdogan 2000). 
The views that Islam and democracy were becoming compatible in Turkey and 
that people began to tolerate lifestyles of each other's proved too optimistic (Heper 
1997). As cakir observed, Islamists in fact wanted a change in secular lifestyles rather 
than promising to respect them. 10 For example, they (including many leading figures in 
the WP) argued that when Islamists come to power those who consume alcohol would 
`voluntarily' `save' themselves from it for good. On the other hand, the WP showed 
evidence from the West to the secular Turkish elite and charged them with not 
following the West, when doing so did not suit to their interests. For example, WP 
circles argued political parties were not being closed down in the U. S., France, Canada 
or Italy (Milli Gazele 4.10.1997). 
Very similar to other Islamist views in the Middle East, Islamists in Turkey 
(including the WP elite) strongly questioned the legitimacy of the regime in Turkey. " 
1'" Most famously, in April 1994, Erbakan said that it was certain that they were coming to power; what 
was not certain was "would it be bloody or sweet" (see, Heper 1997: 42). The secular media showed the 
clip of this speech over and over. Some «'P MPs disturbingly claimed that the TAF which did not 
"succeed" against a handful PKK terrorists could hardly be a match for millions of "Muslims, " if tension 
rose in Turkey. 
1`Y' In fact, lack of Islamically motivated armed struggle or violence toward the state forces in Turkey is 
usually explained by Islamist writers as a reflection of common sense of `Islamic section'. The Sunni 
tradition of obedience to the political authority and strong state tradition of the Turks (belief in the 
necessity of a powerful central administration in the face ofa potentially hostile international 
environment) should be mentioned as other important factors. 
110 In fact, as Ylldlnm points out, the Just Order project of the WP, understood as a `rational' blueprint to 
change the whole society, was a clear sign that the WP elite themselves were not immune to the lure of 
social engineering (1999b: 119) or ideas of progress and development (Yildiz 2003). 
111 An important part of this criticism was based on state's open disregard or violation of certain Islamic 
norms. Another important factor was economic performance and policies. 
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They often made it quite clear that their obedience to the regime was mainly due to 
coercion of the state. In other words, it can be argued that from a substantial Islamist 
section of society, state enforcement enjoyed only the first (following orders) and fifth 
(instrumental acceptance) types of obedience and support, according to classification of 
Held (1989: 101) as discussed in Chapter 1. 
3.7.1 Media and Democracy 
It could be seen that, during the WP's height of power, the Islamist media 
continued to be less influential than the pro-laicite media in Turkey. ": The penetration 
of the Islamist media among the secular elite section of society was especially weak. 
What was more, considerable part of the Islamist media was critical of WP policies. 
Yet, most of the Islamist media shared the view that there were serious problems with 
democracy in Turkey and there was the need for a much more democratic atmosphere, 
mainly understood in terms of religious freedoms. For example, the Islamist daily Yeni 
. Safak strongly criticised "the Turkish type of democracy" where "the NSC decisions", 
enforced by the TAF, meant "democratic demands and beliefs of an important part of 
society are completely ignored" (9.3.1997). 
The WP shared the general Islamist view that the pro-laicite media, the two big 
groups (the Dogan group and the Sabah group) in particular, had been trying hard to 
give a manipulated image of Islamists to the public. ' 13 The larger media had become a 
`weapon' at the hands of their owners who used these media organisations to further 
112 It can be argued that, as far as the television, the radio and the print media (especially newspapers) 
were concerned during the last 5 years of the WP, despite to their strong developments, the `Islamist 
media' had around between 25- 30% of the viewers and readers. 
113 For example, Islamist writer Ta§getiren accused television channels and newspapers belonged to two 
big media groups of a "routine", "ugly perversion of truth" by misrepresenting a huge pro-if lLs meeting 
as organised by the WP (Yeni . afak 13.5.1997). 
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their real business interests in various other sectors often with the help of the state. '" 
In Turkey, an important part of the media elite came from a leftist, secular 
background. According to the WP leadership "a certain section of the media", which 
tried to "defame" the WP and "acted like a political party", was favoured by some 
secular political leaders with state incentives in exchange for supporting their policies 
and this section of the media had become a cartel (see, for example, TDN, 31.5.1997). 
The `monopolisation' process in the Turkish press was obvious; two media groups 
owned by Aydin Dogan and Dinc Bilgin, had 66% of the newspaper circulation in 
Turkey as of November 1996 and also controlled the distribution networks. These two 
groups also owned the two most watched television channels: A TV and Kanal D (see, 
TDN, 1.12.1997). 
The secular elite frequently argued that they were certain that a regime 'captured' 
by the WP or WP-like Islamist groups was not going to be democratic. Turkey could not 
risk being a big laboratory to see whether Islamism and democracy were compatible. 
Their solution was to suppress Islamism. 
3.7.2 Women 
Some generalisations can be made about the WP's approach to women. It could 
be seen that, like many other Islamist groups in the Middle East, the WP circles 
encouraged the active participation of Islamist women into political and economic 
life' 15 (Göle 2000 : 99-103) without compromising the integrity of Islamic precepts. 
114 This seems obvious because the advertising market was too small in Turkey to support so many 
national television channels and newspapers and many of them had to be constantly subsidised by their 
bosses. 
Its This was also a function of desire on the part of Islamist women, like secular women, to earn 
additional income for the family in difficult economic conditions and gain financial independence. 
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According to the \VP discourse, the activism of Islamist women were necessary to 
secure certain "rights" (e. g. education and working in state offices with the headscarf) 
which were denied by the secular system. They were accepted as equal political agents 
in theory, but in practice, as with all other parties in Turkey, their influence in the party 
administration was very limited. ' 16 
It could be seen that the traditional roles of the women as mother and housewife 
were idealised in publications close to the WP (see, Ilyasoglu 1996). In other words, 
similar to views of many other Islamist groups in the world, the participation of women 
in modernity was to be subject to checks by Islam and tradition. They were to be 
protected from the harshness of the street and political life, and from destructive impact 
of foreign ideas (e. g. feminism). 
It is a well-known observation of some academics that the 'headscarved' 
university students do participate in the shaping of modernity in Turkey (e. g. Göle 1991, 
Özdalga 1998). Nevertheless, for the great majority of the secular elite, the headscarf 
symbolised anti-laicism, anti-modernity and the oppressed women. The WP circles 
countered these criticisms by frequent reference to the idealised Islamic history. 
Nothing in Islam could ever be used to justify any oppression of the women. What 
should have mattered when deciding whether Islamist women were for or against 
modernity was whether they favoured science and development (which they did), rather 
than judging them because of their Islamic creed (and dress) as non-modem. 
3.7.3 Minorities 
One of the obstacles to a more democratic WP was undoubtedly the fact that the 
'"' This was justified by WP circles partly by referring to general disapproval by the state of the headscarf 
wearing women occupying official positions within political parties. 
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\VP was eery much influenced from the Islamic-Ottoman (millet) system, which meant 
that individual identities predominantly made sense in the religious C0111111Llilit%' one 
belonged to. Thus, it was not surprising that, the WP's understanding of democracy fell 
short of granting and openly declaring equal rights for minorities, religious or otherwise. 
even just as a lip-service. As the secular system increasingly infringed upon the 
religious freedoms of Islamists, the WP's discourse strongly signalled that its policies 
would also be intolerant toward those that were ideologically and religiously different 
from them, and only Islamically-minded would feel comfortable in a WP dominated 
political system. 
Very similar to the widespread Islamist attitude in the world, and indeed to the 
nationalist sections (e. g. the Ülkiiciis) in Turkey, the WP circles generally approached 
religious minorities (e. g. the Jewish and Greek Orthodox) in Turkey with suspicion. It 
was frequently implied that they might be used as pawns by foreign powers in plots 
against Turkey and their loyalty to Turkey might be weaker than to Israel or Greece. As 
Bali succinctly explains, like other Islamist groups in Turkey, the WP discourse targeted 
the Jew as an abstract figure, not especially those who were living in Turkey. In fact, it 
was an anti-Zionist discourse criticising the Israeli "oppression" of the Palestinians. 
Nevertheless, anti-Zionist Islamist discourses often slipped into anti-Semitism. The WP 
leadership did not object to these until the WP became part of the governmcnt in 1996, 
after that, the anti-Semitic remarks by some WP elite died out (Bali 1996). As for the 
Phanar Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the Afilli Ga_ete frequently warned that it was 
involved in activities against Turkish interests. 
Another example of Islamist intolerance seen in Islamist publications was the 
approach toward the homosexuals. Homosexuality was not seen legitimate by the 
seculars and Islamists. Practice of male homosexuality in some pre-Islamic 
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communities is mentioned as a great sin in the Qur'an (for example, 27: 54-55) and the 
\VP circles too, saw it as a perversion. 
While many observers argued that the WP successfully integrated the peripheral 
societal sections (e. g. the poor, the Kurds, the religious), that have been marginalised by 
`the centre', into the political system in Turkey (Bayramoglu 2001: 68; Yavuz 2000, 
Akdogan 2000, Özcan 2002), many others (columnists in favour of secularism in 
particular) argued that the WP was a disintegrative force and incited hatred among its 
supporters toward the regime. 
Overall, it can be argued that the WP, similar to the general character of Islamist 
movements in the region, refused to internalise1'7 and promote democracy in Turkey, 
especially when it had some opportunity as the bigger partner of the government 
(Gülalp 2002 114-115). Instead, there was an over emphasis and waste of energy on 
some Islamic principles (e. g. the headscarf). Their approach to issues related to women 
and minorities was similar to other Islamist groups in the Middle East and was not 
compatible with liberal democracy to a great extent. However, as an encouraging sign, 
contrary to many other Islamist thinkers and movements the term `democracy' was not 
de-legitimised in the WP discourse. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
Turkey is one of the first Muslim countries, which have been among the most 
exposed to influences of Western modernity. The rise of Europe and Russia forced the 
Ottoman elite to undertake a series of modernising reforms. European ideas also 
penetrated the elite mind. Later, the Kemalist cadres were among the first newly 
117 Yildirim argues that since democracy was presented in a Kemalist form, Islamists thought that it was 
incompatible with Islam (1999b: 116). 
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emerging nationalist and secularist elite that were seen in many Muslim countries. 
These new elites engaged in modernisation of the state and used the state power in their 
modernising drive. 
The modernisation project in Turkey has been marked, inter alia, by 
centralisation of the state, imposition of secularism and secular Turkish nationalism 
which together have greatly influenced the level of democracy. In other words, the 
official content of Turkish modernisation has been mainly defined by powerful state 
organs that have been governed by the secular elite, which included politicians, high- 
ranking military-civilian bureaucrats, and the intelligentsia and the relatively 
westernised upper classes in general which together constitute `the centre'. Turkey's 
transition to a relatively democratic system after the World War II enabled the excluded 
`periphery' to penetrate the centre (mainly through centre-right parties) and influence 
decision making mechanisms. Turkey's relatively democratic system in fact has been 
one of its most important distinguishing feature among Muslim countries in its region 
and indeed in the world. This fact, understandably very much downplayed by Islamists, 
is also central to understand relatively moderate nature of the `struggle' between 
Islamists an secularists since the 1970s. 
Under the light of the fact that it took at least 20 years, after transition to 
`democracy' for the first Islamist parties to emerge and the ebb and tide in the political 
support they could muster over the decades, it should be concluded that the mere 
`existence' of Islam cannot explain much in the rise of Islamism in Turkey. Dedication 
and activism of Islamist groups, making most of the `opportunity spaces' (Yavuz 2004) 
that became available in the `democratic' atmosphere, in various spheres of life such as 
politics, economy, education and mass communication has been very important in the 
rise of Islamic sentiment from which the WP benefited greatly. In other words, a 
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comprehensive Islamist message (including that of the \\'P) in order to be effective 
needs not only a conducive socio-economic atmosphere but also effective presentation 
and delivery (e. g. through mass communication and face-to-face at the community 
level). 
It can be concluded that, the Turkish case supports the view that the 
modernisation of state is politicising for Islamists too. In the case of the WP, this was 
due mainly to the use of state power in imposition of an `un-Islamic' official ideology. 
In other words, the WP's (and other Islamists') objection was not directly against the 
centralisation and strengthening of state mechanism per se but rather against its `abuse'. 
For the Islamist elite who controlled the WP, the party was first and foremost a perfect 
vehicle to gain the control of the state. 
The WP greatly benefited from the rise of a cross-class Islamic sentiment, partly 
provoked by a shared `sense of exclusion', among certain sizeable segments of society. 
WP members contributed to this rise, and tried to shape it. Around 1995, when at the 
height of its power, it could be seen that, approximately (only) half of those who could 
be classified as Islamists voted for the MVP, effectively only Islamist party in the 
country. This meant around half of the electoral support of the party. In other words, the 
WP's case supports the view that Islamism in Turkey is multi-centred (e. g. the party, 
religious communities, unorganised individuals) and multidimensional (e. g. political, 
cultural, economic). The fact that great numbers of Islamists have supported other 
parties and the WP attracted votes from the non-Islamist sections of society shows that 
Islamism in Turkey is well integrated into especially conservative, centre-right sections 
and has no clear-cut political boundaries. 
Very similar to other Islamist views in the region, Islamist members of the WP 
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saw secularisation as an unnecessary ingredient for modernisation. They also 
discredited secularism (laicite) as an alien ideology and diametrically opposed to Islam 
understood as rejecting any division between religion and politics. The party contributed 
strongly to the Islamist efforts to de-legitimise the regime in Turkey because of its 
`strict' understanding and imposition of laicite on the population. The WP's proposed 
solution to `correct' the relationship between tradition (mainly defined in Islamic terms) 
and modernity was a re-definition of secularism. 
It should be once again stressed that Islam (or Muslim societies) constitute no 
exception to the secularising impact of modernity. As we have seen, in the republican 
era the majority of the society came to be in a broad agreement with the secular elite. In 
other words, they gave their implicit/explicit support to the secular politicians and the 
TAF-led bureaucracy, rather than supporting Islamist politicians and groups. In fact, 
according to Islamists there has been excessive secularisation in Turkey, enforced by 
the alienated elite. Nevertheless, the fact that Islamist groups enjoyed popular support of 
a sizeable proportion of the population and became an important factor in Turkish 
politics supports the view that secularisation cannot be considered as an irreversible 
process. 
It can be concluded that when the liberal democracy was taken as the touchstone 
the WP elite had rather a reductionist understanding of democracy. They heavily 
criticised the application of democracy in Turkey for its shortcomings, primarily in 
terms of religious freedoms. Although they demanded the benefits of democracy, they 
themselves essentially believed in an "unchanged Islam" as a holistic system which by 
definition did not allow changes in the essential rules that society lives by. However, 
perhaps mainly due to its being a legal (legitimate in their view) part of the political 
system, the \VP belonged to a small Islamist section in the world that did not dc- 
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legitimise electoral politics and democracy as a term. 
In Chapter 4, the following topics will be analysed: The religious nationalism of 
the WP and how it differed from the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey; the \VP 
elite's conceptualisation of science, scientific and technological progress as important 
parts of modernity, the WP elite's desire for rapid industrialisation for strong economic 
growth by employing scientific and technological progress. Their views on Turkish 
economy and their favourable stance towards capitalism; the WP elite's views on 
modernity and the West; and their conceptualisation of modernity as divisible and 
separate or separable from the West will also be analysed. Thus, a more comprehensive 
view as far as their stance with modernity, the West and the Turkish modernisation 
project is concerned will be reached. 
226 
CHAPTER 4 
THE WELFARE PARTY AND TURKISH 
NATIONALISM, TURKISH ECONOMY, CAPITALISM; 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIALISATION; 
MODERNITY AND THE NEST 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, I have analysed the rise of the Welfare Party (WP) and its elite's 
views and attitudes towards the modernisation of the state, secularisation and 
democracy. Thanks primarily to the dedicated work of the core group of its supporters, 
the WP managed to become the most important Islamist group in the country and tried 
to give its colour to the rising Islamism. In recent decades, an important part of Turkish 
society came to see certain versions of Islamism as a solution to their problems. The WP 
strongly contributed to articulation of a broad Islamist discourse that was very critical of 
the path that Turkish modernisation took under the rule of the secular elite. 
I have argued that the WP elite had a distinct understanding of the modern 
concepts brought about by the Turkish modernisation project. For example, 
secularisation did not have to be a part of modernity. The major Kemalist principle of 
laicite (secularism) was challenged and re-negotiated by the WP elite both on the 
grounds of its wrongful application (as the strict state control over Islam) and as being 
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an "alien" concept to Islam. 
The WP elite argued that the current understanding of the principle of laicite, the 
attitude of the secular media and the place of the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) were all 
responsible for inadequate democracy in Turkey. For the WP elite, democracy was part 
of being modem but they rather understood democracy in a reductionist way (e. g. the 
rule of the majority and religious freedoms). 
In this chapter, analyses of the views of the WP elite, vis-ä-vis another set of the 
important aspects of modernity and of Turkish modernisation will be done. Thus, by 
keeping the previous analyses in mind too, a more comprehensive evaluation of their 
understanding of modernity will be reached. 
The main issues in this chapter will be: 
" The religious nationalism of the WP and how it differed from the dominant secular 
nationalism in Turkey. The WP elite's view of nationalism. 
" The WP elite's conceptualisation of science, scientific and technological progress as 
important parts of modernity. 
" The WP elite's desire for rapid industrialisation for strong economic growth of 
Turkey by ensuring and employing scientific and technological progress. 
" The WP elite's views on the way the Turkish economy was run and their favourable 
stance towards capitalism as an economic mode compared to command economy. 
" The WP elite's views on modernity and the West; and their conceptualisation of 
modernity as divisible and separate or separable from the West. 
4.2 THE WELFARE PARTY AND TURKISH NATIONALISM 
Similar to the views of other Islamist movements in the region as discussed in 
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Chapter 2, the \VP discourse portrayed (secular) nationalism as an alien and divisive 
ideology for the Muslims. ' The main argument of the NVP as far as nationalism in 
Turkey was concerned can be summarised in following terms: The most important and 
worthy base of people's identity in Turkey has been Islam'. The secular nationalist elite 
has promoted other sources of identity (e. g. Turkishness) as a counter force against 
Islam; this trend had to be stopped. Thus, the \VP's conception of the nation with its 
emphasis on Islam differed from the secular nationalism.. which has been dominant in 
the republican era, as the mainstream parties on the left and right subscribed to it. As Ali 
Bulac and some other Islamist writers observe, since the 1970s, the Islamists in Turkey 
tried successfully to "free" their understanding of the nation from the relatively secular 
nationalism of the rightist parties (which have been enjoying support of the Islamic 
sections) (see, for example, Özcan 1997: 104). According to Islamist history-writing, in 
these years, the youth movement of the National Salvation Party was also attacked by 
the Idealist (Ülkiicii) movement of Türke which waged its main struggle with 
revolutionary leftist groups. The Ülkiiciis represented a version of Turk-Islam synthesis, 
emphasising both Turkishness and Muslimness. It is interesting to note that many leftist 
and rightist observers thought that although Ülkiiciis were jailed, like the leftists and 
many Islamists, after the coup of 12 September 1980, their ideology was not very far 
from that of the Generals. 4 
Most, if not all, Islamists objected strongly to the special emphasis on 
Turkishness, by declaring that they were first and foremost Muslims. Islamist 
1 Although, as we will see, the party did also put emphasis on Turkishness as the main ethnic constitutive 
force in Turkey. 
2 One particular and useful categorisation of different competing understandings of the nation (and 
nationalism) in Turkey is, as Bora (1998) employs, is to look at the "the place" of Islam in each one of 
them. 
' For sub-divisions within the secular Turkish nationalism see (Bora 2003). 4 In the famous remark of Ülkücü ideologue A. O. Güner "our ideas are in power, we are in jails" (Bora 
and Can 1991: 88), this book is an excellent study on the Ülkücüs", from a leftist point of view). 
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intellectual. Bulac argues that since the beginning of the centuryy, "the rightist parties 
saw Islam as just one of the elements that make the nation a nation... whereas we 
[Islamists] think that the religion is eveiything, in short, it is [the whole ot] life" (my 
emphasis, 1995b: 62). For about 30 years, it has been very common among Islamists in 
Turkey to present the category of `nation' as a God-given; since a person cannot choose 
his/her ethnic origin, it has been argued, it is meaningless to be proud of being a Turk. 
This denial of `constructedness' of the nation has been serving to argue that, in contrast, 
one chooses to become a Muslim; and, the choice of leading an Islamic life is important, 
because God commands it. 5 
It could be seen that WP members also advocated a union among the Muslim 
countries. Following the National Outlook tradition, the WP too argued that if Turkey 
became a country governed by Islamists, like the \VP leadership, it could play a vital 
role in creating an uninah which is vibrant and capable of discharging its duties 
conferred by Islam. It was assumed that, Islam constituted an adequate natural basis of 
co-operation among the Muslim countries. The Islamist initiative in Turkey was seen 
very important. Once Turkey started to implement a foreign policy with a 'character 6 
and with the help of other few influential Muslim countries (which would come under 
Islamist governance, it was assumed, all other Muslim countries would become much 
more Islamic. They would hence become part of a functional ummah (see, for example, 
Dagi 1998). The desire to end the humiliating geo-political situation of Muslims, as 
often seen in Islamist movements, was also obvious in the WP discourse. However, the 
proposed timetable by the party for realising it was very flexible. The foreign policy 
s Rational and utilitarian explanations of the benefits of Islamic precepts for the individual and the 
community have been used in the Islamist discourses but, in the final analysis `authenticity' demands that 
their legitimisation must depend on the revelation. 
`The WP discourse advocated $a/ºsiyetli dcy politika [a foreign policy with a character], which meant an 
Islamist foreign policy. The WP shares the view that that so far foreign policy of Turkey has been 
colourless, mainly imitating Western, particularly American policies. 7 Thus, the WP downplayed the diversity among the Islamist movements in the world. 
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objectives of the WP. which depended on national/ununahist interests defined according 
to being Turk and Muslim. were disliked by secular circles in Turkey (Bora 1996: 22), 
not only on the ideological grounds but also because they were deemed adventurist and 
potentially dangerous. Ideologically [Islamically] defined foreign policy objectives 
could be too ambitious and costly, as they would certainly court confrontation with 
powerful non-Muslim countries. 
If. the dominant secular nationalism in Turkey was using state power to 
homogenise society (as part of incomplete nation-building process) by enforcing certain 
criteria (e. g. speaking Turkish, subscribing to secular state ideology or at least not 
actively opposing to it), the WP envisioned a different kind of homogenisation, turning 
citi: ens into pious, honest, hardworking, devoted Sunni Muslim `servants' of God (cf. 
Bora 1996). During much of the \VP's life, the secular Kemalist Turkish nationalism 
(represented primarily by the TAF and shared by most seculars) and Turk-Islam 
synthesis (represented predominantly by the NAP of Türke$), had been challenged by a 
rising Kurdish nationalism. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) which claimed to be 
struggling for a Kurdish state emerged as the armed ("terrorist") wing of a section 
sharing this sentiment. The `low-intensity war' between state forces and the PKK 
caused the rise of nationalistic sentiment on both Turkish and Kurdish sides. Turkish 
Islamists in general and the \VP in particular could only give a weak reaction to the 
problem; i. e., the party did not seem passionate about the problem. It did not occupy any 
significant place in the party discourse despite the fact that the struggle against the PKK 
had been a very traumatic episode for the whole population of Turkey (Sakallioglu 
1998b)8. Especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s, thousands of soldiers (mainly 
conscripts at the age of 20 and officers), as well as police officers, and teachers, were 
ý As the %VP marched toward becoming an important political player, it did not want to disturb the voter 
groups with Turkish nationalist sentiments and the state elite (see, Bulac, Yeiri $afak 14.9.1995). 
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"martyred"`' by the PKK. which had strong foreign support. 1° In this atmosphere. an % 
talk of a political solution to the South-East/ Kurdish problem was considered nothing 
short of giving in to terrorism. 
The WP tried to place emphasis on the universality of Islam. Considerable 
amounts of Kurds among the rank and file and party leadership contributed to this 
emphasis, and in reaching out to the Kurds this emphasis was very effective. The Kurds 
who generally live in more traditional parts of Turkey are more religious than the Turks 
and at least 25 to 30 % of them supported the WP in the elections in mid- 1990s 
(significantly higher than party's national average) (see, TÜSES 1999). The party was 
careful in giving the message that in a more Islamic Turkey the Kurdish question would 
be solved `easily' (i. e. between brothers and sisters in Islam) (see for example, Tiirkive, 
17.8.1996). According to the WP discourse, too much emphasis on Turkishness (by 
the secular Kemalist nationalism) was the root cause of the problems with "our Kurdish 
brothers" (see, Duran 1998). For example, Erbakan argued that if the state wrote to 
"everywhere, " (including Kurdish majority areas), Atatürk's words, "How happy 
he/she is, who says I am a Turk" or children in schools are required to chant, "I am, a 
Between 1987 and 1997 the PKK terrorists -as always emotionally stated in Turkey- "martyred" 4.209 
security forces members and 4.245 civilians including women and children; 18.019 PKK terrorists were 
killed in the fights against the security forces (TDN 15.7 1997). Most of the PKK members who were 
killed were also young citizens of Turkey many of whom joined the organisation not necessarily out of 
personal conviction. Martyrdom as an Islamic term mainly referred to those who were killed while 
fighting the non-Muslims, one could see the transformation of the term applying to the soldiers died 
whether in actual combat or not and other civil servants and civilians killed by the terrorists. "" It could be seen that support for the PKK from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece, and Greek Cypriots was 
obvious according to Turkish press. There was also widespread belief among the Islamists and seculars 
that the PKK was receiving direct or indirect support from many powerful western states such as the U. S., 
Germany, France, and the UK, which allocated the PKK a role in their policies in the Middle East. 11 PKK terror was widespread, during late 1980s and first half of the 1990s in the South-East part of 
Turkey where Kurds live in great numbers. Even the naming of the problem was a very sensitive issue. 
The official name "South-East problem" meant that the terror was due to the regional economical and 
social underdevelopment. The majority of the population in Turkey (5 to 1) perceived the source of the 
problem as terror as opposed to being a `Kurdish problem' (see, TÜSES 1995: 65). The "Kurdish 
problem" meant the existence of a political problem of separatist Kurdish nationalism. According to the 
WP documents, the problem increasingly turned to a separatist movement with considerable support of 
the Kurds, because of heightened nationalistic feelings caused by the bloodshed and heavy-handed 
security operations in the region (see, cakir 1994). 
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Turk. honest. hardworking... " 12 then a Kurd has the right to say that "I am a Kurd, more 
honest and more hardworking. " 13 Such state policies caused a split in the unity of 
Turkey. Kurds as Muslims would be first class citizens in a \VP governed Turkey. The 
solution was not the creation of a Kurdish state which went against the general Islamist 
desire of uniting the whole ummah (Sakallioglu 1998b). 
The WP contained some Kurdish Islamist intellectuals who influenced and 
shared views of the party. For example, according to one of these intellectuals Metiner: 
Turkey has suffered from the problems of being a nation-state. The nation-state is 
contrary to this society, it is a bad made-up mechanism. Because there is not one 
nation in this country, there are many different ethnic groups living together, with 
one thing uniting them, Islam. If the society is not homogeneous, a new model 
compatible with its heterogeneous structure is needed. A democratic state'4 where 
the rule of law reigns is the solution, not a federation. 
In the same interview, Metiner argued that the WP had a positive attitude toward 
the solution of the Kurdish problem but feared that "some circles" would not welcome 
its proposed solution. "This situation made the party look like a state party, but it still 
cannot be put on the same scale with other state parties15" (TDN, 28.12.1996, see also, 
Duran 1998 and Akinci 1999: 90-91). 
Indeed, complying with the dominant view within the state, which saw the 
problem primarily as a security issue, strongly related to economic backwardness, the 
WP did not propose any significantly different policies from other major parties, 
including the period when it was part of the ruling coalition. One can analyse their 
12 The beginning of'Anchnuz' ('Our Oath') said collectively by primary school students at the beginning 
of every school day. 
13 Erbakan said this in 1994 and pro-laicite TV channels showed it repeatedly to attack the WP. 14 Such a democratic state would undoubtedly be a modern, nation-state as well, as defined in Chapter 1. 
What Metiner tries to criticise is the strict, `arrogant' understanding that the Turks constitute the dominant 
nation ("real owners") in Turkey. 
The term `state party' meant both that most of the political parties in Turkey did not challenge the 
written or unwritten rules set by the powerful elite (e. g. military officers); and the state itself could 
sometimes act as the most powerful `party' in the country if need be. 
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views on Kurdish question by examining the news of their plans or thoughts on the 
issue, which were not put into the public agenda seriously. According to the Islamist 
daily Zaman, Prime Minister Erbakan was contemplating some "courageous" moves on 
the issue by separating Kurdish identity from PKK terror. \V'hile the fight against 
terrorism was to continue "relentlessly", Erbakan wanted to start a campaign to promote 
the human rights in the region, by passing the necessary legislation in the parliament 
and allowing TV broadcasting and some other forms of publications in Kurdish. 
Overall, Erbakan preferred to give the image that he believed that the root cause of the 
South-East problem was primarily economic backwardness and hence, the state and the 
private sector needed to invest more in the region (24. S. 1996; Cf Duran 199S). 
For the WP, the nation (Muslim-Turks and other Muslims, like the Kurds in 
Turkey) was innately great. The `glorious position' in history could be re-attained if the 
nation was encouraged/allowed to rediscover and hold fast to spiritual-cum-Islamic 
values which still existed deep down within the nation (Erbakan 1997, passim). 
It should be noted that the religious-nationalism of the \VP with its open 
association with the Sunni Islam in Turkey was anathema to the Alevi minority. It is 
argued that the Alevis, with their distinct non-Sunni Islam, 16 had been subject to 
discrimination and "systematic attacks" of the Sunni majority, since the Ottoman times. 
In the republican period, since they wanted to see the "common living spaces" freed 
from the domination of Sunnism, they have been especially supportive of the RPP and 
other leftist parties which have been staunchly secular (Bayramoglu, 2001 [1995]: 263- 
4). The Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, who probably make up around 15 % of the 
16 Öndcr (1998) writes that - and this is the often-voiced Sunni image of the Alevis- the Alevis do not 
practice Islam as the Sunni majority does. (For an implied criticism of Alevi non-practice of Islamic 
obligations from a Sunni, Nurcu point of view see (Kirkinci 1990). Whereas, for the WP and other 
influential Sunni groups, the Sunni practice is an integral part of being Muslim. 
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population17, agave a very small, positive response to the \V'P's attempts to woo their 
support. Their traditional networks, ensuring overwhelming support for the pro-secular 
leftist parties largely remained intact (see, TÜSES 1999). 
It can be seen that there were serious conflicts between the religious-nationalism 
of the WP and the dominant, official, secular, nationalism in Turkey. However, there 
were very important common grounds as well, like a capacity to "produce" foreign 
enemies. Deep suspicion of the West was and is, by no means peculiar to Islamists in 
Turkey (Bora 2002). Many leftists (especially `extreme' left) have been more outspoken 
about western countries, especially about the U. S. More significantly, many high 
ranking retired officers contributed to this suspicion. For example, retired generals 
Beyazit and Gürq openly criticised some western countries including the U. S. for 
giving open or covert support to the PKK in widely watched TV programs. President 
Demirel voiced the deep concern, shared by the secular and Islamist elites alike, by 
openly charging the Western countries of trying to compensate for their failure in 
carving out two more states from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, a Kurdistan and a 
[greater] Armenia. 18 However, it is important to note that, unlike many Islamists and 
`extreme' leftists, the dominant theme about the West among the secular elite has been 
the belief that despite the problems Turkey should be co-operating with the West, and 
continue its historical march toward becoming a westernised/modernised country. By 
contrast, many Islamists, including the leading figures in the WP wanted to re-evaluate 
this policy and replace it with an ever-increasing co-operation and unification of the 
Muslim'ummah' (see, for example, Dagl 1998). 
"Since it is a sensitive issue, there is no publicised official gathering of information on Islamic sectarian 
affiliations in Turkey. Depending on one's stance, realistic estimates about Alevis can be said between 10 
and 20%; Sayari estimates 10-15% (in Rand Corporation 1990: 24), whereas, Onder (1998) puts it as 15 
million, around 25%. 
" This suspicion of the West was named as the `Sevres Syndrome' after the thwarted agreement that 
would have created, inter alia, an Armenia and Kurdistan in Anatolia in the aftermath of the WWI (see, 
TDN 18.4.1997). 
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There have been important repercussions arising from the `unmlahist' (ü, nn et(r) 
image of the WP. First of all, the party was perceived by secular nationalist circles as 
not sensitive enough about national [Turkish] issues (cf. Bora 1996). More importantly, 
the WP discourse on the `easiness' of forming a mechanism of co-operation with other 
Muslim countries went against certain realities. For example, Syria and Iran as Muslim 
countries did not refrain from supporting the PKK. Syria and Iraq campaigned against 
Turkey, in the Arab world, for not letting enough water from the Tigris and Euphrates 
down to them (Öniý 1995: 61). In fact, Turkey's economic and political relationships 
have been much more friendly and intense with Western countries than with its Muslim 
neighbours. 
However, it should be noted that, even if the WP was in favour of unification of 
the ummah, it was not unconditionally internationalist (as far as Muslims were 
concerned). Its this desire definitely revolved around Turkey (Bora 1996: 23). The WP 
shared a kind of neo-Ottoman vision that emerged with Özal and was entertained by 
some elites of the right (Erbakan 1997; Yavuz 1998). According to WP discourse, while 
Islam was supposed to unite, Turkey was to lead the Muslim countries and emerge as 
the guardian of Muslims like the Ottomans did. In fact, for the WP members and many 
other Islamists, the importance of Turkey for a worldwide revival of Islam was self- 
evident. It was assumed that many other Muslim countries, if they are governed by 
Islamists, would be prepared to follow an Islamised Turkey. Erbakan was even arguing 
that, among the candidates, which have the potential to lead the unification of the 
Muslim world, Egypt had lost its claim for this position by signing the Camp David 
Agreement in 1978. Indonesia was too far away from the centre of the Muslim countries 
and lacked the historical wealth of experience; Pakistan had economic difficulties and 
was too much involved in the war in Afghanistan. "Turkey with its economic strength, 
geographical location, historical experience is the only country which can lead co- 
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operation among the Muslim countries. Since the Europeans know this very well, they 
want to accept Turkey into the EC and thus control not only Turkey but also all other 
Muslim countries" (Ceylan 1996: 29 [1990]). 
Like other Islamists in Turkey, the WP members too believed that they were 
following the Ottoman tradition of struggle for Ilay-i Kelinretullah (Promotion of the 
Word of God), in the path of ensuring a world order where the 'Truth' will be superior 
to brute forcet9. To respect the Hak (truth or absolutely right) was the way of the 
prophets and way of the National Outlook. The \VP circles very much referred to the 
history of Islam and especially to the Golden Ages (age of the prophet and the Ottoman 
Empire, which were perceived and presented as well documented periods). There are 
strong parallels with other Islamists groups as far as using an interpretation of the 
Islamic history. Certain level of arrogance and belief in the `organisational capability' 
of `the nation', as also seen in other forms of nationalism in Turkey, was unmistakable 
in the WP discourse. For example, according to Prof. cetin, Konya MP of the WP, "Our 
State has a great historical past. Our Nation is among the Great Nations who 
institutionalised and organised states. " Therefore, the necessary models for re- 
organisation of the Turkish Republic were to be found within this great history; there 
was no need to look outside (Milli Gazete, 11.7.1997). A Milli Gazete columnist 
argued that "culture is made up of religion, language, history, law, morality, customs 
and traditions; if a gathering of people has these elements then they have qualifications 
to be [called] a nation" (Kara, 12.7.1997). 
The nostalgia for the Ottoman past was not peculiar to the WP circles among the 
19 All systems (orders) schematically divided into two basic categories in the Just Order discourse. One 
type, advocated by the WP, "holds the Truth up", i. e. accepts the superiority of what is [Islamically 
defined] "right" and the other type "holds the power up", i. e. the powerful gets what they see fit (see, the 
interview with Karagulle in cakir (1994). 
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Islamists; many other Islamist groups (e. g. Gülen's group) would love to see Turkey 
have a strong influence over other Muslim countries, for example, over the Central 
Asian Turkic Republics. The Ottoman example, according to the WP members. showed 
that the Turkishness should not be emphasised when dealing with other Muslim nations 
as it provokes others to emphasise their own ethnic background (Bora 1996: 23). 
Kahraman, a WP MP and Minister of Culture of the WP-TPP coalition showed a 
typical WP understanding by arguing that culture was to be understood as `national' 
culture. "There is no such thing as world culture, we need to protect and develop our 
national culture. " He saw some art forms as truly Islamic or traditionally Turkish (Milli 
Gazete, 24.8.1996). Other art forms like ballet or opera were seen as un-Islamic or 
alien. 
Despite the differences, the Welfare Party had important common points with 
dominant (secular) Turkish nationalism. Most importantly perhaps, a strong, at least 
regionally dominant, Turkey was also a WP desire. Turkey, according to WP discourse 
had the potential to realise this goal. This message was voiced frequently by Erbakan in 
a populist manner: "Our 65 million children of this country are the most diligent people 
of the world. It is a young population. Our beautiful homeland is the most beautiful 
place on earth. [... ] ornamented with God's blessings" (1997: 7). These "blessings" 
included, the geographical location -which was "exactly at the centre of the world"-; 
forests, mines, suitable lands for agriculture and husbandry, unmatched places for 
tourism, a diligent people who were able to realise an industrialisation drive by different 
"projects" (Ibid. ). 
Despite the "blessings", the WP emphasised that, Turkey has not been very 
successful in "the race of civilisation": 
23S 
The real reason of foundation of the WP is to end [... ] the backward position of 
Turkey in the contemporary race of civilisation. It is saddening for all of our people 
who love their homeland and nation that while world nations quickly progress in the 
technology and civilisation race, we are still very far behind of them in economic 
social and political terms (Welfare Party 1997a: 90). 
According to the WP discourse, there was foreign interference to prevent 
Turkey's social and economic development. Turkey had a `homogeneous' society 
consisted of individuals who wanted to live together: "Terror [the PKK] is a most 
important problem of our country. We know that this is provoked from outside, 
otherwise none of the children of this country would want to harm himself/herself or 
his/her homeland" (Erbakan 1997: 8 [4.7.1996]). 
The WP shared the view that there were some serious enemies of Turkey who 
continuously "plotted" against her. For example, the Russian Federation was arming the 
Greek Cypriots with sophisticated weapons. Therefore, it was argued, governments 
must not wage war against their own citizens [e. g. Islamists] within Turkey and cause 
disunity but had to concentrate on foreign enemies (Milli Gazete, 11.10.1997): 
Imperialist countries and the Zionist circles were using the CIA, Mossad, and KGB 
agents to provoke wars and international conflicts to find markets for their products. 
These are the enemies of a Turkey [... ] which is a candidate to be the centre of a new 
civilisation. That is why they are encircling Turkey and arming our enemies Greece, 
the South Cyprus and Armenia and supporting the PKK (Milli Gazete, 9.2.1998). 
4.2.1 The Welfare Party's Vision of a New World Order 
Very similar to other Islamist discourses in the region, the WP's discourse 
included a criticism of current politico-economic structures in the world. Incessantly 
arguing that the current world system was harming Turkey and other Muslim countries 
(as well as other weak non-Muslim ones), the WP circles often implied that a unity of 
Muslims would put an end to this. According to the WP elite, Muslims had to have the 
consciousness that they were part of the ummah. Globalisation was interpreted as a 
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process enabling increasing antra-ummah co-operation while its potential effect of 
causing more conflicts between Muslim countries, and societies was downplayed (see, 
Ceylan 1996). 
The WP wanted to recover the glorious position of the Muslims, and Turkish- 
Muslims (e. g. the Ottomans) in history. This could only be achieved by an 
ummah/nation, which must `straighten' itself up by attaining its lost virtues. For 
example, a WP MP Arslan stated: 
Yes what a nation we were [... ] which said to the Caliph Umar that `first explain the 
shirt you are wearing before giving your sermon'. 20 A nation who warned the World 
Sultans by chanting `Do not be too proud our sultan, God is greater than thou', a 
nation who did not fear from the rulers but feared only from God. And now, [there 
is] an unconscious ignorant nation [... ]. A nation which does not listen to the order 
[in a hadith] `he who remains silent against in justice is a mute Satan', but follows 
the motto `may the snake which does not bite me live a thousand years' 21 (my 
emphasis, Milli Gazete, 28.9.1997). 
According to the WP circles, a new international order was needed. Erbakan 
said, "We feel that the world has to be reshaped" (TDN, 31.12.1996). The current one, 
dominated by the West, was repressing the Muslims. A Alilli Gazete columnist 
summarised some of the roots of the Islamist rage because of this: 
Muslims are wronged everywhere, in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir [... ] 
Everywhere, there is blood of the innocent, violation of honours, occupation, 
poverty, humiliation, threat and cries. Everywhere, Muslims are in danger of 
extermination [... ] and today, big powers see Islam as an obstacle; one of their tools 
to annihilate this obstacle is the media. They use the media to portray the image of 
Muslims who are not worthy of mercy; who are frightening, who are to be hated, to 
be annihilated with pleasure. All over the world, books, newspapers, journals, TVs 
and radios are working hard to give a wrong image of Islam. And Islam, which 
brings brotherhood/sisterhood to hearts, which preaches virtues to human beings, is 
caricaturised by a few extremely ugly slogans like marrying with four wives or 
N As symbolising the Islamist quest for honest administrators, according to this oft-cited example, when 
the Caliph Umar, as head of the state, was about to start his sermon; one of the listeners demanded an 
explanation first, about how the caliph could get the shirt he was wearing completed. Because the amount 
of the piece of fabric given to others was not enough for one. It was revealed that the caliph's son had 
given his share to his father as well, so that one shirt could be done. 
2' A Turkish proverb, obviously disapproved of by the Islamists when used in the context of inviting the 
religiously inclined to be politically more active. 
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cutting hands off (21. S. 1997). 
Obviously, the \VP circles shared the general Islamist view that Turkey was in 
desperate need of change towards returning to its 'true' identity. if it was. as Islamists 
wanted, going to be a worthy leader of the Muslims. Its current state was sending mixed 
signals: "Is it a country which controls others or being controlled; are we an Islamic 
country, or is Turkey considered by some Muslim societies as an apostate country? Are 
we a model for Turkic republics or a helper in their transfer from one yoke to another? " 
(Özel, ARM Ga_ete, 29.9.1997). 
The WP argued that first the problems of Turkey and then those of the Muslim 
ummah would be solved according to Welfare Party "prescriptions". In realisation of 
closer co-operation with other Muslim countries, Turkey would be a pioneer and would 
greatly benefit from this co-operation. "Turkey is never a second class country. 
Naturally, Turkey, like happened throughout history, will be the vanguard of a new 
world" (Erbakan (1997: 11). Erbakan complained about current level of co-operation 
and lack of favourable treatment among the Muslim countries. For example, Pakistan 
was applying no customs duty for engines bought from Italy whereas it was collecting 
80% duty for the ones from Turkey. These "small" problems needed be solved quickly: 
"We, the Muslim countries, must buy everything, if possible, from Muslim countries" 
(Erbakan 1997: 41). The WP elite argued that greater intra-ummah co-operation would 
help rapid economic growth and increase the bargaining power of Muslim countries vis- 
ä-vis more advanced, mainly Western countries. Erbakan was aiming to increase 
Turkey's share of only USD 3.2 billion in the total import of 447 billion by the Muslim 
countries which took 65% of this from Western countries whereas trade between 
Muslim countries accounted for only 5.4% of this amount. It was stated that to be able 
to build a common market of Muslim countries this ratio must be raised to 40%. 
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Furthermore though Muslim countries have the 80% of world oil reserves. 60% of tin, 
80% of jute... since they have not developed their industries they remain dependent on 
the developed countries (my emphasis, Tiirkiye 4.8.1996). 
During the WP-TPP coalition, the WP's insistence on greater co-operation with 
some other Muslim countries caused a split in Turkish foreign policy. While tiller, the 
President and the military were carrying out the relations with Western countries and 
Israel, " WP officials concentrated their efforts on Muslim countries. After becoming 
the PM, Erbakan made a few high profile, and sometimes controversial, visits to some 
Muslim countries such as Iran, Libya, 23 Malaysia and Indonesia in order to enhance 
economic and political relationships. During his trips, he praised the rapid 
industrialisation of Malaysia and some regions of Indonesia and showed them to be 
examples for Turkey. Erbakan suggested that some political leaders who were "very 
close friends" of his were willing to give their know-how to Turkey (Erbakan 1997: 46). 
Erbakan also initiated the `D-8' which aimed to bring Turkey, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Nigeria together. The D-8 would be 
the foundation of a "just world order", 50 years after Yalta according to Erbakan. He 
criticised the fact that in the UN, 5 countries have the right of veto in the Security 
Council; this meant, "treating other countries like pariahs". Before the first D-8 meeting 
in Istanbul Erbakan was stated "Turkey will pioneer the creation of a just world order. 
Some western countries unnecessarily and artificially creating tension with Islam [... ] 
this group is not against any country or group" (TDN, 13.11.1996). 
22 Israel was (is) an important country in the modernisation efforts of the Turkish Army and when in 
government the WP did not object to the continuation of this relationship. 23 The Visit to Libya turned into "a scandal" according to secular Turkish circles when Qaddafi openly 
supported a Kurdish state. 
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It is interesting to note that Erbakan's vision of a new Islamic world order 
followed the example of the institutions initiated by the West. As early as 1980 Erbakan 
was saying that Turkey should unite with the Muslim world instead of the West. For the 
unity of Muslims, following institutions had to be realised: 
1- A United Nations of Muslims. 
2- A Common Market of Muslims. 
3- "Dinar" as the common Muslim currency. 
4- A common armed forces to defend the Muslim World. 
5- Cultural institutions which would provide unity of ideas according to Islamic 
principles (Milli Gazete, 27.08 1980). 
In 1995, the WP officials were saying that these projects needed around 30 years 
to be realised fully, thus, leaving a moving space for the WP to be pragmatic in daily 
politics. According to Erbakan, since there were no great animosities between Muslim 
countries like the ones which had existed among European states, unification of the 
Muslim world would be much easier compared to the European integration (Milli 
Ga=ete, 21.9.1995). Although, according to Islamic political theory, Muslims are. 
supposed to form one economic and political entity; the WP was not clear about 
whether very high levels of co-operation should eventually lead to a World State of 
Muslims. Perhaps this was only natural as such a political project would take too much 
time and to speculate upon it then was not necessary. What was more, a proposal like 
this could be interpreted to be against the laws jealously guarding the independence and 
territorial integrity of Turkey. 
As in line with the political theory of Islam, according to the WP elite, the 
Islamic world had to solve its problems quickly and from within, without `inviting' the 
intervention of the non-Muslims. It could use similar organisational patterns to that of 
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the UN, the NATO, or the EU2' but what was important was to base them totally on 
Islamic ideals (see, for example, Erbakan 1991 c). 
A `sense of urgency', widespread among the late developing countries was also 
obvious in the WP discourse. According to Erbakan, Muslim countries had to co- 
operate to catch up with the rich ones. "At a COMCEC25 meeting we said that the per 
capita income of 1.5 billion Muslims is $660 and for 350 million people in the EU it is 
S20,000; they are 30 times richer" (Erbakan 1997: 162). Erbakan argued that co- 
operation among the Muslim countries would be successful and the Muslim world 
needed to be more confident for a number of reasons. For example, control of the 20 
kinds of strategic raw materials like cotton, 26 rubber, chrome, belonged to Muslim 
countries. Until now these have been cheaply bought and finished products were sold to 
them dearly; this unequal exchange between industrialised countries and Muslim ones 
would be ended by adding more value to these raw materials (Erbakan 1997: 165). It 
can be seen that, the capitalist framework of the world economy was accepted and 
solutions were proposed within the capitalist system without mentioning its name. This 
is in line with the rising acceptance of "global economic principles" and central 
institutions of capitalism" by Muslims (McDaniel 2003: 519-20). 
4.3 THE WELFARE PARTY, TURKISH ECONOMY AND CAPITALISM 
As was seen in Chapter 1, economic growth with a capitalist mode of economy 
has been an important part of the development of Western modernity. It will be seen 
below that for the WP elite too, one of the most important things that was associated 
24 Some more radical Islamists criticise this view of copying from the West as just mental laziness (see, 
Özkan, lktibas (March) 1994: 6 cited by Sen 1995: 14). 
25 The Committee for Economic and Commercial Co-operation of Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
2' The pro-Islamist MÜSIAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) were 
"planning to create a cotton union between Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran which 
would control 40% of the world cotton production" (Tirkiye, 17.8.1996). 
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with modernity was prosperity, a result of steady economic growth that could be 
reached. in their view, by employing modern technology and industry. Therefore, the 
perceived lack of rapid economic growth in Turkey was used as evidence of failure of 
the secular elite and their modernisation project''. It will also be seen that, the WP elite 
acknowledged the capitalist system in Turkey and indeed in the world, in a realistic 
way. 
4.3.1 The Welfare Party and Turkish Economy 
In accordance with the great dissatisfaction of the masses with the state of the 
economy, the NVP relentlessly criticised the secular elite who dominated the economy 
and the way economy functioned in Turkey. This shows that Islamist questioning of the 
legitimacy of the system in Turkey also depended on economic failure of the state as 
much as on its secular political nature. For example, Erbakan stated in 1996 that 
"Turkey is 63rd in the world according to per capita income; it means that we [i. e. 
previous secular administrations] could not provide prosperity for our people" (Erbakan 
1997: 169). The psychological effect of the failure to realise adequate economic growth 
has reached such levels that the Milli Ga=ete had to reassure its readers: 
Prof. Veziroglu of Miami University said that after the medieval ages the Turks have 
become backward but `this is not because of any faults in our genes, in order to 
reach to the level of contemporary civilisations we need to change our perception of 
the age and our economic and political system' (my emphasis, Atilli Gazete, 10.10. 
1997). 
The WP's approach to economy was very nationalist and competitive. For 
example, a WP official was pointing out that a number of countries like Germany, Italy, 
Japan and Korea developed rapidly in the last 40 years. "Let us work together. Turkey 
has better conditions for development. We cannot accept being the 60th in the world. We 
27 In 1993 Erbakan argued that the "imitators" [i. e. secular elite] could not provide adequate housing, 
health facilities universities or jobs for the younger generation in the past decades ($en 1995: 119). 
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must be among the first 10, the first 5 [countries]" (Milli Ga_ete, 9.12.1997). It was 
argued that the «'P was founded to solve the problems of Turkey. It was to bring 
prosperity to the country, "to elevate Turkey above the level of `Contemporary 
Civilisation', and to transform Turkey to a strong, prosperous, free, respectful to human 
rights, democratic, laic, social, a state of law, country" (Welfare Party 1997a: 90). It was 
a fact that Turkey with its mineral reserves, forestry, agricultural lands, fisheries, labour 
force, the young population had the potential to effectively compete with leading 
economic states (Welfare Party 1997a: 91). Due to the lack of economic development 
Turkey's independence was in jeopardy (Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 8)28. 
The economic views, constituting the economic part of the Just Order, published 
under Erbakan's name29 are worth analysing. His The Just Economic System (1991a), 
first of all, strikes the reader for its remarkably naive and provocative language. It starts 
by claiming that: 
the current system of slavery in Turkey is a direct result of modern colonialism 
which is a planned, programmed instrument of imperialist and Zionist forces [... ] 
Zionism which has its centre in Wall Street, as a creed holds that the Zionists are the 
chosen people of God and all the other people are created as their slaves... They think 
that it is their duty to exploit other people. Imperialism and Zionism support imitator 
parties in Turkey... All the raw materials, particularly the oil of Muslim countries, are 
under the control of world imperialism. 30 
Erbakan was arguing that 700 billion dollars of the Muslim oil revenue was kept 
at "the banks of Zionists" who lend some of this money to some Muslim countries, 
including Turkey, at high interests. However: 
exploitation of mankind and Muslim countries by imperialism [sic] and Zionism 
occurs not only through giving credits but by other mechanisms in other areas. The 
worldwide transport and communication systems, the arm industry, basic strategic 
28 As often the case with WP publications, this party booklet Adi! Düzen 21 Soru/ 21 Cevap [the Just 
Order: 21 Question 21 Answers] has no date of publication but it seems that it was published in 1994. 29 Developed with the help of some Islamist experts but not refined. 30 In the part (a) of introduction [there is no paging]; this pamphlet is mostly a loyal translation of his Adi! 
Ekonomik Düzen (1991 b). 
246 
industries. trade, financial markets, [press] agencies, and media are all means of 
exploitation of imperialism and Zionism. 31 
The "system of slavery" in Turkey, which was set up by other parties, which 
were "imitators" of the West, was a part of this worldwide scheme. This system 
exploited Turkish society, for the benefit of "world imperialism", Israel and a few 
comprador holdings in Turkey, through five viruses: the interest system, unjust taxation, 
increase in the amount of money without justification (money printing), manipulation of 
the exchange rate, banking and credit system (Erbakan 1991a; Erbakan 1991b). 
Showing the theoretical deficiencies in the Welfarist critique of the Turkish and 
world economy is easy. In fact, the naivety of the economic reasoning was very 
disturbing even for the Islamist economists (see, for example Özel 1993). For example, 
the WP propagated that in the Just Order the investment costs would be so low that 
there would be 5-6 times more investment since there would no interest to pay. Money 
that seeks interest would be channelled to investment, 32 running capital for each firm 
would be 3 times lesser; thus, there would be the need for 3 times more work force (see, 
for example, Welfare Party Adil Dfizen 21... ). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
WP, however clumsily, emphasised some real problems of Turkey. Its critical approach 
to the debt problem of the developing world is still shared by many others, including 
many Westerners, albeit often in a milder language. More importantly, WP leader 
Erbakan highlighted some of the most pressing economic problems of Turkish society 
(variants of which can be found in many developing countries including Muslim ones) 
analysed below. 
One of the most emphasised economic problems has been unequal income 
31 Ibid. 
32 The WP discourse argued that the money deposited in banks in return for interest was not being used 
for investment or production at all but in a fictitious game of "earning money out of money". 
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distribution. As Erbakan points out. if the population of Turkey is divided into 5 groups, 
the lowest income group of 20% receives only 4% of the national income. The second 
20% of the population receives only %, the third group receives 14%, the fourth 
receives 17%, whereas the richest 200/; of the population, "the happy minority", 
receives an astonishing 58% of the national income. 33 The WP highlighted the 
economic plight of the lower income groups in society, which included the unemployed, 
small farmers, lowly paid sections of workers and civil servants and "pensioners, 
widows and orphans. "34 The WP spent more time and energy discussing issues of 
equality, social security, welfare and social justice than any other political parties 
including the centre-left and centre-right parties (Ayata 1996: 54). However, this is not 
to say that, as a political party the \VP did not try to promote the interests of some of the 
very important sections of Turkish society too, most importantly of the esnaf (shop 
owners, who are socially influential) and Islamist business circles against the `big 
capital' which has a clear advantage in the changing economy35 
The WP held that there were certain mechanisms ensuring unequal income 
distribution in Turkish society. Most importantly there was a small but extremely 
influential rentier class who owned large sums of capital and most of the banking 
system and who successfully sought rent from the state. First of all, the rentier, 
according to WP, exploited the masses by giving high interest loans to the state that 
needed bigger and bigger loans in the 1990s to finance the budget. In fact, the internal 
debt has become one of the most serious problems of the Turkish economy so much so 
33 Erbakan 1991 b: 9-11. These figures have remained mostly unchanged in 1990s as has been routinely 
reported by the media; see also (Erbakan1997: 123). 
34 These groups also appear in the propaganda of other parties. 'The right of the orphan' is an especially 
powerful figure of speech in Turkey, which is also frequently used in criticising the corrupt practices 
within the state. Orphan have a Qur'anic reference as well: "Have you seen him who denies Our religion? 
It is who harshly repels the orphan and does not urge others to feed the needy" (107: 1-3); translation is 
from (Qutb 1979: 315). 
35 For example small size entrepreneurs, many of whom supported the WP, unlike the big companies 
could not get cheap credits, even from the state banks. 
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that 80 - 90% of tax revenues were being paid back to the rentier, 
36 just as interest. In 
the 1990s. the rentier had interest rates of 25- 30% per annum from the Turkish state in 
U. S. dollar terms. These high interest rates were due to poor management of the state 
budget by politicians and bureaucrats alike. This financial failure by secular 
governments has meant a net transfer of the wealth from would-be receivers with very 
low incomes to a small affluent rentier group according to Islamists. 
Islamist economist and columnist Özel gives a definition and critique of 
rentierism in the Turkish context, from an Islamist point of view: 
Rentierism means going after the undeserved profits and acquiring them by political 
arrangements. Businessmen, co-operating with foreign financiers, started to rob the 
state [... ] It has been estimated that this rentier minority has received 40 billion 
dollars [in interest] from the state in the last six years. Big industrial firms who 
received the great majority of this money, have not used it to boost their 
competitiveness but used it against the entrepreneurs in Anatolia37 and strangled 
them... [T]hese firms, which have been always supported by the state in the last 30- 
40 years, still prefer to produce by licence [taken from abroad] and do not bother to 
develop their own technology and their brands. The Anatolian lions, which emerged 
in various cities, prefer competition instead of the rent or monopoly and the world 
markets instead of the internal market. The rentier bourgeoisie is very much 
disturbed by their competition [... ] the Turkish state must not protect the 
monopolists against this competitive capital; because this will undermine Turkey" 
(M. Özel, Yeni &fak 13.6.1997). 
The WP circles blamed "the architects of this Turkey" which had the 5th worst 
income distribution figures in the world, with 10 million people under the poverty line. 
According to ARM Gazete, the secular elite `attacked' the WP which tried to correct 
this: "They unleashed all their evil forces on" the WP cadres "who have the ideal of 
`rich state, rich nation', " so that, the top "20% [of the population] continue to live like 
sultans. Let us unite closely around the cadres who want to stop this unjust course" 
36 Islamists claimed that, only about a few ten thousands people gave the state more than 90% of the loans 
(see, Ozel 1997a). 
37 Here, Anatolian means provincial, i. e. not the kind of capital which is usually from Istanbul or other big 
cities like Ankara or Izmir which has been enjoying close relationship with secular politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
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(Editorial, 4.1.1998). 
In its criticism of the current state of Turkish economy, the \VP drew support 
from civil associations with an Islamist viewpoint, which were also critical of the 
economic order in Turkey. For example, the Hak-I$ (a workers' union), declared that, 
workers, civil servants, pensioners, small esnafs and small farmers (villagers), who 
received only 27.1 of the national income, paid more than half of the taxes, and 
demanded the rentier incomes to be taxed (Yeni 5afak, 23.4.1997). 
Another very important problem of the Turkish economic system according to 
WP cadres was interest. It is interesting to note how the WP defended the `Islamic ban 
on interest' categorically within a relatively modern economic context. In the Just Order 
there would be a ban on the interest. 38 As Islam aimed at creating a community of 
believers, charging interest is banned (the Qur'an 2: 276; Bukhari 1994: 468-469). The 
WP elite, like other Islamists, defended this ban by arguing that interest gives unjust 
advantage to the lender; causes inflation; and poisons the relationship among the 
brothers/sisters in Islam. The WP shared the view that there are Islamic financial 
institutions, which are perfectly adequate for a modern economy without needing to 
charge interest on loans. One of these financial institutions is the system of profit-loss 
sharing. The investors literally become partners of the firms and receive their shares 
from the profit or loss and the intermediate institution receives its own share 
(commission) (Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 37)3`'. 
However, it cannot be said a priori that an `interest-free' economic system 
38 Interest is defined as anything extra given back to the creditor other than the originally borrowed. 
39 The Turkish experience showed that the ÖFKs (literally, Private Financial Institutions) who use this 
method have less than 5% of the market and returned to their investors very similar yields when 
compared to banks. It is often pointed out that most methods of Islamic banks (e. g. mark-up fees) differ 
from charging interest only in name. 
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would work better than one which charges interest on credits. There are important 
variables; for example, a stable economy with low inflation and low real interest rates 
might be more efficient and satisfactory for both creditors and debtors. Yet, a 
categorical opposition to interest was the dominant position among the Islamists in 
Turkey as it is among other Islamists in the region. However, new Islamist 
interpretations on economic dealings are being put forward in accordance with changing 
times. For example, some of the Islamist elite like M. Özel and F. Beer point out that 
credits given by the Turkish state, with interest levels lower than the inflation, amount 
to direct wealth transfer by the state, and should be taken by the religious as well (see, 
for example, Yeni SSafak 16.5.1997)0. 
Another important economic issue in Turkey has been unemployment. Erbakan 
stated, "One of the gravest problems of our country, as we all know, is unemployment; 
in opposition to 22 million who make up the work force there are 11 million jobless. It 
is important to raise the living standards of all working people" (1997: 9 [4.7.1996]). 
The WP officials often voiced a key concern of its supporters and demanded an 
end to "discrimination" against the Islamist capitalists, dubbed as `the Anatolian Lions'; 
and the favourable treatment of secular businessmen. "Currently everything is between 
two lips of the authorities [... ] The Just Order will end the current application of 
enabling some firms to flourish and causing some others to go bankrupt" (Welfare Party 
Adil Diizen 21...: 2). Many companies belonging to Islamists were not awarded state 
contracts and thoroughly boycotted by the TAF for "supporting" irtica; whereas "in last 
30-40 years the monopoly capital [in Turkey] has been fed by the state.. . 
it is now so 
developed, like Frankenstein, that it gives loans to the state. It wants to play with the 
49 It should be noted that there are views arguing that Islam bans the usurious rates of interests rather than 
ordering a categorical ban. 
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state" (Milli Ga_ete, 9.12.1997). The WP circles strongly argued that the pro-laicite 
capitalists (who were and are referred as Big Capital or tht. ' rentier, were using state 
institutions against the Islamist capitalists. "[In] last 10 years in many Anatolian cities 
new entrepreneurs emerged who do not want rent and monopoly but only a free market. 
They too produce for the world market, but this disturbed the rentier bourgeoisie" (Ozel, 
Yeni $afak 13.6.1997). While hiding behind the principle of the laicite, they in fact 
wanted the current politico-economic system to continue with its economic exploitation 
and political oppression (Milli Gazete 4.11.1996). These concerns showed what 
Islamists believed. Turkey had to increase its share of the world economy too in order to 
alleviate its economic problems that could not be reduced to being just a problem of 
distribution within the country. 
4.3.2 The Welfare Part), and Capitalism 
From the beginning, Turkish modernizers have also tried to follow the route of 
Westernisation in the cultural arena. They tried to follow the model of European 
countries like France, Germany and Great Britain (the U. S. A. gained an important 
position too after the WW II) which all had followed the capitalist route to modernity in 
the economic sphere. In principle, the republican elite preferred to follow a capitalist 
route too, by explicitly rejecting the command economy of the Soviet Union and by 
trying to raise a `national' bourgeoisie (Bugra 1994: 4-5). However, until the early 
1980s, Turkey had followed a strategy of the mixed economy which meant a very high 
level of state control over the economy and an increasingly important private sector 
belonging to businessmen who were careful to remain very close to the bureaucracy and 
political centre (Öniý 1997). 
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that, generally speaking, Islamists criticise both 
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capitalism and socialism. Although they try to portray their economic views as a `third 
way', superior to both, their economic views tend to support basically a capitalist way 
of managing the economy, albeit their discourses voice some ethical concerns. This 
seemed certainly the case with the «'P elite. Therefore, a meaningful analysis of their 
stance vis-ä-vis capitalism, as an important concept associated with modernity, can be 
made. 
During the WP's height of power, the influence of the politicians over the 
economy through state mechanisms was still high. It could be seen, during the last few 
years of the party's life, that the WP leadership, in line with the new developments in 
the world economy and changing profile of the rising Islamist business circles, `' 
gradually started to take up the cause of a `limited state. ' The new duty of the state in 
the Islamist vision was to open the ways to compete with the outside world in industrial 
production and providing services. The `limited state' would also mean an end to the 
state discrimination against the Islamist/conservative business circles (see, Özel 1997b, 
Öniý 1997, Gülalp 2001). 
The WP elite was clearly disturbed by claims that the Just Order advocated a 
state-dominated economy. They declared that "the claim that the Just Order is an etatist 
[command economy] order is not true. The Just Order is a paradise for the private 
sector" (Welfare Party Mil Diizen 21...: 24). Erbakan stated that, because they wanted a 
powerful Turkey, they aimed to put the Turkish economy on a sound track of 
development, with "the private sector in the driver's seat. We aim to make one lira 
equal to one dollar. Now one dollar equals 100,000 liras. This is ridiculous. It is 
41 These Islamist business circles can be categorised in three sections: conservative-religious 
businessmen, Islamic holdings with multiple investors (which usually meant workers in Europe) and 
companies owned by religious brotherhoods or communities (see, Can 1997: 59-65). 
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harming Turkey's image" (TDN, 4.12.1996). One of the main reasons of the WP's 
strong pro-private sector stance in the mid-1990s was undoubtedly the changing 
political atmosphere of Turkey. Starting with Özal in the earlyl9SOs, Turkey embarked 
on a liberalisation policy42. The state control over the economy, especially through very 
big State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and state banks has been criticised for wasting 
resources and contributing to a regular budget deficit. Although the privatisation process 
has been painfully slow, in principle, the majority of the people and politicians have 
been in favour of further privatisation. The `state' has proved clumsy and wasteful in 
ninning its economic enterprises, partly because of political appointments to 
administrative positions and large numbers to lower positions. 43 
The WP gradually became closer to the capitalist version of modernisation, 
partly due to rise of a strong capitalist Islamist section who saw no virtue in 
continuation of state interventions, red-tape, but "wanted" to compete in the world 
markets. They felt that their rising economic power within Turkey was not enough; they 
also had to contribute to make Turkey economically successful in an increasingly 
globalised world. The WP claimed that the Just Order would provide the necessary 
economic atmosphere to create a competitive Turkey (Welfare Party Adil Düzen 21...: 
6). 
The WP elite criticised undesirable features of capitalism, often in a naive and 
schematic way to prove that Islam provides a better economic system. According to the 
WP there have been "5 microbes of Capitalism": "Interest, taxation, mint, banking 
42 For a discussion of post-1980 liberalisation policies that were motivated by "a desire to catch up with 
the rest of Europe" and encouraged by international institutions (IMF, World Bank and the OECD) see 
(Müftüler 1995). 
43 This has been one of the very important ways of party patronage system in Turkey. Thus, the parties in 
power have been able to transfer public funds to their supporters. Another way has been artificially low 
interest credits provided from state banks for the supporters. All these worsened the economic problems 
of Turkey. 
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system and exchange rate". which caused the following "diseases": "Hunger, poverty, 
high prices, inflation, unemployment, exploitation, backwardness, unjust income 
distribution, international disequilibrium. foreign debts, social explosions, wars, terror, 
mafia, bribery, moral corruption" (Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 30). Since "there are 
unjust, arbitrary interventions by the state, interest and exploitation; pricing by the 
monopolies, use of money as a means of enslavement" in capitalism, it prevents 
development, enterprise and production, and "cannot provide happiness for humanity" 
(Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 27). According to the WP, Communism developed as 
a reaction to capitalism, but it too made grave mistakes: "It removed profit too, while 
removing the interest [from the economy]" whereas profit is the most important vital 
factor ensuring the production of needed commodities and services" (Welfare Party Adil 
Diizen 21...: 27). "It removed formation of the prices in the free market too, while 
removing the monopolies. Formation of the prices in the free market is a most vital 
element of a healthy economy. Thus, the economy orders itself in a best way and waste 
is prevented" (Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 28); "[Communism] removed property 
ownership and free enterprising too, while trying to remove exploitation. Property 
ownership and free enterprising are the engines of the economy. Terminating these is 
against the human nature. Communism and Capitalism are indeed twins [... ] The only 
difference is, in communism, the oppressing force is the Political force and in 
capitalism, it is the force of the Capital... As communism bankrupted, capitalism is too 
doomed to bankruptcy" (my emphases, Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 28- 29). 
It can be seen that, overall, the WP was in favour of a market economy, private 
property and a `share' for the capital from the production, three of the core aspects of 
capitalism in the West ($en 1995: 41). Nevertheless, there were occasional anti- 
capitalist views expressed by some party elite; for example, the vice-chairman of the 
party Gill was saying that capitalism was not suitable for Turkey and he was against 
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interest. "But we must be realist. We need to make adjustments according to market 
economy. We cannot solve these according to our own views since we are in a coalition 
government" (TÜrkiye 4.8.1996). 
The political, scientific, moral sub-orders of the Just Order proposed by the WP 
were interpreted as helpful tools for a kind of corporatist capitalism (i. e. in different 
branches of economic life, certain levels of internal discipline and control were 
expected) and potentially more discriminating than the current economic order. This 
was because, the WP was contemplating introducing additional moral checks defined in 
terms of Islamic virtues, on the entrepreneurs and business life (see, $en 1995: 106-7; 
Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...; cinar 1996). 
The WP promised a healthy economy able to supply the `needs' and `wants' of 
the masses, ranging from adequate nutrition, housing, heating, health care, education to 
cars, vacations, designer clothes; and which would enable them to consume these. Some 
more conservative Islamist circles contended that many Islamist figures and sections, in 
Turkey have become very much part of the consumer culture that has been enveloping 
Turkey. As Yildirim (1995) argues, many Islamist leaders consciously use Mercedes', 
which are power symbols, as a way of impressing ordinary people. Erbakan wore 
Versace ties and stayed in 5 star hotels during his vacations. He gave the impression that 
if one can earn money in a halal way it is all right to spend as much of it as he/she sees 
fit provided that it is not for blatantly un-Islamic things. However, generally speaking, 
the poor masses were much more disturbed by the consumption patterns of the secular 
elite44 than those of the Islamist elite. 
°; Shown in popular television programs like Televole. It was only half-jokingly commented by one head 
of the Turkish Intelligence (MIT) that these programs could make people "communists", pointing out the 
poverty level of the vast numbers of people and resulting frustration and anger. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, a strong group of Islamist business circles emerged in 
Turkey who supported Islamist activities with their economic resources'; many of them 
supported the WP, and influenced its economic policies46. It could be seen that these 
newcomers to the economy were trying to organise among themselves. For example,. 
pro-Islamist MÜSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) was 
founded in 1990. MÜSIAD had 3,000 members as of early 1998, who were employing 
500,000 people. MÜSIAD provided services to its members in terms of increasing their 
work related expertise and international business connections and trying to influence the 
policies of local and national authorities. For MÜSIAD the Islamic identity provided 
enough basis for co-operation among its members both at domestic and international 
levels (Gülalp 2001: 439). The Islamist ideology also provided, in a Weberian fashion, 
the ethical justification of the capitalist activity as put by MÜSIAD President: "... the 
goal in this life is to get the consent of the Creator, Allah... In this respect economic 
development is not an end itself, but simply a means to that end" (in Gülalp 2001: 440). 
Thus, it was an Islamist, and WP desire to replace the dominant secular businessmen 
with Islamist businessmen (Ozel 1997a). 
According to Islamists, the state bureaucracy in Turkey favoured secular 
business circles. For example, they argued that the "enterprising spirit" in Anatolia [i. e. 
conservative and Islamist business circles] was suffering due to discrimination by the 
Capital Markets Board (SPK) against them (Yeni $cfak 21.6.1997). For example, 
Kombassan Holding was accused of illegalities such as bringing the capital they 
'S According to the Milliyet, the Chief of Staff had a blacklist of the companies who "finance the 
reactionarism" in Turkey. All army units were warned not to purchase their needs from these companies 
which included Kombassan Holding, Was Holding, Yimpaý, Ülker; MUSIAD Members (see, Ta§getiren, 
Yeni $afak, 7.6.1997). 
46 As showing the views of the TAF, the influential secular daily tldrriyet was writing that "at the briefing 
the TAF gave, the judges and prosecutors were told that with the WP-TPP coalition the reactionaries 
started to form their own cadres within the state. Under the name of privatisation, state economic 
enterprises were being handed out to fundamentalists almost as a gift" (tliirriyet 11.6.1997). 
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collected from the Turkish citizens in Europe in suitcases rather than by using the 
banking system, or collecting investment money in Europe without proper permits. 
Labelled as Islamist (or green) capital, these holdings were accused of funding 
Islamism. 
It was observable that both the Islamist businessmen and the \VP accepted most 
of the capitalist conditions in Turkey and in the world as a given. It can be argued that 
there was not much against capitalism in the Welfarist interpretation of Islam; especially 
as it is applied currently in the West (e. g. the UK and the U. S. ) which was another 
factor enabling them to have a selective approach to western modernity. Thus, the WP 
formulated its suggestions of solutions largely within the world capitalist system. For 
example, it was declared in a party publication "it is a known fact that in the Just Order 
production will be very cheap. It is obvious that the capitalist order cannot compete with 
this cheap production. [... ] It is impossible for the cheap productions not to find markets 
in the world" (Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 31). Cheap production was simplistically 
based upon "lack of interest to pay" and "just taxation. " In the Just Order "taxes will not 
be paid from the profit [... ] but it is the share of the state in return of its contribution to 
the production. " Taxes will be collected justly and exactly, and since "The Just order is 
also an order of ethical rules, because of his/her beliefs, the taxpayer will want to pay 
more and more to his/her state, this had been the case throughout the history" (Welfare 
Party Adi! Diizen 21...: 33). 
Despite their criticism of capitalism, the WP seemed to have no serious 
objection to a well-functioning capitalist economy in Turkey. It was assumed that in due 
course, some serious problems they attributed to capitalism would be solved by a 
transition to the Just Order, where ambitions would be checked by a `humane' 
interpretation of economic rules, thanks to Islam. 
258 
The \VP elite clearly accepted the fact that the world economy was functioning 
according to secular, capitalist rules: the claim that the Just Order cannot get foreign 
credits is not true. Since Turkey will be a most profitable country [... ] the capital would 
definitely come. Because the economy has its ottwii rules. " Besides "the majority of the 
capital in the world belongs to Muslims, they will invest in Turkey if there is stability 
and profit " (my emphasis, Welfare Party Adil Dii_en 21...: 21). 
It can be concluded that the MVP elite had a fairly secularised attitude toward the 
economy. Especially in the increasingly globalised world, world markets seemed to be a 
reality and it was better to get integrated into them in favourable terms; insulation from 
their effects was not realistic or desirable' . 
The \VP circles generally argued that Islamists businessmen were not part of an 
international class of capitalists as their secular counterparts were, but were working for 
the nation and the ummah. Nevertheless, since capital can no longer be effectively 
controlled by the nation-state, as indicated in Chapter 1, Islamist capitalists were quick 
to `pressurise' the secular Turkish establishment by threatening to invest their capital 
elsewhere (such as the Balkans, in Germany or in the U. S. ), if state discrimination 
against them continued. Thus, the unemployment problem would get worse. 
Developments like these and widespread disregard for Islamic virtues because of 
`market realities' on the part of many Islamist business circles led to Islamist observers 
to frequently argue that, Islamists did not act like Homo Islamicus but mainly as homo 
economicus. "[M]any so-called Muslims [i. e. Islamists] think only about DMs and 
dollars" (Eygi, Milli Gazete 11.10.1997; see also, Ozean 1997: 41-53). 
47 According to M. Özcl "Anatolian Lions" (i. e. Islamic businessmen) are superior in spirit to the Big 
Capital in Turkey. As they wanted to integrate into world markets in an active manner; they wanted to 
see their business' as a constitutive element of existing as a nation, they wanted to do what the Germans 
and the Japanese were able to do in the recent past (1997a: 101). 
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It could also be seen that those Islamists who could afford to were also eager to 
join in the consumption, an important characteristic of capitalist economy today. 
Nevertheless they were conscious of trying to follow an `Islamic' way of consumption 
in many areas (for example, different criteria were used for dressing, there were 
separate pools for each gender in hotels serving to them, and alcohol was not served in 
their restaurants). Thus, overall, they had important differences in consumption 
patterns4S compared to laicised sections of the society and this still made them a threat 
in the eyes of the secular elite and the TAF49 . 
Although the WP advocated a redistributive economic policy, the party as a 
recipient of cross-class Islamist support, in line with the general Islamist view that sees 
class as a divisive factor, deliberately rejected to discuss the problems of the capitalist 
system in Turkey in class terms. Instead it used more popular terms like the `happy 
minority' (secular, upper classes which showed little or no sensitivity to the plight of the 
lower classes) or ezilenler" (the oppressed) (cf. White 2002a: 166). 
Whether the WP could have curbed the excesses of capitalism will largely 
remain a mystery. However, from the party's excessive emphasis on global competition, 
(especially between a would-be Islamic bloc and the rest - e. g. the West), and from the 
fact that the Islamist capitalists could not remain loyal to Islamic ideals (Özcan 1997: 
41-53) (they, like secular capitalists, were taking full advantage of high unemployment 
in Turkey), it could be inferred that, the party, if it had ever secured a single party 
government, would have given priority to boosting the competitive capacity of Turkey. 
`$ The emphasis on consumption patterns constitutes an important aspect of Islamist argument that Islam 
was the solution to economic problems. It was frequently argued that if the well-to-do avoid waste/luxury 
consumption and fulfilled their religious duties (e. g. zakat, charity), this would have an important impact 
on the problem of poverty. 
 Most importantly, many Islamists (including many WP members) allocated a certain amount of their 
income to fund Islamisation efforts, which alarmed secular sections of the elite and public. 
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A systematically developed. more just redistributive economic structure would have to 
wait. This was partly because of the sense of insecurity, as also seen in many other 
sections of Turkish elite, with Turkeys place in the global power structure. 
So far, in this chapter, I have argued that the WP elite differed from the 
dominant secular Turkish nationalism by placing a much greater emphasis on Islam as 
the defining character of the nation in Turkey. They advocated a religious-nationalism 
as an alternative to secular nationalism of the Turkish state, which was pursued as one 
of the most important tools in its modernisation vision. The WP also suggested that 
greater intra-Muslim co-operation and unity of the Islamic Ummah was necessary for 
elevation of status of Muslim countries in the world. 
The WP also had an alternative view of the Turkish economy and capitalism in 
Turkey and in the world. It generally championed the economic rights of the lower 
income groups and bitterly criticised the `happy minority', which lived in luxury and 
did not care about these groups. However, the WP's economic vision overall remained 
within the category of capitalism with some moral commitment to more just income 
distribution. In the remaining of this chapter, I will analyse the views of the WP elite 
with regard to science, industrialisation, technology, the West and its relationship with 
modernity, and globalisation. 
4.4 THE WELFARE PARTY, SCIENCE, INDUSTRIALISATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
4.4.1 The Welfare Party and the Science 
The rise of science and its association with a predominantly secular worldview 
has an important place in the advent of modernity as seen in Chapter 1. An analysis of 
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the WP's attitude toward science sheds some lights on their understanding of modernity. 
Although the WP members, like many other Islamists in Turkey, saw science as 
indispensable for technological and industrial progress necessary for a strong Turkey; 
secular conceptualisation of science by the laic elite and their frequent suggestions that 
modem science goes against traditional knowledge (which includes some aspects of 
Islamic teaching), caused great concern among Islamists. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, since the Enlightenment, the West has eclipsed other 
regions of the world in science. Changing scientific views in Europe also influenced the 
Ottoman elite. The WP circles shared the view that the republican elite had also been 
under the influence of the West. For example, they believed in positivism, which, 
Islamists crudely put, took the form of believing only what is observable and 
measurable by human beings and rejecting any meta-physical `reality'. The WP circles 
pointed out the impact of Comte50 and argued that positivism as such was long outdated. 
Islamist intellectual Ali Bulac argues that science could not give satisfactory answers 
about understanding the universe, about the purpose of the creation and meaning of 
existence. Now science is beginning to accept that it has to give up the position of being 
"the guide. " Because of this according to Bulac many people are turning towards 
religions for the hope of finding the answers (Yeni Safak 24.4.1997). Another Islamist 
intellectual comments that "the Industrial revolution was the victory of materialism [... ] 
later, materialism diffused to biology and other sciences. Everything including the 
human being was seen as a machine [... but] today materialism is dead" (M. Özel, Yeni 
$afak 12.3.1997). These comments reflect the general Islamist and Welfarist views on 
science. 
S" Atatürk declared, "The truest guide in life is science" (as opposed to guides [murkids] in religious 
groups) and he clearly had a positivist worldview under the impact of Comte who emphasised order and 
progress in society (Ozbilgen 1994: 114). 
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One could see that the \VP elite were contributim_ to the Islamist efforts of 
putting the modern scientific knowledge into a `proper' Islamic perspective, which 
holds that nothing in scientific knowledge goes against true Islamic knowledge. In fact, 
it was widely pointed out that some "true" scientists have become Muslims when they 
see that the Qur'an foretold some scientific discoveries, such as the developmental 
phases of the embryo. 
It was indicative of the state of the current debate and a cause of resentment 
among Islamists, including the WP elite that they still had to argue that Islam was no 
obstacle to progress that could be attained through acquiring and applying the latest 
scientific knowledge in the world. They often pointed out that Islam encouraged 
scholarly activity and promised divine reward for helping and solving problems of 
human beings through production or transmission of knowledge. Scholars (in religious 
or non-religious sciences51) are highly praised in Islam52. Muslims needed to work hard 
to acquire the latest scientific knowledge and technology for the benefit of Muslims. 
Trying to understand the physical and chemical rules of nature was also serving to 
understand sunnetullah (ways of God) which was a religious imperative. 
It can be argued that the WP members, like many other Islamists in the world, 
wanted first of all an Islamisation of the presentation of the current scientific 
knowledge. The fact that there were first class Islamist scientists made Islamists 
comfortable in rejecting some parts of scientific knowledge that are generally 
considered valid. More importantly, they were against certain secular interpretations and 
presentation of science in a way undermining to Islamic teaching. A famous Islamist, 
31 The very term "non-religious" science is open to debate according to some Islamist views, as long as 
that branch of science proved useful for human beings and hence fulfilled an Islamic duty, it should also 
be categorised as Islamic 
s2 According to an oft-cited hadith, "the ink that the scholar uses is more valuable than the blood of a 
martyr". 
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Harvard graduate, the brain surgeon. Yildizhan, for example was writing that "the state 
has no right. with a Darwinian approach, to teach my kids the view that their ancestor 
was not Adam but monkeys which is against science and demeaning to human honour 
(1998: 756). 
In other words, a certain Islamist interpretation of science, shared by the WP 
members, was unmistakable in Turkey in the 1990s. For example, despite many 
irreconcilable differences among them, all Islamist groups were rejecting the theory of 
evolution. The Milli Ga=ete was depicting a standard WP response to the theory well, in 
a news-commentary, under the heading of "Going back to the monkey": 
The government is planning to re-introduce the Theory of Evolution of Darwin, 
which was removed in 198553, into the school textbooks. The Evolution Theory of 
Darwin, which claims that humankind evolved from the monkeys has been rejected, 
according to scientific data, in the whole world and is not taught even in Cuba. 
Experts say that the real aim is to raise an atheist generation (Milli Gazete, 4.1. 
1998). 
There was another important dimension of the WP attitude toward science. The 
party circles shared the Islamist view that Turkey and other Muslim countries are far 
behind the modern countries in scientific developments which is in deep contrast to pre- 
modem times. They believed that, for centuries Muslims were superior to Europe not 
only in military power, but in sciences as well. 54 
Islam has not been contrary to scientific developments, and in fact, there were 
signs of God indicating the future capabilities of humankind in science. 55 Many of 
scientific developments were reached by "copying the creatures56 of God Almighty" 
53 By the MLP education minister Dincerler who belonged to conservative-Islamist wing of the MLP. sa In fact, this view is also shared by many western experts; see for example (Fuller 2003: 1). ss Ozcan gives a well-known list; for example, Moses' extracting water from the rock with his rod 
signalled that humans would be able to invent the artesian well. S" E. g. camera copies the eye and radar copies bats according to Özcan 
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(Özcan, Milli Ga_ete 1.7.1997). 
The \VP circles shared a widespread Islamist view in the Middle East that 
without the contribution of Muslim scholars, science could not have developed so fast 
nor passed on to Europe. Erbakan argued, "in the development of science and 
technology the greatest share belonged to our [Muslim] ancestors. Today nobody [e. g. 
Westerners] has a right to be arrogant, everybody should be modest" (Erbakan 1997: 
202). 
A utilitarian and capitalist approach to science was discernible in the \VP 
discourse. According to Erbakan, science should be at the service of the people and 
industry. Universities had to work to solve problems of the society (Erbakan 1997: 188). 
Scientific activity had to aim to be "useful"57 (Erbakan 1997: 121). 
The prominence of engineers in the WP (also seen in other Islamist movements, 
such as in Egypt), could be taken as an example of the effectiveness of the 
differentiation process, which accompanies modernisation. It also increased the 
importance of non-religious technical experts in Turkish 'Islamism' and decreased the 
social status and prestige of those who have religious knowledge. Thus, graduates of the 
IHLs, or many other Islamist youth wanted to be computer engineers, or medical 
doctors rather than a member of the clergy. This trend has contributed to a latent 
secularisation process among the religious sections. 
It is important to note that the WP elite contributed to the Islamist efforts of 
rationalisation of Islamic thought. The rationalisation trend dismissed the nakl 
(transmitted Islamic knowledge) if it conflicted openly with the aql (reason) and valid 
57 Reference to oft-quoted hadith is obvious "I take refuge in God from useless knowledge. " 
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scientific knowledge. Thus, it was argued that Islam was suitable for progress, 
compatible with reason; and superstitions passed as Islamic knowledge cannot be used 
as excuses to argue - as some seculars do - that Islam as a whole was in conflict with 
scietlce'S. 
In the view of the WP elite, modem scientific knowledge could play a part in 
the salvation of Turkey. As Prime Minister Erbakan stated "his top two priorities will be 
democracy and human rights. He also added wisdom and science as tools to overcome 
the huge problems confronting Turkey" (my emphasis. TDY 9.1.1996). 
4.4.2 The Welfare Party, Technology and Industrialisation 
Industrialisation has been one of the most important parts of modernity. The 
Islamist cadres who founded the WP and its two predecessors all emphasised the 
importance of industrialisation for Turkey to become a modern country. Erbakan 
advocated a "heavy industry drive" in the 1970s. 'Modem' countries meant the 
industrialised ones for Erbakan and other leading figures of the 'National Outlook' 
(Saribay 1985; Yildiz 2003). 
Since industrialisation has been a major factor in modernisation of Europe and 
the West, it is not surprising that the 'National Outlook' movement too saw 
industrialisation as a must. Although, in the mid-1990s, the need of industrialisation was 
not an issue any more in the West, Erbakan and other leading WP members continued to 
say -although with less emphasis than in the 1970s - that Turkey needed 
industrialisation. This was normal in a late industrialising country like Turkey with still 
around 45% of its population living off agriculture that produced only about 15% of the 
5" From Said Nursi to Erbakan (1969) it has been an important concern for Islamists to prove that Islam is 
compatible with science and cannot be undermined by new scientific discoveries. 
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national income in the mid-1990s. 
The `VP cadres were firmly believing and propagating that they were the ones 
who could deliver the rapid technological progress and industrialisation. Technological 
progress was seen as one of the keys of rapid industrialisation and hence, of rapid 
economic growth. A strong industrial base and high technology were deemed essential 
for an economically and militarily strong Turkey. Dependency upon foreign (mainly 
western) countries was unacceptable and had to be counted among the indefensible 
failures of the previous governments run by the secular elite (Erbakan 1997). 
The WP elite showed Gei-many as a successful example of achieving prosperity, 
"out of ruins, " twice in 40 years. Turkey could not achieve this in 80 years due to the 
wrong policies. According to Erbakan, the German model showed the way of 
industrialisation in terms of producing machinery, locomotives, cars, planes, and tanks. 
Turkey needed to develop its own heavy industry not just a `montage industry'59 or 
tourism and agriculture that could not sustain real economic growth (Welfare Party 
1997a: 92). 
The WP circles saw scientific and technological progress as vital means of 
reducing dependency on other countries. For example, technological dependence in 
defence industry was harming Turkey's independence. 60 Investment in this area would 
also bring much needed foreign currency to Turkey. According to Erbakan: "75% of the 
defence industry needs of the TAF are met from abroad but in Romania this rate is only 
20%, so, we need giant steps in this area; in the future we expect to export important 
S9 The term montage industry refers pejoratively to the semi-production of industrial goods under foreign 
patent. 
" Many western countries (e. g. US, Germany) applied pressure on Turkey in issues such as human rights 
(e. g. the Kurdish question), the Aegean dispute, and the Cyprus problem by not selling weapons or 
attaching strict conditions for their use. 
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amount of defence industry products to America and other western countries. Muslim 
countries too will buy from Turkey [... ] we want the private sector too to get involved in 
the defence industry" (Erbakan 1997: 71-72). 
It can be seen that in Turkey too technology was and is considered by Islamists 
to be predominantly value-neutral. "Technology itself cannot produce results, its results 
depend on the purpose of the users"; although current technology can solve many 
problems effecting people in the wti orld, technologically advanced countries do not care 
enough about others (Özdenören 1997: 7-13 quotation from p. 13). 
Islamist intellectuals, including the WP elite, were acutely aware that 
technological underdevelopment made the defence of `Islamic truths' in the world very 
difficult. A strong industrial base was important for defending an Islamic way of life in 
Turkey and in other Muslim countries, and Turkey's national interests and pride. "We 
must progress in science, art, and technical areas, equipped with Islamic moral; 
otherwise, we could not protect even our prayer mats" (Hekimoglu, Zaman, 29.8. 
1996). Realpolitik dictated that Turkey had to catch up with modern countries in terms 
of technology and industry. The `backwardness' of Muslims in these areas had been 
causing great problems: 
Muslims have left inventions to others [... ] The unworthy had gained control of 
technology [... ] It should not have happened like this... Egypt of 25 million should 
not have lost in 1967 to 2.5 million Jews. Algeria should not have suffered at the 
hands of France; we should not have cried for Bosnia, Palestine, Chechnya, 
Azerbaijan [... ] (Hekimoglu, Zanian, 28.8.1996). 
It is indicative of their positive attachment to technology that WP officials 
claimed they used it most efficiently among the political parties in Turkey and 
according to cakir they were correct. So much so that, sometimes state officials 
requested them to make use of their comprehensive voter databases (1994: 73). 
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It could be seen that the \VP elite was associating modernity with high 
technology, which was defined as, inter a/ia, as efficient, clean. fast and safe. "We are 
working for an electric power station in Bursa which will be utilising natural gas. [We 
are] creating it with Japanese co-operation. The most modern and most advanced 
technology in the world will be used" (Erbakan 1997: 194). Erbakan reiterated that they 
successfully completed the Ankara underground, which was "a modern project, " "we 
are bringing the heavy industry and the most modern technology' to the country. Because 
we are the real progressive ones [in the country] (my emphases, Milli Ga_ete, 6.1. 
1998). 
The WP elite had a clear understanding of how a modern industrialised economy 
should be. According to this understanding, Turkey must not be dependent on foreign 
countries for high technology products, but must meet its needs from within. According 
to the WP one other important aspect of Turkey's dependency on the West (with grave 
results) has been financial,: "credits [mainly from the Western countries] with heavy 
conditions, undermined production in Turkey and this means that our youth, sitting in 
the coffee houses, had to finance the employment of the youth in the Western countries" 
(Welfare Party Adil Düzen 21...: 8). These were very similar concerns shared by many 
other Islamists in the world as seen in Chapter 2. 
The WP members shared the view that the next generations must be well-versed 
in science and Islamic culture, as succinctly put by Özal "holding the Qur'an in the one 
hand and a computer in the other" (see, $en 1995: 31). Turkey needed highly qualified 
professionals. Thus, one of the prerequisites of economic growth for the WP was 
investment in education of the masses, particularly the youth, in order to raise scientists 
and technical experts. These would initially transfer and use the latest technology; and 
in a very short time make Turkey capable of developing its own technology and be one 
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of the most technologically advanced countries in the world. 
According to the \VP, if governed by their cadres, the industrialisation of Turkey 
would be very rapid; its industrial strength would then be used to help other Muslim 
countries. The double standards toward being technologically and industrially advanced 
could be noted in the \'VP discourse: Turkey was "being exploited" when she was 
behind; but selling industrial products and know-how, for example, to Iran, Iraq, Central 
Asian Republics, Russia, Malaysia. the U. S. or Belgium was a legitimate goal (Erbakan 
1997). 
Prime Minister Erbakan was explaining his vision of a new Turkey with bullet 
trains, dual carriageways (which would reduce traffic accidents to as low as in Finland 
or Nontwj). Each family would own 2-3 cars, electric consumption per capita would be 
12000kWh each year as in Germany, and towns and cities would be illuminated. New 
satellite cities, with parks, shopping centres, universities, culture centres, mosques and 
sport areas, would be constructed. Iskenderun would become the Singapore of the 
Middle East; parts of new planes by Airbus, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas would be 
produced in Turkey. Inflation would be around 10% (Dogru, Sabah, 26.01.1997). 
According to the «'P elite, one of the most important prerequisites of rapid 
industrialisation was production of cheap and abundant energy. They seemed to ignore 
the environmental concerns for this. For example, they were in favour of nuclear power 
stations in Turkey which were "the safest" and "most environment friendly" type of 
power stations. "Foreign companies will build four of these in Turkey but, in contrast to 
previous governments, we will also demand technology transfer as well; Turkey will be 
able to build nuclear stations in sister countries" (my emphasis, Erbakan 1997: 219- 
220). 
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In the case of the \VP too we see the pragmatic Islamist approach to technical 
knowledge. It had to be sought after from wherever it was most advanced. therefore. 
one could see that many of the WP elite were sending their children to the West. 
especially to the U. S. for undergraduate and postgraduate studies. The technology or 
expertise transfer was not to be accompanied with non-Islamic, western or other 
retrograde ideas or values. In contrast to views of some of the westernised republican 
elite, they believed, as did the previous generations of Islamists in Turkey, that it was 
not necessary to adopt the whole of the social environment that produces the 
technology. 
The WP elite wanted Turkey to be in the core group or preferably create an 
Islamic bloc of core countries in the Wallersteinan sense. 61 The most important step 
toward this goal was to attain the latest technology and a strong industrial base. They, 
like some other nationalist elite sections, were against the exchange of large amounts of 
agricultural and low technology products for industrial, high technology products from 
abroad. Erbakan like many other Islamist opinion leaders, was confident that Turkey 
could produce many industrial products herself (see, Ceylan 1996). For the WP, the 
relative backwardness of Turkey in science and technology compared to advanced 
countries was essentially an organisational and administrative problem. If society 
became more `Muslim' and administered by Islamists, this problem would be solved. 
It can be observed that technological progress creates certain problems for 
Islamists from a religious ethical point of view. For example with regard to organ 
transplantation, initially Islamist sections in Turkey remained rather hesitant; some 
`" According to the famous characterisation of Immanuel Wallcrstein "the structure of the world-economy 
permits an unequal exchange of goods and services [... ] much of the surplus-value extracted in the 
peripheral zones of the world-economy is transferred to the core zones" (In Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 503). 
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opposed to it as it seemed to be interfering with God's will. However, in time, they 
approved it, provided that certain conditions are met`". 
If modern technology has brought new versions of `sinning, ' like watching 
Islamically inappropriate programs, Islamist columnists were quick to offer `solutions' 
from the Islamic tradition. These included `flight' (hicret) from the television room to 
another room or "arming oneself with the weapons of the `enemy"', i. e. setting up 
Islamic television channels to counter 'westernisation' and de-Islamisation effects of 
mainstream (secular) channels. On the one hand. technology in the hands of the 
'seculars', makes leading an Islamic way of life difficult: "The TVs entered our homes 
and from their screens sins. infidelity, rebellion [against God], hypocrisy are flowing 
into our houses, idols are in our hearts [... ]"(Eygi, Milli Gazete 11.10.1997), on the 
other hand, it is seen as a must to have the same media (television, newspapers, internet IL. 
etc) to disseminate the Islamist message. 
As far as their visions of industrialisation and a strong Turkish economy were 
concerned, it should be said that the WP elite generally thought that women should be 
able to work and contribute to Turkey's development. However, this had to be done 
with an Islamist perspective; i. e. only in `suitable' working places and `feminine' jobs. 
They were frequent Islamist views that women should not work if there was no pressing 
need and if there was too much unemployment among the males who after all are 
responsible to provide for the females and children in the greater family according to 
Islam. Thus, the WP members shared the views that Islamic dress for women was not an 
obstacle to becoming an active part of Turkish modernisation. Islamist women joked 
62 1 remember that late in the 1980s, our teacher of "Culture of Religion and Knowledge of Ethics" ,a graduate of Theology Faculty, stated that a Muslim donor had to make sure that the receiver of the 
donated organ must be a `good' Muslim. Such remarks made the Islamists be seen as having incompatible 
views with modem humanist values. 
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about that way of understanding modernity by saying that "did you send a shuttle to 
space and it entangled in our headscarf? " i. e. Islam was not an obstacle in front of 
technological and industrial progress which should be considered as real issues of 
modernisation. 
4.5 THE WEST AND MODERNITY ACCORDING TO THE WELFARE 
PARTY 
The WP elite had a fairly coherent conceptualisation of modernity and the West; 
and of the relationship between them. They believed, as Tayyip Erdogan put it that "the 
most advanced (muasu") level of civilisation could be Islamic" (cinar 1996: 33). In this 
respect they differed from secular politicians63 and intelligentsia by refusing to take the 
West as the only touchstone for modernity. 
Since the 1840s, the dominant definition of `modem' in Turkey had been done 
by the state authority. With the republic, a modernising state emerged with a quasi- 
ideology, defined in terms of westernisation. As Mardin has argued the Turkish 
revolution was "primarily a revolution of values; " a new republican elite, those who 
supported Kemalist revolution, emerged with new cultural codes and lifestyles diffused 
from the West (see, Göle 1997: 50-51). Therefore, the Islamist elite, including the WP 
elite, were among the rising counter-elite who strongly challenged the secular, 
nationalist republican elite who behaved like "Janissaries of the West" according to 
Cemil Merig (quoted by Ozel 1997a: 172). According to self-styled "progressive" 
intellectuals (llerici Aydinlar), Islamic reaction had been an impediment to progress. 
Delaying the introduction of the printing machine press to the Ottoman Empire (1727) 
`'' One former minister was writing, for example, "Atatürk has shown the way for the Turkish nation, this 
way is the West -modernisation and civilisation" (Kilercioblu, TDN28.4.1997). 
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has been an oft-stated example64. 
4.5.1 A Critical Approach to the West and Westernisation 
In contrast to the secular discourse, the West was heavily criticised in the 
Welfarist discourse, very similar to the general Islamist discourse in Turkey and indeed 
in the Muslim world. 65 This general negative attitude toward the West because of its un- 
Islamic features, was a very important factor in Islamist reluctance to see the West as a 
holistic role model in modernisation. It is possible to depict the main themes of 
'Welfarist' criticism: the West was morally decaying; it was hypocritical, sexually 
permissive; the family was in decline in the West; it was using its power against the 
Muslim interests, (e. g. supporting Israel). The West had an arrogant attitude towards 
non-westerners. In short, the party members shared the Islamist view that many western 
ways and ideas could not be justified according to Islamist Weltanschauung. 66 
The WP circles generally took a very antagonistic stance vis-a-vis the West. The 
Milli Ga_ete for example gave regular news-commentaries, which would cause hatred 
of Western countries among ordinary readers. For example: 
According to confessions of the Pentagon officials one of the main reasons for the 
new imminent American attack on Iraq is to test their new weapons -which are 
technological miracles- on the innocent and oppressed Muslims and thus effectively 
advertise them to potential buyers [... ] we know that 2/3 of the world weapon 
production is done by the U. S. and the Russia and most of this production is done by 
the Zionist-Jewish bosses [... ] (Milli Gazete, 9.2.1998). 
The WP circles held that western countries and international institutions 
°' For an Islamist explanation to this seemingly reactionary attitude, see (Özcl 1995). 
`'s Bahri Zengin a WP MP was arguing that the West was "trying to break up Turkey", there was 
something wrong with the "basic values" of the West, "because 100 million people perished in the wars 
in the 20`h century" and "the biggest genocide has been done in America, Australia and Africa during the 
period of this civilisation" (1995: 105,113). 
66 Needless to say, emphasising the destructiveness and moral deficiencies of Western civilisation is not 
peculiar to Islamism and widely shared by many non-Westerners. 
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dominated by them did not want others to be economically developed. "Somalia was 
self-reliant 10-15 years ago but, in the traps of the IMF and World Bank. it sunk to 
today's miserable point". When joining NATO, they informed Turkey not to produce 
weapons, because they would provide them at cheap prices, "thus, they have 
undermined our industry" (Welfare Party Adil Dii_en 21...: 9). When asked about 
international organisations, WP supporters expressed the least belief in those from the 
West. Only about 25% believed that the IMF, the EU, the UN and NATO actually help 
Turkey. On the other hand, 59.5% said they think the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (which receives very little publicity and is thus a relatively unknown 
organisation) helps Turkey (TDN, 17.1.1997). 
Since the West was "hostile" toward Turkey, one Milli Gazete columnist 
wondered, "why try to be close to the EU and the US given that they prefer to support 
Greece and the Greek Cypriots against us, let us try to create a new balance [in the 
world]" (Özkan, Milli Gazete, 16.10.1997). The WP elite often pointed out undue 
Western pressure on Turkey not to develop its relations with some of its neighbours 
(Iraq, Iran, and Syria) which had serious problems with Western countries (e. g. the 
U. S. ). According to WP vice-chairman Gal, Turkey had the right to improve relations 
with neighbouring countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria but this did not mean that the NVP 
wanted to change "structural relations with the West" (TDN, 13 .2 1997). 
Erbakan argued that the West's wrong policy of exploiting, cheating and not 
caring for others was causing serious problems in the world. In the long run, these 
problems would adversely effect the West and for example poor and hungry people 
from Africa might "invade" Europe. "Exploitation, arrogance and disparities" had to 
give way to "co-operation, peace and mutual respect" (1997: 144-145). 
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The West with its lack of affection for the poor of the world and its inertia when 
action was needed (e. g. in Bosnia), was condemned from an Islamic point of view. 
Actions of the West were perceived and presented as based only on self-interest. For 
example, the \VP circles, like many Islamists and seculars in the region, believed that 
the West had been conspiring in, and manipulating the Middle East in order to control 
the oil resources. The Milli Gazete voiced a widespread conspiracy theory that the U. S. 
secretly encouraged/allowed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and then used this as a 
pretext to encamp in Saudi Arabia and gain control of the oil in this region. "What is it 
to the U. S. and the UK, who are far away, if Iraq has any deadly weapons? " These 
countries did not care about the lives of the people in the region. "The Iran-Iraq war 
continued for so many years because of the deadly weapons sold to Iraq by the U. S., the 
UK and other western countries. Does the U. S. really like the regime in Saudi Arabia? 
[... ] the real aim is to control the oil in the region, even at the expense of the Muslim 
blood" (Editorial, 12.2.1998). 
Islamists in Turkey, like many secular sections, were deeply suspicious and 
fearful of powerful, mainly western, states in the world. For example Ismet Özel was 
writing that "plans to re-Christianise Anatolia, to send the Turks back to where they 
come from [i. e. Central Asia] by world powers should be taken seriously" 67 (Milli 
Ga: ete 15.9.1997). The WP elite generally condemned the West for not getting rid off 
its `'historical disease" of playing with less powerful countries in the world, including 
Turkey. Erbakan informed WP supporters that "the U. S. A. allows the MED-TV [which 
had close links to the PKK] to make propaganda, the UK and Belgium allowed a 
67 It seemed a paradox that many secular and most Islamist elite argued on the one hand that Turkey was a 
very powerful and important country, on the other hand, they argued that it may be broken tip easily by 
external or internal enemies. Or its survival could be in jeopardy if it is not ruled very carefully. These 
arguments served to argue both in Islamist and secular elite discourses that the masses had to be kept 
away from both foreign and domestic policy formulations, because of their alleged naivety regarding 
these issues. 
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Kurdish Parliament to meet, 'Madame Mitterrand said that the Kurds are oppressed in 
Turkey, [... ] in Northern Iraq. the UN and the U. S. A. gave de facto support to the PKK" 
(Milli Gazete, 10.10.1996). 
Ertan Yülek, a prominent WP MP, accused the NATO and EU countries for 
seeing Turkey primarily as a guardian of their security in South-East Europe over the 
years and a convenient base for possible operations by them in the Caucasus, the 
Balkans and the Middle East. The same countries were very unwilling though when it 
came to sharing their economic prosperity with Turkey (Milli Gazete, 7.10.1997). 
The WP's anti-western nationalism struck a chord with many Turks who felt 
rejected in their country's effort to be recognised as a partner deserving respect in its 
alliance with Europe and the U. S. "The West is making a big mistake, Turkey has 
always wanted to be with the West, but the West has always pushed it away. " This 
"one-sided love story" had to be stopped. Turkey had to pursue a foreign policy 
according to its own interests even this sometimes went against the West. The West was 
using double standards according to Erbakan, for example, Washington did not accuse 
Italy of supporting terrorism for purchasing I billion dollar worth of Iranian oil each 
year, but attacked Turkey for concluding a similar energy deal with Iran (TDN31.12. 
1996). Islamist business circles shared this view, for example the MÜSIAD vice- 
president Bayramoglu stated: 
Turkey is an independent country, so, it can sign any contract with any country and 
nobody can prevent this [... ] the U. S. cannot impose an embargo on Turkey because 
it needs Turkey which has a geopolitical importance [... ] Because of the embargo on 
Iraq, although it has sided with the Western allies, Turkey has lost 30 billion dollars 
in the past 6 years" (Tiirkiye, 17.8.1996). 
It is hard to over-emphasise the influence of the West over the Turkish elite in 
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general, as one prominent secular observer puts it: 
apart from 300,000 people in Turkey who are world class, there is a group of around 
5 million. They are urban, well-educated professional and entrepreneurial category. 
They live, think, consume like upper or upper-middle class West Europeans. Their 
main reference is the West" (Ergil 1997: 11). 
The WP circles argued that, the westernisation of large sections of this elite 
meant their alienation from the cultural values of the masses who could not, despite all 
efforts, be westernised as much as them. 68 Alienation of the majority of the politicians 
and military-civilian bureaucrats was pre-eminent in their ideological stance vis-ä-vis 
Islam and in their lifestyles and standards. This prevented them from really 
understanding the plight of the general population. It was a well-established view 
among Islamists that the vast majority of these had minimal knowledge of Islam yet 
they belittled it. The WP cadres believed that by virtue of their Muslimness, they were 
the ones who could put an end to the state-nation alienation as a reflection of (secular) 
elite-mass gap. For example, at the beginning of his government, Erbakan stated, "our 
infinite thanks to God Almighty that we see these days [... ] the unification of the state 
and nation will be realised" (Erbakan 1997: 11). 
In the cultural arena, the WP circles, like other Islamists in Turkey, tried hard to 
promote Islamic symbols in rejection of the Western influence. These efforts sometimes 
reached novel forms such as organising a celebration for the anniversary of Mecca's 
conquest against celebration of the Gregorian New YearCi9. 
Turkey's efforts to become part of western institutions (e. g. the European 
fi8 In fact, since 1839 (start of the Ottoman reform period) what has been happening in Turkey could not 
be called true westernisation but a poor "imitation of the West" according to the WP discourse (Dag] 
1998: 43; Ceylan 1996: 27-8). 
`'" The religious sections strongly argued that since it is a custom of Christians, Muslims should not 
celebrate the New Year, which would make them resemble Christians and this was wrong; as the Prophet 
did not want the Muslims to follow the traditions of non-Muslims. 
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Community/Union) were strongly condemned by the \VP elite until the last few years of 
the party. In 1987 Erbakan argued that, Turkey, in effect, was abandoning other Muslim 
societies. For him this was tantamount to saying "\ve have been together with you for a 
thousand years but now we want to join in the EC and became one nation with Israelis 
[which would also join the EC in the future] (Ceylan 1996: 88-96). However, since 
there is no clear-cut Islamic principle which can be interpreted to be commanding 
fundamental opposition against non-Muslim (e. g. western) countries regardless of the 
conditions, some Islamist positional changes vis-a-vis the Nest in Turkey were 
possible. For example, as more and more people wanted EU membership, Islamists 
politicians, including the MVP leadership softened their attitude towards the EU in the 
mid- 1990s and shifted from an uncompromising negative position to one that demanded 
equality from the EU in bilateral relations. 
Nevertheless, many in the WP elite continued to share a widespread Islamist 
view in Turkey that those who have the "Crusader mentality" in the West were afraid of 
the possibility of "the Turkish State making peace with Islam" and hence become the 
leader of the Islamic world. That was why they were trying to prevent "the Islamic 
awakening in Turkey by using the part of the media and intelligentsia which serve 
them" (Aydin, Yeni 'afak 12.5.1997). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, from an Islamist point of view, the history of social 
evolution of the West in the modem era constitutes not progress but degeneration. WP 
circles shared this view and were against the influence of current western culture, which 
according to them, was a principal cause of moral decay defined in terms of increasing 
amoral individualism, hedonism, conspicuous consumption, disrespect to the elderly 
and traditional values, and sexual permissiveness. For the WP westernisation threatened 
"our culture" which meant the cultural values and code of behaviour defined 
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predominantly in Islamic terms. Western and other non-Islamic cultural values were to 
be discouraged. \VP members, like other Islamists in Turkey, were afraid of negative 
Western cultural influences as much as degeneration from within. For example, 
according to the : Milli Gazete, "entertainment crazes" spread by some television stations 
and newspapers, in combination with "the Western-imitating education system", were 
producing "horrors". The youth who were raised without beliefs and religious 
education, were in an "abyss" and were using drugs (12.10.1997). According to 
Turkish Islamists, the abhorrent signs of cultural penetration of the West included 
brands of western societies like McDonalds and Cola. It was frequently advised that 
Muslims had to choose to consume traditional products, for example donner kebab or 
kölie (meatball), instead of a Big Mac, or a glass of ayran or sherbet instead of cola. 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s m odlernity continued to `cone' to Turkey 
predominantly from the West. The relatively western ised/modern ised sections of the 
society, especially the majority of the elite, appropriated and adapted this ever-evolving 
modernity according to their worldviews; and then the larger society was led, or 
carefully forced, to adapt to that modernity. One could argue that Islamist sections 
under the leadership of their elite (including the WP elite) found `Islamic' ways of 
appropriating this modernity, which predominantly took the form of reacting to the 
secular interpretations of modernity. 
As Islamists, the WP members had to counter the widespread acceptance that 
progress is a unilinear process. This was used by many secular circles in Turkey 
implicitly or explicitly to argue that western civilisation or modernity constituted a more 
progressive form of human development compared to a society based on Islamic rules 
which came 1400 years ago. Thus, the WP elite followed the Islamist tradition of 
separating the spiritual (niunevi) and material (mud(fi) development of an individual or 
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society (see, for example Erbakan 1997; Yildiz 200: ). Naturally, what really matters is 
the spiritual dimension and it may get `better' or `deteriorate' in time. If a society is to 
be worth living in, it must uphold ma, iei'i (spiritual-cum-Islamic) values, which are 
more important than material progress. Against the common, modern understanding of 
unilinear progress of humankind from the pre-modern to modern, from barbarism to 
civilisation, the Turkish Islamists enlisted the late intellectual Cemil Meric: "There can 
be no time of civilisation, either you have civilisation or you do not (see, Yeni . 'afak 22. 
6.1997). Thus, like many other Islamist groups in the world (Esposito 1995), the WP 
circles argued that Islamic civilisation could be re-lived in modem times. "Some accuse 
the Muslims [i. e. Islamists] of wanting to bring back the judgements of 14 centuries 
ago70; this is a demagogy; they want to live Islam in this age (Eygi, Milli Gazete, 7.7. 
1997). 
For the Islamist masses, a philosophical discussion of modernity was too 
academic, whereas some Islamist intellectuals were attacking the very concept .71 For 
example, M. Özel wondered "what is modernity other than the ideal of realisation of the 
paradise here and now" (Yeni ýafak 9.5.1997). However, the WP as a party was not de- 
70 For example according to the Chief Prosecutor, the party "wants to take this country 1400-year back to 
a desert mentality" (see, Welfare Party 1997a: 52). 
71For example A. Arslan's comments worth quoting at length: "with modernity human being places 
himself/herself at the source of everything, good, bad, beauty, justice, truth, love, art. Modernity reshapes 
the religion and presents it as a new thing. Thus, the consumption of this new thing is not too frightening. 
But, since it came to us as westernisation we saw it as alien. We are face to face with a new concept, a 
native modernism, the synthesis of Islam and modernity is emerging. Muslims are producing this with 
their own hands with fashion shows and music like the ones done by the leftists 20 years ago. The real 
question is, whether there is going to be an Islamic modernity - we do not know yet - what will be left of 
Islam? What will happen if Islam becomes folkloric like Christianity? Modernity involves a secret 
polytheism [. irk] as far as the source of knowledge is concerned. Secularism is a fundamental defining 
characteristic of modernity. Secularisation means becoming worldly ( diinyevilelme); making everything 
popular and presenting it to consumption. From a certain angle, it means stripping sacredness off 
everything. Thus, modernism means not irreligion but unreligion [. .. 
] A religion whose monotheism is 
not corrupted is, of course, an alternative to modernism, provided that we do not read religion with a 
modern consciousness. An example to this is trying to validate verses of the Qur'an by scentific data [... ] 
Religions try to construct societal structures based on the community. At the centre of this is the 
'believer' not the 'individual. ' The individual emerged with Protestantism, especially in 1850s, belongs to 
modern world. Modernity's vision of the future is incompatible with Islam. It wants to create a paradise 
on Earth. Its ideology is to create a new life. Muslims resisted to this life style for two centuries by calling 
it ' Westernisation'. Today, they are opportunistically joining into this new life" (Selam, 24-30.7.1995). 
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legitimising the concept of modernity at all. 
For the WP elite modernisation was a legitimate aim provided that it was done 
along Islamic lines. Since many aspects of the current Western culture clashed with 
Islam, its widespread association with modernity in Turkey was something to be 
undermined. In order to do this, similar to the general attitude of Islamists in the region, 
the NVP elite made use of the selective facts about the West by comparing them to 
Islamic ideals. WP members believed and presented Islamic Golden Ages as models 
greater than the Western model. Nevertheless, the WP members did not have to reject 
the West in its totality. They could afford to be selective. For example, if modernity was 
associated with certain aspects of civility (medenilik) as perceived to be existing in the 
West (e. g. respecting the rights of others in traffic, bureaucratic efficiency, honesty in 
business life or hard work), there could not be any problems with accepting these as 
virtues actually commanded by Islam. Thus, Islamisation was the natural solution to the 
lack of these virtues in Turkey not westernisation. 
Westernisation in Turkey has been observable in different forms such as, 
increasing influence of ideologies and ideas originating in the West, resembling western 
people in appearance, or penetration of similar consumption patterns. According to 
Islamists, including many WP members, those who acted under the influence of the 
West, were doing so either out of disdain for their own culture or because they did not 
give much thought to what these meant. Islamist duty included overturning this trend of 
westernisation by realisation of a cultural program of resistance to the foreign, non- 
Islamic influences and turning back to authentic sources and practices (see, for example, 
Ceylan 1996: 15-55). 
4.5.2 A Non-Western Way to Modernity 
Since according to the WP elite, social and individual `progress' could 
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meaningfully be defined only in Islamic terms, the West could not be considered a 
model for progress. Like other Islamist circles, the 11'P preferred to see the modernity of 
the West mainly in terms of being technologically and industrially advanced. Even in 
these areas, the West was losing its edge, as was evident in its declining share in world 
production. "2% of world production is shifting from the West to the East each year; in 
1994,67% of world production was done by North America, Europe and Japan, but in 
2019,67% will be done by Asia and Japan" (Erbakan 1997: 93-94). Thus, the West was 
also losing its referential position in the definition of modernity. Therefore, 
westernisation could not be a preferable way of modernisation for Turkey. The NVP 
made use of every-day association of modernity with industrialisation and prosperity 
and tried to draw attention to the fact that non-western countries were also achieving 
this, in a decidedly non-western way. The Milli Gazete approvingly quoted Prof. 
Veziroglu: "The Japanese are working 60 hours per week and we want to work 37.5 
hours a week (10.10.1997). Some non-western examples of rapid economic growth 
were clear: "The Japanese experience, [the South] Korea, Taiwan are examples in front 
of us" (Welfare Party Adil Diizen 21...: 31). Therefore, for the WP elite, the need to 
refer to the West as the geographical-cum-symbolical location of modernity was 
decreasing. 
Although the Welfarist discourse favourably referred to certain characteristics of 
Western countries when it seemed appropriate, rapidly developing South-East Asian 
countries which had the `virtue' of being non-western were shown as good models of 
"how economic and technological development could be combined with `cultural 
authenticity'. " (Gülalp 2001: 444): "Look at Batam [in Muslim Indonesia] it was a 
village of 600 people. In 18 years its population has become 220 thousand; the highest 
technological production in the world is being done here, the per capita income rose 
from $50 to S33,500. Look at Singapore it has per capita income of $35 thousand" 
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(Erbakan 1997: 145). 
Therefore, it was a cause of resentment for the WP members that the West was 
still being presented and perceived as the model of modernisation in Turkey by majority 
of the elite and public. Islamist intellectuals joined in the de-legitimisation of the 
Western model; for example they argued that while "Islam kept the people in this 
country together for 1000 years, Western ideologies [e. g. laicite and nationalism] could 
not have kept it together for 50 years" (Özel 1997a: 127). 
The WP had to argue that modernity was divisible and thus the West and 
modernity were separable. Only, if this division was accepted by the public, a selective 
modernisation model (which excludes Islamically inappropriate parts of westernisation), 
could it be put forward as a more suitable and desirable alternative for Muslim Turkey. 
Only in this way, could the suggestion made by the westernised/secular elite in Turkey 
that the West is the only viable model of civilisation, which has to be accepted in its 
totality, be countered. 
According to the \VP elite, Turkish-Islamic culture valued human beings more 
than the "materialist" West. Therefore, the solution to many social problems in Turkey 
was to re-vitalise true Islamic culture, not repeat illegitimate ways of western 
modernisation. "[W]e are not like those. who flooded the world with blood and tears in 
order to exploit it. We are the grandsons/granddaughters of the Ottomans who spent 
their lives and property in the way of God" (Aydin, Yeni $afcik 12.5.1997). Thus, the 
rise of the West was primarily explained in terms of its exploitation of the non- 
westerners, rather than any inherent qualities of the West. This exploitation began with 
the geographical explorations and was still continuing. Such a route to modernity lacked 
legitimacy from an Islamist point of view. 
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The WP, like other Islamist groups, had a more coherent conceptualisation of 
modernity distinct from the mainstream, but a much less coherent, relatively secularised 
understanding of non-Islamists. Thus, the WP members like other Islamists criticised 
this dominant conceptualisation of modernity and the modernisation process in Turkey. 
As in the West, the family was under threat, respect for elderly diminished, and 
individualism had gone too far. Materialism had risen; a blatant lack of compassion for 
the poor in society was tearing through the social fabric. 
According to the WP's discourse Turkey's route to modernity should not follow 
Westernisation (or Europeanisation 2). Westernisation was one of the forms of'de- 
Islamisation in Turkey and had contributed much to the collapse of the social structure. 
The WP elite, like other Islamist opinion leaders, quite often highlighted the dangers of 
this de-Islamisation showing itself in rapid atomisation of society, increasing legitimacy 
of get-rich-quick attitude (köýe dönmecilik), and increasing corruption (especially since 
the start of liberalisation policies in the early 1980s). 
In their effort to re-define the dominant 'Kemalist' understanding of the 
relationship between the West and modernity (cakda. lik), the WP elite started to argue 
that they were the true Kemalists in Turkey, because they were after real independence 
unlike "these imitators [other secular politicians] of the West". In other words, for them, 
modernisation was meant to increase the self-reliance and independence of Turkey 
rather than make it resemble to western countries mainly in appearance. 73 
It could be seen that only when pressed by the undemocratic circumstances of 
72 It is interesting to note that Europeanisation has also, once again, become a legitimate and frequently 
used concept for many seculars, as Turkey's pre-occupation with becoming an EU member has increased 
in the 1990s. 
73 In this sense, rather controversially Erbakan argued, "ifAtatürk were alive he would be with the WP" 
(Milliyet 7.5 1997). 
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the 28 February Process. the \VP leaders started to think that moving closer to the West 
might actually help to make Turkey more democratic. The EU may well be the 
antidote of coups". a leading \VP official told to the TDN (cevik, TDN, 25.3.1997). 74 
One Milli Gazete columnists pointed out that when viewed from the EU 
perspective, the problems with Turkey were: 
human rights violations, lack of democracy, the Kurdish question, the Cyprus 
problem. The EU implies that the place of the NSC in the system is unacceptable for 
democracy. [... ] the highest number of applications to the ECHR originates [from 
Turkey]. Turkey tries to solve its problems with military means instead of political 
and economic ones" (Kanber,. Milli Ga: ete, 18.7.1997). 
Thus, the WP elite implied that. the secular elite governing the country had to 
solve these problems (and thus, enhance religious freedom), if they really wanted the 
EU membership and if they were sincere in their desire to reaching Western standards. 
It is indicative that, in 1996,55% of those surveyed wanted EU membership, 
16% did not (similar results in 1998), 40% of those who wanted shariah wanted the EU 
membership (TÜSES 1999: 79-83). In other words, almost half of those who wanted 
shariah did not see any conflict between being pro-shariah and being part of a highly 
secularised EU that contained many people with strong anti-Islamic feelings. Even as 
late as 2002,90% of the people in Turkey did not feel that they knew enough about the 
EU (surely, similar lack of knowledge would be found about the West). Yet, they had a 
general idea of `prosperity' in the West. 'The West' meant European and North 
American prosperous, democratic countries. 
74 This can be categorised as an `instrumental use' of the West, rather than a sincere appreciation that 
some important Western values arc in fact compatible with Islamic ones. Some Islamist writers observed 
that many Islamists began to think at that time that another strategy against the secular centre in Turkey 
could be implemented after becoming firmly anchored to the West (e. g. by becoming a member of the 
EU; which would provide the necessary democratic atmosphere to secure the religious freedoms in 
Turkey). 
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Nevertheless, EU membership did not seem realistic or desirable for many of the 
WP elite both for economic and cultural reasons: Unemployment was at all time high 
since WW II in the EU. They would not tolerate Turkish workers "invading" Europe. In 
the European Commission and the European Parliament, the quota given to each 
member state was according to population size. As Turkey would pass Germany in the 
near future in terms of population, this meant that if accepted, Muslim Turkey would be 
leader of the Christian Europe. This was unacceptable for the Europeans. The most 
important factor, however was religious, "they are Christian and Turkey is Muslim" 
(Koc, Milli Gazete, 22.9.1997). Therefore, Turkey had to be careful not to make 
concessions over its national interest for membership that may never materialise. 
An important part of the strategy of reaching an Islamically acceptable form of 
modernity was obviously protecting vital elements of tradition. As indicated earlier, the 
WP elite were by no means alone in perceiving that some traditional roles and values 
have been undermined by secular modernisation in Turkey. According to these often 
voiced conservative views, for example, `modernisation' of family often meant 
exclusion of the elder members of the extended family from traditional family support 
system. Modernisation of women meant their exploitation (e. g. sexually, in advertising 
or in work places). A modern parent (usually the father) might mean that he allows his 
daughter (usually the daughter) to have a boyfriend. In other words, the 
modernised/westernised sections of society use modernity as a label for their self- 
awareness of having distinct ('superior') lifestyles from the traditional masses, the term 
modernity for the religious gained some negative connotations as far as social 
relationships were concerned. 
The WP elite shared the view that Turkish society had to be on guard against the 
contamination of its traditional/Islamic way of life by Western lifestyles and values. 
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The inevitable interaction with so many different sections with different worldviews 
should not have led to concessions on the part of the Islamists to non-Islamic 
worldviews. As often put. the consensus of living together in Turkey had to be without 
degeneration O-o_laýmadan, u laýmak), without sacrificing Islamic identity. 
WP circles shared the general Islamist view that westernisation, as the dominant 
form of modernisation, has produced societies consisting of materialist individuals who 
think only about themselves and money. Islamisation remains the only way of re- 
creating the `warm society of the past; a society with high community spirit, high 
moral standards which secularism failed to provide. '' Such a society would be eager to 
solve the problems of each individual; the \VP organisations tried to show a glimpse of 
it by trying to solve the daily problems of their needy supporters as discussed in Chapter 
3. 
4.5.3 Welfarist Counter-Definition of Modernity 
Laciner argues that while the traditional WP supporters had always felt a certain 
inferiority about not being able to participate in the creation of science, technology, 
economic-military power and the growth of prosperity, newly emerging supporters of 
the party could claim to be as familiar with the dynamics producing the `modem way of 
life' as those who consider themselves modern in Turkey. However, there emerged 
considerable criticism and concerns from within modernity in the West itself. The 
Islamist elite (e. g. intellectuals) conveyed these criticisms to the wider Islamist sections. 
Therefore, Islamists could even contemplate presenting Islam as a superior (at least 
alternative) way of life (1996: 11). The WP leadership therefore increasingly felt more 
's Once again, it should be noted, whether Islamists remained loyal to these 'Islamic virtues' was a hotly 
debated issue. 
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and more comfortable in their effort to re-negotiate the content of modernity in Turkey 
and in criticising more secular conceptualisations of modernity. 
Thus, the WP contributed strongly to the ongoing Islamist efforts of promoting a 
counter-definition of modernity in Turkey. This definition had to include arguments 
against associating modernity with some `desirable' qualities by the secularists. For 
example against the association of modernity with emancipation from tradition (e. g. 
Islam) (see, Yavuz 1997), the common Islamist argument has been that although self- 
styled modern, westernised sections refuse to be slaves of God, they have become 
slaves of money, sex, status... Thus, for example the much praised West could be 
described as a "civilisation of nefsi enunare" (dominating self)76 (Özcan, Milli Gazete 
28.9.1997), i. e. the West contained many bad habits and passions, a Muslim must 
discard from his/her carnal soul. 
The 'Welfarist' counter-definition of modernity included, as mentioned earlier, 
alternative models of modernisation to the West. For example, Erbakan claimed 
Malaysia "has become a shop-window of the Muslim world. We take Malaysia, which 
lives Islam and which has caught a n: oderi: line, as a model" (my emphasis, Milli 
Gazete, 3.9.1996). Malaysia has managed to create a successful economy without 
pursuing radical secularist policies. The WP elite were showing these examples but also 
praising the native human resources of Turkey: "Anatolian lions [i. e. Islamist 
businessmen] are superior to Far Eastern Tigers, so our development will be faster than 
[... ] Malaysia, Indonesia" (Erbakan 1997: 45). 
The WP elite shared the general Islamist thought that counter symbols and tastes 
"' The lowest degree for the carnal soul to fall; according to Islamic . Sufism, at this stage the carnal soul is 
absolutely corrupted, "with no hope of transformation for the better" according to Balci (1992: 22), and 
thus, always orders the self to be rebellious against God. 
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had to be promoted against western ones. For example, Islamists felt the need of 
creating Islamic content for modern art forms. There had to be an Islamic cinema 
against the tide of Hollywood films, and the dominant secular cinema in Turkey, which 
had a corrosive effect on native Islamic culture. 
It could be observed that, within the Welfarist counter-modernisation project the 
WP was itself selective, as some issues were not treated as belonging to `the core' of 
Islam. Thus, the WP's position could be changed vis-ä-vis some issues. For example, as 
cevik highlights, when in government, Erbakan tried to change his rigid image. He has 
stopped attacking Zionism and Jews, abandoned his strong anti-Western rhetoric, 
redefined secularism in a way acceptable to the WP supporters, and praised Atatürk. "A 
few years ago", all of this would have been "unthinkable". "Yet 70% of the electorate" 
did "not trust WP", because its gestures were found "too artificial" (TDN 24.4.1997). 
Changing attitudes and modifying discourse was one thing, gaining trust of the secular 
sections of public or western governments was another. 
4.6 THE WELFARE PARTY AND GLOBALISATION 
The WP experience showed that Islamists are subject to global influences and 
they want to influence global developments to their benefits. They usually try to 
understand global processes through their elite who act as local interpreters. WP elite's 
discourse also included alternative strategies to counter negative effects of cultural, 
political and economic forces of globalisation. Greater political and economic co- 
operation among Muslim countries was presented as an important strategy that would 
help in this task (Ceylan 1996; Dagi 1998). 
In the case of economy, in one sense, the WP acted as an agent of globalisation, 
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it advocated full integration of Turkey, preferably at the hands of `Islamist capitalists', 
to world markets which is a sign of growing confidence of Islamist economic elite. At 
the same time, it promised by virtue of its loyalty to Islam. to safeguard the relatively 
uneducated, un-enterprising sections, especially those who were among its supporters, 
against negative effects of the global capitalist system with 'redistributive' mechanisms, 
which take their cue from Islamic rules and virtues. The central view was that Turkey 
and Muslims should not be on the losing side of globalisation. 
It could be seen that the WP elite had internalised economic rules governing 
world markets and was confident, even within these secular rules, that Turkey could be 
successful, provided that Turkish elite played the game well. For example, Erbakan 
complained that despite the fact that Turkey produced 80% of the world hazelnut 
output, its bourse was in Hamburg and that "the Westerners who buy it cheaply and sell 
it dearly make the real profit; the bourse must be in Turkey (Erbakan 1997: 54-55). 
Although the WP elite was very much in favour of making Turkey a beneficiary 
of economic globalisation by working-hard and increasing trade, especially with 
Muslim countries, they were against integration with the EU just for economic benefits. 
They thought Turkey should not beg to be admitted into the European Union and should 
give priority to the development of its relations with Asian and African countries as an 
alternative strategy (Sabah, 14.11.1996; Milli Gazete 7.10.1997). 
Turkish Islamists generally argued that Turkey must become powerful first and 
then its relationship with the West would be that of an equal. 77 Trying to become a 
member of the EU or intensifying the relationship with other western countries (e. g. the 
" For example leader of the GUP Yazicioblu stated, "We are not obliged to Europe. If we make sure that 
we are unified in Turkey and develop our relationship with other Turkish republics, Europe will have to 
be friends with us" (Yeni $afak, 7.3.1997). 
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U. S. ) might seem attractive as the shortest way of reaching a regionally more powerful 
Turkey, but, this was full of dangers as far as protecting Islamic identity was concerned. 
In other Nvords, there was an `Islamic' and proper way for both Turkey and the Muslim 
world to take part in globalisation. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Turkey has not been an exception to the impact of Western modernity in its 
wider region and its people have not been an exception to giving a rather fragmented 
response to its advent. 'S In the mid-1990s, Islamists generally held that a more Islamic 
path toward becoming (more) modern was possible in Turkey. The WP occupied a 
central place within that Islamist section. This chapter discussed a cluster of themes that 
were related to the WP's understanding of different aspects of modernity and the 
Turkish modernisation process. In fact, the general character of Turkish modernisation 
imposed a certain form on the WP (like it did to other societal sections) to a large extent 
as far as its reaction to modernity was concerned. It also forced it to give its reactions 
within this general framework (e. g. having to be a legal organisation). It has been seen 
that, as expected, the WP had a distinct understanding of modernity and its relationship 
with the West. As Islamists, the WP elite opposed to more secular and `ethnic' 
conceptualisations of the nation held by powerful centres (e. g. the TAF) and non- 
Islamist majority of society. In particular, secular Turkish nationalism was accused of 
being an extremely divisive and alien (Western) ideology in multi-ethnic Turkey and 
hence a great factor in the rise of secular Kurdish nationalism/PKK terror. The WP 
possessed its own version of religious-nationalism which meant much greater emphasis 
78 Of course, as indicated earlier, being within the group of relatively more democratic Muslim countries 
and having a more diversified and better economy in comparison to many other Muslim countries in the 
region should not be forgotten. These factors also strongly influenced the relatively moderate character of 
the Islamist movements in the country. 
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on Islam and lesser emphasis on Turkishness. This distinct definition of the nation, they 
argued, was more inclusive as it would make non-Turk Muslims in Turkey feel like first 
class members of the society and curb ethnic nationalism in the county. However, the 
WP's religious-nationalism excluded non-Sunnis (e. g. Alevis) and large secularised 
sections in society. The party's nationalism revolved around Turkey that "deserved" to 
be the leader of the uninah which, if successfully revitalised, would mean a new world 
order and an end to the humiliation of the Muslim world by powerful (e. g. Western) 
countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that like other Islamist movements in the 
region the WP. wvas also actually implicitly accepting the modem: institution of the 
nation-state as a valid framework in formulation and implementation of its policies, at 
least for a (long) period, on the way to unite the ummah. 
As for the economy, similar to other Islamists discourses in the Muslim world 
the WP did not neglect to condemn foreign forces (e. g. Zionism, `imperialists', and the 
Western countries) for the lack of economic development in Turkey. However, the WP, 
which sided with the lower income groups of 'the periphery, ' mainly argued that its 
Islamist cadres were capable of realising a rapid economic growth in Turkey with a 
strategy that included rapid technological and industrial development and 'radical' 
overhaul of'redistributive' mechanisms within the economy. The use of the lack of 
economic growth in de-legitimisation of the secular elite (and regime) should not be 
considered as sign of secularisation of the WP ideology, rather it was a reflection of the 
holistic understanding of Islam that also safeguards economic interest of the faithful. 
In rhetoric, very similar to other Islamists in the Middle East, the WP elite 
criticised both capitalism and socialism (which was another Western ideology). 
However, it can be argued that their economic views, which were put across as 
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alternative to the current Turkish economic order remained within the broad category of 
capitalism. This was mainly due to their preoccupation with economic growth (also seen 
in centre-right parties) rather than a particular economic mode and influence of recently 
emerged Islamist business circles with close ties to the party. It also related to their 
interpretation of Islamic economic precepts. `Islamist capitalists' were in direct 
competition with pro-laicite business circles including `the Big Capital' for state 
favouritism (or failing that, at least to stop state discrimination against them). 
As for science, from which much rivalry emerged against religion in the 
historical evolution of modernity, the WP circles, like many other Islamist groups in 
Turkey and in the region, argued that it is not incompatible with Islam if properly 
understood. In fact, scientific and technological progress was seen by the WP circles as 
vital means of reducing dependency of Turkey to other, in particular western countries. 
Technology and industrialisation were seen as `core' parts of modernity as opposed 
being `modern' in appearance only. 
The WP elite, like other Islamists, believed and argued that modernity is 
divisible between economic and industrial aspects, and the socio-political organisation 
of a society. While they were very much in favour of a modernisation process which 
would eventually make Turkey modern in the sense of material well-being (defined, for 
example, in terms of meeting the demands of individuals as consumers or meeting the 
defence needs of the country); they were against adapting foreign `un-Islamic' cultural 
and social practices which were mainly coming from the West. 
Similar to the views of other Islamists in the region, as seen in Chapter 2, the 
WP elite too resented the dominant role that has been being exercised by the Western 
powers in Turkey and the wider region because of their ascendant position in the world 
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economy and nation-state system. The \VP elite argued that if an Islamic (/nationalist) 
resistance to Western dominance could be formulated in political, economic. cultural 
and religious terms in a conscious (Islamist) way Western 'exploitation' and dominance 
through various mechanisms could be stopped or reduced. 
It can be concluded that since the WP elite, like many other Islamist elite in 
Turkey, were in fact `at home' with capitalism, science, technology and 
industrialisation, and had their own version of nationalism, overall they can be 
conceptualised within modernity. Since they were against secularisation (an important 
part of modernity) in principle, they were also against secular nationalism and secular 
interpretation of some aspects of science. They did not regard the West as a holistic 
modernisation model. The WP elite shared and promoted the general Islamist view that 
only Islam provides a blueprint for life (not the western model). In this regard, the \VT 
contributed strongly to the Islamist de-centralisation of the West in conceptualisation of 
modernity and thus to the pluralisation of conceptualisations of modernity in the world. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this study, my main research concern was to understand how the WP elite 
conceptualised modernity; how this conceptualisation was formulated, constructed and 
what was its relationship with the West is in their view. It was understood that they had 
a distinct (Islamist) understanding of modernity and could not just be labelled and 
dismissed as anti-modernists. It was also possible to reach some conclusions with regard 
to whether their understanding of modernity was compatible with Western modernity, 
where it differed and where it came closer to dominant understanding of modernity held 
by westerners or by secularists (laics) in Turkey. 
In Chapter 1,1 have tried to put modernity in a time and space context. I have 
analysed historical evolutions of some of its most important processes and concepts. 
Modernity's relationship with the West was also analysed to set the background for 
analyses of Islamists' and the WP elite's views on aspects of modernity and the West. I 
have argued that it is possible to see the advent of modernity very closely connected 
with the rise of Europe (later West) through a chain of momentous economic, social and 
political developments. As a result, the West gained a dominant position in the world 
and exercised different levels of control over the rest (So 1990). 
It was seen that some very important historical developments and concepts such 
as capitalism, the rise of science, industrialisation and technology, nationalism, 
secularisation and the modern state occupied central places in the evolution of 
modernity in the West. However, `from the start', there has not been much agreement 
on the definition of these concepts. For example, Marx emphasised exploitative 
character of capitalism while Weber defined it in terms of pursuit of profit. 
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Nevertheless, it was argued, the capitalist mode of economic activity (defined as 
acceptance of market conditions. private property etc) has been far less resisted by the 
rest of the world compared to some other Western institutions (e. g. liberal democracy). 
It was also largely `accepted' by the Muslim world and by Islamists, including the «V' 
circles. 
Nationalism as one of the most important and powerful modem ideologies was 
also analysed. It has generally been a secular force. However, its synthesis with religion 
has also been possible in various national contexts. Different theories, explaining the 
power and variety of nationalism were touched upon (nationalism as a response to 
industrialisation; a product of the modern, rational state or sub-elites who use it in their 
struggle for the control of the state; an ideological construct by intellectuals who seek to 
undermine anciens regimes and establish modem states and societies). 
Secularisation has been another most important core process of modernity. The 
secularisation thesis asserts that the social significance of religion declines during the 
modernisation process. While it was conceded that this was what happened especially in 
the West and indeed in the Middle East to a great extent, it has been argued that 
secularisation is neither inevitable nor irreversible. New `religions' (e. g. Communism, 
nationalism, Fascism, Humanism) emerged in modernity as formidable rivals of 
traditional religions (e. g. Christianity and Islam). Some processes of modernity 
(differentiation, societalisation, rationalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, 
bureaucratisation, and increasing mobility) disengage modern individuals from social 
forms of religion. Secularisation has been a process in which traditional religions have 
been pushed to the periphery of modern industrial societies. 
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However. in the last several decades secularisation as a form of social change 
and secularism as a political principle came tinder a strong attack from rising religious 
movements. Almost every basic assumption of secularisation thesis and secularism has 
been challenged (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2000, McClay 2001, Baird 2000). Islamism 
has been part of this global phenomenon. 
The rise of the modern state has also been an important factor in the evolution of 
modernity. The difficulty of generalising about the state was recognised. However, 
Mann's definition of the state was taken as an important starting point: "a differentiated 
set of institutions and personnel", "political relations radiate to and from a centre" and 
"binding rulemaking, backed up by some organised physical force" within a territory 
(Mann 1993: 55). Thus, since the state influences every aspect of life from politics to 
economy, from ideology to law enforcement (Carnoy 1984: 3), it was argued, the 
modern state is politicising by definition. Although the nation-state as a political form 
became globalised, a distinction should be made between democratic (where the state is 
under popular control) and undemocratic countries, (where the state is under the control 
of a sub-group, - hence the frequent Islamist complaint about control of the state 
by 
secular, westernised or nationalist elites). 
There are vast differences among nation-states (due to their being at different 
levels of economic, social and political modernisation). The public and politicians 
compare them on various indices of modernisation (GNP per capita, life expectancy, 
illiteracy, level of urbanisation, income distribution, and health expenditure). Such 
comparisons have been important for Islamist groups including the WP in pointing out 
that secular regimes in Muslim countries failed in the task of modernisation. 
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Globalisation, defined as "time and space compression" (Harvey 1990: 240). has 
become another central concept in the evolution of modernity. Globalisation is a key 
development in `three arenas' of life: The economy, the polity and culture (Waters 
1995). It was pointed out that, Islamism could be conceptualised, in one important 
aspect, as a resistance to continuing global influences of the West and an attempt to 
break the strong association between modernity and the West. 
In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that, the modernisation of Europe brought the 
end of the superiority of Islam (principally embodied in the Ottoman Empire). The 
European superiority in war, economics and technology forced Muslims first to 
critically examine and then try to appropriate European modernity. Islamism emerged in 
this modernising context as a form of mobilisation around the central theme, with regard 
to modernity, that an Islamic path of social change/modernisation is possible in Muslim 
countries. 
It was seen that Islamism is usually explained by the failure of the modernisation 
drive under the post-colonial secular, nationalist elite. This failure can be defined in 
various terms (economic, political and cultural). It was pointed out that the availability 
of Islam as an alternative to the existing regimes, unlike the other ideologies, has been 
an important factor. Much of the discontent of Muslim masses has been articulated in an 
Islamist language under the leadership of Islamist elites. Powerful Islamist groups 
emerged and they have been influential in re-Islamisation process. Islamists utilised 
both traditional and modem venues and means of mass communication in spreading 
their message. Today, in many Muslim countries Islamists constitute the main 
oppositional force vis-ä-vis the regimes (Fuller 2003), and control many mosques, 
professional associations, schools and universities. 
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It was seen that secularism was rejected by Islamists as an alien (imported from 
the West) and harmful ideology imposed by a rather `alienated' westernised/ 
secularised) elite. Secularisation, as a form of de-Islamisation, was seen as undermining 
Islam. the only working social cement. Another image of secularism was a challenge to 
Allah's authority (i. e. making permissible what is Islamically not permissible and vice 
versa). 
The liberal democracy was taken as the model for comparison (Diamond 1996) 
and it was found that the dominant Islamist understanding of democracy was a limited 
one. This conclusion was reached, by noting, for example, their attitude toward 
minorities and their tendency to see Islamic values as eternal, immutable and final 
(Vatikiotis 1987). However, the existence of a minority group of Islamic reformers 
(Wright 1996) was a positive sign of the possibility of a greater degree of flexibility in 
interpretations of Islam that would bestow much needed legitimacy on democracy in the 
Muslim world. It was also pointed out that despite the ideological and intellectual 
opposition to democracy, where allowed Islamist groups do partake in national and 
local elections, often with good results. 
It was seen that Islamists advocate greater involvement of Islamist women in 
social and economic life, however, in an Islamic way and in `feminine' professions 
(Göle 1991). They emphasise the role of the women as mothers and wives (Mayer 
1999). Lack of any high-ranking women in Islamist groups and Islamist use of 
biological and `psychological' differences to justify unfavourable treatment of women 
were noted as factors contributing to the continuation of the patriarchal social system 
(Roy 1994: 59). 
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I argued that the state's extensive power over society and its promotion of 
`official' versions of Islam provoke Islamists to struggle to gain control of it. Many 
Islamist leaders want to use the state power in the service of their understanding of 
Islam (Ahmed 1980; Ayubi 1991). It was pointed out that since constitutional theory is 
underdeveloped in Islam, there is no clear model of an Islamic state. However, the 
general Islamic principles that are binding on Muslims are also to be respected by an 
Islamic state (Mawdudi 1980; El-ANva 1980). 
The Muslim world has also been subject to the impact of secular nationalism. I 
argued that while Islamists have generally been against nationalism in principle (as a 
divisive force for the ummah); in practice, they usually espouse a version of religious 
nationalism. This can be attributed to the deep entrenchment of the nation-state (as 
another important modern institution) which has been a reality of life in the post- 
colonial period. It is accepted realistically as a valid framework of Islamic activism (at 
least temporarily). 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the Ottoman Empire was among the first Muslim states, 
which came under the impact of Western modernity. The modernisation/rise of Europe 
(and Russia) forced the Ottoman elite to enact modernising reforms. European ideas 
penetrated the elite mind. Later, in the Turkish Republic, we saw the emergence of the 
Kemalist cadres who were among the first nationalist, secularist elites that were seen in 
most Muslim countries. The Kemalists engaged in further modernisation of the state 
(which predominantly meant an authoritarian centralisation) and used the state power in 
their modernising drive (e. g. imposition of laicite and secular Turkish nationalism). 
Turkey's transition to a relatively democratic system after the World War II and 
growing confidence of Islamists enabled the emergence of Islamist parties of the 
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National Outlook Movement starting from the early 1970s. The \VP (1983) was the 
third party of this movement. Its rise in the 1980s and peak in 1994 local elections 
(19%) and in 1995 parliamentary elections (2 1%) was described. It was pointed out that 
the \VP greatly benefited from the general rise of Islamism in Turkey. The party's 
relationship with the broader Islamist section was also explored. 
The WP was a manifestation of the rise of a cross-class Islamic sentiment, very 
much provoked by a shared `sense of exclusion' among certain sizeable segments of 
society. \V"P members contributed to this rise, and tried to shape it. Around 1995, when 
at the height of its power, it could be seen that, only approximately half of those who 
could be classified as Islamists voted for the WP, despite it being effectively the only 
Islamist party in the country. This made up around half of its electoral support. In other 
words, the WP's case supports the view that Islamism in Turkey is multi-centred (e. g. 
the party, religious communities, unorganised individuals) and multidimensional (e. g. 
political, cultural, economic). The fact that great numbers of Islamists have supported 
other parties and the WP attracted votes from the non-Islamist sections of society shows 
that Islamism in Turkey is well integrated into especially conservative, centre-right 
sections and has no clear-cut political boundaries. 
It was seen that the state, represented by attitudes and positions of the secular 
elite (politicians, majority of high-ranking military-civilian bureaucrats, including the 
judiciary) and the laws of the republic restricted the WP in voicing its views. It was 
shown that the WP gave a coarse and unrefined message to the electorate. It, quite often, 
preferred to address, `the anger' of the religiously inclined toward the secular regime 
and elite. 
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The rise of Islamism in Turkey included a conscious effort to raise an Islamist 
counter-elite (Göle 1997). This Islamist elite guided the Islamic masses in their 
economic and political decisions. Islamist intellectuals, who were kept at bay by the 
WP, nevertheless interpreted Islam and the West (modern Western ideologies) for their 
followers. 
In the rise of Islamism, a number of factors were prominent such as the 
transition to `democracy' (at least in terms of introduction of a multi-party competitive 
electoral system albeit with some intervals of military rule), increasing mass-education 
and modernisation of communication technology. Thus, Islamists published 
newspapers, magazines, owned radio and television stations, and founded hundreds of 
associations, foundations, schools and courses. Islamisation in Turkey should be 
explained mainly by referring the heightened activism of the Islamist section, which 
expanded by recruiting new members and attracting new sympathisers. Islamist groups 
provided a sense of belonging, and emotional and material support for their members 
and sympathisers. 
The Turkish case supported the view that in many Muslim countries the 
relatively secular state elite helped the rise of Islamism by promoting a `moderate' 
version of Islam. After the 1980 coup, the state provided a `moderate amount' of Islam 
(through the school system and the Directorate of Religious Affairs), as a panacea to 
some social ills. With the financial assistance of the religious sections, many IHLs were 
opened (especially by centre-right governments), and in other state schools, some 
vocabulary of Sunni Islam was provided for the youth. 
It was pointed out that Islamists used a coherent vocabulary among themselves. 
The WP was very successful in using some `sloganic' aspects of this vocabulary to a 
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great effect. For example. working for the party was presented as jihad. However, there 
were unbridgeable disagreements between many other Islamist groups and the WP with 
regard to methods to be used in Islamisation efforts. 
The WP was annoyed by the charges of exploiting Islam for political gains. It 
explained its popularity by arguing that its cadres delivered services (e. g. in 
municipalities) that the electorate demanded. Yet, influential pro-laicite circles in 
Turkey considered the party illegitimate (even illegal) because, it was obvious in their 
view that a large section of its members wanted to establish a shariah-based state. 
The Islamist groups shared the view that the secular cadres, who had been raised 
according to official ideology, did not posses the necessary Islamic characteristics. 
Therefore, they provided facilities and encouraged their young members, sympathisers 
to receive university education so that they can gain the control of key bureaucratic 
positions. 
It was pointed out that the WP had a variety of types of followers operating for 
different motives. Disillusionment with other secular political parties, the `availability' 
of a rich Islamic vocabulary that was shared by perhaps a majority of the population (at 
least in its basics), and skilful use of this by Islamists were important factors in the rise 
of the WP. The repression of the revolutionary left by the state in the aftermath of the 
1980 coup was another factor. The most important factor was the dedicated activism of 
the core group of WP members (with strong women participation). They attached 
religious significance to political activity as stated by Erbakan, "other parties have 
members, we have believers" (1997: 91). The grass roots activism carried the party 
discourse to the electorate; it `explained' the causes of problems in Turkey and offered 
`solutions' often in an Islamic terminology. The discourse presented the party as a 
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'native' element; the party cadres were "sharing, " the same `authentic' cultural, Islamic 
values and the background with the target audience. Thus, the WP received higher than 
average support from the relatively more traditional and religious sections. These were 
Sunni Kurds and Turks in the landlocked areas, migrants from these areas to big cities, 
the relatively poor sections and those who received lower than average level of formal 
education (TÜSES 1999; cake 1994; Akdoz-an 2000). It became clear for the WP that it 
had to develop its ties with non-Islamist voters in order to be a partner in government. 
The WP was an important actor in shaping Islamism in Turkey. It acted both 
like a religious community and like a political party (Yildirim 1999b). WP elite 
attempted unsuccessfully at monopolising leadership of Islamism in the country. This 
move disturbed other more intimate and often more sophisticated Islamist groups 
(Bayramoglu 2001, Akdogan 2000; Yavuz 1997). This was a clear effect of the 
diversity of Islamism in Turkey. 
The WP elite shared the predominant Islamist view in the world that Islam is 
timeless and universal, and 'knowable' in its ideal form (Bucenun 1990), thus, does not 
need `reform'. On the contrary, Muslims need to change their "decayed, corrupted, 
eroded" understanding of Islam according to `ideal' Islam (Bulac 1995b). The efforts, 
by the Turkish state or foreign powers, to promote a modernised, convenient version of 
Islam had to be resisted (Kaplan 1993). 
One of the most important topics for Chapter 3 was the WP's views vis-ä-vis 
secularisation. For Islamists in Turkey, secularisation was perhaps the most disturbing 
development. The WP discourse did not recognise it as a natural process accompanying 
modernisation but argued that it was a reflection of the worldviews of the republican 
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elite whose stance undermined Islam (and with it the family and community ties) and 
led to a general moral degeneration. 
The WP was part of the Islamist effort to replace 'the official understanding' of 
Islam with their understanding of it. The WP elite shared the view that the laicite was 
aggressively applied in Turkey and it was abused to ensure the dominance and 
privileges of a minority. They tried to re-negotiate the content of the principle of laicite 
and make it, at least, much more respectful to religious freedoms. 
The whole education system has been a `battle ground' between Islamism and 
secularism in Turkey. In the mid-1990s, secular sections became increasingly alarmed 
by the systematic Islamist efforts to enhance the `Islamised' spaces within the education 
system. The struggle focused upon the IHLs and the headscarf issue. The headscarf ban 
was considered a zulm (wrongdoing) and violation of a democratic right. 
Another important area worth exploring was the WP's stance vis-ä-vis 
democracy. It was pointed out that the WP elite and supporters, like most other Islamists 
in the world, did not exist in a fully democratic culture. They strongly criticised Turkish 
`democracy' for its shortcomings and accused those who shared the `official ideology' 
and controlled some important state organs (e. g. the TAF) of defending an undemocratic 
nationalism and Jacobin secularism. Nevertheless, very importantly, the WP elite, as a 
legal part of the political system, generally tried to re-negotiate the content of 
democracy and did not de-legitimise it from an Islamic point of view as often done by 
Islamist writers (Gülalp 2002: 93-95). This can be attributed primarily to the fact that 
existing `democracy' enabled them to influence (ultimately change) the political system 
peacefully. The WP's understanding of democracy was reductionist (the rule of the 
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majority) and impaired by its negative attitude toward minorities (e. g. Greeks and 
Jews). 
In Chapter 4, we saw that the WP discourse also portrayed (secular) nationalism 
as an alien and divisive ideology for the Muslims. Islam was the most important and 
appropriate base of people's identity in Turkey. Other sources of identity (e. g. 
`Turkishness'), that were promoted by secular elite. were undermining the national 
unity and weakening Turkey. Like many other Islamists, the WP elite advocated re- 
vitalisation of Muslim community (ummah). Turkey could play a vital role in this task. 
The desire to end the humiliating geo-political situation of Muslims, common to all 
Islamist groups, was also obvious in the WP discourse. 
The WP argued that secular Turkish nationalism was working against national 
unity/democratisation by refusing to recognise rights of sizeable non-Turks (e. g. the 
Kurds). Islam was presented a more inclusive supra-identity. The WP emphasised 
successfully the universality of Islam when appealing to Kurds who supported the party 
in great numbers (TÜSES 1999). Nevertheless, it was doubtful that Islam, as understood 
by the WP elite, was overall a more inclusive `ideology', as it was clearly perceived as 
discriminatory against non-Sunnis (e. g. Alevis) and large secular sections of society. 
The WP also espoused a version of religious-nationalism and its `ummahism' 
revolved around Turkey. The initial aim of the party could be characterised as to make 
Turkey at least a regional power and a leader in the Muslim world. The WP circles 
referred to two Golden Ages (the first decades of Islam and luminous periods of the 
Ottoman Empire, which were perceived and presented as well-documented) in contrast 
to secular Turkish nationalism. The necessary models for re-organisation of the Turkish 
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Republic were to be found within these ages; there was no need to look further (e. g. the 
West). 
The WP discourse included a populist appeal: Turkey contained "the most 
diligent people of the world, " it was "ornamented with God's blessings" which 
included, the geographical location ('`at the centre of the world"), forests, mines, 
suitable lands for agriculture and husbandry, unmatched places for tourism (Erbakan 
1997: 7). Therefore, the lack of success in "the race of civilisation" was explained by 
lack of proper Islamic creed. partly due to attitudes of the secular elite and foreign 
interference. 
It was shown that the rise of Islamism in Turkey had a strong economic 
dimension. For example, the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy was 
one of the most important factors. The WP's approach to the economy was nationalist 
and competitive. The "system of slavery" in Turkey was exploiting Turkish society, for 
the benefit of foreign powers and a "happy" minority in Turkey. The WP highlighted 
the economic plight of the lower income groups in society (the unemployed, small 
farmers, lowly paid sections of workers and civil servants and "pensioners, widows and 
orphans). It was a frequent observation that, the party spent more time and energy 
discussing issues of equality, social security, welfare and social justice than other parties 
(Ayata 1996). 
The WP shared the Islamist view that Islamic financial rules are perfectly 
adequate for a modern economy. They, too, criticised both capitalism and socialism. 
However, it was shown that the WP gradually became closer to the capitalist version of 
modernisation. In the mid- I990s, the WP was clearly in favour of a market economy, 
: 0S 
private property and a share of the capital from production; all among the core aspects 
of capitalism in the West ($en 1995). 
The WP circles shared the general disapproval of a secular interpretation and 
presentation of scientific knowledge. They defensively pointed out that, in fact Islam 
encouraged scientific activity. The WP elite saw scientific and technological progress as 
vital means of reducing dependency of Turkey on others, in particular western 
countries. The WP elite also participated in the Islamist efforts to `rationalise' Islamic 
thought (i. e. clear it from superstitious folk beliefs). 
The WP elite had understood modernity in comparative and civilisational terms. 
They believed that the most advanced form of civilisation could be Islamic ((; inar 
1996). In this respect, they differed from secular elite by refusing to take the West as the 
model for modernity and the `official' route to modernity via westernisation. The West 
was heavily criticised in the Welfarist discourse, similar to the general Islamist 
discourse in Turkey and indeed in the Muslim world. The West was morally decaying, it 
was hypocritical, and abusing its power against Muslims (e. g. supporting Israel). 
The WP elite argued that the need to refer to the West as the geographical-cum- 
symbolical location of modernity was decreasing because the West was losing its 
importance in technological and industrial terms as was evident in its declining share in 
world production. Thus, the WP made use of the every-day association of modernity 
with industrialisation and prosperity and pointed out that non-western countries were 
also achieving this, in a `non-western' way. Modernisation (economic and technological 
development) could be done while remaining loyal to `authentic' culture (e. g. Islam) 
(Gülalp 2001). 
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It was shown that the WP contributed strongly to the ongoing Islamist efforts of 
promoting, a counter-definition of modernity in Turkey. Thanks to the limited success of 
the overall modernisation project in the country (e. g. mass education), newly emerging 
Islamists (including supporters of the WP) could claim to be as familiar with the 
dynamics producing `modernity' as those who consider themselves secular and modern. 
The WP elite employed modern concepts (like laicite, nationalism, and 
industrialisation), besides Islamic concepts, in developing their counter-discourse to the 
secular one. This shows the difficulty of escaping totally from the conceptual world of 
modernity. However, the \VP elite did not seem to be much troubled with this; rather 
they gave priority to re-negotiation of the content of these concepts. 
Analysis of the WP experience also showed that Islamists are subject to global 
influences and they want to influence global developments to their benefit. The WP 
discourse included strategies (e. g. greater intra-ummah co-operation) to counter 
negative effects of the cultural, political and economic forces of globalisation (Ceylan 
1996; Dagi 1998). It was seen that the party elite and `Islamist capitalists' wanted 
integration into world markets. At the same time, the party promised by virtue of its 
loyalty to Islam, to safeguard the relatively uneducated, un-enterprising sections against 
negative effects of the global capitalist system with Islamic 'redistributive' mechanisms. 
Islamist ideology is much more influenced by modernity than vice versa due to 
asymmetrical relationship between developed and developing countries. Modernity 
imposes certain forms on different versions of Islamism. These forms are influenced by 
both self-perceptions of the `moderns' (both in the West and in the Muslim countries) 
and conceptualisations of modernity on the part of Islamists. Due to differences in 
particular histories (e. g. elites' attitudes toward Islam) these forms have been different 
from each other, but all Islamists have been forced to react to certain aspects of 
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modernity (e. g. secularisation, rise of science, technology and industrialisation, 
nationalism and capitalism). Islamists tend to favour modernisation of Muslim 
countries, if understood, for example, as progress in science, technology and 
industrialisation while opposing secularisation and secular nationalism. Therefore, it 
should be concluded that not all aspects of modernity, as generally understood in the 
West, cause equal amounts of fierce Islamist opposition. In fact, the rise of Islamism 
owes much to, however qualified, `successes' of modernising drives in Muslim 
countries (e. g. increasing mass education and means of mass communication) enabling 
dissemination of Islamist values and discourses. Islamists gained self-confidence vis-ä- 
vis westernised/modernised elite and other sections of society. Islamist movements 
emerged in a modernising context. They share some common attitudes (e. g. opposition 
to secularisation and anti-Westernism) but these have not been enough to create an 
orchestrated Islamist movement in the Muslim world. 
Islamism contributes to decentralisation of the West in the world. This goes 
hand in hand with renewed affirmation of local values (e. g. Islam) in each specific 
Muslim country. Islamism can also be seen as trying to replace `universalism' of the 
West with `universalism' of Islam at least in the Muslim world. Thus, one of the most 
important aspects of Islamism is its refusal to accept the West as a model (and hence the 
dispute over the definition of modernity). One of the most important sources of the 
debates over the definitions of modernity is the debate about the `correct' interpretation 
of Islam. In other words, emergence of nationalist and secularist elites in Muslim 
countries mainly due to impact of the West led to pluralisation of Islamic thought 
(assuming that previously there was a greater unity). Thus, westernisation and 
"invasion" of western-inspired ideologies are presented in the Islamist discourses as 
alienation and a source of de-Islamisation. The relatively secular discourses present 
Islamism as anti-modern and a throwback to the "Dark Ages". Given the lack of any 
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common political ground or vocabulary in most Muslim countries (i. e. lack of adequate 
democracy. the debates quite often lead to violent clashes. 
A key feature of both modernity and Islamism is lack of any central authority to 
define them. Nevertheless, it is possible to see some of the processes and concepts that 
were discussed in this study belong to the `core' of modernity more than others do. For 
example, industrialisation, technological advances (together contributing greatly to 
sustained economic growth and military superiority) and secularisation tend to be more 
common and prominent in accounts of modernisation. Nationalism and the nation-state 
have also been prominent in different modernisation stories. Capitalism though has been 
prominent in the evolution of modernity in the West, is not regarded as a vital part of 
modernity in some other parts of the world. Liberal democracy is still not fully accepted 
by many societies and social groups (e. g. Islamists) as belonging to the core of 
modernity. Islamism, I argued, gives priority to industrialisation and technology in its 
definition of modernity while rejecting secularism. Islamism also accepted nationalism, 
the nation-state and capitalism to a great extent. Thus, central to the selective (through 
the `filters' of Islam) modernisation strategy of Islamists is the belief that modernity is 
divisible between economic and industrial aspects on the one hand and the socio- 
political organisation of a society on the other. Likewise, the WP elite also favoured a 
selective modernisation. Paradoxically their argument that modernity was divisible was 
implicitly accepted by the seculars themselves by attacking the WP mainly because of 
its understanding of laicite rather than for example its approach to industrialisation or 
technology. 
The strength and importance of Islamist movements like other social movements 
depend on the political, economic and social conditions. When these conditions change, 
the movements too change or even disappear. However, it is too simplistic to argue, as 
312 
sonic experts in Turkey do, that Islamism is pathological in the sense that it is a side 
effect of failing to realise a desired level and pace of modernisation in economic and 
political terms. Islamism can easily serve as an ideology in more modern and affluent 
circumstances, perhaps by becoming rhetorically less radical. 
Overall, the general Islamist deep anxiety to arrest the secularisation in the 
Muslim world rejects the views of scholars who tend to see Islam (or Muslim societies) 
particularly resistant to secularisation (e. g. Gellner 1994b). In Turkey too, Islamists 
complained about `excessive' secularisation. They were right in the sense that, the 
majority of the society gave their implicit/explicit support to the secular politicians and 
the TAF-led bureaucracy, rather than supporting Islamist politicians and parties in secret 
ballots. 
Islamists share a widespread view in the world that the West has a rather 
arrogant attitude towards non-westerners and more importantly exploits them through 
various international politico-economic structures. It will be more and more dangerous 
for the world if greater number of Muslims came to agree with the opinion also voiced 
by Erbakan that the West only understands the language of power. In this sense, Islamist 
views contain strong warning messages to the more aggressive and exploitative 
governments (e. g. the U. S. A. ) within the western `camp'. 
Islamism has a cyclical view of progress and rejects a linear understanding of it. 
The WP also rejected the view that western civilisation constituted the most progressive 
form of human development (in comparison to an ideal Islamic society). The WP elite 
did this by following the Islamist tradition in Turkey of separating the spiritual (manevi) 
and material (maddi) aspects of progress (Erbakan 1997; Yildiz 2003). 
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The \VP elite, like other Islamists in Turkey, wanted to change the direction 
(content) of social change in accordance with their interpretation of Islam and history. 
They wanted to stop cultural erosion, defined as de-Islamisation and loss of other 
'national' virtues. They wanted to correct the economic situation (poverty, income 
inequalities, economic exploitation and lack of adequate economic growth due to lack 
of industrialisation and high technology). They wanted to increase the political 
influence of Islamists without any serious effort to enhance democracy for all. This was 
because, as part of Islamist movement, the WP circles were mobilised in the name of 
Islam that was perceived to be under "attack" by secularism. The source of problems in 
Turkey was "diagnosed" as de-Islamisation and the cure was re-Islamisation. Lack of 
democracy, until the `28 February Process' hit hard, was not high on the Islamist list of 
priorities, as was also the case for non-Islamist sections. 
Like other Islamists in the region, the WP elite selectively compared facts about 
the West with ideals of Islam. The Islamic Golden Age was a greater model than the 
West. If modernity was achieved with certain qualities as seen in the West (e. g. 
bureaucratic efficiency, honesty in business life or hard work), these were virtues 
actually commanded by Islam. Thus, "return to Islam" (Islamisation) was the natural 
solution to the lack of these virtues, not westernisation. 
The criticism of the West, however, should not have been used as a means of 
escaping from facing the realities in Muslim countries. Most of the problems in Turkey 
(lack of a democratic, compassionate culture, corruption, nepotism, bureaucratic 
incompetence and inertia) were fault of the whole society, including the Islamist 
314 
section. Perhaps, it was a bit naive to expect a radical critique of the society from the 
WP, which after all, as a political party, aimed to win the most votes. However, the 
National Outlook movement presented itself as a'religio-moral'g roup, and the WP as 
more than a party. 
Characterisation of Islamism in Turkey as the mobilisation of urban poor by a 
section of middle class or reaction of Anatolian small bourgeoisie, who felt threatened 
by Turkey's integration into the world markets (Gülalp 2002), are inadequate. It was 
shown that the WP attracted more than average votes in most rural parts of Anatolia as 
well (Akdogan 2000), not just from Istanbul or Ankara which received heavy migration. 
Similar to other Muslim societies (Ayubi 1991: 221), in Turkey because of 
special historical conditions, culture and class have also become intertwined in a certain 
way; the upper classes tend to be more westernised and the lower classes relatively 
more `native' in their cultural outlook. However, Islamism in Turkey was more than just 
a struggle in the name of authentic, native (/Islamic) values against the universal 
(Western) values. More importantly, Islamists in fact were also engaged in a struggle to 
persuade the wider society that their interpretation of Islam was the authentic (true) 
interpretation. The heterogeneous ideological/cultural make up of Turkey meant that 
there could not be any agreement over the definition of Islam and no agreement over the 
`core' identity of Turkey. 
The WP served as a vehicle for voicing concerns of peripheral societal sections 
(e. g. the lower income groups, the Kurds, the religious) and thus could be regarded as 
serving democratisation in that respect (Bayramoglu 2001; Yavuz 2000; Akdogan 2000, 
1 According to an academic survey, while 98% of the population believes in God and 95% believes in 
`sin', only 10% agrees with the statement that `most people can be trusted' (see, Özkök, Hürri), et, 27.1. 
2001). 
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Ozean 2002). However, like many other Islamists in Turkey, the NVP elite did not try to 
earn the trust of the large pro-laicite sections by respecting their lifestyle choices. 
Instead, they gave the impression that ultimately they aimed to change the whole 
society. They themselves were not immune to the lure of social engineering which they 
condemned vehemently (Yildinm 1999b; Bora 1996). 
`Politicisation of Islam' in Turkey was partly explained by the state's (or certain 
circles within it) refusal to meet even most simple and natural demands of ordinary 
Muslims (Türköne 1994: 70; Yavuz 1997). This also was related to the fundamental 
problem of Turkey's inability to consolidate its democracy (i. e. making democracy "the 
only game in town" ((5zbudun 1996) which would guarantee rights of different social 
sections. Nevertheless, Turkey's relatively more democratic system in fact has been one 
of its most important distinguishing features from other Muslim countries in its region 
and indeed in the world. This fact, understandably very much downplayed by Islamists, 
is a key to understand the relatively moderate nature of the `struggle' between Islamists 
and secularists in Turkey since the 1970s. 
In Turkey, Islamist groups tried to make the most of `opportunity spaces' 
(Yavuz 2004) that became available in the `democratic' atmosphere, in various spheres 
of life such as politics, economy, education and mass communication. This heightened 
activism of Islamists can be explained by the fact that, they were amongst the most 
excluded by the centre, in both political and economic terms. 
It was seen that for Turkish Islamists `the West' predominantly meant the USA 
and powerful European countries. When viewed from an Islamist perspective, the West 
may seem more unified than it may seem from within itself. Analyses of Islamism in 
this study support the view that it is still possible talk about `the West' (Hall 1992b; 
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Olean 2002; Belge 2002). Nevertheless, this perception of a *unified' West may change 
with regard to major international events (e. g. Western policies with regard to Iraq after 
September It, 2001). 
Partly due to considerable internal criticism and concerns over modernity in the 
West itself, the Islamist elite in Turkey (e. g. intellectuals) was even presenting Islam 
(i. e. as interpreted by them) as a superior (at least alternative) way of life (Laciner 
1996). However, the WP's Islamism. as shown shared important basics of Western 
modernity and lacked the necessary sophistication and theoretical development, where it 
differed, in order to be a serious alternative. In fact, the WP was on the way of repeating 
some modern mistakes, for example. because of its sense of urgency for rapid 
industrialisation in order to reduce Turkeys dependency and protect the Islamic way of 
life in a hostile international atmosphere. It can be argued that, the WP's position was 
not considered modern enough by westerners as was evident in the lack of any 
significant support from the West when the WP's closure case was continuing at the 
Constitutional Court. 
The WP's discourse like its target audience was complex and multidimensional. 
The party discourse, as analysed in this study, was constructed with the contribution of a 
diverse elite with greater input of the core (gekirdek) group of Erbakan and his very 
close circle. The WP elite made use of popular, religious and cultural vocabulary that 
the target audience was very familiar with. The party elite and the supporters were 
connected to the party discourse with different degrees of commitment and awareness 
and not all aspects of the discourse were considered equally important by the supporters. 
While for the `core' Islamist group religio-moral concerns and economic difficulties and 
sense of exclusion were important, the non-Islamist, protest vote was attracted because 
of party's anti-systemic (i. e. anti-centre) position. 
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Irtica (Islamic reactionism) and bülüciilfik (separatism, the PKK) have been 
identified as two greatest internal dangers by the TAF (and many other secular. 
nationalist groups). However. Islamists in Turkey were only loosely in agreement over 
some of the more vital issues in their view (e. g. the right to educate the next generation 
about `Islam' and right to observe some Islamic `duties' e. g. the headscarf) in normal 
times. They were subject to further fragmentation and internal clash under domestic or 
foreign pressure. ` 
It should be concluded that the rise and evolution of the recent version of 
Islamism in Turkey is a modern phenomenon. It is not the resurgence of an 
understanding of Islam that went into hibernation and resurrected in less repressive 
conditions. Rather, it is a new reinterpretation of Islam in the condition of modernity as 
it unfolds in Turkey and in the West. The WP elite's understanding of modernity was 
evolving with contributions from many factors such as their interpretation of Islam. 
their view of the West and modernity in general and the nature of their interaction with 
the dominant secular nationalist ideology in Turkey. In fact, the gradual moderation and 
reduction in Islamist demands was a result of the strength and determination of secular 
sections. 
The supporters of the WP demanded modernisation, understood as socio- 
economic development in a conservative social atmosphere. According to the WP elite, 
Turkey as a latecomer did have the luxury of eschewing the negative consequences of 
Western modernity and Islamic values were actually a great help rather than being 
obstacles in front of progress. 
2 For example, as seen in `the 28 February Process', Fethullah Gülcn argued that the headscarf was part of 
"details" in Islam which meant it could be discarded if necessary and the elections should be held v. hile 
the WP's closure case was continuing to give maximum damage to the WP. 
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The Islamic set of criteria. with which the WP members was evaluating Western 
modernity and other foreign ideas or processes, was constantly evolving. Therefore. the 
Islamist «'P members were willing to appropriate certain aspects of modernity that were 
deemed as good or at least harmless according to Islam. From internal criticisms among 
the Islamists, it was clear that, many Islamists were also taking part in different 
processes of 'modernisation' (e. g. becoming ruthless capitalists or plunging into 
consumerism) in Turkey even when it was contrary to Islamic precepts according to 
these critics. 
More, detailed studies should be done about debates within the Islamist section 
with regard to different aspects of modernity and Turkey's relationship with the West 
(e. g. the U. S. A. and EU). Comparisons among Islamic groups (e. g. the Gillen 
Community, Iskender Pasha Community, Siileymancis) and political parties (e. g. the 
JDP, the NAP and the GUP) will further our understanding in these areas. 
Studying the WP also, once again, showed that both Islamists and the 
Westerners must try much harder to know and understand each other's concerns. The 
West has greater responsibility as the dominant side. Without trying to understand the 
powerful, sophisticated, multi-layered, rich vocabulary of Islamic messages, there is 
little chance for the West for influencing future path of Islamism. There is a need to 
create an international atmosphere where Islamists are given real incentives to 
emphasise tolerant and peaceful aspects of Islamic tradition rather than ones glorifying 
various forms of sacrifices in clashes (e. g. with non-Muslims or secular Muslims). 
3 l`) 
The Justice and Development Party: The New Address for Islamists? 
The \VP was banned in February 1998 because the TAF and other defenders of a 
secular way of life (pro-secular politicians and bureaucrats and the big capital) saw the 
party as part of `irtica' (Islamic reaction). The Virtue Party (VP), the successor to the 
\VP, was also banned in June 2001 on the grounds of violating the secular principles. Its 
cadres split into two and those who remained loyal to Erbakan formed the Felicity 
Party. Those who followed Tayyip Erdogan formed the Justice and Development Party 
(JDP) on 14 August 2001. In the parliamentary elections held on 3 November 2002, in a 
highly-charged political atmosphere due to the most serious economic crash in the 
history of the republic (Cizre and cinar 2003: 318), the Felicity Party gained only 2.5%. 
The parties in the previous government, the DLP of Ecevit (1.2° ö), the NAP of Bahceli 
(8.3%) and the MLP of Yilmaz (5.1%) were severely punished. The TPP of tiller 
(9.5%) also won no seats in parliament. The JDP with 34.2% of the votes won 363 seats 
and the RPP of Baykal (19.4%) 178 seats in the parliament. On 28 March 2004, in the 
elections for the local governments, the JDP increased its share of votes to 42% while 
the RPP gained 18.4%. 
The leadership of the JDP distanced the party from the National Outlook 
heritage and presented the party as based on a new, familiar synthesis (socially 
conservative, economically liberal) (cf. Öniý and Keyman 2003: 99). The most 
prominent members of the party leadership are from the \VP cadres (Erdokan, Gül and 
Arinc) but there are people from the MLP, the TPP and NAP, so in this sense the JDP is 
reminiscent of the MLP of Özal. Although it is clearly the new address of the Islamist 
voters, the JDP flatly refused to be defined as Islamist and defined itself as 
Conservative-Democrat. Tayyip Erdogan (2004) defines his party as a mass party based 
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on Conservatism, 3 occupying a central place in the centre-right (p8)4. According to 
him, the JDP seeks: 
A modernity that does not exclude the tradition 
A universality that accepts locality [native values] 
A rationality that does not reject the meaning 
A change which is not radical. (p. 12). 
Global competition, trade and the web of international relations forces closed 
societies to open themselves to the world (p. 12). The party believes that "radical 
rhetoric does not bring any good to Turkish politics". It is a social demand that 
consensus and toleration must replace polarisation and conflict (p. 14). Turkey must 
have "a pluralist, tolerant democracy with many voices" instead of "a sni generic 
democracy" (p. 14). 
It can be seen that the JDP constitutes a new strategy on the part of Islamist 
elites who secured the political support of the Islamist masses, for the time being. along 
with non-Islamist voters who come predominantly from the centre-right. The JDP 
constitutes in one sense a retreat of Islamists, this time in a leading role, into the fold of 
`conservatism' of the centre-right which is more amorphous, more acceptable by the 
regime and hence less open to the attack of the forces of secularism. The new strategy 
sees democratisation and sound economic growth as solutions to the problems of 
Turkey (such as unemployment, the Kurdish question5, lack of some religious freedoms 
3 The JDP expresses its conservatism with regard to the subject of the family and women, need for 
protecting the traditional values (usually means Islamic values), see (Insel 2003). 
° With the further decline of the left, it could be argued that the traditional left-right divide in Turkish 
politics now stand as 25% vs. 75%. Due to problems within the RPP of Baykal, it is frequently pointed 
out that there is a vacuum of opposition (that is being filled by certain sections of bureaucracy e. g. the 
TAF, the Judiciary and the Council of Higher Education), and that the political alternative to the JDP 
could be another party on the right. 
S Ali Bulac criticises the JDP for giving a basically secular message to the Kurds in Turkey which "cannot 
be as effective as" the WP's message that emphasised Islamic brotherhood/sisterhood (Zanman, 6.10. 
2004). 
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according to Islamists). In this strategy, the role of the EU. or of the desire to be a 
6 member of it, is very much valued. 
Turkey's desperate search for more democracy, a 'right' balance between 
tradition and modernity, between `forces of Islam' and forces of secularisation 
continues. The fact that many Islamists, Kurdish leaders and liberal intellectuals in 
Turkey see EU membership as the only or the most important solution to these 
problems is an indication of very low level of belief in Turkey's ability to solve its 
problems peacefully through internal dynamics. 
a Early signs of this attitude were already seen immediately after 28 February 1997 NSC meeting, as 
discussed in Chapter 4: "The EU may well be the antidote of coups" (cevik, TDN. 25.3.1997). 
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